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Abstract 
The research aims to evaluate the adequacy of the insolvency system in Libya to 
support the national desires and objectives identified in the country to enhance the 
national economy and to maintain social stability. The thesis considers the need for 
reform in the current business insolvency and rescue framework taking into account the 
country’s domestic circumstances. To conduct this evaluation, the research reviews the 
Libyan insolvency law by examining the theoretical approaches to corporate insolvency 
laws in order to understand the role that should be played, or the goal that should be 
reached, by the insolvency law. This is important to identify whether the insolvency 
and rescue laws should be concerned only about maximising economic interests or 
should be concerned also about wider societal interests and objectives. The study also 
undertakes an in depth evaluation of the current business insolvency and rescue 
framework by using the international benchmarks with particular reference to the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. The thesis establishes that the 
current insolvency law is insufficient to promote the economic and social goals of the 
country because of both the deficiency of the legislative framework and inefficient 
institutions. The investigation reveals also that an application of the social justice 
theory as traditionally perceived by the Civil Code 1953 (as manifested in property law 
and contract law) that is primarily designed to achieve social goals (for example, the 
priority given to the wide-ranging category of privileged creditors over secured 
creditors) prevents the insolvency law from achieving the sought-after objectives 
leaving much to be desired for a reform. The research builds on these foundations to 
identify challenges and impediments to the development of the insolvency and rescue 
regime of Libya. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview of the Research 
1.1. Introduction 
Companies and their businesses are important in market-based economies because 
they play a significant role in promoting investment and stimulating economic growth. 
But, at the same time, they are exposed to the market risk in which insufficient and 
uncompetitive businesses are eliminated and replaced by more competitive ones.1 This 
potentially leads to a more efficient use of resources and to a healthy market. The legal 
response to this scenario is to facilitate exit from the market for the uncompetitive 
companies though insolvency laws.2 From a legal point of view, business failure 
implies that companies are experiencing financial distress or insolvency. The 
occurrence of business failure or insolvency may lead the companies to exit the market 
and this will potentially have a negative impact on the market stability and growth. 
Given the important role that companies play in promoting economic growth and 
stability, it is necessary to provide effective legal mechanisms to mitigate the impact of 
such scenarios when they arise. There is no doubt that the existence of an effective 
insolvency law is essential to enhance economic growth and stability.3  
However, it should be noted that the insolvency law is not supposed to ignore or 
intervene with the function of the market. Indeed, its role is to provide collective 
measures and a non-destructive process designed to eliminate only economically 
nonviable companies from the market by means of liquidation procedures while viable 
 
1 Philippe Frouté, ‘Theoretical Foundation for a Debtor Friendly Bankruptcy Law in Favour of Creditors’ 
(2007) 24 Eur J Law Econ 201, 204 
2 Michelle White, ‘The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision’ (1989) 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 129; 
Christopher Frost, ‘Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process’ (1995) 
74 NCL Rev 75  
3 Frouté (n 1) 201-02 
2 
 
companies may be rescued.4 This is desirable and should not be intervened with 
because failed companies will be replaced by businesses that are capable of meeting the 
requirements of market economies and correspond to the desires of consumers and 
community. This will also provide certainty in the market especially among 
stakeholders like investors and creditors who are affected by the insolvency of their 
debtor company.5 It is admitted that an effective legal framework within which citizens 
can plan is a vital requirement for economic growth. This is because the economic 
performance and enhancement of investment which are necessary for healthy markets 
can be influenced by sound laws.6  
Historically, insolvency laws were dominated by the liquidation process reflecting the 
economic theory which supposes that uncompetitive and unproductive businesses 
should be eliminated from the marketplace because this would promote healthy market 
economies.7 This perception and treatment of distressed businesses took a long time to 
shift towards rescue or reorganisation of troubled businesses instead of the employment 
of liquidation.8 Business failure has recently attracted more attention within domestic 
jurisdictions and insolvency laws have increasingly become an important topic in 
jurisdictions around the globe. During the past decades, reforms and reform plans of 
domestic insolvency laws have taken place in many countries around the world.9 
Insolvency has proven to have a wider social impact not only on debtor companies and 
their creditors but also on other stakeholders such as the employees, suppliers and 
 
4 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, 
CUP 2017) 117; White (n 2) 
5 Frouté (n 1) 201-02 
6 Terence Halliday, ‘Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction of 
States in East Asia’ (2012) 37 L&Soc Inq 265, 273 
7 White (n 2) 
8 David Ehmke and others, ‘The European Union Preventive Restructuring Framework: A Hole in One?’ 
(2019) 28 Int’l Ins Rev 1, 1-2 
9  Rebecca Parry, ‘Introduction’ in Katarzyna Broc and Rebecca Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An 
Overview of Recent Developments (2ed edn, Kluwer Law International 2006) 1; Gerard 
McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law--an Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar 2008) 1 
3 
 
customers and the economy in which those companies operate. It can also traverse all 
sectors of the economy.10 Therefore, it has become necessary and legitimate to design a 
framework within which interests of such parties must not be overlooked.11  
An approach that employs social objectives12 as a response to business failure and 
distress justifies the implementation of a rescue system whose policy objectives are 
tailored to avoid the social costs that may be caused by liquidation and to preserve the 
distressed companies as a going concern. Rescue procedures have the potential to 
achieve a number of positive outcomes including the preservation of insolvent but 
viable businesses that have a going concern value greater than if they are sold in a 
piecemeal basis,13 the preservation of jobs, the maximisation of returns to creditors, the 
avoidance of harms that may be caused to suppliers, customers and tax authorities, and 
the economy at large.14  
Further, rescue procedures are also important because they can alleviate the 
detrimental consequences of business distress and may even prevent systematic 
financial crises. For example, the lack of adequate insolvency systems in East Asian 
countries exacerbated the Financial Crisis hit the region in 1997 since it was impossible 
for distressed businesses to reorganise their affairs in the face of the crisis.15 It has 
recently been realised by State governments and international bodies around the world 
 
10 Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
in England and the United States (Clarendon Press 1998) 1; Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures of 
Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 OJLS 227, 227 
11 Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd. 8558, 1982) 
para 204 (hereinafter the Cork Report) 
12 See for example the discussion on the communitarian theory below in Sec 2.2.2.1 
13 Unless the business is economically distressed where its assets will have more value in a break-up 
basis than they would if they are kept together. See: Rebecca Parry and Yingxiang Long, ‘China’s 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Building an Infrastructure towards a Market-based Approach’ (2020) 20 J 
Corp Law Stud 157, 160  
14 Finch and Milman (n 4) 201-02; Parry, ‘Introduction’ (n 9) 2 
15  Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and 
Principles’ (2008) 8 J Corp Law Stud 113, 125; David Burdette, Rebecca Parry and Adrian Walters, 
‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Call for Reform of Insolvency Law Systems’ (2010) 4 Insolvency 
& Restructuring Int’l 13, 13 
4 
 
that attempts to create and promote more animated market economies require 
insolvency laws to facilitate rescue mechanisms for distressed but viable businesses as 
an alternative to liquidation.16 
The global financial crises of 1997 and 2007-2008 indicated that the global financial 
architecture could be vulnerable to the regional and global collapse and highlighted the 
importance of insolvency law reform for business activities in national states in 
developed and developing economies alike.17 The focus on reforming domestic 
insolvency systems has increased and various international institutions were compelled 
to view financial stability on a global scale.18 The period of 1998 to 2005 witnessed 
intensive international reform efforts to develop international benchmarks for 
insolvency systems in an attempt to develop domestic insolvency laws. In response to 
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the international community, through the G-22,19 
encouraged the international financial institutions and international organisations to 
push for reforming domestic corporate insolvency systems and develop global models 
and guidelines for efficient and effective insolvency systems as a first step towards 
 
16  Parry, ‘Introduction’ (n 9) 1; Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp 
L Rev 1, 76  
17 Burdette, Parry and Walters (n 15) 13; Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper and Mahesh Uttamchandani, 
‘The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform’ (2012) 27 World Bank Research Observer 185, 199-200; 
Jenny Clift, ‘Choice of Law and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process’ (2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin & 
Com L 29, 44 
18  Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, Global Lawmakers: International Organizations in the 
Crafting of World Markets (CUP 2017) 121-22 
19 The G-22 comprised of finance ministries and central bank governors of 22 countries shortly after the 
Asian crisis and issued an expansive report on the need to enhance the global financial architecture. See:  
‘Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises’ (5 Oct 1998) 
<www.imf.org/external/np/g22/ifcrep.pdf> (hereinafter G-22 Report) accessed 29 Jun 2018. The G-22 
charged the international financial institutions and international organisations with the task of 
examining how to increase the stability of the international financial architecture and to encourage the 
effective functioning of global capital markets in order to prevent national and regional financial 
downfall. See: Terence Halliday, ‘Legal Yardsticks: International Financial Institutions as 
Diagnosticians and Designers of the Laws of Nations’ [2011] Center on Law and Globalization 
Research Paper no 11-08, at 5 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928829> 
accessed 29 Jun 2018 
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preventing systemic financial crises.20 The G-22 constantly stressed the importance of 
effective insolvency and debtor-creditor regimes as “crisis prevention, crisis mitigation 
and crisis resolution”.21  
International organisations such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) have considered reforming local insolvency laws towards more effective 
corporate or business rescue22 objectives as an important part of strengthened 
international financial architecture. Particular attention was paid to the reform of 
national corporate insolvency systems of developing and transitional countries.23 The 
international organisations have now become advocates of domestic law reforms in the 
field of insolvency and believe that an effective insolvency system can provide national 
financial systems with a safety net to minimise their vulnerability to business failure 
during global financial crises as well as to provide assurance to investors as to what 
will happen in the event of insolvency.24  
Several initiatives were created for that purpose. For example, the Asian 
Development Bank’s Policy Reform, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s (EBRD) legal transition surveys, the IMF’s report of Orderly and 
Effective Insolvency Procedures 1999, and the WB’s Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems in 1999. These guidelines were 
further complemented by the issuance of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
 
20 Block-Lieb and Halliday (n 18) 121 
21 The G-22 Report, 14-15. Also see: Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law: 
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes’ 
(2007) 112 AJS 1135, 1157  
22 Corporate rescue is a term used to refer to the situation where the distressed company as an entity 
emerges from insolvency intact, while business rescue refers to the situation where only the business of 
the company or part of it is rescued. For details see below Sec 1.6.3 
23 Parry, ‘Introduction’ (n 9) 6 
24 Halliday and Carruthers (n 21) 1137 
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Insolvency Law (hereinafter ‘the Legislative Guide’)25 in 2004.26 These international 
initiatives were combined in a unified set of guidelines to ensure complementarity and 
collaboration in practice and avoid duplication.27 
It should be noted that the insolvency benchmarks, especially those provided in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, reflect that fact that national insolvency laws and 
policies differ from one jurisdiction to another as a one-size-fits-all approach is 
impossible to achieve.28 The UNCITRAL took consideration of the difference in 
cultures and unique circumstances of every country in its Legislative Guide and 
admitted that it is not designed to provide a single set of model solutions to address the 
issues that are central to insolvency law. Rather, its Legislative Guide is designed to 
assist domestic legislatures to evaluate different approaches available and decide which 
one is the most suitable for their domestic contexts.29 As such, national states would 
benefit from those initiatives as they have the flexibility to consider their unique 
circumstances and cultures. Besides, the praise of such international benchmarks is that 
they are intended to promote economic efficiency, help to improve transition to market 
economy, promote economic stability and raise the living standards of community.30 
 
25 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nations 2005) 
26 Parry and Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws’ (n 15) 125; Gerard McCormack, ‘Criticising 
the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (2018) 8 KJLL 1, 4 
27 In 2005, the World Bank posted on its website a revised document of its Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems and explained on the site that the Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Standards (ICR Standards) are based on a combination of the World Bank Principles for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide which 
together represent the international consensus on best practices for evaluating and strengthening 
national insolvency and creditor rights systems. See: World Bank brief on Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, (World Bank, 19 Nov 2015) 
<www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-world-bank-principles-for-effective-
insolvency-and-creditor-rights> accessed 18 Jul 2018. Also see: Block-Lieb and Halliday (n 18) 365-
66 
28 McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 26) 28 
29 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Introduction, para 3 and Part One, Chap I, para 17 
30 McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 26)  1 
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1.2. Background to the Libyan Context 
Historically, the Libyan insolvency law has been implemented throughout three 
different periods since independence in 1951 up until the time being. Each of these 
periods has had distinct economic, political and social features that noticeably 
influenced the application and the function of insolvency law. Therefore, a general 
background regarding the Libyan context will be outlined below. 
1.2.1. Insolvency Law after Independence (1951-1969) 
The first insolvency law in Libya was enacted in 1953 when the country introduced 
its legal system after its independence in 1951.31 The Libyan legal system, in particular 
the insolvency framework, is traceable to the colonial legacy of Italy from 1911 to 1943 
during which time Italy transplanted its legal system in the country including the 
Commercial Code (in which the insolvency law was included) displacing the Ottoman 
legal Islamic system (known as the Majalla).32 The enacted Libyan legal system of 
1953, although slightly modelled on compliance with Islamic Law principles, preserved 
much of the influence of the Italian Codes.33  
It should be noted that the economy of Libya when it enacted its legal system was in 
an extremely deteriorated condition.34 The country was even in urgent need for foreign 
 
31 Libya gained independence in 24 Dec 1951 by the resolution No 289 of 21 Nov 1949 of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
32 Edward Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (2ed edn, CUP 1954) 203 
33 With the exception of the Civil Code of 1953 which was influenced by the old Egyptian Civil Code of 
1948, which was in turn influenced by the French Civil Code. See: Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, 
The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning (Springer 2007) 63. 
Also see: International Legal Assistance Consortium, ‘Rule of Law Assessment Report: Libya 2013’ 
[2013] at 18 <www.ilacnet.org/blog/2013/05/09/ilac-assessment-report-libya-2013/> accessed 23 Oct 
2017 
34 A chief economist and the UN envoy to Libya in 1950, Benjamin Higgins, described the economic 
situation of Libya after independence writing that: “… the hard fact that the whole Libyan economy 
operates at a deficit; the country does not produce enough to maintain even its present low standard of 
living”. Benjamin Higgins, The Economic and Social Development of Libya (United Nations 1953) 3 
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aid.35 Most Libyans were very poor and could hardly live at a subsistence standard of 
life and they were even unqualified to run the newly independent country. There was an 
almost total lack of credit and banking facility services. The capital formation was 
below a level necessary to run the economy.36  
The legal system and laws, particularly the Commercial Code and the insolvency 
regime, were considered more complex than the simple lifestyle of the citizens at the 
time and therefore they were absolutely meaningless to the locals as those laws had no 
tangible influence on the real life of people and the society where custom, as a natural 
law, regulated all their aspects of life.37 Local leaders in the country, through leaders of 
Tripolitania province, had previously expressed their rejection of the Italian legal 
system when Italy enacted its laws during its colony of Libya because those laws would 
contradict the Islamic Law principles on which the society was founded.38 In addition, 
the country was even not technically ready to apply its enacted legal system. And in 
order to apply this newly enacted system, the government had to hire legal experts from 
abroad to put such a system into effect because of the lack of lawyers amongst Libyan 
citizens.39 Therefore, courts in Libya depended on foreign experts and judges for a long 
time from neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt and even from European 
 
35 On 15 Aug 1950, the UN Economic and Social Council issued a resolution declaring that Libya was 
still in urgent need of aid to help improve its economy. Shukri Ghanem, ‘The Libyan Economy before 
independence’ in E Joffe and Keith McLachlan (eds), Social and Economic Development of 
Libya (ME&NASP 1982) 156-58 
36 Ibid 150-58. Also see: World Bank, ‘The Economic Development of Libya’ [1960] Johns Hopkins 
Press, at page 27 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573751468757209997/The-economic-
development-of-Libya> (hereinafter World Bank, Libya 1960) accessed 15 Sepr 2017; Adrian 
Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization (YUP 1970) 395 
37 Bleuchot Hervé, ‘The Green Book: Its Context and Meaning’ in John Anthony Allan (ed), Libya Since 
Independence: Economic and Political Development (Routledge 2014) 148; Nathan Brown, The Rule 
of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (CUP 2001) 20, 224-25 
38 Pelt (n 36) 18-19 
39 Ibid 576; Gamal Badr, ‘New Egyptian Civil Code and the Unification of the Laws of Arab Countries’ 
(1955) 30 Tul L Rev 299, 303-04 
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countries such as Italy and the United Kingdom.40 All of this illustrates the degree of 
inconsistency of those laws to the situation of Libya at the time as they did not stem 
from the domestic circumstances and culture. 
The adoption of the Italian laws may be justified by the desire of the country to 
energise its devastated economy by maintaining a familiar legal system to the Italian 
businesses and investors41 which still remained in operation in the country,42 indeed 
dominating the investment and business activities in the economy.43 In Tripolitania 
province, for example, large and prosperous Italian farming businesses that remained in 
operation, contributed significantly to the economic life in the province and to Libya’s 
exports in general. Moreover, the industrial sector, which alone contributed one-tenth 
to the output of the country,44 was almost entirely owned and managed by Italian 
investors. Further, many other economic activities, such as medical services, 
management of hotels, commerce and so on, were taken over by Italian investors. The 
skills and the experience, professionals and workers that the Italian settlers offered to 
help run the Libyan economy were considerably valuable assets to the national 
economy at that time.45  
 
40 See: International Legal Assistance Consortium (n 33) 18; Marwan Al-Tashani, Abdul Fattah Ibrahim 
and Tareq Al-Wesh, ‘Libya’ in Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, The Reform of Judiciaries 
in the Wake of Arab Spring (Sida & Danida 2012) 73; Pelt (n 36) 576; Badr (n 39) 303-04 
41 Besides, the country was driven by the widespread trend in the mid-twentieth century amongst most of 
the Arab nations at the time when they modelled their legal systems on the European-inspired legal 
codes, especially by the French model of law (the Commercial and Civil Codes of 1804 and 1807) and 
Libya had no choice but to follow suit. See: Otman and Karlberg (n 33) 63 
42 The United Nations in its resolution of 15 Dec 1950 No 388(V) Economic and Financial Provisions 
Relating to Libya, required that all property, rights and interests of Italian, including natural or juridical 
persons, to be protected and respected. Art VI(1) of the resolution stated that: “The property, rights and 
interests of Italian nationals, including Italian juridical persons, in Libya, shall, provided they have 
been lawfully acquired, be respected. They shall not be treated less favourably than the property, rights 
and interests of other foreign nationals, including foreign juridical persons.” 
43 The government after independence also kept other Italian pre-existing legislations in effect to serve 
that goal including the law (Royal Decree no 1207 of 1921) regarding land tenure, a legislation 
regarding fish manufacturing and preserved vegetables. For more details see: World Bank, Libya 1960. 
131 and 459 
44 Ibid 33 
45 Ibid 22 and 191 
10 
 
Maintaining and honouring the Italian investment and businesses in Libya was more 
than necessary to the national economy. The UN Commissioner to Libya, Adrian Pelt 
(1949-1952),46 forcefully recommended the Libyan government to persuade and 
incentivise the Italian settlers and investors to stay in the country because encouraging 
such investment and businesses would have the potential to contribute to the economic 
development of the country.47 It can be concluded therefore that the decision of the 
Government in Libya at that time to model its commercial code, and insolvency law in 
particular, on the colonial legacy of law mainly was to serve the interests of foreign 
demand. 
It should be stressed, however, that those imported legal codes to Libya were 
incompatible with pre-existing principles of the society and they were not responsive to 
its demand and culture. Rather, they were transplanted from a country with different 
circumstances and realities in various aspects. As pointed out, for laws to be effectively 
functioning as expected, the population and participants, such as law enforcing 
agencies and institutions and other legal intermediaries responsible for enforcing and 
developing the formal legal principles, should be familiarised with the new adopted 
legal principles.48 Effective transplantation could be expected only when the borrowing 
country adopts the law in a way that is well responsive to its domestic conditions and 
realities. Not only that, but even law enforcement institutions can be more effective 
when the enacted law systems are broadly compatible with the pre-existing legal orders 
and principles or when they are adopted to match local demands and realities.49 All of 
this, however, was lacking resulting in the laws being non-functional or less effective 
 
46  See: United Nations Archives, ‘United Nations Commissioner in Libya (1949-1952)’ 
<https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-commissioner-in-libya-1949-1952> 
47 LaVerle Berry, ‘Historical Setting’ in Helen Metz (ed), Libya: A Country Study (4th edn, Library of 
Congress 1989) 36 
48 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality, and 
the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 Eur Econ Rev 165, 167 
49 Ibid 174 
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than they were meant to be.50 As will be seen in the following two sections, this 
problem of legal mismatch was not resolved and continued to apply throughout the 
whole periods of the economic and social development in the country. 
1.2.2. Insolvency Law under the Socialist Economy (from 1969 to Late 1980s) 
The situation in Libya changed dramatically when the country adopted the socialist 
economic system in 1969.51 The Government in the Constitutional Proclamation of 
196952 clearly expressed that the State would implement a socialist system as an 
ideology to govern the social and economic life in the country.53 This newly adopted 
political system had a direct impact on the private sector and rights of individuals as it 
encouraged equity in distribution using public rather than private ownership to be the 
engine for the economic life in the country. The aim of the State at the time was to 
achieve socio-economic stability and to improve the living standards among Libyan 
citizens by eliminating inequality and differences between social classes.54 
The State believed that such social objectives cannot be attained unless private 
ownership and private businesses were restricted to be functioning alone or dominating 
business activities in the country.55 As a result of this change and to effectuate the 
country’s full control of its economy, the State depended heavily in achieving its 
objectives on the operation of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), monopolisation and 
 
50 The author could obtain only one insolvency case that was dealt with by Musrata First Instance Court 
in 1957. See: Musrata First Instance Court, Initial Commercial Chamber, Civil Case No 25/3J. 
Decision issued on 12 Feb 1957 (Personal communications) 
51 Toyin Falola, Jason Morgan and Bukola Oyeniyi, Culture and Customs of Libya (Abc-clio 2012) 112  
52 The Constitutional Proclamation of Libya of 1969 (promulgated in 11 Dec 1969) 
53 The Constitutional Proclamation of Libya of 1969 in Articles 6, 7 and 8 stated that the aim of the 
socialist State was to achieve social justice while the public ownership was the basis of the economic 
and social development in the country. 
54 Otman and Karlberg (n 33) 64 
55  Ibid 64; Kirsten Doty, ‘Economic Legal Reforms as a Necessary Means for Eastern European 
Transition into the Twenty-First Century’ (1999) 33 Int’l Law 189, 189 
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nationalisation.56 During the socialist economy in the country, the insolvency regime 
was practically irrelevant since businesses, particularly the SOEs, received full 
financial support in the form of bailouts from the government when there was a 
problem of distress. This is because if such businesses were allowed to fail, the State 
would not be able to accomplish its social and economic objectives when the country 
depended mostly on SOEs as the sole or the primary participants in the economy.57 
1.2.3. Insolvency Law under the Transition Economy (from Late 1980s up to date) 
Later on and because of the economic decline that Libya had witnessed in the 1980s, 
the Government adopted a strategy to transition to a greater role for the market in the 
Libyan economy and society. This economic transition required legal reform to 
promote the process. Between late 1980s and the early 1990s, the private sector 
received attention by the Government and some reforms were witnessed to encourage 
the private sector to take an active role in promoting economic growth.58 This resulted 
in the introduction of the privatisation programme in the country supported by the 
introduction of the Doing Business Activities Act of 1992.59 To further progress the 
economic reform process in the country, important legislation to attract foreign 
investment and to increase credit and capital inflows was also introduced (Encouraging 
Foreign Investment Act 1997).60 The aim of the reform was to promote the economic 
 
56 Several sectors and industries, including the hydrocarbon industry, insurance, communication and 
transportation sectors and the banking sector, were affected by the nationalisation policy of the State. 
For details see: Otman and Karlberg (n 33) 217 
57 Dennis Hui, ‘The State and the Development of Corporate Insolvency Law in China and Russia: A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 2 Asian Education and Development Studies 212, 212-15; Michael 
Kim, ‘When Nonuse is Useful: Bankruptcy Law in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe’ 
(1996) 65 Fordham L Rev 1043, 1044 and 1068 
58 Hervé (n 37) 144; Falola, Morgan and Oyeniyi (n 51) 112 
59 Doing Business Activities Act (no 9/1992) introduced in 02 Sep 1992 
60 Encouraging Foreign Investment Act 1997. This legislation was reformed and replaced later by the law 
no 7 of 2003 (Encouraging Foreign Investment Act 2003) (EFI 2003) 
13 
 
and social development for the citizens and to enhance the competitiveness of the 
national market of Libya in general.61  
During this period, however, the State and the public sector still dominated the 
economy at a significant degree and no genuine progress was seen in the privatisation 
programme.62 This was attributed to the fear that the privatisation of SOEs would affect 
the working class and would leave employees at a socially disadvantageous situation. 
Therefore, the plan of the State was to encourage the workers and employees of SOEs, 
especially small and medium-sized, to apply for a privatisation scheme so that the 
ownership of the enterprises would be transferred to them. This scheme was not 
considered a genuine change towards the privatisation and it did not even succeed as a 
market-driven reform. This is because such transferred businesses operated under the 
influence of the State and they could also be bailed out when they became insolvent.63  
In an important report, the WB acknowledged that the legal system governing 
business activities including the insolvency regime was underdeveloped and therefore 
recommended the Libya government to make reforms so as to ensure consistency with 
the market-oriented economy. The judiciary system was also under examination since it 
lacked the capacity to resolve business disputes.64 The insolvency law of Libya 
accommodated the outdated features of the insolvency systems that were available in 
the 19th century. The design of the regime focused mainly on liquidation and this 
 
61 Ibid, Art 1 
62 Dirk Vandewalle, ‘The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969’ in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), Qadhafi’s Libya, 
1969-1994 (St Martin’s Press 1995) 38 
63 François Burgat, ‘Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework’ in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), Qadhafi’s Libya; 1969-
1994 (St Martin’s Press 1995) 55 
64  World Bank, ‘Libya - Country Economic Report’ [2006] World Bank, at page 60 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/918691468053103808/pdf/30295.pdf> accessed 10 Dec 
2018 (hereinafter World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006) 
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process was complicated and extremely time-consuming.65 It is argued that both the 
inefficiency of the insolvency law and of the institutions in the country have been the 
reason behind investors and creditors’ frustration in enforcing their claims.66  
Indeed, several legal committees were established by the Government to reconsider 
and reform the legal system in the country for that end. This was followed by the 
introduction of the legal reform in 2010 which was the widest reform process seen in 
the country since the gaining of independence in 1951. The aim was to keep up with the 
economic reform process and to establish an attractive business and investment 
environment. This indicates clearly how policymakers in Libya became aware of the 
importance of attracting foreign investment to promote national economic growth and 
the welfare of citizens.67  
To achieve the above objectives, the Government in 2010 introduced, for example, 
the Law of Stock Market68 and the Promotion of Investment Act 2010 (PIA 2010).69 
The latter legislation was very important as it was designed in compliance with the 
government’s intention of enhancing economic growth and competitiveness of the 
national economy.70 The 2010 reform resulted also in the introduction of the Code of 
Employment Relationships 2010 (CERs 2010).71 Moreover, the lawmakers reformed 
the laws regarding the secured transactions system by reforming the Commercial Code 
 
65  For more details see: Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘No Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency 
Regimes in the MENA Region’ (2011) 1 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5609, at 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794914> accessed 4 Jan 2019 
66 For more details see: Aburawi Gabgub, ‘Analysis of Non-performing Loans in the Libyan State-
Owned Commercial Banks: Perception Analysis of the Reasons and Potential Methods for Treatment’ 
(PhD thesis, Durham University 2009) 205-24 
67 Mustafa El Hamoudi and Nagmi Aimer, ‘The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic 
Growth in Libya’ (2017) 2 IJELS 144, 147 
68 The Law of Stock Market (no 11 of 2010) promulgated in 28 Jan 2010, which superseded the decree 
regarding the Establishment of the Libyan Stock Market (no134 of 2006) promulgated in the National 
Gazette in 03 Jun 2006 
69 Promotion of Investment Act 2010, promulgated in 28 Jan 2010, which replaced the EFI 2003. 
70 This intention was clearly stated in Art 3 of PIA 2010 
71 The Code of Employment Relationships 2010 (no 12 of 2010) promulgated in the National Gazette in 
27 Jan 2010 (hereinafter CERs 2010) 
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of 1953 which led to the introduction the Code of Commercial Activity 2010 (CCA 
2010)72 and also by introducing the Financial Lease Act 2010 (FLA 2010).73 This 
reform, according to the Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Libya in 2011, 
commenting on the enactment of FLA 2010, attempts to improve standards of secured 
transactions in order to create an attractive business environment, by improving the 
credit-oriented environment and facilitating access to credit, and to enhance the social 
and economic development in the country.74 
The insolvency system was not included in the reform agenda in 2010 although it was 
highly demanded to promote the transition of economic reform75 and to deal with the 
series of insolvencies that occurred in the country caused by the economic depression 
of the late 1980s.76 The deeply-rooted social situation of the country may have had its 
impact on the options of the government in choosing the type of insolvency system that 
would suit its domestic situation. For instance, the unemployment issue in Libya was 
one of the major political barriers that faced the government that was first tasked with 
privatisation of the economy in 2003. This was because the privatisation and its 
immediate consequences on employment go against the principles of the unique 
governance system of Libya as “the State of the Masses”.77 In 2007, the government in 
order to proceed with the privatisation programme established a programme to liquidate 
 
72 The Code of Commercial Activity (no 23 of 2010) promulgated in 28 Jan 2010 (hereinafter CCA 2010) 
73 The Financial Lease Act (no 15 of 2010) promulgated in 28 Jan 2010 (hereinafter FLA 2010). This Act 
is the first legislation regulating financial leases in the country. 
74 ‘Financial Lease Act 2010 will Make a Shift in Small and Medium Sized Businesses’ (Libya2020, 24 
Jan 2011) <https://libya2020.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/> accessed 25 Jan 2018 
75 Experts and officials in Libya, such as Farhat bin Gadara the former Governor of the Central Bank of 
Libya, called for insolvency reform so as to contribute to enhance the national economy and encourage 
investors doing business in the country. See: Farhat bin Gadara, ‘Improving and Restructuring 
Commercial Banks in Libya’ (Central Bank of Libya) at page 12 
<www.cbl.gov.ly/pdf/09X3V96mnc4gaQ3kSDK.pdf> accessed 17 May 2017 
76 Alafi Abdourhim, Abouazoum Alafi and Erik de Bruijn, ‘A Change in the Libyan Economy: Towards 
a More Market-Oriented Economy’ (Management of Change Conference, University of Twente, 
Lüneburg, Nov 2009) at 6-7 <http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/76014;> accessed 25 Nov 2017 
77 Alison Pargeter, ‘Libya: Reforming the Impossible?’ (2006) 33 Review of African Political Economy 
219, 223 and 231 
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the insolvent nonviable SOEs. But because the government was reluctant to expose its 
insolvent enterprises to the pure insolvency and market rules due to the fear of social 
instability of potential unemployment, it adopted a compulsory programme, called the 
Liquidation of State-Owned Enterprises, to deal with the exit of the insolvent SOEs 
from the market. By this programme, the government stressed that the laid-off State 
employees because of the liquidation programme must be offered an early retirement 
pension scheme or re-employment in other State departments to absorb any potential 
unemployment.78 
Such treatment is inappropriate partly because of the lack of efficient insolvency and 
rescue laws and institutions that are responsible to apply such laws in the country. 
Therefore, reform in this field has become more than necessary and there is a need to 
reinvigorate the thinking that is influencing the Libyan insolvency regime for the 
country to proceed with its economic transition policy towards the market economy in 
an appropriate manner. This is important because an efficient insolvency regime is 
crucial to promote business and create an inviting investment environment in the 
country. Also, an efficient and effective insolvency law with sound rescue mechanisms 
can help mitigate the social instability witnessed in the country after the Arab Spring 
events in 2011.79  
But the lack of such insolvency and rescue regimes would be detrimental to the 
achievement of such objectives because it can affect the decisions regarding investment 
in the country and it would also slow or frustrate the transitional process of the 
economy. Moreover, particular attention should be regarded to the development of the 
 
78 Resolution of the Prime Ministry Council (no 104 of 2007) regarding Liquidation of State-owned 
Companies Fund, Art 3(z) (promulgated in 28 Feb 2007) 
79 Elena Lanchovichina, Lili Mottaghi and Shantayanan Devarajan, Inequality, Uprisings, and Conflict in 
the Arab World (World Bank 2015) 
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rescue system because functional rescue systems have the potential to mitigate the 
social consequences caused by insolvency. It is unfortunate that the current Libyan 
insolvency framework has been static since its first introduction in 1953 and as a result 
has long been unable to meet the needs for promoting the business environment in the 
country. According to the WB Doing Business 2018 report, Libya ranks 185th out of 
190 economies on their ease of doing business with the insolvency law (having 
considered various measures ranging from the average time the procedures take; the 
average cost of the procedures on the insolvency estate; the average recovery rate to the 
creditors), Libya ranks 168th worldwide for resolving insolvency cases.80 Policymakers 
and reform committees in Libya can benefit from such valuable evaluations offered by 
such a report to indicate the extent to which the current insolvency laws and institutions 
are sufficiently adequate to support or discourage the investment climate in the country 
and therefore they can respond accordingly. 
Libya may have had no choice in the past but to adopt colonial legal rules, but to 
retain the same rules in force today though with different circumstances voluntarily 
may be regarded as total failure. Reforming the insolvency system in Libya has become 
crucial especially because credit is now expected to be used more extensively in the 
market after the reform of the secured transactions system. Accordingly, there is a need 
to structure the flow of credit and to deal with the financial and economic distress that 
inevitably occurs as a result of promoting credit in the market.81 This fact is 
acknowledged worldwide. For example, the Cork Report in the UK stated that where a 
 
80 World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (World Bank 2018) 174 
81 Martin, ‘The Role of History’ (n 16) 5 
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credit system is encouraged, the adoption of an efficient insolvency law is correlatively 
required to deal with potential causalities that may be caused by the flow of credit.82 
It is pointed that an effective and efficient insolvency law is necessary to mitigate the 
impact of business failure and to limit its duration.83 Further, the social implications of 
business failure must be considered when designing an adequate business rescue 
regime that goes beyond the focus on a pure economic objective that primarily 
promotes wealth maximisation for creditors as the primary goal of insolvency law. As 
the situation has changed in the country, keeping the old insolvency system in 
operation would not serve the national needs and would probably extend the problem of 
legal mis-transplantation previously mentioned. As the government recently established 
several committees to review the existing laws and legislations,84 including the CCA 
2010 in which the insolvency law is embodied, this research is timely and will offer to 
policymakers and reform committees in Libya a valuable and comprehensive 
evaluation for reforming the existing insolvency and restructuring laws. The research 
will be aware of all circumstances underpinning the country as well as insights from 
theories of insolvency law and international benchmarks. 
1.3. Research Questions 
As the research seeks to examine the adequacy of the insolvency and rescue system 
for dealing with business failure, it seeks to answer the following main question: 
 
82 The Cork Report, para 198(a) 
83 Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘Introduction’ in Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng 
Zhang (eds), China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Context, Interpretation and Application 
(Ashgate 2013) 15 
84 Several committees were established in Libya to review and reform the existing laws. As recent as 
2015, a committee was established by resolution (no 25 of 2015) issued by the President of General 
National Congress to review the laws and to amend legislations in accordance to principles of Islamic 
Sharia’. 
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 How should the insolvency law of Libya be reformed taking into account the current 
economic and social circumstances in the country?  
This question is followed up by sub-questions, drawing upon insolvency theories and 
international benchmarks: 
1. How may theories of insolvency be regarded from a Libyan perspective so as to inform 
decisions regarding the role that should be played by the insolvency law in Libya? 
2. In light of theoretical perspectives, what approach should be taken in insolvency 
regarding affected stakeholder interests, in light of the social and economic 
circumstances of Libya? 
3. Do the insolvency and rescue laws, supported by the existing institutions, in Libya 
presently promote desirable objectives, as defined by the theories and international 
benchmarks of insolvency? 
4. What is the relationship between the insolvency law and secured transactions system in 
Libya in relation to the objectives that should be protected by the insolvency law? 
5. Drawing upon the evaluation of both theory and the international benchmarks, how can 
the Libyan system and institutions best achieve the protection of the affected interests 
and the promotion of the objectives identified as important for the Libyan context? 
In addressing the research questions, the thesis will, at a macro-level, use theories of 
insolvency law and, at a meso-level, the international guidelines as embodied in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to evaluate, at a micro-level, the Libyan systems of 
insolvency and secured transactions. This represents an original approach to insolvency 
reform in Libya, geared towards Libya’s social and economic circumstances and not 
merely relying on the transplantation of approaches from mature insolvency systems. 
The combination of these evaluative tools will contribute to the thesis, and thus to 
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human knowledge, in establishing whether the Libyan insolvency system is compliant 
or noncompliant with the insolvency law theory and international guidelines. This 
thesis will also aim to establish for the first time whether or not the current Libyan legal 
system is coherent in itself.85 Further, the thesis will set out whether or not the Libyan 
system is suitable for use within the Libyan society. This will therefore be the engine 
and bridgehead from which the research will progress. 
1.4. Research Objectives 
This research evaluates whether the current insolvency law in Libya is adequate to 
support economic development and social stability in the country. The thesis explores 
the theories of insolvency law that are widely used to evaluate the objectives of 
national insolvency laws worldwide. The examination of the insolvency law theories is 
important to inform whether the insolvency law implements desirable and achievable 
objectives. The thesis also evaluates the international benchmarks of insolvency law, 
with a particular reference to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, to consider the 
alternative mechanisms that are available to deal with the insolvency of businesses as 
these benchmarks provide multiple alternatives and choices for countries to establish an 
effective and efficient framework for an insolvency system that best works for each 
countries’ circumstances. The thesis, however, establishes that the conduct of both the 
insolvency theories and the international benchmarks is closely influenced by the 
desires and circumstances underpinning the national community. In light of both 
insolvency theories and the international benchmarks, the research aims to establish 
objectives which are: 
 
85 It will be established in this thesis that there is an ideological divide shaping the Libyan legal system 
across different areas of the commercial law, given the existence of which the insolvency and rescue 
systems will be unable to deliver adequate resolutions to business failure. 
21 
 
 To determine the purposes that the insolvency law of Libya should serve. 
 To define how these purposes can best be pursued through insolvency law reform. 
1.5. Research Method 
This research employs principally a doctrinal research method which is a library-
based approach. It conducts a comprehensive review of primary sources, authoritative 
international law sources and academic commentary as secondary sources on the 
subject of insolvency law. Primary sources include laws and regulations related to the 
insolvency regime in Libya (with some reference to law of other jurisdictions when 
appropriate). The research also examines laws and legislations related to the secured 
transactions system that are scattered in separate codes and legislations in Libya (such 
as the CCA 2010, the Civil Code of 1953 and the FLA 2010). Authoritative 
international ‘grey law’ sources consist of reports from international organisations such 
as the UNCITRAL, the World Bank and the IMF. Secondary sources consist of 
monographs, chapters in edited books and journal articles.86 The resources are collected 
through the electronic database available via Nottingham Trent University (NTU) such 
as HeinOnline, LexisNexis and Westlaw. Sources are also collected in hard copies 
available in or provided by NTU library and through personal communications.  
As a doctrinal research, this thesis promises to be analytical as well as synthetic.87 It 
promises to offer a comprehensive and critical analysis of the insolvency and rescue 
system in Libya in light of the international benchmarks on insolvency law and 
 
86 Mike McConville and Wing Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Mike McConville and Wing Chui 
(eds), Research Methods for Law (2ed edn, EUP 2017) 3-4 
87 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton 
(eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 9-12. Doctrine has been defined as “a synthesis of 
various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It explains, makes coherent or 
justifies a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law”. Trischa Mann (ed), Australian Law 
Dictionary (OUP 2010) 197. “In this method, the essential features of the legislation and case law are 
examined critically and then all the relevant elements are combined or synthesised to establish an 
arguably correct and complete statement of the law on the matter in hand”. Hutchinson, ibid 9-10 
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academic analysis of insolvency system with particular reference to the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide to evaluate the adequacy of the insolvency law of the country. It also 
promises to synthesise the objectives of insolvency law as identified in both theoretical 
approaches of insolvency law and the international benchmarks and guidelines within 
the national context in order to make a coherent examination of what is desired to 
establish a functional legal system of insolvency as part of a larger legal system in the 
country. 
While this research does not undertake a comparative study, reference to experiences 
of other jurisdictions (such as the UK, USA and others) will be made with the aim of 
highlighting how objectives of insolvency law are implemented to fit the unique 
domestic situation of a particular jurisdiction. It should be stressed, however, that 
reference to other jurisdictions’ experiences in adopting functional insolvency and 
rescue systems is not intended to be used for comparative purposes. Rather, they are 
used to evaluate lessons as to how insolvency law objectives are implemented to suit 
unique domestic situations of a particular jurisdiction. This is useful for the study for 
two main reasons. Firstly, it confirms that national insolvency laws differ from each 
other as they might have different objectives and different public policy imperatives 
because the level of development and circumstances of each country are different. This 
is to emphasise that although key objectives of efficient and effective insolvency law 
may be agreed worldwide, especially in developed countries, the implementation of 
those objectives may differ in one jurisdiction to another. Secondly, this will 
demonstrate how various jurisdictions around the world implement different responses 
to a particular issue. While in some countries there is a well developed professional and 
judicial force and a system of institutions which are available for the implementation of 
an insolvency reform, in other countries the establishment of these institutions must 
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form an aspect of any such reform process. Insolvency law reform in Libya should, 
therefore, take this fact into consideration in order to come up with an appropriate 
framework that is suitable to the social, economic, legal and cultural realities unique to 
the country. In addition to this, borrowing fixed legal regimes from other nations with 
different contexts would in most cases result in undesirable outcomes.88  
1.6. Key Terms and Concepts  
1.6.1. Stakeholder Interests 
Stakeholders are usually classified into narrow and wider categories. The first 
category group of stakeholder refers to those which are vital of the business to exist and 
or which have formal contractual relationship with the business. This includes owners 
or shareholders, the employees, creditors, customers and suppliers. The second group is 
as wide as to include those stakeholders with social and political interests in the 
business. This includes the local communities and governments.89 In this thesis, the 
term ‘stakeholder’ will refer to the first category of stakeholders90 as the following; 
 Creditors 
Creditors are those parties who extend credit to the debtor either by a loan agreement 
(usually banks) or by providing goods or services on credit (trade creditors/ suppliers). 
Creditors are either secured or unsecured. Secured creditors are those who have a legal 
right against the debtor’s property over which they have a security (proprietary rights). 
Unsecured creditors are those who have no legal rights against the debtor’s property but 
 
88  Thomas Waelde and James Gunderson, ‘Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western 
Transplants—A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?’ (1994) 43 Int’l & Comp LQ 347, 369; 
Parry, ‘Introduction’ (n 9) 18 
89  Silvia Ayuso and others, ‘Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance’ (2014) 53 Business & Society 414, 419-20 
90 As will be discussed later, this group of stakeholders contributes to the firm-specific investment. See: 
Lynn LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57 Vand L Rev 741 
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they have only a legal right against the debtor (personal rights). Therefore, they receive 
no payment unless all higher ranking creditors are paid in full.91 In addition to the 
secured creditors, it must be added in the Libyan context there is a class of unsecured 
creditors who are given privileged rights92 against the debtors’ assets. These privileges 
include privileges of judicial expenditures, the privilege of unpaid wages for the 
employees, and the privilege of taxes owed to the public treasury (the Government), the 
privilege of expenses spent for maintaining the debtor’s movables. The privilege 
system, as it operates in Libya, includes some more unusual privileges such as the 
privilege for supplies of agricultural businesses, the privilege of the lessor of land for 
unpaid rent, the privilege of the vendor for the purchase price of goods, the privilege of 
contracts and architects, and it may therefore be regarded as unusually wide.93 
 Investors 
The term ‘investors’ includes people who, by their input of capital, have investment 
in any business regardless of the legal form it takes.94 This includes shareholders in 
companies and partners in partnerships. Shareholders and partners under the Libyan 
law are those who enter into agreement to share profit from the business they make,95 
and they only have the residual claims in liquidation.96 Therefore, investors 
categorically are distinguished from creditors. 
  
 
91 CCA 2010, Art 1120(4) 
92 It is worth noting that the literal translation of the term privileged creditors from Arabic is ‘excellent’ 
creditors. This appears to reflect the political imperatives in Libya that has an exceptional treatment for 
such claims. However, the thesis will use the term privilege because of its common use. 
93 These privileges will be examined in detail later in Chapter Five (Sec 5.3.7) 
94 See: Art 1 of PIA 2010 
95 The Civil Code of 1953, promulgated in the National Gazette in 28 Nov 1953, Art 494 (hereinafter CC 
1953) 
96 Ibid, Art 534. Traditionally, shareholders and partners are considered residual claimants because they 
are repaid only after all other contractual claimants (such as secured creditors, employees, customers 
and suppliers) are paid. 
25 
 
 Employees 
The employees are stakeholders by their input of labour and their interests can be 
affected by the insolvency of their employer.97 The economic well-being of the 
employees in terms of job security and wages will possibly be interrupted by the 
insolvency of their employers. The worst case scenario occurs when their employer is 
liquidated which means that they will lose their jobs permanently.98 The protection of 
the employees against the situation of insolvency is a main objective of the 
employment law. Employees in the Libyan law have two types of recognised interests 
in the insolvent business. Under the Civil Code 1953, they have direct interest with 
regard to the unpaid wages for which they are considered creditors. Under this 
category, they enjoy preferential right (privileged right).99 Employees also have an 
interest in the future of the business with regard to the continuation of their jobs. They 
enjoy protection under the Libyan law against their employer in the event of insolvency 
by which the employer has limited powers to make employment redundancy under the 
CERs 2010.100  
1.6.2. Financial Distress vs Economic Distress  
By and large, distress refers to the situation when a company faces difficulty in 
repaying debts. An efficient insolvency law does not necessarily function to save all 
distressed companies from failure. Some companies should be safeguarded by means of 
rescue procedures while some should be eliminated from the market by liquidation.101 
 
97 Yuval Bar-Or, ‘Human Considerations in Turnaround Management: A Practitioner’s View’ in Jan 
Adriaanse and Jean-Pierre Van der Rest (eds), Turnaround Management and Bankruptcy (Routledge 
2017) 191 
98 Ibid 179-80; Melvin Stephens, ‘The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earning Shocks’ (2001) 83 
Rev Econ Stat 28 
99 CC 1953, Art 1145  
100 CERs 2010, Art 77(2). This will be discussed later in Sec 4.7 
101 Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 13 
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The insolvency law’s strategies employed regarding these two situations vary 
depending on the level of distress that a company encounters (economic distress or 
financial distress). An economically distressed company is one that is unable to pay its 
debts as they fall due and its business’s going concern value is less than the value of its 
assets. Companies in such a situation are worth more if their assets are sold on a break 
up basis than if the business is kept together. In other words, they are nonviable due to 
fundamental problems regarding their going concern which has a low or negative value. 
A financially distressed company is economically viable as a going concern but it is 
unable to pay its debts when they fall due because of a cash flow issue.102 Accordingly, 
attempts to save an economically distressed company would be at the expense of all 
claims against the company as a group especially creditors. This means that liquidation 
would be the best option because it would save the remaining value of the company’s 
going concern.103 In contrast, when the company is only financially distressed, rescue 
attempts are preferable because the piecemeal sale of the business’s assets would not be 
in the interests of the creditors since the value of the business is greater if kept 
together.104 
1.6.3. Corporate Rescue vs Business Rescue 
Following from the above, a company that is only financially distressed should 
normally be a candidate for rescue processes. Rescue procedures may result in saving 
either the company as a whole or, when that is not possible, its business as a going 
 
102 Douglas Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale LJ 573, 580-81; John Armour, 
‘The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review’ (2001) ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No 197, at 4 
<www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp197.pdf> accessed 8 Nov 2019 
103 McCormack, Corporate Rescue  (n 9) 9; Finch and Milman (n 4) 117 
104 Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Administration and Administrative Receivership-An Analysis’ (2004) 57 CLP 1, at 
4-5 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466701> accessed 23 Jul 2019 
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concern.105 Rescuing the company as a whole would imply that the company as an 
entity would emerge from the process substantially intact with the same workforce and 
ownership. This is described in literature as ‘pure rescue’.106 On the contrary, business 
rescue would imply that only the business of the company or viable parts of it would be 
rescued as a going concern. And if the business was sold as a going concern to a third 
party, this form of rescue would lead to the business continuation under new ownership 
and, commonly, the reduction of workforce.107 This latter form of rescue is the most 
likely outcome in practice as seen in the UK.108 
1.6.4. Informal Workouts 
Financially distressed businesses may have two rescue approaches to resolve their 
dilemmas. Beside the formal insolvency procedures, which are normally regulated by 
the insolvency law and carried out through court collective procedures, there are 
informal out of court approaches. Informal workouts or restructurings involve 
voluntary negotiations between the debtor and some or all of its creditors away from 
the formal procedures that are offered by the State insolvency law’s collective 
procedures.109 The purpose of these procedures is to restructure the capital structure of 
the insolvent company typically by the reduction of the debt volume or postponement 
of payment date of the debt.110 Informal workouts are termed as out-of-court 
proceedings yet the court can be involved in the informal workouts as potential arbiter. 
 
105 Ibid 5 
106 Sandra Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 247, 
248-49 
107 Ibid 248-49; Finch and Milman (n 4) 197-98 
108 Although the rescue of the company (corporate rescue) is a primary objective of the law under the 
administration procedures in the UK, business rescue is far more common in reality. See: Kayode 
Akintola and David Milman, ‘The Rise, Fall and Potential for a Rebirth of Receivership in UK 
Corporate Law’ (2019) 20 J Corp Law Stud 99, 119. Also see: Mokal (n 104) 7 
109 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap IV, para 76 
110  Régis Blazy, Jocelyn Martel and Nirjhar Nigam, ‘The Choice Between Informal and Formal 
Restructuring: The Case of French Banks Facing Distressed SMEs’ (2014) 44 JBF 248, 249 
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Informal workouts are based on the contract law and can involve individual bargaining 
between the debtor company and its creditors or can be collectively by creditor 
consensus, such as the London Approach.111 
1.6.5. Debtor-in-Possession vs Practitioner-in-Possession 
Debtor-in-Possession system (DIP) is a distinct feature of the US Chapter 11 of 
Bankruptcy Code 1978. By this system, the management of an insolvent company 
retains their full day-to-day controlling position to take ultimate decisions regarding the 
business affairs during rescue procedures without the appointing of an insolvency 
practitioner.112 In the contrary, Practitioner-in-Possession (PIP) is a traditional feature 
of the UK insolvency regime by which the existing management of the company is 
displaced by an external insolvency professional or practitioner to take control of all the 
assets and business of the company.113 
1.6.6. Insolvency System 
The insolvency system is a collective procedures system which is designed to provide 
mechanisms for both rescue/ reorganisation and liquidation to take place, subject to 
court supervision.114 While rescue might lead to the continuation of the business or part 
of it as a going concern as discussed above,115 liquidation means that all measures that 
are taken to realise the assets of the company on a piecemeal basis in order to terminate 
 
111 For details see: Parry and Long (n 13) 
112 Nathalie Martin, ‘Common-law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences’ (2003) 11 Am 
Bankr Ins L Rev 367, 397 
113 Vanessa Finch, ‘Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374 
114 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 
41-42 
115 See above Sec 1.6.3 
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its business activity and subsequently distribute the sale outcomes proportionately 
between creditors.116 
1.6.7. Secured Transactions  
Secured transactions in Libya are mostly covered by the CC 1953 (property law) 
under Book IV and known as the Accessory Rights in Rem or in rem securities 
(proprietary rights). A secured transaction is a transaction that creates a security by 
which a creditor obtains a right that is exercisable against the property of the security 
grantor (debtor) to enforce the obligations of the latter to the creditor.117 Secured 
transactions in Libya can be classified as consensual securities which are created by an 
agreement between the contractual parties. This includes transactions like the 
mortgage,118 the pledge119, the pledge of debts120 and the pledge on a going concern.121 
Secured transactions can also be classified as non-consensual security which is created 
by the operation of the law which exclusively includes the privilege rights122 or by the 
judge like the judicial mortgage.123 Security can be classified also as real security and 
quasi-security. Real security covers the consensual and non-consensual securities 
mentioned earlier. Quasi-security124 includes title-based transactions such as the 
conditional sale125 and the financial lease.126 
 
116 Mohamed Al-badawi, ‘Legal Provisions of Company Liquidation in Libya’ (2003) 2 TJL 8, 10 
117 Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Present and Future of Real and Personal Security’ (2003) 11 European Review of 
Private Law 623, 625 
118 See below Sec 5.3.1 
119 See below Sec 5.3.2 
120 See below Sec 5.3.3 
121 See below Sec 5.3.4 
122 See below Sec 5.3.7 
123 See below Sec 5.3.1 
124 Generally, quasi-security transactions are not classified as real security however they have the same 
function by using ownership to secure the creditor’s right. See: Hugh Beale and others, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing (OUP 2012) 1.20 
125 See below Sec 5.3.5 
126 See below Sec 5.3.6 
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1.6.8. Post-commencement Finance and Super-priority  
Post-commencement finance is a new fund provided, either by existing or by 
potential lenders, to the insolvent company to be used to fund the rescue process. The 
provider of post-commencement finance will be granted a priority over the existing 
creditors by means of super-priority system.127 
1.7. Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters. In Chapter One (current Chapter), the 
thesis gives an introduction to the topic of insolvency and definition of concepts. It 
briefly outlines a background to the insolvency law development through various 
periods in Libya. This was necessary to introduce the thesis to the reader by outlining 
how a reform of the insolvency law has become necessary in the country to enhance the 
national objectives that were set up by the government to shift the economy towards a 
market economy. This Chapter explains the importance of having meaningful and 
effective insolvency law and procedures to the society and the national economy.  
Chapter Two explores the theories and foundations underpinning the insolvency law 
scholarship. Exploring the insolvency law theories is necessary to understand what 
objectives an insolvency system should serve, whether it is to promote the interests of 
one particular group of stakeholders (mainly the creditors) or to have a wider role to 
include the interests of other stakeholders that are affected by the event of insolvency. 
This discussion then examines whether the insolvency law should consider rescue 
process for failed businesses and for what purposes. This Chapter furthers the 
discussion to explore how the insolvency law theories can be applied to the 
 
127 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing in Early Transition Countries: Taking a DIP in 
the Distressed Debt Pool’ [2004] LiT <www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit042.pdf> accessed 
01 Dec 2017 
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circumstances of Libya as a developing and transitional economy. It explores which 
theoretical approach best suits Libya bearing in mind all the domestic circumstances 
and realities. The Chapter demonstrates that Libya needs to accommodate a theory that 
can promote objectives of economic growth and can maintain social stability. The 
Chapter concludes that a theory like the Team Production Theory would be appropriate 
not only to achieve those objectives but it is also a suitable approach to address the 
incoherence within the legal system that is caused by adopting conflicting ideologies 
within the different branches of the commercial law in Libya.  
Chapter Three undertakes an evaluative analysis of the present Libyan insolvency law 
and procedures by reference to key objectives as set by the international guidelines of 
insolvency law particularly those offered by the UNCITRAL in the Legislative Guide. 
This Chapter will examine the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide principles that are related 
to insolvency matters in general whereas principles concerning business rescue and 
secured transactions issues will be dealt with in the following two chapters. This 
Chapter aims at assessing the insolvency framework in Libya to learn about what is 
desired to boost a reform project from the standpoint of enhancing investment and 
economic growth. This Chapter contends that the insolvency law of Libya is lagging 
behind as it offers no satisfactory response to insolvency and business failure and it 
thus leaves much to be desired for a reform. 
Chapter Four deals with the current composition scheme as a rescue system in Libya. 
This chapter examines whether the available rescue mechanisms are adequate to 
support business rescue. This is measured against the principles of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide with reference to principle Three.128 The Chapter will examine what 
 
128  Principle Three is about ‘Striking a balance between liquidation and reorganization’. See: 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 6 
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objectives and interests the composition system is designed to promote. It contends that 
rescue procedures in Libya are outdated and inadequate to offer a reasonable pathway 
for rescue. The system is geared towards promoting the interests of secured creditors 
only at the expense of other stakeholders by excluding secured creditors from the 
process as they are not bound by a composition plan even after the court’s approval. In 
regarding the institutional level, courts and insolvency practitioners (known as syndics/ 
trustees) are not prepared and trained to deal with business failure and insolvency 
cases. All of such features associated with the insolvency law in Libya would frustrate 
any rescue endeavours. 
Chapter Five explores the secured transactions system in Libya and its relationship 
with the insolvency law. The exploration is carried out in light of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide with reference to Objective Eight129 and UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Secured Transactions130 (hereinafter ‘the ST Guide’). This is necessary 
because both systems regulate debtor-creditor relationships and because they may 
implement different objectives, therefore, harmonisation between these two fields of 
law must be sought in order to achieve a proper balance between the interested parties. 
The objective of a secured transactions law is to protect the economic value of the 
secured creditors’ property rights against their debtor’s assets by ensuring effective 
enforcement of the rights of individual creditors when the debtor business becomes 
insolvent.131 This Chapter will explore whether the Libyan secured transactions system 
achieves this objective and whether or not the design of this system supports an 
effective application of the insolvency and business rescue procedures in the country. It 
contends that the secured transactions system in Libya is based on principles that 
 
129 Objective Eight is about ‘Recognition of existing creditor rights and establishment of clear rules for 
ranking of priority claims’. See: Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para13 
130 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (United Nations 2010) 
131 Ibid, Chap XII, para 2 
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contradict the principles of the insolvency and rescue law by building upon a theory of 
‘social justice’ to primarily achieve social objectives. 
Chapter Six examines how a reform can synthesise the objectives of an efficient and 
effective insolvency system into the domestic system. This Chapter explores what 
measures are to be taken on board by the policymakers before, or in parallel with, 
reforming the insolvency law in Libya. It first examines what the Libyan legal system 
needs to accommodate to align with the objectives identified by theory and 
international benchmark and what the Libyan insolvency law should consider for a 
reform.  
Chapter Seven concludes the research. It highlights the main insights of every chapter 
of the research. The Chapter also states the original contribution to human knowledge 
this thesis claims to have made. It also states the research limitation and suggests 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 The Theoretical and Functional Aspects of the Insolvency 
Law 
2.1. Introduction 
The insolvency situation of a business touches the interests of a wide range of 
different stakeholders in the business. These stakeholder interests will conflict when the 
insolvency scenario occurs because the distressed business cannot meet all 
stakeholders’ demands.1 The problem in the insolvency situation is financial because 
assets are insufficient to meet all liabilities, so the law has to choose who to pay. This 
implies that the law must decide who bears the risk of insolvency which also means 
that there will be winners and losers in insolvency; some creditors may be paid in full 
where as other creditors may be paid only partially or even paid nothing.2 
This has been subject of debates in the academic literature and in practitioner 
commentaries regarding what approach should be employed to resolve the problem, or, 
more specifically, what interests the insolvency law should take into account. As such, 
should the insolvency law take into account all affected stakeholders or should it be 
confined to the interests of some particular stakeholders?3 Should the primary concern 
of the insolvency law solely be to maximise returns to the creditors and to protect their 
interests? Or should the insolvency law be concerned about the wider interests to 
achieve goals such as job preservation and maximising community welfare? This 
 
1 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (UTP 2003) 
57-58  
2 Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 1 
3 John Armour, ‘The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review’ (2001) ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No 197, at 8 
<www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp197.pdf> accessed 8 Nov 2019 
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Chapter will examine how these questions should be addressed under the Libyan law, 
taking account of the circumstances of the Libyan society. 
These questions have been approached by various scholars representing different 
theoretical normative approaches to corporate insolvency law. The theoretical 
approaches to insolvency law were divided by Baird into two main camps which are 
referred to as proceduralists and traditionalists.4 As will be discussed in this Chapter, 
the proponents of these camps hold completely different ideological views and 
responses in respect to the corporate or business insolvency. Proceduralists, driven by 
their economic view of insolvency, limit the insolvency law on pre-existing contractual 
entitlements. They believe that the insolvency law should exclusively deal with creditor 
distribution questions so as to maximise the creditors’ returns as the ultimate goal of 
the insolvency law.5 This theoretical camp builds their view on the fact that the 
insolvency law historically assumes that a property law is in existence and then solves 
the disputes arisen in insolvency between the various stakeholders in accordance with 
the provisions as provided by the property law. The result depends on the adopted 
approach which either respects or undermines the secured transactions law.6 
On the contrary, there are the traditionalists who adopt a wider focus to include 
social justice. They criticise the approach offered by the proceduralists for what they 
believe as its failure in fostering goals and values that are necessary to achieve social 
justice. They believe that limiting the goals of insolvency law on contractual terms 
ignores the effect of business failure upon various stakeholders far beyond those of 
 
4 Douglas Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale LJ 573, 576 
5 Thomas Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 
Yale LJ 857  
6 Jackson, the originator of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory (see below Sec 2.2.1) argues that all what the 
insolvency law should do is to respect the secured transactions law (property law) and the derived 
rights from it (non-insolvency entitlements). Ibid 871-72 
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creditors such the employment and the welfare of the community and therefore the 
insolvency law choices should be inclusive.7 
These theoretical debates are important to explore because they have influenced 
developments in insolvency policies and influenced decisions of both policymakers and 
courts in different jurisdictions. It must be noted that these long-standing debates arise 
from different ideologies and, thus, they have yet to generate consensus.8 It should be 
noted that there is a quite extensive literature on both sides of the debates, and the 
thesis will strictly investigate the prominent views on the matter. Literature in the USA 
has been enriched by the function and the philosophy of corporate and business 
insolvency law since the introduction of the US Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Reviewing 
the literature on theory is important because they set out normative principles that 
should be borne in mind when designing an insolvency system. However, the review of 
the literature of theory in this thesis does not assume that such literature will 
necessarily be suitable to the Libyan context as a developing country with different 
legal culture and different circumstances (represented by the lack of a functioning 
market system with weak property rights and inefficient institutions). Therefore, it is 
important to note that examining the theory literature must be read in light of the 
domestic circumstances and in the context of the Libyan legal system more generally. It 
is important to note that the discussion of theories, at the end of this Chapter, will 
evaluate which theory best meets the Libyan desires and circumstances. 
This Chapter aims at analysing and exploring the insolvency law in order to 
understand why it contains certain principles, and how these principles are justified, 
 
7 Robert Rasmussen, ‘An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice’ [1994] U Ill L Rev 1, 5. 
Also see: Ziad Azar, Guidelines for Efficient Bankruptcy and Creditor’s Rights Reform (LAP 2013) 2 
8 Samuel Etukakpan, ‘The Lost Voice in Insolvency: Theories of Insolvency Law and their Implications 
for the Employees’ (2014) 23 Nottingham LJ 34, 39-40  
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and what objectives it serves or should serve. In doing so, it will discuss and explore 
the theoretical approaches to the insolvency law. The discussion in this Chapter will be 
extended to analyse the views and objectives of insolvency as set forth in the 
international benchmarks particularly the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.9 Finally, this 
Chapter will examine the application of those theories in Libya taking into account the 
domestic situation and desires in the country as a transition economy.  
2.2. Corporate Insolvency Law Theories: An Ideological Divide 
As has been mentioned in the introduction of this Chapter, in answering the question 
of what interests the law should serve in the insolvency, there are two main groups of 
theories that have responded to this question, characterised in literature as 
proceduralists and traditionalists. The former group’s approach is influenced by their 
economic view of insolvency while the latter group in contrast is driven by a wider 
social view of the issue.10 These two groups of theoretical schools offer distinct 
perspectives regarding the role that the insolvency law plays or should play. The basic 
contention between the two schools of thought stems from the concern whether the 
insolvency law’s role should be extended to serve the interests of stakeholders as well 
as creditors.11 
Professor Baird describes proceduralists as a theoretical group which consists of 
almost entirely academic scholars whose main focus is on procedures. They believe 
that a coherent insolvency law must recognise how to be consistent with the rest of the 
legal system and how to function in a vibrant market economy.12 The other camp, 
 
9 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nations 2005) 
10 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 4) 576 
11 John Pottow, ‘Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’ (2004) 45 Va J Int’l 
L 935, 940-42 
12 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 4) 577 
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termed as traditionalists by Professor Baird, is described as scholars as well as 
bankruptcy practitioners and lawyers whose views largely reflect the traditional school 
that focuses on the rich store of bankruptcy cases that have developed over time. The 
basic approach they claim stems from a conviction that the bankruptcy laws play 
special roles in the legal system and advance substantive goals that are important and 
distinctively sensible.13  
The proceduralists view insolvency law as a part of the law of civil procedures. The 
insolvency law accordingly serves the substantive law; i.e. to apply and enforce the 
substantive law principles and satisfy the interests of holders of legal entitlements as it 
finds them under a non-insolvency law.14 Proceduralists believe that insolvency law is a 
response to the debt-collection problem and it should solely be employed as a debt-
collection device.15 Therefore, the law should play a role mainly to maximise the estate 
value for the benefit of creditors when the company is insolvent.16 The insolvency law, 
according to this group, should focus mainly on respecting and enforcing the claims of 
parties with legal rights and entitlements to the debtor’s property (non-insolvency 
entitlements) while other entitlements should not be a concern of the insolvency law 
unless doing so would maximise the value for creditors.17  
According to this group, the insolvency law should not result in addressing issues that 
are beyond the collective imperatives such as redistributions of entitlements and 
modifications to non-insolvency creditor interests such as job preservations and the 
 
13 Ibid 576-77 
14 Thomas Jackson, ‘A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1867, 
1873 
15 Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP 1986)  
16 See: Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5); Thomas Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers 
in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 725, 728; Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, 
‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 UChiL Rev 97, 100-01; Alan 
Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale LJ 1807, 1814  
17 Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5); Schwartz (n 16) 
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community’s economic prosperity.18 Because that will be detrimental to the parties 
with legal rights against the debtor’s property (creditors) and it has even been described 
as tantamount to “prima facie theft” and a “corruption of civil justice”.19 
On the other side, there are the group of traditionalists who reject the concept that the 
sole purpose of the insolvency law is to serve the interests of creditors. For them, the 
insolvency law is a response to the problem of business failure which is wider than the 
collective action problem as advocated by the proceduralists. The insolvency law 
according to this group should therefore be to address such a wider problem. According 
to them, business failure affects a wide range of diverse interests including not only the 
creditors’, but also other interests such as the shareholders, employees in preserving 
their jobs and social welfare as well as the community. Therefore, they believe that all 
affected stakeholders should be afforded an “equal”20 regard of consideration in 
corporate or business insolvency.21 
Further, the theoretical divide between the proceduralist and traditionalist approaches 
is extended to the issue regarding corporate or business rescue. As the proceduralists 
view the insolvency law’s sole role is to maximise returns to creditors, they believe that 
collective procedures should be supported only when they are likely to increase the 
aggregate pool of assets for the benefit of creditors.22 Therefore, individual actions by 
 
18 Christopher Frost, ‘Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process’ (1995) 
74 NCL Rev 75, 83. See also: Schwartz (n 16) 1809; Hamiisi Nsubuga, Employee Rights in Corporate 
Insolvency: A UK and US Perspective (Routledge 2019) 28  
19 Charles Mooney, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure’ (2004) 
61 Wash&Lee L Rev 931, 964-65  
20 However, they are very cautious when referring to the term “equal”. A right to equal concern is not 
intended to mean “equality” in the strict sense. Rather, it is intended to mean equal respect and concern 
should be regarded to all affected parties. Similarly, equal respect does not mean the same as equality 
of treatment. See: Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Contractarianism, Contractualism, and the Law of Corporate 
Insolvency’ (2007) SJLS 51, 87-90 
21 Donald Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 
Tex L Rev 541, 572-7; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 
Mich L Rev 336; Frost (n 18) 76-77  
22 Gerard McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law--an Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar 2008) 23 
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creditors should be avoided only because it leads to a disorderly piecemeal dismantling 
of the debtor’s business and decreasing the asset value.23 They believe that insolvent 
companies must “live or die in the market” and, accordingly, the insolvency law may 
restrict creditors’ actions against their debtor, but this is not to avoid the liquidation as 
much as to ensure that the race of creditors to collect their interests does not accelerate 
a disorderly liquidation.24 Reorganisation per se is not and should not be an insolvency 
law’s independent objective because, as their argument goes on, rescue does little to 
maximise the creditors’ diverse interests besides there is no guarantee that the process 
would result in a positive going concern value that creditors would benefit from.25  
By the account of traditionalists, the rescue of financially troubled businesses is one 
of the important goals of the insolvency law.26 For them, enhancing rescue procedures 
to effectively take place is beneficial to maintaining the going concern value of 
distressed yet viable businesses unlike an immediate liquidation which leads to 
negative effects for stakeholders far beyond those of the creditors. Because of this, 
rescue should be facilitated to take place as an alternative to liquidation as much as 
possible.27 
Accordingly, the discussion in this Chapter will start by exploring the pro-
proceduralist camp mostly represented by the Creditors’ Bargain Theory28 and then it 
 
23 Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 864 
24 For details see: Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 4) 578 
25 Sarra (n 1) 37; Frost (n 18) 92-94 
26 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 4) 577 
27 Donald Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 
717, 772-74; Douglas Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’ (1986) 15 Journal of 
Legal Studies 127, 133-34  
28  The Creditors’ Bargain Theory was the first theory that offered a framework for a normative 
evaluation of the insolvency law since it was devised by its generator Thomas Jackson in 1982. See 
below Sec 2.2.1. It should be borne in mind that this theory inspired much scholarship and debates 
have advanced in subsequent years and as a result it has been extensively criticised for its narrow 
approach for insolvency law as a response to the traditional collective action problem. More recent 
debate on this theory has been conducted by Professors David Skeel and George Triantis in their more 
recent article (‘Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1777). 
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will focus on the pro-traditionalist group of theories including the Communitarian 
Theory,29 Authentic Consent Model,30 Team Production Theory,31 Multiple Values 
Theory32 and the Forum Theory.33 As the thesis uses the principles and objectives of 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as a guideline for a reform alongside the theories, 
the discussion will be followed by elucidating the theoretical choices as reflected in the 
Legislative Guide.34 This will be followed by evaluating the merits and relevance of the 
theoretical approaches.35 The discussion of these theoretical choices indeed is important 
as it can be very informative for a law reform in a country. However, reviewing 
literature on theory will be carried out from the Libyan perspective because these 
theories are not necessarily relevant to Libya without consideration of the country’s 
context.36  
2.2.1. Proceduralist Approach 
The Proceduralist approach to insolvency is represented by the Creditors’ Bargain 
Theory (CBT) which was the earliest and most widely debated theory of normative 
distributional principles that dominated the insolvency law scholarships for the past 
decades. The CBT was devised by Professor Thomas Jackson through his writing in the 
1980s.37 This model was further developed by co-writers with Thomas Jackson like 
Douglas Baird and Robert Scott who strongly supported his view of the creditors’ 
 
Notwithstanding the debate, which may be counted valid to a great extent, Jackson’s theory remains 
useful as a theoretical framework for consideration because it has some relevance for Libya and 
because it offers clarity and simplicity as to how an insolvency law should function in the insolvency 
situation. (Further discussion is found in Sec 2.4 below) 
29 See below Sec 2.2.2.1 
30 See below Sec 2.2.2.2 
31 See below Sec 2.2.2.3 
32 See below Sec 2.2.2.4 
33 See below Sec 2.2.2.5 
34 See below Sec 2.3 
35 See Sec 2.4 
36 This evaluation will be in Sec 2.5 (Application of the Theoretical Debate to Libya) and Sec 2.6 
(Application of the Team Production Theory to Libya) 
37 In an article he published in 1982: Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 
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bargain theory.38 This theory was influenced by principles derived especially from the 
law and economics approach to law development that was generated in the United 
States in the mid-1970s.39 
The creditors’ bargain model offers a normative approach as to what insolvency law 
should be. This model is anchored on a hypothetical bargain, as Professor Jackson 
argues that the primary role of the insolvency law should be to address one single 
concern; i.e. to resolve the collective action problem of the debtor’s limited assets for 
the collective benefit of creditors.40 The insolvency of a debtor would create a problem 
where creditors dismember the debtors’ estate by the race to collect their rights 
individually on the basis of ‘first come, first served’ which results in the assets of the 
debtor being sold off piecemeal and then the dismemberment of the business.41 But 
when the business was worth more as a going concern, the creditors would find 
themselves faced with a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.42  
The CBT assumes that creditors cannot effectively solve this problem unless they act 
under a mandatory collective system, whether in the form of reorganisation or 
liquidation, to prevent the suboptimal outcomes of piecemeal liquidation, thereby 
eliminating the prisoner’s dilemma. This is advantageous because it increases the 
 
38 Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15); Baird and Jackson (n 16); Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott, 
‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 
Va L Rev 155. Also see: Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 70  
39  Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values’ (n 27) 717; Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: 
Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 27  
40 Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values’ (n 27) 717; Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 
5). Also see: Armour (n 3) 11 
41 Schwartz (n 16) 1840; Jackson and Scott (n 38) 159-60; Douglas Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ 
(1987) 50 Law&Contemp Probs 173, 184 
42 The prisoner’s dilemma is a problem of choice in which everyone is in a worse-off situation. It arises 
in the absence of cooperation between individual creditors when their debtor becomes insolvent as each 
creditor has an incentive to act individually to promote its self interests. This leads to a less efficient 
outcome for the collective creditors by disorderly liquidation of the debtor’s business than if the 
creditors acted collectively. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 862 
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aggregate pool of assets for the benefit of the creditors as a group.43 Insolvency law, 
according to Jackson, exists to solve the distribution problem of ‘first come, first 
served’ among creditors and this is the advantage and justification for having, and an 
answer to the question of why do we have, corporate insolvency law in the first 
place?44  
The CBT rests on the argument that the creditors would realise that such an 
individualist behaviour is disadvantageous to the group as a whole and they would 
agree to participate in a collective manner and cooperate with each other to avoid such 
collective disadvantages under a mandatory collective regime.45 The CBT believes that 
this is the bargain creditors would make ex ante if they had the opportunity to do so 
before they enter into transactions with their insolvent debtor and the insolvency law is 
seen by this theory as a product of this hypothetical bargain.46 Uunder the hypothetical 
bargain, creditors would be operating under a “veil of ignorance” and so would not 
know in advance what sort of creditor they would be.47 
The hypothetical bargain of creditors assumes that the sole role of insolvency law 
should be to protect the non-insolvency entitlements48 of secured creditors, particularly 
property rights. The insolvency law, therefore, should not permit distributional 
objectives among different classes of interests in insolvency unless such distributions 
 
43 Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15) 14-16 
44 See Jackson’s newly published article: Jackson, ‘A Retrospective Look’ (n 14) 1870-71 
45 Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 861-63; Jackson and Scott (n 38) 159-60 
46 Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 860; Jackson and Scott (n 38) 173; Keay 
and Walton (n 39) 27-28 
47 Jackson justifies his hypothetical creditors’ bargain in insolvency using social contract theory as an 
application of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”. On his reference to the work of (John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice) see: Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15) 17 at f.n. 22  
48 ‘Non-insolvency entitlements’ refers to the entitlements or rights that exist by the operation of law, 
contracts or by any other source of law unconnected with the insolvency regime. See: Jackson, 
‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5) 858 
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are necessary to increase net asset distributions to the creditors as a group.49 This is 
because, from the collective point of view, the distributions will undermine the primary 
concerns of the collectivisation; i.e. to protect the creditors’ property rights, and will 
reduce the relative attractiveness of security to secured creditors.50  
The CBT rejects the consideration of non-contractual entitlements of stakeholders 
such as the employees, the local government or the community beyond their 
entitlements as creditors in the process. Such interests, accordingly, are considered only 
to the degree that such stakeholders are creditors and hold enforceable legal rights or 
claims against the debtor’s property recognised by non-insolvency laws.51 Beyond that 
point, however, such stakeholders would have non-creditor claims. Therefore, concerns 
such as the benefits arising from continuance of the business to employees as 
employees, or the local community of suppliers and consumers as such, should be 
considered neither by lawmakers nor insolvency courts. Rather, they should be dealt 
with outside of the insolvency procedures because that to consider these matters in 
insolvencies would create conflicts with the collective goal of maximising asset 
value.52  
Regarding the issue of rescue, Jackson argues that rescue procedures may be allowed 
to take place but to the extent that they are necessary to maximise values for the 
existing creditors.53 As has been discussed, the CBT justifies having a mandatory 
collective system of insolvency by arguing that interested people would cooperate with 
 
49 Jackson and Scott (n 38) 164, f.n. 17. See also: McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 22) 22; David Skeel 
and George Triantis, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1777, 
1779  
50  Jackson and Scott (n 38) 178; Robert Scott, ‘Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’ Bargain 
Heuristic’ (1986) 53 UChiL Rev 690, 707 
51 Jackson and Scott (n 38) 177-78; Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15) 28; Mooney (n 19) 943; Goode 
(n 38) 72-73 
52 Mooney (n 19) 959; Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (n 41) 185; Keay and Walton (n 39) 28 
53 Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15) 2 
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each other if they knew that they would be better off as a group if they did so than if 
they reacted on an individual basis.54 But what Jackson rejects about corporate or 
business rescue is that when the purpose behind the rescue process is to achieve goals 
beyond maximising returns to creditors. Accordingly, if rescue is undertaken to keep a 
business alive to implement policies like job preservation or maintaining community 
welfare, this should not be implemented within the province of the insolvency law but 
rather in non-insolvency laws.55 This is because, according to Jackson, objectives and 
policies of rescue to preserve non-creditor stakeholder interests are not independent 
insolvency law policies and should not be thought of as the legitimate concern of the 
insolvency law.56  
The CBT’s model for insolvency law analysis has been very influential, not least in 
inspiring thought by others. Debates and theories of insolvency scholars have begun by 
either arguing within the CBT’s assumptions or by making its assumptions their first 
and sometimes their primary subject of debate. It is even acknowledged by those who 
fundamentally reject its model that the approach of CBT is the only sustained 
principled-analysis theory of law governing insolvent businesses.57 Its perspectives can 
be seen reflected even in some jurisdictions that are known as creditor-friendly systems 
like the German Insolvency Code of 199458 and the UK insolvency regime.59  
 
54 CBT is a version of social contract theory applied not to a society but to a discrete area of law and it 
depends on a thought of experiment. See: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (HUP 1972) 
55 Scholars recently argue that insolvency law is different from restructuring law. While the insolvency 
law responds to a common pool problem and protects the common pool of the limited assets from 
individual enforcement actions, restructuring law deviates from this and is not confined to the common 
pool problem. Rather, it facilitates restructurings governed by contract law rules and principles. See: 
Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of 
Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus Org Law Rev 615 
56 Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15) 209-10; Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (n 41) 184-86 
57 Rizwaan Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005) 33-34  
58 Bo Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: The Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue (Edward Elgar 
2016) 10 
59 The UK insolvency law prioritises the interests of creditors over all other stakeholder interests in 
insolvency. However, the UK system employs a more wealth maximisation goal than the CBT which 
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It should be noted that what CBT is concerned about regarding rescue is the way the 
reorganisation procedures are set up under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
1978. The CBT rejects the redistributive purpose as set up under the Chapter 11 
reorganisations because this will affect the ex ante rights and priorities of secured 
creditors. For example, the reorganisation system under Chapter 11 allows for 
conversion of debt into equity shares and it also enables the new lender to have a 
priority over the existing creditors by the super-priority system.60 From the CBT’s 
perspectives, such features are objectionable because they undermine the substantive 
rights of secured creditors. The CBT accepts rescue when its purpose is only to 
maximise returns to secured creditors. If business rescue procedures lead to the rights 
and the priorities of secured creditors being affected, then the CBT is more likely to be 
concerned. That is why Baird and Jackson argue that the alternative procedure under 
Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, under which going concern sales are 
permissible, is consistent with their theory insights because it does not interfere with 
the non-insolvency rights of creditors.61 Also, CBT objects to giving the controlling 
power in the procedures to parties other than secured creditors. The CBT rejects that on 
the basis that creditors’ priorities and rights will be affected by other parties controlling 
the process.62 Therefore, the CBT can be less hostile to business rescue models under 
which ex ante agreed rights and priorities of secured creditors would be protected 
because this is what parties would agree to if they could do so ex ante. 
 
focuses on maximisation of returns solely to secured creditors. This can be seen by, for example, the 
priority of some preferential creditors, the employment of the rescue of distressed businesses as a going 
concern which go beyond maximisation of creditor’s return, and the duty of the administrator to 
maximise the returns for the unsecured creditors. For details see: Armour (n 3) 12-13; John Armour, 
Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: 
Evidence from the UK’ (2012) 8 RLE 101, 106-07 
60 McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 22) 288-92 
61 David Webb, ‘An Economic Evaluation of Insolvency Procedures in the United Kingdom: Does the 
1986 Insolvency Act Satisfy the Creditors’ Bargain?’ (1991) 43 Oxford Economic Papers 139, 154-55  
62 See generally: ibid  
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Moreover, the CBT shows that the market appreciates an insolvency system that is 
capable of promoting efficiency of resource management and ensuring predictable 
outcomes of the process. It is said that the perspectives of this theory offer a very 
simple and clear answer to an essential question about the role of the law in the event of 
insolvency, which is to maximise creditors’ returns. The CBT argues that 
reorganisation process, for example, may lead to prolonging the life of nonviable 
businesses with no assurance for successful outcomes and this may likely lead to the 
depletion of the creditors’ entitlements.63 It assumes that the insolvency law 
corresponds to a significant degree with efficient market hypothesis. Under this 
hypothesis, the market will decide if the company should live or die. Therefore, they 
view the insolvency law as a system that should lead to increased efficiency by 
facilitating the re-allocation of resources and capital to their highest and best use. If the 
assets of failed businesses are reallocated to more succeeding businesses, this will 
result in better outcomes; i.e. jobs and prosperity will continue to flow.64  
The approach of the CBT is also simple as it focuses primarily on maximising the 
interests of contractual creditors. The CBT offers a more informed and sophisticated 
approach to determine when and to what extent to intervene with the contractual rights 
and when and to what extent insolvency law should derogate from the contract law 
rules and principles. As will be discussed later, the traditionalist view about the role of 
the insolvency law allows account to be taken of a wide range of stakeholder interests 
in the scenario of insolvency to ensure fair distribution in insolvency, yet they suffer 
 
63  Hamiisi Nsubuga, ‘The Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law: Remedying the Theoretical 
Limitations in the Traditionalist and the Proceduralist Perspectives on Corporate Insolvency’ (2018) 60 
IJLMA 824, 829 f.n. 8  
64  Thomas Jackson and David Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery’ (2013) University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper no 13-27 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306138> accessed 8 Mar 2020. Also see: Sarah Paterson, ‘Rethinking 
Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-first Century’ (2016) 36 OJLS 697, 699 
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from weakness as they provide no clear answer as to how to balance these various 
interests against each other65 despite the fact of their limitlessness.66 
However, what elicits the debate about CBT mostly is its central assumption and 
consideration only for hypothetical contract creditors; that is the creditors’ bargain is 
merely to take into account those who have legal claims against the debtor’s assets. 
Therefore, the insolvency law’s primary concern should be to maximise pre-insolvency 
agreed rights of creditors as it finds them under non-insolvency law. This account fails 
therefore to consider the legitimacy of other interests in the community such as the 
employees and the community at large which do not qualify as contract creditors.67 
Professor Warren argues that the important objective of corporate insolvency and 
rescue laws is to function to maximise the assets value not only for the benefit of 
creditors but also for the benefit of all stakeholders who are affected by the insolvency 
of the debtor.68 For example, business failure will have a negative impact on 
stakeholders such as “employees who will lose jobs, taxing authorities that will lose 
ratable property, suppliers that will lose customers, nearby property owners who will 
lose beneficial neighbors, and current customers who must go elsewhere”.69  
Similarly, Professor Finch points out that the CBT’s vision fails to respect the 
continuation of business relationships that are not formalised in contracts and also it 
neglects to consider the interests of those who suffer the greater hardships caused by 
 
65 Nsubuga, Employee Rights (n 18) 36 
66 It could be argued that the traditionalist approach provides a less simple story to tell. However, the 
story of the traditionalists is responding to a real complexity in the situation of insolvency which is the 
impacts that the insolvency or the business rescue has upon various stakeholders within the society. 
This in itself is a more far difficult story to tell and insolvency law should therefore be responsive to 
this fact and attuned to the affected stakeholders. See: Rasmussen, ‘An Essay’ (n 7) 5 
67 Karen Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash 
ULQ 1031, 1033 
68 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy in an Imperfect World’ (n 21) 354-55; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ 
(1987) 54 UChiL Rev 775, 787. Also see: Lynn LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy 
Reorganization’ (2004) 57 Vand L Rev 741, 765-66  
69 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy in an Imperfect World’ (n 21) 355. Also see: Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 68) 
787-88 
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business failure.70 The CBT’s strict adherence to its perspectives of maximising 
creditors’ returns during the insolvency process is likely to lead to unfairness vis-à-vis 
other stakeholder interests because most returns will be enjoyed by secured creditors.71 
As such, the CBT was attacked on the ground that its assumptions are not reflective to 
what is claimed to be an application of the John Rawls A Theory of Justice. Rather, it 
consists of many features that contradict the aspects of the Rawls’s theory. The CBT 
does not redress the issue of inequalities in bargaining power because, in the CBT, the 
people that are protected are the most powerful parties in the bargaining table, which is 
unfair.72 
In addition, the assumptions of this theory are said to be far from reality because it 
suggests that all creditors are equal in terms of knowledge, experience and influence. 
However, creditors are not uniform as some are stronger than others. Creditors like tort 
victims and employees may not agree to the hypothetical ex ante bargain which the 
CBT posits.73 
Finally, a major criticism to the CBT has recently been advised by Professors Skeel 
and Triantis. The hypothetical bargain in the CBT was built on the assumption that 
creditors are so dispersed that they are unable to make actual contracting therefore the 
need for extrapolation of a consensus based on hypothetical bargaining between 
creditors ex ante. They argue that what the CBT failed to acknowledge is that creditors 
now in practice can and do make actual bargains both ex ante and ex post.74 Skeel and 
 
70 Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 OJLS 227, 234 
71 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 68) 800, 803; Nsubuga, ‘Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law’ 
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73 Keay and Walton (n 39) 28-29. See also: McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 22) 24 
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Triantis argue that insolvency law is less mandatory in nature; shifting towards 
implementing a more contractarian framework and even encourages contracting during 
insolvency than before at the time when the CBT was devised. According to them, the 
traditional collective action problem is no longer a core objective in the current 
insolvency practice thus maximising returns to creditors is also no longer the sole 
objective of the insolvency law.75 Because in reality, insolvency law gives no special 
respect to non-insolvency entitlements and it functions almost exclusively by adjusting 
and interfering with those non-insolvency entitlements by facilitating an ex post 
structured renegotiation framework (ex post bargain).76 
2.2.2. Traditionalist Approaches 
The starting point of traditionalist theories is that the focus on maximising returns to 
creditors, as advised by the proceduralists, oversimplifies the issues to which the 
insolvency law responds. The insolvency law rather exists as a response to more 
complex problems that shape real life and implicate various moral, political, social as 
well as economic considerations.77 The traditionalist approaches are in agreement that 
the role that should be played by the insolvency law should be beyond only maximising 
returns to creditors. It should be noted, however, that there are variations in these 
different traditionalist approaches as to how the various stakeholder interests affected 
by the insolvency can be defined by the insolvency law and only selected approaches 
will be discussed in this chapter. The thesis will discuss selected traditionalist theories 
 
75 For details see: ibid 
76 Anthony Casey, ‘Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy’ 
[2020] Colum L Rev, 2-3 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353871> accessed 06 
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before discussing towards the end of this Chapter the approach that arguably best suits 
the Libyan context.78 
2.2.2.1. Communitarian Theory 
The communitarian theory was generated in dissatisfaction with the model offered by 
the CBT and it has put a vision forward to explain the role that the insolvency law 
should play, distinctively from CBT. This theory’s proponents offer a potential solution 
with an emphasis on a variety of constituent interests to be considered and their 
attention has largely focussed on the public law and policy rather than solely on private 
rights and wealth maximisation of creditors.79 The communitarians argue that the 
insolvency laws have simultaneously competing objectives including not only 
maximising returns to creditors, but also preserving the going concern value of viable 
businesses, preserving jobs and community welfare that may be affected by business 
failure and also enhancing the credit system generally. All such competing objectives 
are legitimate and worth preserving, but the sole focus on asset value maximisation will 
lead to dismissal of such objectives.80  
Therefore, the communitarians suggest that the welfare of the community should be 
very much central to the corporate insolvency law because this will achieve a better life 
for all by distributing responsibilities fairly among all participants in the community 
impacted by the insolvency.81 The communitarians advocate that in the distribution of 
asset value in the insolvency the wider interests of stakeholders, including the 
community, should be taken on board, allowing them to share the value of the insolvent 
 
78 This will be discussed in Sec 2.6 (Application of the Team Production Theory to Libya) 
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company with higher priority claimants.82 The redistribution scheme according to this 
theory is an unavoidable objective of the insolvency law which is designed to 
redistribute losses and costs amongst those at risk.83 
The communitarians argue that there is no justification why issues caused by 
insolvency, and for no other reason, should be governed away from the insolvency law. 
Professor Warren expressed her frustration with the economic approach on which 
theories such as the CBT are based and argued that the collective theory sees the 
collective pool as a tool that is used as “an excuse to impose a distributional scheme 
without justifying it, and, incidentally, a way to work in a damn good deal for secured 
creditors”; an approach that “eliminates without discussion or proof any other values 
that may be served by bankruptcy”.84 
The communitarianism vision considers that individuals share common interests and 
they are obliged to act in the best interests of the welfare of their community at large, 
even if this would reduce or prejudice some of their individual freedoms.85 Professor 
Warren firmly affirms that the law, by accepting the rescue of insolvent businesses, 
acknowledges the losses of those parties affected by the insolvency of the debtor and 
distributes some of that loss caused by the default. The insolvency law, according to 
Warren, may allow for delay in liquidation of the business, even if this is inevitable, in 
order to allow all parties affected by the insolvency more time to accommodate the new 
circumstances as a way of redistribution.86  
 
82 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, 
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As far as the welfare of the community is concerned, this theory, furthermore, favours 
the rescue of insolvent businesses over liquidation.87 This objective is very central to 
this theory as communitarians claim that the rescue objective should be regarded as an 
important consideration in insolvency objectives. Under this approach, corporate or 
business rescue should always be permitted where, by doing so, the community at large 
would be better off even if this would have unfavourable results for other parties.88 This 
is contrary to the CBT attitude to rescue which, as noted previously, is not considered 
an independent objective of the insolvency law unless the process would maximise 
values for the creditors.89  
2.2.2.2. Authentic Consent Model 
Unlike the CBT, the Authentic Consent Model theory (ACM)90 has developed a 
wider concern about the interests that the insolvency law should serve. Mokal, the 
originator of the theory, argues that the insolvency law’s substantive goal is in fact 
based on a just disposition to all affected stakeholders in the insolvency process. The 
ACM rejects the exclusive approach offered by the CBT which restricts participation in 
the ex ante hypothetical agreement only to those parties who have contracted for legal 
rights to the debtor’s assets upon the occurrence of insolvency.91 He, therefore, rejects 
the notion of the CBT because it creates a problem of bargaining advantages and 
imbalances which stronger parties (secured creditors) would exploit and overwhelm the 
weak such as the employees and unsecured creditors in insolvency, which is considered 
 
87 It should be noted that the communitarians believe that rescue should not take place where businesses 
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arbitrary. Based on the principle of justice, Mokal argues that his model would redress 
the bargaining advantages problem in contrast to the CBT which only reflects them.92  
The ACM demands that the interests of all stakeholders affected by the insolvency of 
the debtor should be granted equal weight of concern and respect in insolvency 
procedures.93 The ACM adopts a broader answer in that affected parties are not 
restricted to those who have contractual legal rights to the debtor’s property. Rather 
they include those with interests that may be damaged or undervalued by the event of 
the insolvency and therefore they should also have a choice to select the principles 
governing their interests or alternatively have their interests fairly respected.94  
The ACM advocates for an inclusive approach that offers participation to a wide 
range of stakeholders which would be excluded by a theory like CBT. However, it 
should be noted that this theory limits its breadth only to those parties who can prove 
that their interests are affected in a way peculiar to the insolvency of the company. 
Accordingly, any issues related to business failure but which are not peculiar to 
insolvency are to be settled out of insolvency law.95  
This contractualist approach from which the ACM has developed is anchored on the 
philosophy of the early social contracts which assumes that if citizens are given the 
opportunity to submit to procedures and principles, they would agree in advance on 
those procedures and principles to which they have to submit.96 The ACM assumes that 
the insolvency law lays down the terms of fair cooperation between all parties in the 
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insolvency.97 The character of co-operation on which the ACM is based is influenced 
by Rawls’s theory of “Political Liberalism”98 which defines co-operation as:  
“a. … Cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures that those 
cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conducts. 
 b. Cooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms that each 
participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them”.99  
Accordingly, the ACM-type of justice is based on the notion that in the insolvency 
scenario co-operation between all stakeholders is facilitated amongst them as moral 
equals. And co-operation, according to this theory, implies that those who are affected 
by issues (whether social, commercial or legal circumstances) that are peculiar to 
insolvency, and triggered only by insolvency, should work together and “co-operate by 
each being guided by just insolvency law principles in pursuing their own self interest, 
and thereby allowing all others similarly to pursue their self-interest guided by the same 
principles” because this is “a fair cooperative venture for mutual advantage”.100 
2.2.2.3. Team Production Theory 
The Team Production Theory (TPT), as its name suggests, was originally prevalent in 
economics literature trying to apply economic analysis by outlining a framework for 
justifying economic efficiency of business organisations.101 It was later approved and 
developed by the corporate law scholars notably Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout in their 
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article entitled ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’.102 This theory has had 
its influence on the theories and debates of corporate insolvency laws. Professor 
LoPucki approved the TPT and applied its foundations on insolvency law theory. 
Through his theory ‘Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’,103 
LoPucki has contributed to the theoretical debates on corporate insolvency law and 
developed it into an alternative normative theory of explaining and justifying the 
corporate insolvency law.104 
It should be mentioned here that literature on corporate governance systems was 
dominated for decades by the notion that the purpose of the company was to increase 
its profits or to maximise the wealth for the benefit of the common shareholders. Such 
theorists, accordingly, believe that the managerial accountability to the company’s 
shareholders is the only corporate law problem while consideration of the stakeholder 
interests is not, and they should therefore be considered by other legal systems.105 The 
agency theory assumes that the company exists only to serve its shareholders simply 
because they have made a financial contribution to it. Therefore, the other corporate 
stakeholders are considered mere hired hands to serve the owners as their agents.106 
This approach’s main focus is on the assets of the debtor and those parties with legal 
entitlements to those assets in insolvency. This perceived view seems to tie in with the 
basis of a theory like the CBT which considers only hypothetical contract creditors and 
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views the assets of the debtor accordingly as being subject only to the creditors’ claims 
in insolvency.107  
The Team Production Theory of corporate law has been established on a ground 
completely opposed to the corporate agency theory and it posits a different account of 
what corporate law should achieve. The advocates of the TPT believe that a company 
owes its going concern value that exceeds the value of its mere assets to its general 
body of stakeholders who constitute the team members who include the creditors, 
suppliers, managers and employees, not only the shareholders.108 Such going concern 
contributions made by the team members are also valuable to the corporate entity and 
should therefore be considered and preserved by the law.109  
It follows that the TPT’s response to the question of what interests should be served 
by the insolvency law is that the insolvency law should take into account the interests 
of all stakeholders that contributed to the company’s going concern, not only those who 
made the financial contributions.110 This is because, as justified by the TPT, team 
members have made their contribution to the aggregate value of the company and 
therefore they have various degrees of economic interests in it. According to this 
approach, all corporate obligations to all members who made firm-specific investments 
to the company should be honoured when they cannot protect their investments in any 
other ways. Put this in context, parties who made a human capital investment, 
particularly long-term employees, could also be protected by preserving their jobs 
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rather than being made redundant.111 This would also mean that in order to facilitate a 
company honouring its obligations and commitments to its members in the insolvency 
situation, legal entitlements of some creditors would be altered or reduced to be 
redistributed to other team members.112 
Such an inclusive approach of the TPT favours rescue over liquidation in order to 
preserve the going concern value that is made by team members. They view 
preservation of the debtor company and the maintenance of the going concern of the 
business as the top priority of the societies even though it is at the expense of some 
individual rights of insolvency participants because this is what team members intended 
at the time of contracting.113 If an insolvent company with a going concern surplus is 
forced into liquidation, that going concern value will be lost because such relationships 
will stop contributing to the company as they will collapse by liquidation. One of the 
TPT objectives is to allow the insolvent debtor to remain operating in times of distress 
if this would benefit the team members more than if the debtor’s business is 
liquidated.114 
2.2.2.4. Multiple Values Theory 
The main proponents of the Multiple Values Theory (MVs) are Warren115 and 
Korobkin.116 In his response to the CBT, Professor Korobkin in his theory, which he 
labelled the ‘value-based account’, offers a normative explanation of insolvency law 
rejecting the economic account of the CBT that limits the role of the insolvency law as 
 
111 Ibid 764-67 
112 Butler and Gilpatric (n 109) 280-85 
113 LoPucki (n 68) 769. LoPucki in this article refers to the work of Peter Drucker (Concept of the 
Corporation ) and quotes his writing “Society must insist on the maintenance of the “going concern” 
and must if necessary sacrifice to it the individual rights of shareholders, creditors, workers, and, in the 
last analysis, even of consumers”. Peter Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (John Day 1946) 21 
114 LoPucki (n 68) 764 
115 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 68) 
116 Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values’ (n 27) 
59 
 
a tool to collectivise debt recovery for the benefit of creditors.117 On her account, 
Professor Warren believes that the insolvency law’s distributional objective should not 
be limited to the debt-collection and priority issues but should encompass wider issues 
reflecting the range of values and interests that may be hurt by a business collapse.118 
Professor Korobkin argues that the insolvency law should be viewed as a response to 
the various aspects of business failure that include moral, political, social and also, but 
not limited to, the economic aspect of distress. He disapproves the idea of viewing the 
insolvency estate of an enterprise as only a pool of assets. Instead, it should be viewed 
as “an evolving and dynamic enterprise, capable of having diverse aims”.119  
In response to the question asked by Professor Baird issuing a challenge to explain 
why an insolvency law exists at all, the value based theory argues that the insolvency 
law exists as a response to the problem of financial and economic distress which has an 
effect on various interests and values. The insolvency law’s response to this problem, 
therefore, should be by providing a forum in which those competing interests and 
values, such as of the employees, managers and the community, affected by business 
distress are expressed and sometimes recognised and this is what makes the insolvency 
law distinct.120  
As an inclusive approach, this theory differs completely from the perspectives on 
which the CBT has been based. It acknowledges that the insolvency law is unique from 
non-insolvency laws and thus has a broader role to play because it exists in reaction to 
the financial and economic distress, by which diverse interests and values are affected, 
 
117 Ibid 721 
118 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 68) 796. Also see: Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values’ (n 27) 769 
119 Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values’ (n 27) 721-22 
120 Ibid 764-66 and 789. Korobkin argues that no law other than the insolvency law responses to the 
problem of financial distress. The insolvency law is not simply a response to the debt collection 
problem which could be addressed under non-insolvency laws. Ibid 766 
60 
 
rather than to the debt collection problem that concerns only with creditors’ returns. As 
a response to business failure, the insolvency law should establish a balance between 
all affected interests; establishing priority of creditors and serving the interests of 
parties who do not have legal entitlements to the debtor’s assets but who have interests 
in the continuation of its business such as the employees and the community.121  
2.2.2.5. Forum Theory 
The forum theory was published by Professor Flessner who advocates a traditionalist 
approach in responding to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory.122 It conceptualises the 
insolvency process in procedural terms rather than in terms of substantial objectives.123 
It claims that various parties that have concerns about the business cannot be limited 
merely to creditors and shareholders. The scenario of insolvency affects wider 
stakeholder interests beyond those of the creditors and shareholders. Therefore, the law 
should consider such interests though they may not immediately represent monetary 
claims, yet they are real. Accordingly, the function of the insolvency law and 
procedures should be to establish a forum in which to consider all those interests and 
rights affected by business failure.124 For Flessner, the established forum would offer a 
practical resolution for the interested parties as it would enable them “either to adjust 
gradually and more easily to the inevitable closure of the firm, or, if it is feasible, to 
agree on a rescue plan and on the contributions necessary to support it”.125 
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2.2.2.6. Remarks on the Traditionalist Approaches 
From the above discussion, the traditionalist theories agree with the CBT that the 
priority given by property law to secured creditors is important and should be respected 
by the insolvency law. However, where they disagree with the CBT is that they view 
the priority of secured creditors as not sacrosanct and they consider that it should not 
displace the aims of the insolvency law which might desire to respond to other valuable 
interests such as the employees, local community and other stakeholders. Secured 
creditors from the traditionalist point of view should accept the redistributive goals of 
insolvency law and they should make a sacrifice for other valuable social imperatives 
in the insolvency system.  
The discussion provided by the traditionalist theories offered elegant debates for the 
role of insolvency law as an alternative to the narrow approach of the CBT. However, 
they suffer from a number of weaknesses for which they have been criticised. The 
common criticism to the inclusive approach of the traditionalists is that they, unlike the 
CBT, lack the degree of focus necessary for the design of insolvency law.126 The 
inclusive approaches are criticised that they represent unlimited interests in insolvency 
because the stakeholder interests at stake in insolvency are potentially indeterminate 
which would create uncertainty regarding to order of priority in insolvency. As the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide recommends, the insolvency law should set out clearly 
the priority of claimants in the insolvency procedures.127  
It is argued that such an inclusive approach will face practical difficulty or even 
impossibility as to how courts will measure all affected stakeholders or weigh them 
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against each other.128 This is because courts are not necessarily the best placed party to 
decide what should, or should not, be a community issue, or what should be considered 
as best interest of the community.129 Further criticism is addressed to a theory like the 
ACM. This theory supposes that all parties are free and equal in the negotiation process 
which makes the principle chosen fair and just. However, this is unrealistic as creditors’ 
behaviour in the real life is not homogeneous and creditors’ actions are not always 
motivated by economic rationality but also by wider considerations and, therefore, 
relevant creditors do not and cannot behave and act rationally at all times.130 As 
criticised by Professor McCormack, parties in real life negotiations may not be pleased 
with such ideal qualities. In fact, individuals may have dramatically different 
conceptions about fairness or justice depending on their political, philosophical or 
religious beliefs.131  
The criticism raised against such inclusive approaches may drive one to conclude that 
a theory that offers a clear response to insolvency and practicable implementation of 
the law may be desirable. A theory like the CBT definitely subscribes to such concerns 
as its response to the insolvency is very clear and easily applicable where at least one 
type of interests will be well-protected.  
Although the arguments against the traditionalist approach may be counted valid, this 
approach is still commendable. Its normative explanation for the function of the 
insolvency law as a response to financial and economic distress rather than as a debt 
collection problem provides better solutions to the impact of business failure as it 
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contributes towards the recognition of a wide range of interests that are affected by 
business failure and the recognition of rescue as an alternative to liquidation.  
The inclusive approaches are welcomed by many constituencies in the society 
because their interests are given equal weight and respect in the insolvency 
proceedings. Employees, for example, will potentially gain advantage from such an 
approach because their jobs can be preserved.132 As Professor Warren argues, the 
distributional effect of a business failure on non-creditor parties should attract more 
attention by the insolvency law because the impact of insolvency is not limited to those 
who are classified as creditors.133 Such a perspective is valuable in considering reforms 
in a developing country like Libya where the interests of a wide range of people must 
be accommodated specially for social considerations. As will be discussed later,134 the 
inclusive approach of the traditionalists can contribute to mitigation of social injustice 
and instability and this has been a popular demand of citizens in the country especially 
since the social uprising took place in 2011. Under this approach, various important 
interests can be protected. Potentially the employees would retain their jobs, the 
welfare of the community can be enhanced and the local suppliers can continue trading 
by ensuring that distressed businesses are supported to continue their activities and 
emerge from their distress. 
The Cork Report in the UK, which influenced the objectives of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (IA 1986) and the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 2002), encourages the adoption of an 
approach that goes beyond achieving the economic concerns of creditors. It states that 
the aims of a good insolvency law should be to, inter alia, “… recognise that the effects 
of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the insolvent and his creditors, 
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but that other interests of society or other groups in society are vitally affected by the 
insolvency and its outcomes, and to ensure that these public interests are recognised 
and safeguarded;”.135 The Cork report also affirmed that “… a concern for the 
livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an enterprise which may well be the 
lifeblood of a whole town or even a region, is a legitimate factor to which a modern law 
of insolvency must have regard. The chain reaction consequent upon any given failure 
can potentially be so disastrous to creditors, employees and the community that it must 
not be overlooked”.136 This demonstrates a clear endorsement of an inclusive 
approach.137 A closer to home example is Tunisia where insolvency laws were 
reformed in 1995, influenced by its French insolvency laws of 1984 and 1985, geared 
towards rescuing distressed businesses, preserving employment and eliminating 
business’s liabilities.138 
Regarding the indeterminacy problem that is addressed to the traditionalist theories, a 
theory like the TPT arguably provides an adequate response to this criticism. Under this 
theory, the interests of variety of stakeholders can be defined and limited specifically to 
the group of people who have contributed to the necessary firm-specific investment to 
the company. According to Blair and Scout, team members to the firm-specific 
investment includes “… shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly 
other groups, such as creditors”.139 By using the notion of a firm-specific investment, 
people whose human or financial firm-specific investment that cannot be separated 
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from the going concern of the business will be counted in as a team member and then 
should be served by insolvency law. The firm-specific investment so recognised might 
include the long-term skilled employees because they are important to the continuance 
of the business. It might also justify protection to long-term suppliers of specialist 
goods and products to the business and have a business relationship with the debtor 
business for a long time by which the two businesses become dependent on each 
other.140 
2.3. Insolvency Theory in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide  
International benchmarks, as embodied into the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, have 
integrated insolvency choices in response to the question of whose interests the 
insolvency law should cater for. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide’s central 
underlying philosophy is to promote business rescue with providing an appropriate 
balance between rescue and liquidation.141 The Legislative Guide also consists of high-
order principles, termed as key objectives,142 that are designed to reduce concerns that 
the Legislative Guide is solely concerned with protection of the creditor interests, or 
alternatively the interests of the debtor, and it explicitly committed at the beginning to 
achieve a balance between the different economic interests in the insolvency process.143 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide employs a more friendly approach towards 
business rescue and reorganisation than a theory like the Creditors’ Bargain does.144 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide justifies rescue as it would achieve multiple 
 
140 For details see: LoPucki (n 68) 765-70 
141 Terence Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb and Bruce Carruthers, ‘Missing Debtors: National Lawmaking 
and Global Norm-Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes’ in Ralph Brubaker, Robert Lawless and 
Charles Tabb (eds), A Debtor World: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Debt (OUP 2012) 265 
142 Rec1 of UNCITRAL Legislative Guide identified eight key objectives. 
143  Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law: The UNCITRAL 
Experience (Edward Elgar 2011) 154-55  
144 The CBT accepts corporate or business rescue only when purpose behind such a process is entirely to 
maximise the returns to secured creditors. See above Sec 2.2.1 
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purposes that go beyond merely maximising returns to secured creditors to encompass 
advantages such as preserving jobs for employees and trade for suppliers by preserving 
viable businesses and their going concern value.145 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
enhances this objective by the imposition of a moratorium on the creditors’ actions to 
collect their debts or repossess their property that are essential to the operation of the 
business. By employing this strategy, the Legislative Guide seems to be founded upon 
maximising wealth for the benefit of the many interests affected by business failure.146 
The central principle of business rescue, however, is not prioritised above all others in 
the Legislative Guide. The proprietary rights of creditors may be affected to ensure 
successful outcomes of the process, but they are not sacrificed to attain other goals of 
the rescue.147 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is more friendly with the property 
rights of creditors than the traditionalist approaches mostly are, as it considers the 
maximisation of returns to creditors an overriding objective of the insolvency law.148 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide accepts and encourages business rescue but while it 
does so, it minimises the risk associated with business rescue by subordinating business 
rescue to the value of the insolvency estate, thereby prioritising the economic value of 
the security interests and contractual rights of creditors ahead of the needs of distressed 
businesses and other stakeholders in general.149 While UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
does not guarantee that all stakeholders will be wholly protected under the rescue or 
 
145 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap IV, para 3. See also: Bruce Carruthers and Terence 
Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction: Predictable and Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the 
Wake of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ in Meredith Woo (ed), Neoliberalism and Institutional 
Reform in East Asia: A Comparative Study (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 244 
146 McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law (n 143) 161  
147 Ibid 155-161  
148 See: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 27 
149 This is what the UK system and culture of business rescue basically incline for. For example, the sale 
of the business as a going concern though the pre-pack is encouraged provided that doing so maximises 
returns to the creditors by ensuring the best price for the assets. This is to ensure that the failure of 
business rescue is not born by the creditors. In contrast, the US reorganisation system under Chapter 11 
internalises the risk of failure within the company which eventually leads to the creditors being the risk 
bearers. See: Webb (n 61) 153-56; McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 22) 306 
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reorganisation procedures, it emphasises that rescue has to ensure that the creditors will 
eventually receive more than they would if the debtor were first liquidated.150 
This is because the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide attaches the highest importance to 
the commercial bargains rather than the social and political ones.151 Consideration of 
the interests of employees and the community in the continuance of the business is 
viewed in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as a social and political issue which 
should be dealt with outside the insolvency law.152 This is because affording priority to 
such claims in insolvency law may render the insolvency procedures less effective, and, 
besides, it is regarded as an incomplete and inadequate solution153 for the social 
problem.154 Although the Legislative Guide allows for some social and political 
interests to be recognised and included in the insolvency law and have effect in the 
process, the Legislative Guide insists that the inclusion of such interests is clearly 
defined and stated in the insolvency law so as to ensure that the process is sufficiently 
transparent and predictable to the creditors.155 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide recommends national policy makers when 
designing an insolvency law to take the importance of providing protection, especially 
to the interests of secured creditors in the insolvency process, as a high consideration. 
Recommendation 7 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide states that the insolvency law 
should consider features of, inter alia, “Protection of the insolvency estate against the 
actions of creditors, the debtor itself and the insolvency representative and, where the 
 
150 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap II, para 25 
151 Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para 13 
152 Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, ‘Legitimation and Global Lawmaking’ [2006] Fordham Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 952492, at 65-66, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952492> accessed 28 Jul 2018 
153 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide refers to the practice in some countries of establishing a wage 
guarantee fund or insurance scheme that provides a separate source of funds for claims of the 
employees where a State provides no priority to such claims. See: Part Two, Chap V, para 73 
154 Ibid, Part Two, Chap V, para 68 
155 Ibid, Part Two, Chap V, para 68 
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protective measures apply to secured creditors, the manner in which the economic 
value of the security interest will be protected during the insolvency proceedings”.156 
This is a general principle that should be applied to any measures or procedures for any 
purpose whether rescue or liquidation. 
Such a recommendation can be seen as reflective through the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide in various issues. For example, the Legislative Guide advocates for the 
imposition of the moratorium in the procedures for a number of reasons, including the 
achievement of equitable treatment to creditors and the maximisation of the debtor’s 
assets value for the benefit of creditors as a whole.157 However, it does apply the above 
mentioned approach regarding the protection of the secured creditors by stating that the 
insolvency law should clearly specify that (where secured assets are included in the 
insolvency estate) secured creditors are not deprived of their rights in the secured assets 
even if a moratorium is in effect.158 Therefore, secured creditors should be entitled to 
request the court to have the effect of moratorium lifted where the secured assets are 
not necessary to the procedures (in rescue or the sale of the business) or where the 
value of the secured assets are deteriorating as a result of the commencement of the 
procedures.159 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide justifies the protection of the secured 
creditors’ interests on their secured assets on the ground that this is what secured 
creditors bargained for (ex ante).160 
Another example that suggests the Legislative Guide’s approach regarding 
prioritising the interests of creditors is the attitude towards the Debtor-in-Possession 
 
156 Ibid, Rec 7(e) 
157 Ibid, Part One, Chap II, para 35 
158 Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para 10, and Part Two, Chap II, para 8 
159 Ibid, Rec 51(a)(b) 
160 Ibid, Part Two, Chap II, para 37. “For that reason, the introduction of any measure that will diminish 
the certainty of the secured creditor’s ability to recover debt or erode the value of security interests, 
such as applying the stay to postpone enforcement, may need to be carefully considered”. 
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(DIP) rescue procedures. Although the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide permits DIP 
system, it employs no presumption in favour of it.161 This is because the debtor may, as 
the Legislative Guide justifies, take advantage of this system to pursue its own agenda 
at the expense of the overriding objective of maximisation of creditors’ returns.162 The 
same approach is applied in regard to the issue of post-commencement finance where 
secured creditors should always be protected.163 
From the above discussion, one can argue that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
employs neither a proceduralist nor a traditionalist approach in a precise manner. 
Actually, there is an overlap in the Legislative Guide between these two approaches. 
On the one hand, the Legislative Guide has an emphasis on protecting and prioritising 
the rights secured creditors have bargained for ex ante. It also has no favour on public 
policy concerns which should not be dealt with by the insolvency law. These features 
obviously reflect the approach that is offered by the proceduralist camp. On the other 
hand, the Legislative Guide employs features that deviate from the proceduralist view 
to lean towards the other camp of traditionalists. For example, business rescue is 
viewed by the Legislative Guide as an independent objective of the insolvency law that 
should be encouraged to take place as much as possible. This is because the Legislative 
Guide builds this objective not only on secured creditors’ standpoint (where rescue is 
permitted only when it achieves returns to creditors), but also on the aim of wealth 
maximisation that goes beyond simply maximising returns to creditors to benefit other 
stakeholder interests such as the employees and suppliers. 
 
161 McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law (n 143) 156  
162 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 7 
163 See Rec 66 and 67 of UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
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2.4. Policy Choices on the Insolvency Law Framework 
Insolvency theories are very essential because they provide a wide understanding of 
the role that should be played in the case of insolvency and business failure. 
Policymakers can be enlightened by the critical analysis of the legislative objective 
offered by these theories when considering a reform process.164 However, it should be 
acknowledged that insolvency theories discuss the foundations of insolvency laws 
taking into account various issues including the level of economic development, 
institutional capacity and social reality of the community in which those insolvency 
laws operate. Therefore, they are not necessarily suitable for adaptation to suit the 
variety of economic development levels worldwide, including on account of factors 
such as court capacity and social security provision. Literature in America, for 
example, discusses the insolvency law theories in light of the role that courts should 
play to address important issues arising in insolvency cases.165 These theories are not 
therefore suitable for countries where courts suffer from case backlog or where there 
are not specialist courts, and it would take time for these institutions to be developed. 
Furthermore, a theoretical approach is most appealing when its foundation and utility 
are kept constant with the variables of real life and, also, the strength or the 
attractiveness of any legal rules will be determined by their compatibility with 
theory.166 Nations around the world vary in terms of social and political contexts and 
the levels and types of economic development and their insolvency laws, accordingly, 
 
164 Hamiisi Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ 
(2016) 4 NIBLeJ <www4.ntu.ac.uk/nls/document_uploads/191390.pdf> accessed 19 Jul 2019  
165 See: Frost (n 18) 
166  Lawrence Ponoroff, ‘Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate 
Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings’ (1994) 23 Cap UL Rev 441, 452-53  
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should vary reflecting their own existing circumstances.167 Policy discussion becomes 
meaningful only in a specified factual context because, as asserted by Warren, 
constraints by the real world necessarily inform insolvency policy.168 Jurisdictions, like 
China, captured this fact and introduced its bankruptcy law reflecting China’s own 
characteristics of a socialist market economy.169 
It is important therefore to note that policymakers in Libya should demonstrate that 
the national insolvency law takes account of the various domestic circumstances rather 
than building on foreign legal systems.170 This is because complete adherence to the 
mature systems of insolvency of the developed world would not result in adopting a 
functional legal system in the context of a developing nation without considered and 
appropriate modifications.171 And any attempt to transplant a foreign insolvency law to 
the country borrowed from a foreign model is expected, regardless of how successful 
the model is, to fail if the conflicts between the model and the domestic circumstances 
are not worked out.172 Nonetheless, foreign theoretical approaches and experiences on 
how to implement the law in an effective and efficient manner can always be 
instructive to evaluate a domestic law.173 It offers the means by which to access 
 
167  Terence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between 
Global Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Apr 2006) at 33 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Halliday5.pdf> accessed 02 Aug 2018 
168 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy in an Imperfect World’ (n 21) 378 
169Huimiao Zhao, Government Intervention in the Reorganisation of Listed Companies in China (CUP 
2019) 61-63 
170 As will be developed later (in Sec 2.6 and more in Sec 5.4), the Libyan legal system employs unique 
ideologies particularly in the contract law, under which the freedom of contract has limited efficacy, 
and the property law, under which property is characterised to play a more social function in the 
society. These unique features have to be considered in any comparison with the insolvency law 
theories. 
171  Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and 
Principles’ (2008) 8 J Corp Law Stud 113, 125 
172  Curzio Giannini, ‘Promoting Financial Stability in Emerging-market Countries: the Soft Law 
Approach and Beyond’ (2002) 44 Comparative Economic Studies 125, 137 
173 This perspective will be developed later in detail when discussing the contractual basis and the social 
function of property in Libya. See below Sec 5.4 and Sec 6.2 
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different foreign patterns of thoughts that have been developed in different cultures, 
institutions and jurisdictions.174  
As has been discussed in this Chapter, the philosophy and foundations of insolvency 
regimes have been developed through a diversity of approaches to the role that should 
be played by the insolvency law in a response to the question: whose interests should 
the insolvency law be concerned with? Insolvency law theories vary from a narrow 
approach with the focus only on maximisation of returns to the benefits of creditors, as 
advocated by the CBT,175 to expansive approaches offered by the traditionalist camp, 
according to which the insolvency law should play a wider role to accommodate a 
wider range of stakeholder interests beyond only maximising returns to creditors.176  
It may be essential to stress that, as Scott acknowledges, all camps of theory 
contribute something useful to know about the situation of business failure.177 The 
economic account of the CBT, for example, informs us something useful to know by its 
focus on protecting the non-insolvency entitlements of secured creditors. The starting 
point of this model is its focus on the property law which explains the focus of this 
model on secured creditors. They argue that if secured creditors are advantaged by 
values of non-insolvency law such as the property law, the insolvency law should not 
change this non-insolvency value without a good solid reason.178 Therefore, the 
objective of maximising returns to secured creditors and protecting their pre-insolvency 
 
174 Edward Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 
451, 456 
175 See for example: Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements’ (n 5); Jackson and Scott (n 
38); Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 15); Mooney (n 19); Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (n 
41). See also: Goode (n 38) 68-70 
176 See for example: Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law (n 57); Mokal, ‘Authentic Consent Model’ (n 92); 
Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism’ (n 21); Warren, ‘Bankruptcy in an Imperfect World’ (n 21); LoPucki (n 
68) 
177 Robert Scott, ‘Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond’ (1989) Colum Bus L 
Rev 183, 185-68, f.n. 7 
178  The CBT allows interference with those pre-insolvency rights only to the extent necessary to 
maximise collective returns for the benefit of creditors. See: Jackson, ‘A Retrospective Look’ (n 14) 
1872-73.  
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entitlements by the CBT is very important to be recognised as an overriding objective 
of the insolvency law.179 The approach offered by CBT has informative features and 
thus it is a useful reference and worthy of examining,180 although with a limit,181 even 
though scholarship has since moved the debate forward considerably.182 Further, the 
CBT’s view of insolvency is welcomed because it assures that creditors will not bear 
the risk of insolvency and their security will not be interfered with when the insolvency 
occurs. Such protection is important to promote certainty of the law among investors 
and creditors which will in turn encourage investment decisions and lending 
confidence. 
However, the CBT’s central concepts; that the insolvency law should solely cater for 
those interests with legal entitlements to the debtor’s assets, are very controversial. It is 
argued that the insistence by the CBT on solving the collective action problem of 
creditors may limit the role of the law to be a debt collection device whereas the law 
 
179 This CBT feature is recognised by UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as an overriding objective of the 
insolvency law. See: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 27. According to 
Professor Goode, the role of the insolvency law is not to affect pre-insolvency entitlements of creditors. 
Rather, its role is to organise a collective system designed to ensure those entitlements are preserved to 
the maximum extent possible and it is only to this extent that business rescue is a legitimate function of 
the law. See: Goode (n 38) 39. See also: Rebecca Parry and Stephen Gwaza, ‘Is the Balance of Power 
in UK Insolvencies Shifting?’ (2019) 7 NIBLeJ 2, at f.n. 9 
<https://www.ntu.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/941417/2.pdf> accessed 31 Mar 2020 
180 Therefore, the study will examine the property law (secured transactions law) of Libya in Chapter 
Five. 
181  Jackson himself recognises the limitations of his theory. See his newly published article ‘A 
Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1867, 1872 noting that “In a 
move I came to regret—somewhat—I labeled it a “creditors’ bargain” … In retrospect, I might have 
better labeled it a “claimants’ bargain” or something broader”. 
182 Literature on Creditors’ Bargain Theory decades ago focused the debate of the objective of the 
insolvency law on the collective action problem. But scholarship moved the debate far beyond this 
issue. Professors Skeel and Triantis argue that ex post coordination problems among creditors 
nowadays stands at odds with the standard account of the traditional collective action problems noting 
that collective action problems “are much less pressing” these days. Therefore, solving the collective 
action problems is no longer the central objective of corporate insolvency law. See: Skeel and Triantis 
(n 49) 1817. Recently, scholars argue that the CBT is not a purpose theory because of its unnecessary 
limitation of welfare maximisation to the ex ante rights of secured creditors. Yet this theory is a 
necessary limitation on an insolvency system “which has a purpose of solving the collective action 
problem among creditors”. Casey (n 76) 8-15 
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should also consider other legitimate interests and groups in the community.183 The 
CBT’s justifications of the insolvency law were focused almost exclusively on the 
advantages provided under the property law which explains its view of the law’s role to 
be limited to the creditors’ bargain. Therefore, its approach is not a completely 
adequate response to the problem because the insolvency law should be intended to 
solve other bargaining problems related to business failure.184 
On the other side, the counter approaches tell us something else which is useful to 
know. The traditionalist approaches acknowledge that business failure in itself is not a 
simple story as it leads to more life complexity than the CBT envisions. The wider 
approach of the traditionalist group focuses not only on promoting the private rights but 
it also pays more attention to the significance of social impacts of insolvency in the 
society. Social repercussions that are caused by insolvency require the law to recognise 
the effected stakeholder interests which are vital and important to the society as well as 
the business.185 The rationale is that the effect of insolvency is not limited to the private 
interests of the debtor and its creditors, but it vitally spreads over the interests of the 
community and other parties in the society. Therefore, such wide interests must be 
recognised and safeguarded.186  
It should be noted, however, that which theoretical approach is to be preferred is, and 
will remain, a contentious issue and what is considered effective and efficient 
insolvency or rescue procedures will vary depending on what normative choice is set 
out to be achieved in a given State. This is because there are multiple objectives against 
which an insolvency system can be measured; for example by the value returned to the 
 
183 Nsubuga, Employee Rights (n 18) 35 
184 Casey (n 76) 11-16  
185 Ponoroff, (n 166) 455 
186 The Cork Report, para 198(i) 
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creditors, by preserving jobs, by the process costs and by the ability of the rescued 
business to endure in the future and countries are different on the optimal choices to 
which they subscribe.187 For example, states may agree that economically distressed 
businesses should be liquidated while those are suffering only from financial distress 
are to be rescued. However, national insolvency laws differ as to how to implement that 
objective.188 
For example, French and UK corporate insolvency systems are both in favour of 
preserving distressed businesses, yet they differ about the choices of how to implement 
such an objective. While the French system implements rescue procedures, rescue is 
associated with a prime goal of maintaining employment. As a result, insolvency courts 
in France are given control over the insolvency procedures whereas creditors are 
entitled only to an advisory role in the process.189  
In the UK, although the IA 1986 mentioned three authorised purposes of the 
administration190 with a primary objective to rescue the company as a going concern,191 
rescue procedures in the UK have always had an emphasis on providing protection for 
secured interests.192 This approach was legislatively mitigated by the substantial 
abolition of the administrative receivership by the EA 2002 in order to loosen the effect 
 
187 Sarra (n 1) 51 
188 Irit Haviv-Segal, ‘Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements’ (2005) 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 355, 355; 
Robert Rasmussen, ‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private Ordering’ (1999) 98 Mich L 
Rev 2252, 2253 
189 Sergei Davydenko and Julian Franks, ‘Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, 
Germany, and the UK’ (2008) 63 J Fin 565, 566 
190 IA 1986, Sch B1, Para 3(1) states that “The administrator of a company must perform his functions 
with the objective of: 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or  
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company 
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191 IA 1986, Sch B1, Para 3(1)(a) 
192  Davydenko and Franks (n 189) 566. Also see: Ian Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent 
Developments–Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary 
Arrangements–The Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 
Eur Bus Org Law Rev 119, 120 
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caused by the focus on secured creditors.193 The Government White Paper Insolvency – 
A Second Chance in reviewing administrative receivership stated that by placing 
control and outcomes of the process on the hands of secured creditors, administrative 
receivership is seen to be outdated because it fails to consider many other important 
stakeholders in the distressed company, including the unsecured creditors, shareholders 
and employees.194 
2.5. Application of the Theoretical Debate to Libya 
As has been mentioned before, a sound insolvency law should be reflective of the 
variety of domestic situations and desires in a country. In a response to what choice 
Libya should subscribe to, some issues must first be acknowledged. 
As has been mentioned, Libya witnessed an economic reform process to move from a 
socialist economy towards a market economy. To that end, reforms in the legal 
infrastructure were introduced from the 1990s till 2010 with an aim of promoting 
economic growth and attracting foreign investments.195 However, the foreign direct 
investment inflows to Libya have been small, indicating the failure of the reform 
adopted in the country.196  
For Libya to attract foreign direct investment, the importance of providing incentives 
to create a desirable business environment must be stressed. There is a growing 
awareness among developing countries of the importance of insolvency reform as part 
of the financial architecture needed to attract and facilitate foreign investment and to 
 
193 McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 22) 54 
194 Department of Trade and Industry, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency - A Second Chance 
(Cmnd 5234, 2001) at Foreword. 
195  For details see above Sec 1.2.3. Also see: Naser Tawiri, ‘Domestic Investment as a Drive of 
Economic Growth in Libya’ (International Conference on Applied Economics, Athens, Aug 2010) 759, 
762 <http://i-coae.com/?p=389> accessed 31 Dec 2019 
196 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2019: 
Special Economic Zones (United Nations 2019) 212, Annex Table 1 
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structure the flow of credit.197 This is because an effective insolvency law can reassure 
outsiders as to predictability and enforceability against insolvent companies and the 
ability to recover investment through the realisation or the sale of the assets.198 As 
Libya became aware of a need for attracting foreign investment in the country,199 it 
may be argued accordingly that an approach provided by the CBT proponents would be 
desirable because it provides desirable protection and certainty for secured creditors 
necessary to attract foreign investment. 
Furthermore, the circumstances in Libya are not limited only to the need to attract 
investment. As Libya has been under pressure of social uprising since 2011,200 there is 
a desirability to consider also the approach offered by the traditionalists. Under the 
inclusive approach of the traditionalist, various interests that are important for the 
society and for the business can be protected. This includes the employees, with regard 
to job preservations, the community, which will be negatively impacted when a large 
business ceases trading, and the local suppliers, with regard to the effect of the 
insolvency on their businesses. Therefore, the role of the insolvency law should not be 
limited to maximise returns to creditors but it should also be concerned with the 
welfare of community. 
Such inclusive approaches would be desirable because they offer solutions that 
would meet the need for improving the economic system and promoting a better life for 
 
197 Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
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all citizens in the country.201 In the Libyan context, the employees, for example, have 
always been in consideration for social reasons and such considerations must still be 
stressed especially nowadays as the country has been through social and political 
instability since the Arab Spring events in 2011.202 Ignoring social considerations, such 
as the interest of maintaining jobs for employees203 may lead to more dilemmas in the 
community and may eventually lead to ineffective implementation of the law, 
especially with the absence of effective social safety protections.204 The employment 
issue in Libya has always been seen sensitively as a political issue.205 Therefore, any 
endeavours towards reforming the insolvency system should take this situation in mind. 
Furthermore, the traditionalist approaches would be in keeping with the domestic 
legal culture and desires that have long prevailed in the country. As will be discussed 
later,206 the legal system and society have long been influenced by the objective of 
prioritising ‘social justice’ in the community in the light of which the law and courts 
may intervene in parties’ private relationships. Such a social justice ideology was 
further influenced in the country by the adoption of the socialist economy since 1969. 
In measuring ideology against the theoretical debate of insolvency law, it may be 
argued therefore that the situation in Libya may require policymakers to not ignore the 
societal realities that have been in existence for decades. Put differently, the philosophy 
 
201 Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests into Account’ (n 67) 1041-42; Goode (n 38) 73 
202 See above Sec 1.2.3 
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on which a theory like the CBT has been rested may not be suitable to be fully 
implemented in the country, despite its previously outlined merits. 
In addition, unlike the narrow approach provided by the proceduralists, the inclusive 
approach of the counter camp of traditionalists offers fair treatment by considering the 
wider stakeholders interests in insolvency. This has been acknowledged worldwide. 
Even the most creditor-oriented insolvency regimes in the world, such the UK 
insolvency regime,207 have recently reformed their approach in order to include other 
interests in the procedures. The UK insolvency system pre-Enterprise Act 2002 had an 
excessive focus on the secured creditors. In the administrative receivership procedures, 
the receiver was obliged primarily to achieve the interests of the floating charge holder 
whereas the interests of other stakeholders were disregarded. Also, the floating charge 
holder was allowed to exercise significant powers to block the appointment of an 
administrator in administration by appointing an administrative receiver.208 This 
approach has changed towards considering more stakeholders in the insolvency 
procedures by the substantial abolition of the administrative receivership procedures by 
the EA 2002 in an attempt to protect more stakeholders in the process.209 
As the discussion encourages the adoption of the inclusive approaches offered by 
traditionalists because of their fair perspectives in relation to the situation of 
insolvency, it is desirable now to define which approach would be appropriate to adopt 
in Libya. This is because the traditionalist approaches have been criticised for being 
unable to offer a practical application. The response is that the TPT approach seems to 
be appropriate for some reasons. First, it seems to respond well to the criticism arisen 
 
207 John Armour and Sandra Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ (2001) 21 OJLS 73, 73 
208 Fletcher (n 192) 124 
209 Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Administration and Administrative Receivership-An Analysis’ (2004) 57 CLP 1, 6-
7 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466701> accessed 23 Jul 2019 
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against the other approaches. Second, the view of the TPT seems to align well with the 
domestic situation and culture of Libya. This will be discussed below. 
2.6.  Application of the TPT to Libya 
Unlike other traditionalist approaches, the Team Production Theory (TPT) responds 
well to the criticisms of the traditionalist approaches.210 First, under the perspectives of 
the TPT, the indeterminacy problem can be solved because what is considered a 
stakeholder interest can be clearly defined in the law. This theory sets an approach that 
is geared only towards stakeholders who made firm-specific investment in the business 
and are important for the business to succeed, such as the employees, the suppliers and 
the shareholders/ partners as well as the creditors. This approach of the TPT is a more 
just and socially responsible view than CBT. This is because it is not based only on 
contractual terms but also on business relationships and continued personal investment 
that made the going concern of the business. Therefore, the contributions of each team 
member to investment will be considered as relevant in an insolvency or business 
rescue regime.211 
Second, the approach of the TPT provides a natural approach for business rescue 
because it leads to fair considerations of all the key stakeholders needed for a 
successful rescue. The TPT has a position where the team contracts have to continue 
during insolvency which allows for rescue of the business and also supports the 
retention of important interests such as those of the employees should the business be 
sold to a new owner. Maintaining the employees in their jobs will help the business 
continue its activities during the process because otherwise the business will struggle. 
Suppliers are also important because without taking into account their interest in the 
 
210 See above Sec 2.2.2.6 
211 Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection’ (n 164) 
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business and without their support during the process, rescue may likely fail.212 All 
such interests are identified in the TPT to have crucial roles in a successful business 
and they have crucial roles in a successful business rescue too and it therefore makes 
sense for the insolvency law to consider all these groups in the process.213 
Third, the TPT approach in the insolvency context and the emphasis upon ongoing 
relationships comes to some extent in line with the policy imperatives that underpin the 
Libyan legal system which, for ‘social justice’214 and considerations, drives excessively 
towards the realisation of businesses to be based on personal relationships rather than 
purely contractual. Illustrations can be seen in the relationships of parties participating 
in the collective partnerships institution (tasharukiyya), discussed in the next 
paragraph, and in the nature of the relationship between the workers and the business 
owners as governed under the Code of Employment Relationships 2010 (CERs 2010). 
Driven by the need to apply the sociological theory to the contractual relationship 
between the shareholders and workforce in the country, the Government introduced the 
collective partnership institution which was grounded in the doctrine of the socialist 
regime in the 1980s. This was known as ‘tasharukiyya’215 by which the policymakers 
intended to apply the above philosophy to ensure that parties of this institution, mainly 
workers and owners, are equally treated.216 It should be noted that this theoretical 
approach was an application of the theory of social justice, or social function of 
 
212 For details see: LoPucki (n 68) 
213 The TPT offers protection to all team members but it makes so without privileging one party over the 
other. See: Etukakpan, ‘The Lost Voice in Insolvency’ (n 8) 63  
214 The CC 1953 was based on a theory of social justice as proposed by its draftsman Professor al-
Sanhuri. This theory has its, direct or indirect, effect on the relationships of creditors and debtors. This 
theory will be explored later in Chapter Five. See below Sec 5.4 
215 This kind of partnership is unique to Libya as they were based on the socialist philosophy by which 
workers are treated equally to the owners for the purpose of participation in management and profit. 
See: Bleuchot Hervé, ‘The Green Book: Its Context and Meaning’ in John Anthony Allan (ed), Libya 
Since Independence: Economic and Political Development (Routledge 2014) 144  
216 A notable example to this institution in the UK is the John Lewis Partnership where the business is 
employee-owned. See: John Storey and Graeme Salaman, ‘Employee Ownership and the Drive to Do 
Business Responsibly: A Study of the John Lewis Partnership’ (2017) 33 Oxford Rev Econ Policy 339 
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property,217 offered by the draftsman of the Libyan Civil Code 1953 Professor al-
Sanhuri.218 In his very popular and most influential book series Commentary on the 
Civil Law (known as Al-Wasit), he called for equality in distribution between business 
owners and workers stating that: “Individual ownership vs ownership of the enterprise: 
Social structure in the community must exist but it must be based on the equality in the 
distribution. This is because the production system does not belong solely to the owner. 
Rather, workers contribute to it and thus they also should be partners in that system. 
This would entail, accordingly, that profit should be distributed on a fair and just basis 
between the owner and workers. .... This is because they contribute to the production 
system and management. … So, the production does not belong to the ownership of 
capital, but rather to the enterprise ownership”.219 Such a philosophy can be seen 
reflected in the CERs 2010 which defines the nature of the employment relationships to 
be based on equal considerations between the contractual parties. Article 1(1) of the 
CERs 2010 asserts that “The employment relationships between citizens in Libya are 
independent with a purpose of eliminating the wage-slavery relationships while 
implementing partnership basis in the economic entity they make up …”.220 All of 
these examples clearly are an application of principles of social justice that form the 
personal relationships between business parties in Libya. 
Moreover, to achieve social justice in the community, the law in Libya is driven 
towards protecting the weak party in the community. This is reflected in property law 
 
217 As will be discussed later in Chapter Five, the theory of social justice and social function of property 
has an effect on the rights and priorities of secured creditors by the application of the privilege system. 
See below Sec 5.3.7 and Sec 5.4 
218 The Libyan Civil Code was modelled on the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 both of which were drafted 
by the famous Egyptian jurist Professor Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri. See: Nabil Saleh, ‘Civil Codes of 
Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes’ (1993) Arab Law Q 161, 162 
219 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: Property Right, Vol 8 (2ed edn, Arab 
Heritage 1967) 567. (hereinafter Property Right) 
220 Art 1(2) of the CERs 2010 states that “Exceptionally, the employment on a wage-basis … may be 
permitted”. 
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(by given some parties such as the employees a privileged position) and in contract law 
which gives the court powers to intervene in contractual relationships to correct the 
bargaining inequalities. As will be discussed,221 there are some preferential debts, such 
as the judicial expenses, taxes and money owed to the public treasury and employees’ 
entitlements, which are given statutory priority over other creditors.222 The intention of 
supporting the weak party in the community resembles the account of the TPT which 
advocates for the interests of weak members of the team (like the employees) that often 
struggle to protect their interests against their strong team member counterparts 
(secured creditors) to be balanced in business failure scenario.223  
Further, the CC 1953 does not limit its protection to the pre-insolvency rights of 
secured creditors, as the CBT advocates for. Rather, these priorities reveal that it 
employs an approach that is concerned with rights of other stakeholders in insolvency 
driven by the objective of social justice which accepts more loss distribution among 
parties.224 Besides, by giving the court power to intervene in contractual relationships, 
the Libyan legal system implements a less contract bargain-based approach that 
dramatically deviates from what a theory like the CBT was based on. For social justice, 
the law does not always allow the contractual parties to live with the bargains they have 
made. Rather, courts in some circumstances are given power to intervene to adjust the 
contractual obligations when an economic imbalance between parties occurs.225 
 
221 See below Sec 5.3.7 
222 Preferential creditors in the UK are paid in priority to all other unsecured debts including holders of 
floating charges. IA 1986, Sec 175(1) and 175(2)(b). The preferential debts in the UK are the unpaid 
employees’ wages and accrued holiday entitlements, unpaid contributions to state and occupational 
pension schemes and the unpaid levies on coal and steel production. IA 1986, Sch6, Categories 4, 5 and 
6 
223 Etukakpan, ‘The Lost Voice in Insolvency’ (n 8) 59 
224 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: Theory of Obligation in General, 
Vol 1 (2ed edn, Arab Heritage 1967) 650 
225 The application of the theory of social justice will be explored in Chapter Five. See below Sec 5.4 
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It is argued accordingly that the above discussion would support the instinct that 
Libya will be a more natural home for a theory like TPT for some reasons. First, the 
Libyan legal system supports the protection of the wider interests in the society to 
achieve social justice and social stability by supporting the weak, which matches the 
basis of the TPT. Second, Libya has the tradition and culture where the relationships 
between parties are based on personal relationships, which also comes in line with the 
perceptions advocated by the TPT. Third, the Libyan legal system is based on 
principles that contradict the notion on which a theory like the CBT is based. In the 
Libyan law, contracts can be intervened with when the contractual balance is disrupted 
in order to address the problem of inequalities of bargaining power.  
2.7. Conclusion 
The theoretical approaches that have been discussed in this Chapter differ on what the 
ultimate aim of insolvency law is, or should be, in a legal system. The proceduralist 
camp advocates that the insolvency law responds to the common pool problem and 
should be concerned at heart with collecting debts and therefore its focus is, or should 
be, exclusively on maximising returns to creditors. According to them, corporate and 
business rescue is not, and should not be, an objective of the insolvency law unless it 
leads to equivalent or better returns to secured creditors or creditors overall including 
secured creditors.  
However, this exclusive approach has limitations. This is because if such a narrow 
approach was applied to insolvency cases, it would cause potentially unfair outcomes 
for some creditors and other non-creditor stakeholders who have interests in the 
85 
 
debtor’s business.226 The other camp, represented by the traditionalists, believes that 
the insolvency law responds to the problem of business failure which can have wider 
externalities and therefore its role should be extended to serve a wider set of interests 
beyond those of creditors. Rescue procedures in this view should be one of the key 
objectives of the insolvency law. 
In addition, this ideological divide illustrates that insolvency laws and policies cannot 
be identical in every country because each jurisdiction has preferences depending on 
what choice the policymakers in a given jurisdiction would subscribe to. Despite what 
approach and objectives are inclined to, national policymakers should realise that the 
scope of the insolvency law should not be restricted to the private rights of the creditors 
since business failure can cause a widespread impact on various interests. Adoption of 
specific objectives may reflect the domestic realities and circumstances of a 
community. An insolvency law can be designed to achieve competing objectives such 
as maximising the creditors’ returns, preserving businesses’ going concern value 
through rescues or liquidations, maintaining jobs, promoting the community welfare 
and enhancing the credit system. As previously discussed, the focus on maximising the 
private rights of the creditors, and in particular secured creditors, fails to capture these 
objectives.227  
Policymakers in Libya should, therefore, look through the merits of all insolvency 
theories and align them with the reality and situation of the community. An insolvency 
law reform may take into account the desires of the country to attract foreign 
investment and encourage the credit system for the prospective economic transition. 
Therefore, an insolvency law must be designed in a way which will not impede or 
 
226 The CBT model prohibits in principle any diminution of the returns of secured creditors regardless of 
potential gains to unsecured creditors because this is what corresponds to the bargain secured creditors 
have made. Obviously, the CBT is a rights based discourse not welfare maximising. 
227 Sarra (n 1) 51 
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restrict credit availability and investment. Besides, social considerations and 
challenges, such as unemployment, that exist in the community are also important for 
social and political stability. These may be captured by expanding the objectives to 
include the interests of the community and other stakeholders such as the employees, 
by saving jobs, and the insolvent viable businesses, by facilitating effective rescue 
procedures. Such various and competing interests in insolvency require the insolvency 
law to achieve the right balance between them. Therefore, social significance requires 
the insolvency law to respond beyond the enforcement of private rights. As has been 
argued in the Chapter,228 the Team Production Theory arguably best captures the 
desires and realities that exist in the Libyan society by the recognition of the 
contributions of all important stakeholders to the business. 
In a nutshell, insolvency laws differ from one jurisdiction to another depending on the 
choices adopted and the aims to be achieved. The UNCITRAL has been aware of this 
fact and took consideration of the difference of cultures and circumstances of every 
country in the Legislative Guide. It stressed that this Guide is to assist domestic 
legislatures to evaluate different approaches available and decide which one is the most 
suitable for their domestic contexts.229 The positive point from referring to the 
international benchmarks (which will be discussed in the next Chapter) is the flexibility 
they offer to the national policymakers to choose principles and rules that can fit 
appropriately into the domestic legal system and culture.230 Policymakers in the country 
can be informed by both the flexibility of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the 
approach of the TPT which can be used to inform the choices made in applying the 
principles of the Legislative Guide.  
 
228 See above Sec 2.6 
229 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Introduction, para 3 
230 See: Block-Lieb and Halliday (n 152) 1-2 
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Chapter 3 In Depth Analysis of Libyan Insolvency Law Considering 
the UNCITRAL Key Objectives of Insolvency 
3.1. Introduction 
A well-functioning insolvency system is among the laws that are believed to be very 
significant to promote economic growth by encouraging the business environment and 
credit market. Insolvency laws have particular importance in developing and transition 
market economies where businesses often are important participants in the economy. 
Efficient and well-balanced insolvency systems are vital to attract foreign direct 
investment and are considered a prerequisite for any positive investment decision in 
transitional markets because they can reassure predictability and the enforceability of 
obligations.1  
Reforming the insolvency law is one of the preconditions for the transition towards 
the market economy that Libya has engaged in. This is because in market-led 
economies as well as in transition economies businesses will be subject to the market 
rules and consequences in which they are expected to experience financial and 
economic distress. Libya has been under international pressure to reform its insolvency 
law to cope with the situations when businesses are insolvent or near insolvency.2 
Lawmakers in the country can gain guidance from international benchmarks and 
guidelines of insolvency law as to how best to implement an insolvency reform. The 
merits of the international benchmarks are highlighted by the flexibility that national 
states would enjoy in designing their insolvency laws in a way that suits their domestic 
 
1 Philippe Frouté, ‘Theoretical Foundation for a Debtor Friendly Bankruptcy Law in Favour of Creditors’ 
(2007) 24 Eur J Law Econ 201; Mike Falke, ‘Insolvency Law Reform in Transition Economies’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Berlin 2003) 67 
2  World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 32 
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context. The UNCITRAL, for example, stressed that its Legislative Guide should 
consider flexible approaches including a discussion of the possible alternative 
approaches and the possible advantages and disadvantages of any approach.3 It should 
be noted that the international benchmarks and initiatives are broad but this Chapter 
limits the discussion to those benchmarks as offered by the UNCITRAL in its 
Legislative Guide for the reasons mentioned below. Also, this Chapter focuses on the 
analysis of the Legislative Guide’ principles and key objectives in general leaving a 
more detailed examination of principles identified as having high importance to 
Chapter Four (which will focus on the application of these benchmarks regarding 
business rescue) and Chapter Five (which will examine their application to secured 
transactions law).  
3.2. Why the Legislative Guide?  
The benchmarks that are embodied in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide have been 
recognised as the most influential international text to promulgate global norms.4 They 
were based on wide representation of participants representing expert organisations, 
governments, non-state organisations, practitioners and academic figures from all levels 
of economic development around the world.5 Such a representation process resulted in 
a remarkable degree of consensus among the participants with very few exceptional 
cases where the Legislative Guide recommends no more than two alternative options 
for every topic.6 This approach enabled the UNCITRAL’s guidelines to attain global 
acceptability and legitimacy, that other international benchmarks lacked, and enabled 
 
3 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Preface. 
4 Gerard McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (2018) 8 KJLL 1, 2 
5 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing in Early Transition Countries: Taking a DIP in 
the Distressed Debt Pool’ [2004] LiT, at 10 <www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit042.pdf> 
accessed 08 Apr 2018. Also see: Terence Halliday and Pavel Osinsky, ‘Globalization of Law’ (2006) 
32 Annual Review of Sociology 447, 460 
6 Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes’ (2007) 112 AJS 1135, 1185 
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the UNCITRAL to exercise much influence in affecting national insolvency laws.7 The 
guidelines as set out in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide have gained consensus and 
approval even by other international organisations, such as the WB and the IMF, to be 
used as global guidance for evaluating domestic insolvency laws around the world.8 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is seen as offering more sophisticated 
benchmarks by offering alternatives and minimal principles to allow national states to 
accommodate whatever option that suits their domestic desires and situations. 
Therefore, they are believed as suitable for bringing genuine real improvements in this 
field of law.9 It is asserted in the first place in the Legislative Guide that the insolvency 
law that is launched from these key objectives “must be complementary to, and 
compatible with, the legal and social values of the society in which it is based and 
which it must ultimately sustain”.10 This approach offers alternative options for 
national reforms by being cognisant of domestic divergence and the differences in 
political regimes and states of economic development. The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide rejects a one size fits all approach that is used by other international bodies such 
as the World Bank in its Doing Business Resolving Insolvency framework which it has 
been suggested is biased towards absolute and rigid approaches.11 
 
7  Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, Global Lawmakers: International Organizations in the 
Crafting of World Markets (CUP 2017) 322-24; Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and 
State Change’ (2012) 37 L&Soc Inq 229, 250-51 
8 Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis 
(SUP 2009) 160-61. Also see: Jenny Clift, ‘Choice of Law and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process’ 
(2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 29, 32, f.n. 11; Terence Halliday, Josh Pacewicz and Susan 
Block-Lieb, ‘Who Governs? Delegations and Delegates in Global Trade Lawmaking’ (2013) 7 
Regul&Gov 279, 295 
9 McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 4) 1-2 
10 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Introduction, para 3 
11 McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 4) 
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This soft law approach12 adopted by the UNCITRAL in its Legislative Guide is 
favourable to national states because it offers greater flexibility and it allows them to 
preserve their sovereign13 authority when reforming their national insolvency 
systems.14 As a developing nation seeking to adopt a meaningful and functional 
insolvency law, Libya would benefit more by measuring its reform against such 
international benchmarks than by borrowing from a foreign system. It is believed that 
borrowing even from well-established developed insolvency systems would not 
necessarily result in the borrowed system functioning in the same way. This is because 
every nation has its own unique circumstances as they may be influenced by dissimilar 
socio-economic contexts or they may have different levels of institutional 
development.15 
Further, UNCITRAL promoted the adaptability of its benchmarks by offering 
national policymakers the opportunity to engage in more cooperation with its 
established technical assistance resource.16 It has been submitted that legal technical 
assistance provided by the international institutions, such as the UNCITRAL, has 
 
12 Hard law, as a term opposed to soft law, is used to refer to legally binding obligations between 
international actors, whereas soft law, which falls within the realm of international treaty-making or 
conventions, is used to refer to non-binding norms and benchmarks set forth in regulations, model laws, 
legislative guides, best practices, and the like. The latter is often easier to achieve than the former 
especially when the actors are states that are jealous of their autonomy and when the state sovereignty 
is challenged by the issues included in such laws. For more details see: Kenneth Abbott and Duncan 
Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 Int’l Org 421, 421-23 
13 Sovereignty, as Professor McCormack comments, is “the relationship between law and national culture 
and, more generally, the connectedness of law with a country’s history and development. Law is 
valuable as a facilitator of contractual, commercial and corporate relationships but also as a protector 
and shaper of traditions, an expression of shared beliefs and ultimate values, and in much less definable 
ways, as an expression of national expectations, allegiances and emotions”. McCormack, ‘Criticising 
the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 4) 23 
14  Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, ‘Harmonization and Modernization in UNCITRAL’s 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2007) 42 Tex Int’l LJ 475, 511-12 
15  Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and 
Principles’ (2008) 8 J Corp Law Stud 113, 125. Also see: Thomas Waelde and James Gunderson, 
‘Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western Transplants—A Short-Cut to Social Market 
Economy Status?’ (1994) 43 Int’l & Comp LQ 347, 371 
16  UNCITRAL, ‘Technical Assistance and Coordination’ <https://uncitral.un.org/en/content/technical-
assistance-and-coordination> accessed 20 Sep 2018 
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become an essential part of economic development around the world.17 It can provide 
developing countries with various means of support ranging from policy advice to 
assist in law drafting, introducing and implementing the legal reforms, providing 
judicial training and other forms of legal education for law and business students as 
well as professions, offering public information campaigns, supporting professional 
development at the institutional level, advice in streamlining the legal regulation of 
businesses and alternative dispute resolution.18 Besides, reports provided by such 
organisations are important as they will influence foreign investors’ decisions in a 
country.19 Libya, therefore, has a chance to achieve appropriate implementation of the 
international guidelines into the local context if such cooperation is reached. 
It should be stressed, however, that complete adherence to the international 
benchmarks does not necessarily lead to the reformed laws functioning effectively. 
Irrespective of how effective and efficient the options and alternatives, and how 
desirable the mechanisms that the international benchmarks offer to the world may 
look, or how successful elsewhere they may be, national reformers should carefully 
capture a balance when considering those benchmarks. As Professor Halliday argues, 
“… too rigid an adherence to global norms will contribute to a “transplant effect”20 of 
incomplete implementation; … too much local deviation from global norms may 
 
17  Scott Newton, ‘Law and Development, Law and Economics and the Fate of Legal Technical 
Assistance’ in Julia Arnscheidt, Benjamin van Rooij and Jan Otto (eds), Lawmaking for Development: 
Explorations into the Theory and Practice of International Legislative Projects (LUP 2008) 23 
18 Ibid 
19 Jingxia Shi, ‘Twelve Years to Sharpen One Sword: The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and China’s 
Transition to a Market Economy’ (2007) 16 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 5, 6 
20 According to an empirical study, countries can likely be subject to the transplant effect when the 
transplanted legal rules were not properly adopted to the local conditions and context or when those 
rules were not familiar to the public. As such, it would be expected that the demand for the adopted law 
to be weak. See: Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 Eur Econ Rev 165, 167 
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reduce flows of capital and trade necessary for economic development”.21 Although 
there is a growing need among, especially developing, nations around the world to 
reflect the international guidelines in reforming their laws, risk can still be posed 
threatening the desired social and economic stability and peace. To encourage more 
adaptability, it is suggested that the international benchmarks have to be read and 
analysed in light of both theory, as discussed in the previous Chapter, and domestic 
context of Libya. 
3.3. Overview of the Libyan Insolvency Law and Procedures 
Insolvency in Libya is viewed as something that merits blame rather than attention. It 
is based on the assumption that business failure is caused by mismanagement. Because 
of that, the concept of insolvency is still heavily stigmatised and socially repressive. 
Even the preventive composition, which was designed to employ a rescue function, is 
viewed in a repressive way and is viewed in some occasions as an insolvency 
declaration. For instance, the Banking Law 2012 mandates a prohibition on anyone 
who was a director of a company which became insolvent to be a member of board of 
directors in any national bank in Libya. The strict nature of this prohibition can be seen 
from the fact that it applies even where the directors have honestly made efforts to 
rescue the company through the preventive composition procedures.22 
Further, the insolvency procedures carry criminal perception and the insolvency 
declaration triggers the application of criminal provisions. The directors and managers 
of the company may be held criminally responsible for damage caused to the value of 
 
21 Terence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global 
Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Apr 2006) at 33 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Halliday5.pdf> accessed 02 Aug 2018  
22 Art 68(4)(b) of the Banking Law no 46 of 2012 amending the Banking Law no 1 of 2005 (Promulgated 
in the National Gazette in 05 Jul 2012. Hereinafter Banking Law 2012) 
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the company’s assets by their wrongdoing and also they may be responsible for 
transactions carried out while the company is in distress. The company’s directors may 
be held criminally liable if they commit ‘simple’ or ‘fraudulent’ insolvency crimes.23 
Examples of the former include execution of high risk transactions during the pre-
insolvency period, worsening the insolvency situation of the company by the late filing 
for the procedures or by grossly negligent actions, failure to maintain corporate 
financial records and documents or failure to properly maintain the records during the 
last three years prior to the insolvency declaration. And examples of fraudulent 
insolvency include hiding, damaging or diminishing the assets of the company or 
declaring non-existing securities in order to prejudice the creditors or falsifying or 
destroying corporate records and documents.24 Also, members of the board of directors 
are not allowed to change their home address without the consent of the court.25  
The criminal perception of insolvency in Libya is illustrated by the involvement of 
the Public Prosecutor in the procedures. The public prosecutor can be involved in the 
composition procedures along with the judge during the examination of the 
composition,26 and has the authority to trigger the insolvent liquidation.27 The 
involvement of the Public Prosecutor in the procedures historically is justified to 
observe the public interests and public order.28  
 
23 The imprisonment is for a period up to one year and up to five years respectively. CCA 2010, Art 1169 
and 1170 
24 Ibid, Articles 1169, 1170, 1175 - 1177 
25 Ibid, Art 1155 
26 Ibid, Art 987 
27 Ibid, Art 1013 
28 Jan Dalhuisen, Compositions in Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Laws of the EEC Countries, 
England and the USA (A W Sitthoff 1968) 74-75 
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The available insolvency procedures are two procedures. The first is the composition 
procedure (preventive and final composition),29 while the second type of procedure is 
insolvent liquidation. These procedures are discussed below: 
3.3.1. Insolvent Liquidation 
The ordinary insolvency proceedings are fundamentally the liquidation proceedings 
which are available to insolvent debtors who have ceased to pay off debts.30 By the 
liquidation procedures, the company is prepared for its ultimate demise by which its 
assets are realised, its liabilities and debts are paid to the creditors and any remaining 
surplus assets will be distributed to the shareholders and by the end of the process the 
company will be dissolved.31 Insolvency is considered as a matter of Public Order 
reflecting the disgracefulness associated with it. As a result, the Public Prosecutor and 
the judge during the examination of an insolvency case are granted ex officio power to 
file for the insolvency of the debtor without a need to recourse to the creditors’ 
approval. The insolvent liquidation process can be initiated by the debtor company, the 
creditors or the Public Prosecutor. 32 The ultimate aim of this procedure involves the 
liquidation of the business and realisation of assets, payment of its debts to the creditors 
and distribution of the remaining assets to shareholders.33  
 
29 This distinction was inherited down from the Italian Bankruptcy Act 1942 which recognised  two types 
of compositions: compositions for the termination of insolvency proceedings (concordato fallimentare) 
and compositions for the avoidance of insolvency (concordato preventivo). Stefan Riesenfeld, ‘The 
Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law: A Comparison of the Recent Bankruptcy Acts of Italy and the 
United States’ (1947) 31 Minn L Rev 401, 409 
30 CCA 2010, Art 1012 
31 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011), 149; Andrew 
Keay, McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidation (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 6; Gerard 
McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ [2007] JBL 701, 704-5; Mohamed 
Al-badawi, ‘Legal Provisions of Company Liquidation in Libya’ (2003) 2 TJL 8, 8 
32 CCA 2010, Art 1013 
33  See: Book IX, Part II, Chapters VI and VII entitled ‘The Assets Liquidation’ and ‘The Assets 
Distribution’ respectively. 
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As such, this procedure is designed to liquidate the business in the best interests of 
the creditors and once the insolvency status is declared the debtor company will lose 
the control over its assets and its business affairs,34 and the assets will become in the 
possession of the insolvency trustee.35 However, the company’s business may still be 
maintained in progress at the discretion and under control of the court if it thinks that 
the abrupt termination of the business and immediate liquidation would result in the 
business value being dramatically deteriorated.36 This if allowed would have a bad 
effect on the creditors’ interests. Therefore, the law allows the court to permit the 
continuation of the business. However, the business continuation during this procedure 
is only permitted on a temporary basis and permitted only to the extent that preserves 
the interests of the creditors. Finally, the creditors’ voice regarding the continuation or 
the resumption of their debtor’s business activities does count and the court must 
consult them about the matter and must not enjoin the continuation of the business 
activities unless the creditors have approved it.37  
3.3.2. Final Composition 
After the declaration of the insolvency status and the commencement of the insolvent 
liquidation procedures, the debtor is allowed to apply for a composition. This kind of 
procedure, known as the final or the simple composition, is aimed at terminating and 
exiting the insolvency procedures.38 When the final composition is proposed, the 
procedures of the insolvent liquidation will be paused so that the composition takes 
 
34  CCA 2010, Art 1047(1) states that “Once the insolvency status is declared, the debtor shall be 
prohibited from managing its assets or disposing of them”. 
35 Ibid, Art 1097(1) 
36 Ibid, Art 1099 entitled ‘Interim Management’, stipulates that: 1. “Having the debtor been declared 
insolvent, the court may enjoin the interim continuation of the debtor’s business activities when it 
thinks appropriate that the immediate termination of the business activities would lead to the value of 
the business being in a critical destruction that may be irreversible to reconstruct”. 
37 Ibid, Art 1099(2) 
38 Ali Younis, The Bankruptcy (Arabic Book Library) 58  
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place.39 If the final composition was rejected or unsuccessful, the insolvent liquidation 
will be resumed against the insolvent company.40  
This type of composition is designed for the debtor and its creditors to reach an 
agreement with an ultimate aim of satisfying the creditors’ interests. The creditors may 
agree to receive partial payment of their debts and they may agree not to enforce any 
further legal actions against the debtor after the court’s approval of the composition. As 
a result, the debtor’s liability will be discharged completely upon the success of this 
composition.41 This procedure can be initiated only by the debtor upon a petition 
presented to the judge delegate attached with details of the percentage of debt to be 
paid to the unsecured creditors (the secured creditors are not affected by this 
composition unless they wish to participate),42 the payment date and the guarantees of 
debts payment, the costs of the procedures and the insolvency trustee’s 
remunerations.43 The judge delegate has to consider the opinion of the insolvency 
trustee and the voice of the creditors’ committee. After the consent of the creditors’ 
committee, the judge shall order that the composition to be communicated to all 
creditors who must declare their position within 30 days if they wish to refuse.44 The 
majority of creditors45 in number representing at least two thirds in debt value have to 
 
39 CCA 2010, Art 1134(4) which states that: “The judge delegate may issue an order to suspend the 
liquidation after the composition being proposed”. 
40 Ibid, Art 1148 
41 Younis (n 38) 60 
42 CCA 2010, Art 1136(2) 
43 Ibid, Art 1133(1) 
44 Ibid, Art 1134(1) 
45 The Libyan insolvency law seems to have only one class of creditors who participate in the vote 
procedures. And if secured and privileged creditors wish to participate, they will be counted as 
unsecured creditors and they participate in voting as such. Ibid, Art 1002(2) 
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accept the proposal,46 and the approved composition will bind the dissenting minority 
creditors.47 
3.3.3. Preventive Composition  
Unlike the final composition, the preventive composition is a procedure that is 
available to, and only to, the debtor company48 before the official insolvency 
declaration by the court.49 The debtor’s petition for this procedure is required to 
constitute a credible offer to the creditors with a proposal worth of at least 40 percent of 
the total debts of unsecured creditors. One of the striking features of the composition is 
that it is not designed to affect the interests of the secured creditors who can decide not 
to participate in the process if they think that their interests are not well protected.50 
3.4. Application of the UNCITRAL Key Objectives51 to the Libyan Insolvency 
Law 
In its early involvement in the issue of insolvency reform, UNCITRAL’s 
policymakers acknowledged, in the report of ‘Possible Future Work on Insolvency 
Law’, that there was “broad agreement on the key objectives” for the design of 
effective and efficient insolvency regimes.52 The key objectives emphasise the need for 
making a balance between the different interests of various stakeholders and the 
development of an insolvency law that is designed to achieve high order principles 
 
46 Ibid, Art 1137(1) 
47 Ibid, Art 1144(1) 
48 Ibid, Art 984 
49 Ibid, Art 985(1) 
50 A detailed account of the preventive composition scheme will be subject of discussion in Chapter Four. 
51 As mentioned in the Introduction of the thesis, analysing the Key Objectives of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide is divided up between Chapter Three (which focuses on the general matters of 
insolvency and liquidation), Chapter Four (which deals with rescue matters with reference to Key 
Objective Three) and Chapter Five (which examines the secured transactions law - Key Objective 
Eight). 
52 UNCITRAL Working Group on Insolvency Law, ‘Possible Future Work on Insolvency Law’ [1999] 
UN General Assembly resolution no A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50, para 24 
<https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50>  accessed 28 Sep 2018 
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including, as will be discussed in detail below, certainty, predictability and equitable 
treatment of similarly situated claims, efficient and timely resolution of insolvency and 
maximisation of the assets value.53 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide provides comprehensive and thoughtful 
guidelines that vary from key objectives and principles of an effective insolvency law 
to specific detailed provisions.54 In Part One, it identifies Key Objectives and high 
order principles that are designed to direct the reminder of the Legislative Guide and 
can be used by national legislators as an evaluative framework for of the issues and 
targets to be achieved. Part Two provides details on core provisions for an effective and 
efficient insolvency and provides a detailed discussion and analysis of variant options 
of the core provisions for a model of insolvency law. Each chapter of the Legislative 
Guide also includes a set of recommendations designed to outline the central issues that 
the law should consider addressing.55 The Key56 Objectives of an effective insolvency 
law are discussed below. As previously mentioned, the thesis will discuss Objective 
Three (striking a balance between liquidation and reorganisation) in detail in Chapter 
Four because this Chapter will examine business rescue in Libya as regulated in the 
composition system, and Objective Eight (recognition of existing creditor rights and 
priority) in detail in Chapter Five because this Chapter will focus the examination on 
the rights and priorities of creditors as regulated in the Libyan secured transactions law. 
These objectives are regarded as of key importance and a more detailed examination is 
therefore merited. 
 
53 Jenny Clift, ‘International Insolvency Law: The UNCITRAL Experience with Harmonization and 
Modernization Techniques’ in Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of Private 
International Law, vol 11 (SELP 2009) 419 
54 Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Lawmakers (n 7) 50-51 
55 Clift, ‘International Insolvency Law’ (n 53) 419 
56 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 1 identified eight key objectives. 
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3.4.1. Obj.1. Provision of Certainty in the Market to Promote Economic Stability 
and Growth 
The classical role of insolvency law is to deal with uncertainty that is associated with 
insolvency. The nature of insolvency and business failure is that it is associated with 
uncertainty which affects various stakeholder interests as to how to protect and enforce 
their rights when such a scenario occurs.57 In principle, insolvency laws should not 
transfer the burden of insolvency borne by a stakeholder especially one whose interests 
enjoy more protection under a non-insolvency system.58 Returning to the theoretical 
discussion of the previous Chapter, it was emphasised by the CBT that the insolvency 
law has to play the role that is only geared towards protecting non-insolvency 
entitlements of secured creditors and the insolvency law should not lead to a change in 
those entitlements.59 The perspectives of such a view are, therefore, important to be 
recognised to promote certainty needed in the market.  
The emphasis on legal certainty is rational as it should be a central principle of the 
law. Legal certainty, as Professor Otto argues, is a precondition of the implementation 
of the law and the achievement of development goals; i.e. poverty reduction and 
eradication, health promotion, raising of education quality and level of living standards, 
etc.60 The European Court of Justice well summarised the definition of legal certainty 
as “… a fundamental principle of Community law which requires, in particular, that 
 
57 Anthony Casey, ‘Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy’ 
[2020] Colum L Rev, at 18 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353871> accessed 
06 Apr 2020 
58 Thomas Jackson, ‘A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1867 
59 See discussion above Sec 2.2.1 
60 Jan Otto, ‘Toward an Analytical Framework: Real Legal Certainty and its Explanatory Factors’ in 
Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li and Jan Otto (eds), Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China 
(Kluwer Law International 2002) 24-25. Also see: Barbara Oomen and Adrian Bedner, ‘The Relevance 
of Real Legal Certainty – An Introduction’ in Adriaan Bedner and Barbara Oomen (eds), Real Legal 
Certainty and its Relevance: Essays in Honour of Jan Michiel Otto (LUP 2018) 10 
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rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain 
unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly”.61  
Maintaining a balance between the need for achieving insolvency law objectives and 
the need to maintain legal certainty in the market is not an easy task to undertake. This 
is because objectives of insolvency law and principles of certainty can contradict each 
other. For instance, in rescue processes, stakeholders like creditors cannot easily 
anticipate what will happen to the value of their interests by the end of the process. 
Such concerns are reasonable since any interested party in the community needs to be 
certain as to what will happen to their interests in various scenarios and this certainty 
cannot be achieved, as Professor Bell argues, without providing intelligible and precise 
rules.62  
The focus on providing rules supporting certainty in the community, according to 
Professor Otto, should be placed not only on the implementation of the effective rules 
and laws but also on the effectiveness of institutions responsible for implementing such 
rules. This is because effective institutions can contribute to the achievement of sound 
outcomes by ensuring that the gap between the application of the enacted rules and 
practice is reduced.63 Particular attention should, accordingly, be paid to adequate 
education and training for judges since this is particularly important to enhancing the 
capacity of judges and the court system to administer justice independently, fairly and 
effectively and promoting legal certainty in the market.64 In the insolvency context, the 
successful implementation of an insolvency law and the development of the rescue 
 
61 Case C-110/03 Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR I-2829, para 30 
62 John Bell, ‘Certainty and Flexibility in Law’ in Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New 
Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 2008) 110 
63 Otto (n 60) 24-25 
64 International Commission of Jurists, Challenges for the Libyan Judiciary: Ensuring Independence, 
Accountability and Gender Equality (ICJ 2016) 46. Also see: Oomen and Bedner (n 60) 10 
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culture while maintaining certainty are dependent on the implementation of a sound 
judicial system and insolvency profession.65 This is captured by the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide in Objective One emphasising that both laws and institutions are 
simultaneously important for nations to achieve benefits and avoid the pitfalls of 
integrating with the international financial system.66 
It should be noted that insolvency laws should not only be implemented to achieve 
certainty in the market. But there are also other objectives that should equally be taken 
into account. Insolvency laws should also be enacted in a way that promotes economic 
stability and growth.67 Certainty in itself will not lead to optimal levels of economic 
growth because the easiest way to be certain is to liquidate insolvent businesses 
straightaway. This can create certainty for the creditors as they would know for certain 
what is going to happen in the event of insolvency. 
However, the scenario of insolvency requires effective tools to mitigate the impact of 
such scenarios when they arise. Sound insolvency laws can definitely enhance 
economic growth and stability by liquidating nonviable businesses and facilitating their 
replacement by more competitive businesses.68 However, liquidation is not always the 
best solution because of its impact on market stability and growth. Rescue procedures 
can contribute to economic growth and stability. The issue with rescue, as opposed to 
liquidation, is that it potentially generates more uncertainty and unpredictability among 
stakeholders because it can reallocate the losses from insolvency onto stakeholders like 
 
65 Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building’ (n 21) 16. Also see: Parry and Zhang (n 15) 137 
66 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 4 
67 Ibid 
68 Frouté (n 1) 201-04 
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secured creditors whose interests enjoy more protection under a non-insolvency 
system.69 
Despite the recent reform that has been witnessed in Libya, local and foreign 
investors suffer to a large extent from the uncertainty that exists in the market because 
of institutional inefficiency and the outdated legal system. As the WB observed, the 
country would suffer increasing uncertainty which in turn would affect investment in 
the market if no steps were taken in response to the situation.70 For instance, a large 
number of insolvent SOEs are subsidised by means of bailouts by the State to mitigate 
their distress, regardless of their viability, in order to achieve social considerations.71 
Two issues can be drawn in this regard. First, the political will of the State to support 
inefficient business is unpredictable and it thus creates a degree of uncertainty in the 
market. This will affect investors’ ability to calculate risk which leads to moral hazard72 
leaving private businesses running at competitive disadvantages.73 Second, the political 
support for inefficient businesses is economically wasteful because it is detrimental to 
 
69 The reason why a theory like CBT does not view rescue as an independent objective of insolvency law 
is because rescue interferes with pre-insolvency entitlements of creditors. See above Sec 2.2.1 
70 World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 63-64 
71 Until recently, the Government still subsidises its distressed SOEs to cover the employment salaries. In 
2016, for example, forty SOEs were bailed out to support their employees. See: The Presidency 
Council of the Government of National Accord, resolution no 44 of 2016 and resolution no 590 of 
2016 regarding the salary payment of employees of financially distressed SOEs. Art 1 of the resolution 
no 560 of 2016 states that ‘Payment of the employees of the distressed state owned companies, 
according to resolution of the Council of the Government of National Accord no 44 of 2016, shall 
continue to be effective’. 
72 The term ‘moral hazard’ problem is used to describe the situation of risk-taking behaviour, but in an 
inefficient way, by some investors in the market because they know they will be protected against the 
risk, such as through a bailout by the government. But this will leave other actors incurring the cost and 
will give incentives to lenders to increase the interest rate of credit to protect themselves against the 
potential risk. See: Leonard Kostovetsky, ‘Political Capital and Moral Hazard’ (2015) 116 Journal of 
Financial Economics 144 
73 Isabel Faeth, ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment - A Tale of Nine Theoretical Models’ (2009) 
23 Journal of Economic Surveys 165, 167; Rebecca Parry and Yingxiang Long, ‘China’s Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, Building an Infrastructure towards a Market-based Approach’ (2020) 20 J Corp Law 
Stud 157, 162 
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the market’s efficiency and economic growth by prolonging the life of unproductive 
businesses.74  
Moreover, the recent reform undertaken in Libya in 2010 did not take into account 
the importance of the insolvency system for the reform process in the country. The 
current insolvency law of Libya still accommodates the outdated features of the 
insolvency systems that were available in the 19th century. The design of the regime 
focuses mainly on liquidation and it is complicated and extremely time-consuming.75 
Such features of the current insolvency law in Libya besides the institutional 
inefficiency can result in undermining the investors’ certainty. It is argued that both the 
inefficiency of the insolvency law and institutions in the country have been the reason 
behind investors and creditors’ frustration in enforcing their claims.76 This is 
detrimental to the economic environment in the country as it can badly affect the 
investment decisions among investors. As has been mentioned,77 according to the WB 
Doing Business 2018 report, Libya ranks 185th out of 190 economies on their ease of 
doing business while the insolvency law of Libya ranks 168th worldwide.78 For Libya to 
promote credit availability and investment and to encourage investment decisions for 
local and international investors, it is widely emphasised that the legal framework must 
 
74 Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper and Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform’ 
(2012) 27 World Bank Research Observer 185, 194 
75  For more details see: Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘No Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency 
Regimes in the MENA Region’ (2011) 1 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5609, at 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794914> accessed 4 Jan 2019 
76 For more details see: Aburawi Gabgub, ‘Analysis of Non-performing Loans in the Libyan State-
Owned Commercial Banks: Perception Analysis of the Reasons and Potential Methods for Treatment’ 
(PhD thesis, Durham University 2009) 205-24. It should be noted that although there was a legal 
reform in Libya in 2010, the reform did not affect the institutional or legal foundations of these 
problems.  
77 See above Sec 1.2.3 
78 World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (World Bank 2018) 174 
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provide investors with practical protections and remedies in the scenario of debt default 
and insolvency.79  
3.4.2. Obj.2. Maximisation of the Value of Assets 
When the company is distressed, secured creditors, generally, tend to prefer to 
reclaim their assets rather than being restrained by insolvency procedures since this is 
the cheaper and quicker way to preserve the value of their individual interests. If 
creditors were prevented from enforcing their claims due to the implementation of 
objectives to promote, for example, a rescue process, they would press to have the 
value of their assets well protected during the process.80  
Maximising the value of the insolvency estate is an overriding objective of the 
insolvency law which should be sought either in liquidation or rescue proceedings. In 
liquidation, the emphasis will be on the realisation of the assets in order to satisfy the 
creditors from the proceeds as quickly as possible.81 The emphasis on keeping the 
business operations in business rescue should also be based on maintaining the going 
concern value of the business.82 Promoting business continuation will normally result 
in maximising the assets value as a going concern for all stakeholders including secured 
creditors, who would usually receive more than they would do if the company was 
placed into liquidation.83 It should be remembered that the primary principle sought by 
 
79 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Model Law on Secured Transactions, 
(2004) Introduction. (hereinafter EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions) 
80 Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Lawmakers (n 7) 292 
81 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 27 
82 Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para 05 
83 Terence Halliday, ‘Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction 
of States in East Asia’ (2012) 37 L&Soc Inq 265, 274. Also see: Clift, ‘International Insolvency Law’ 
(n 53) 419  
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the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide during the rescue procedures is that it always gives 
the value of the estate a priority over other objectives of rescue.84 
The objective of maximising the value of the insolvency estate can practically be 
achieved through the imposition of moratorium to avoid dismemberment of the estate. 
Individual debt enforcement remedies that are employed outside insolvency law are 
different from the remedies offered under insolvency procedures. Under the insolvency 
law as a collective system of debt enforcement, creditors’ claims are, or should be, 
suspended or prevented from being enforced. This mechanism is termed as a 
moratorium, or automatic stay, on the creditors’ claims. The moratorium is vital as it 
saves the going concern value of the business by preventing the estate from being 
dismantled by the individual enforcement of debts which, if allowed, would reduce 
recovery in liquidation and frustrate any rescue endeavours.85  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide recognised the significance of the moratorium for 
the insolvency process. It is important for rescue86 because it encourages distressed 
businesses to initiate rescue procedures. It is important for liquidation because it 
ensures a fair and orderly administration of the proceedings by providing the 
practitioner and the court with adequate time necessary to maximise the value of the 
assets, potentially by the sale as a going concern where the collective value of the 
assets are greater than the value of the assets if they were sold on a piecemeal basis.87  
Insolvency systems in the world differ substantially over the scope of the insolvent 
estate; i.e. over which property should be included in the estate and be subject to the 
 
84 For details see above Sec 2.3 
85 Goode (n 31) 64. Also see: Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 3 
86 The importance of the moratorium for business rescue will be further discussed in Chapter Four. See 
below Sec 4.3.5 
87 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 26 and 27 
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insolvency procedures.88 For the purpose of maximising the value of the assets, the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide takes the broad approach of the breadth of the 
insolvency estate to include the secured assets and thus limiting the right of secured 
creditors to enforce their security by the application of the moratorium. The 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide justifies this approach as it may facilitate the 
achievement of multiple goals such as ensuring the equal treatment of creditors and 
increasing the likelihood of rescue efforts where the assets are essential to the business 
continuation and where the business is to be sold as a going concern in the event of 
liquidation.89 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide recommends that the insolvency law 
should identify the assets that should be included in the insolvency estate which can 
include the “debtor’s interest in encumbered assets and in third-party-owned assets”, 
the “assets acquired after commencement of the insolvency proceedings”, and “assets 
recovered through avoidance and other actions”.90 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the secured assets in the insolvency estate must not lead 
to depriving secured creditors of their rights in those assets and the law should ensure 
that the rights of secured creditors in the secured assets are well protected. For 
example, that law may specify situations where the secured assets may be excluded 
from the insolvency estate.91 This is important to maintain the value of the secured 
assets and to ensure certainty for secured creditors about that value because otherwise 
the lending market will be undermined. 
 
88 See: Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, ‘Legitimation and Global Lawmaking’ [2006] Fordham 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 952492, at 21 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952492> accessed 28 Jul 2018 
89 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 7 and 36 
90 Ibid, Rec 35 
91 Ibid, Part Two, Chap II, para 8 
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In Libya, in the case of the insolvent liquidation, the CCA 2010 in Article 1056 states 
that “Unless otherwise stated, it shall not be permitted; the constitution or the 
continuance of any individual actions on the assets that are included in the insolvency 
estate”. This is advantageous because it facilitates value maximisation of the estate and 
enhances the equitable treatment of creditors by preventing the business’s early 
dismemberment. However, apart from that, the moratorium in Libya is associated with 
some deficiencies particularly in the composition system. For instance, secured 
creditors are not bound by the composition procedures as they are not considered in the 
majority of creditors required to vote for the composition plan.92 Therefore, they are 
enabled to enforce their securities during the process whenever they wish to. This is 
problematic because setting secured creditors out of the composition procedures would 
potentially lead to dismemberment of the business and reduction of the value of the 
insolvency estate. This will consequently lead to the disturbance of the rescue efforts 
and the sale as a going concern because the total value realised will be less and the sale 
may no longer be possible.93 
3.4.3. Obj.3. Striking a Balance between Liquidation and Reorganisation 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide consciously embraces rescue as an overriding 
objective of any effective insolvency regime and rejects exclusively liquidation-centred 
insolvency laws. Thus, it recommends that insolvency laws should “include provisions 
addressing both reorganization and liquidation of a debtor”.94 The UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide justifies its preference for rescue on the ground that keeping the 
 
92  CCA 2010, Art 1002(1). Art 1002(2) states that “Secured creditors shall not participate in the 
composition plan voting unless they renounce their securities. Security renunciation may be partially to 
at least one-third of the total debt …”. 
93 The moratorium of the composition system in Libya will be discussed in Chapter Four (Sec 4.3.5) 
94 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 2. For more details see: Terence Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb and 
Bruce Carruthers, ‘Missing Debtors: National Lawmaking and Global Norm-Making of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Regimes’ in Ralph Brubaker, Robert Lawless and Charles Tabb (eds), A Debtor World: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Debt (OUP 2012) 265-66 
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essential components of the business together would lead to a greater value than if the 
estate is fragmented in a piecemeal sale.95 This would lead to preserving the going 
concern value of the business, to achieve goals that go beyond only maximising returns 
to creditors to promote advantages to other stakeholders in the community like the 
employees and suppliers which will eventually benefit the community as a whole.96 
Given the importance of this Objective, it will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
3.4.4. Obj.4. Ensuring Equitable Treatment of Similarly Situated Creditors 
The insolvency law should employ the objective of equitable treatment during the 
collective proceedings by which similarly situated creditors are treated fairly; in that, 
they should receive a distribution on their claim in accordance with their relative 
ranking and interests when liquidation takes place.97 The implementation of this 
principle should lead to an equal and rateable distribution of the insolvent company’s 
assets among creditors. It is based on the idea that the loss resulting from insolvency 
should be shared rateably among those who have claims against the insolvency estate.98 
This objective in Libya is governed in the insolvency system by the operation of the 
pari passu rules.99 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide provides a definition for the pari 
passu principle as it is “… the principle according to which similarly situated creditors 
are treated and satisfied proportionately to their claim out of the assets of the estate 
available for distribution to creditors of their rank”.100 
 
95 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 6 
96  Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction: Predictable and 
Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the Wake of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ in Meredith Woo 
(ed), Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia: A Comparative Study (Palgrave Macmillan 
2007) 244 
97 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 7 
98 Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of 
Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus Org Law Rev 615, 623 
99 CCA 2010, Art 1120(4) 
100 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Introduction, para 12. (cc), at page 6 
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The principle of pari passu distribution is often said to be the foremost and most 
fundamental principle of corporate insolvency law as it ensures equality among 
unsecured creditors in the common pool and provides predictability to investors as to 
what to anticipate should their debtor company becomes insolvent.101 The pari passu 
principle is, as explained by Professor Seligson: 
“All persons similarly situated are entitled to equality in treatment in the distribution of 
the assets of the bankrupt estate. It would be inequitable to disregard what has transpired 
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition”.102 
The principle pari passu distribution mandates that, in liquidation proceedings, 
unsecured creditors shall share rateably,103 to the extent to their pre-insolvency claims, 
in the assets of the insolvent company that are available for distribution.104  The pari 
passu is effectively applied only where there are unencumbered assets of the insolvent 
company that are available for distribution. Therefore, when the insolvent company has 
granted security of a particular asset, this asset is available for distribution pari passu 
only to the extent that its value exceeds the sum of the security.105  
While some acknowledge that the pari passu principle is all-pervasive and 
fundamental to the insolvency process, some commentators, such as Mokal, heavily 
criticise this principle as it remains only as a theoretical doctrine and it has no 
significant application in the real world. In overwhelming majority of insolvency cases, 
 
101 Goode (n 31) 235; Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (4th edn, 
LexisNexis 2017) 505 
102 Charles Seligson, ‘Preferences under the Bankruptcy Act’ (1961) 15 Vand L Rev 115, 115 
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as Mokal goes further, unsecured creditors are left with little if anything to be 
distributed to them due to numerous exceptions.106 The Cork Report, having praised the 
principle of rateable distribution of unsecured assets, acknowledged that this principle 
is rarely attained in practice.107  
However, the pari passu principle cannot simply be disregarded. Professor Goode, 
for instance, praises this principle and purports that its practical deficiency cannot 
undermine its centrality to the insolvency law. But rather, the reason behind its 
impracticality is attributable to the fact that this principle is applied only to the 
unencumbered assets of the company which are depleted by the development of 
extensive range of security interests, hence, the amount of unencumbered assets 
available for distribution to unsecured creditors became relatively little.108 Accordingly, 
the Cork Report in the UK admits that the system of priorities accorded by the law is 
the cause of this public dissatisfaction because they operate to the detriment of 
unsecured creditors. The Cork report, therefore, suggested significant reduction and 
even elimination of the categories of debts with insolvency priority.109  
The objective equitable treatment of creditors supposes that creditors are categorised 
into groups with relative rankings and interests.110 Many creditors enjoy similar 
situations with respect to their claims they hold on the ground of similar legal or 
 
106 Mokal identifies these exceptions into five categories which can truly violate the pari passu principle; 
they are namely the insolvency set-off rights, creditors whose claims arise after the winding-up order 
has been made are given privileged treatment, some types of pre-liquidation creditors, preferential 
claims and finally some types of debts have been deferred by the statute. For details see: Rizwaan 
Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology: the pari passu Myth’ (2001) 60 CLJ 581, 585-90. Also see: Keay and 
Walton (n 101) 506 
107 The Cork Report, para 1396 
108 Goode (n 31) 99 
109 The Cork Report, paras. 1397-98. The Cork Report suggested also that a ‘Ten Per Cent Fund’ “equal 
to 10% of the net realisations of assets subject to a floating charge should be made available for 
distribution among the ordinary unsecured creditors”. Ibid, para 1538. This proposal was never 
implemented but it influenced the “Prescribed Part” introduced in Insolvency Act 1986, s 176A, 
following the EA 2002. See: Kayode Akintola, ‘The Prescribed Part for Unsecured Creditors: A Pithy 
Review’ (2017) 30 Insolvency Intelligence 55 
110 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 7 
111 
 
contractual rights. However, other creditors enjoy different treatment by which their 
claims or rights are superior. Accordingly, those various claims are ranked by the law 
for the purposes of distribution of the insolvency estate in liquidation according to the 
creditors’ prescribed pre-insolvency priorities.111 This does not operate against the 
objective of equitable treatment however. The ranking of creditors’ claims is justifiable 
as creditors usually enjoy distinct situations with the debtor based on commercial 
bargains which have to be recognised and respected by the insolvency law.112 For 
instance, secured assets are, for the purpose of security, not assets of the debtor and 
therefore they fall outside of the debtor’s distributable assets. Accordingly, secured 
creditors can enforce their claims against the insolvent debtor outside the insolvency 
procedures or obtain distribution from those assets in liquidation.113 This, as the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide acknowledges, would achieve broader goals; namely 
the preservation of legitimate commercial expectations, the promotion of predictability 
in commercial relations and the equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.114  
There are other kinds of interests which the law entitles to some kind of priority as an 
exception to the pari passu principle. The justification of such exceptional cases varies 
depending on social and maybe political considerations. Those can be based on 
important public interests (employment protection and preference), the desirability to 
achieve orderly and effective conduct of insolvency process (priority of insolvency 
professionals and expenses for the insolvency administration) and the promotion of the 
continuation of the business and rescue (priority for post-commencement fund).115 
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However, the application of some rules may have an effect on the achievement of the 
equitable treatment through the pari passu principle. To start with, the rule of set-off of 
mutual claims116 is provided by insolvency laws regarding mutual money obligations 
between the debtor and its creditors to be paid out of the insolvency estate. Critics of 
insolvency set-off argue that it has an effect on the equitable treatment of similarly 
situated creditors. For example, where counterparty A has provided the credit to 
counterparty B without security and A also owes B money then it will be placed in a 
better position than the insolvent counterparty B’s other unsecured creditors with 
regard to the debt owed to B which is effectively paid to the counterparty A before 
other unsecured creditors are paid anything.117  
In Libya, set-off right entitles a counterparty of mutual claims to exercise the right to 
set-off claims against the insolvent company. Set-off rights under the Libyan law are 
exercised by creditors without the need for judicial interference.118 Ironically, the set-
off is generally permitted during the insolvency procedures even if the debt is not yet 
due, unless the undue debt was acquired by a creditor after the insolvency declaration 
or within one year prior to the insolvency adjudication, then it shall be void.119 Set-off 
rights have an impact on the principle of equitable treatment and, therefore, the use of 
this right should not be left to the full discretion of individual creditors. Set-off rights in 
countries where they are permitted, are only permitted by the insolvency practitioner or 
the court in a claims verification and admission process, provided that certain 
conditions are met, in order to restrain the creditors’ race in enforcing their claims.120 
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Furthermore, secured claims may rationally be subordinated to other claims. First, 
should the insolvency administrator need to spend some money in maintaining the 
value of the encumbered assets, secured creditors are meant to contribute to the 
recovery of those expenses as administrative expenses from the amount that would 
otherwise be paid in priority to the secured creditor from the sale proceedings.121 This 
is reasonable because such costs are spent directly to maintain the creditors’ own 
interests. Secured creditors may additionally be subordinated to other claims when the 
survival of the distressed company relies on the post-commencement finance with post-
commencement lenders being granted super-priority security as long as the effect on 
the interest of secured creditors of any security granted is set forth clearly at the time 
finance is provided.122 A notable example of the super-priority security for post-
commencement creditors is the priming lien system of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code 1978 as contained in section 364(d) on assets that are already secured 
by pre-existing liens.123 
In addition, preferential claims (or as known in Libya as privileged or excellent 
claims) are originally unsecured claims which are thus supposed to enjoy same 
treatment with similarly situated unsecured claims and be paid proportionally. 
However, the law assigns them priority over other unsecured claims.124 That is why it is 
 
121 Resources expended by the insolvency representative in maintaining the value of the encumbered 
assets can be considered as administrative expenses and should be recovered in priority from the assets’ 
sale proceedings. See: CC 1953, Art 1142(1)(2) states that ‘The judicial expenses spent for the benefit 
of all creditors for maintaining and selling the debtor’s assets and property are entitled a priority over 
the price of these assets. And such expenses are paid in priority to any other rights …’. It should be 
noted that the provision of this Article covers the expenses spent for the benefit of all creditors, secured 
and unsecured. General administrative expenses, as such, will be prioritised even over the secured 
creditors. Although such expenses are important to have some statutory priority, they should not be 
paid ahead of the secured creditors unless they are spent to maintain the value of the secured assets. See: 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap V, para 66 
122 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap V, para 65 
123 But subject to the approval of the court. See: George Triantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-
in-Possession Financing’ (1993) 46 Vand L Rev 901 
124 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap V, paras. 67-71 
114 
 
believed that such claims operate against the principle of pari passu distribution125 and, 
consequently, they could reduce the value of assets available for distribution to other 
ordinary unsecured claims.126 Where such privileges are to be incorporated into the 
insolvency law, it is recommended by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide that such 
privileges are minimised.127 
Strikingly odd, the privileged claims in Libya enjoy a priority order above not only 
the claims of unsecured creditors, but also over secured creditors. This contradicts with 
maximisation of the value of the assets and equitable distribution of the creditors and is 
detrimental to the any insolvency procedures.128 It also undermines the pre-insolvency 
rights of the secured creditors which must be protected to ensure certainty of the 
insolvency procedures which is crucial to enhance the affordability and availability of 
credit in the market. 
3.4.5. Obj.5. Provision for Timely, Efficient and Impartial Resolution of 
Insolvency 
Effective insolvency and rescue procedures require the court and the insolvency 
practitioners to take rapid decisions and quick actions to address insolvency cases 
because if the procedures take longer than necessary they otherwise will result in 
inefficiency as well as maximising the distress of creditors because of the losses they 
suffer.129 The delay of the procedures is detrimental to the whole rescue process by 
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minimising the likelihood of successful rescue efforts. The delay leads to reducing the 
value of the debtor’s assets and maximising loss by creditors even where the process 
has potential for a successful rescue.130 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide Objective 
Five insists that “Achieving timely and efficient administration will support the 
objective of maximizing asset value …”.131 Insolvency laws, accordingly, have to 
ensure flexibility in the procedures; in that nonviable and inefficient businesses can be 
liquidated in time while efficient and potentially viable businesses can be rescued.132 
In order to apply rapid decisions, courts have to put a time limit to certain procedures 
and commence the rescue procedures within a short time from the date of application. 
In this short period, courts will not need to undertake substantive tests regarding the 
eligibility of the insolvent business for the rescue procedures. Thus, the court’s 
examination authority for the commencement of a procedure should be limited to 
procedural formalities like whether the debtor has used the proper forms and the fees of 
application.133 Delays in courts’ decisions, as the IMF acknowledges in its 1999 
document regarding to Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures, can adversely affect 
the value of the debtor’s assets or the viability of the business.134 Therefore, courts have 
to ensure that their decisions are made in a quick and orderly manner. And when 
appeals are available, they have to be expeditious ensuring that the lower court’s 
decisions continue to be binding pending the outcome of appeal.135 
 
Corporate Insolvency Regime, 1992–2007’ in John Gillespie and Randall Peerenboom 
(eds), Regulation in Asia: Pushing Back on Globalization (Routledge 2009) 244-45 
130 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (UTP 2003) 
59 
131 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 8 
132 Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para 8 
133 Oh and Halliday (n 129) 244-45 
134 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues (1999) 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/> accessed 24 Oct 2018 
135 Ibid   
116 
 
Furthermore, striking a balance between liquidation and rescue requires the 
insolvency law to facilitate easy conversions from failed rescue to liquidation. In the 
absence of such a mechanism, the rescue process would be at the expense of the 
creditors who may decide not to support it as a consequence.136 And, the court and the 
insolvency practitioners should be independent and not try to waste their efforts by 
trying to bring pulses to a dead body because this will result in wasting creditors’ 
interests by decreasing the estate value through needless incurring of costs. 
In general terms, efficiency is described as the relationship between the aggregate 
benefits and the aggregate costs of a situation or a legal rule.137 Efficiency of 
insolvency laws seems to relate to, as Ringe acknowledges, the speedy process in 
which the available resources are allocated to their best use in the insolvency 
procedures, either through traditional liquidation or rescue processes. The efficiency of 
the insolvency law is achieved by expeditious process since this would result in lower 
costs and higher efficiency of the process.138  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in Objective Five provides examples on how to 
achieve quick and orderly resolution of the debtor’s financial trouble by introducing an 
insolvency law that provides: (a) easy access to the insolvency procedures either in 
liquidation or reorganisation, (b) a convenient means of identifying, collecting, 
preserving and recovering assets and rights that should be applied towards the debtor’s 
payment of debts and liabilities, (c) participation of the debtor and the creditors with 
the least possible delay and costs, (d) a proper structure of the supervision and 
 
136 Carruthers and Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction’ (n 96) 252 
137 A Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (5th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2018) 
138 Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Strategic Insolvency Migration and Community Law’ in Wolf-Georg Ringe, 
Louise Gullifer and Philippe Théry (eds), Current Issues in European Financial and Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives from France and the UK (Hart Publishing 2009) 91 
117 
 
administration of the procedures either through professionals or court processes, (e) 
effective resolution of the debtor’s financial burdens.139 
Further, to achieve the goal of equitable treatment, the insolvency law has to be 
applied impartially.140 Impartiality of insolvency law relies on certain characteristics of 
the persons who are in charge of administrating the insolvency procedures. To ensure 
that, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide indicates that “the insolvency law should 
specify the qualifications and qualities required for appointment as an insolvency 
representative”, as well as “grounds upon which a proposed insolvency representative 
may be disqualified from appointment”.141 The insolvency practitioner should attain 
qualifications and personal qualities as prerequisite for appointment. Qualities of the 
practitioner may include “integrity, independence, impartiality, requisite knowledge of 
relevant commercial law and experience in commercial and business matters”.142  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide explains in the commentary the focus on the 
qualifications and qualities prerequisite for the appointment of insolvency 
representatives by the central role that the representatives play to ensure effective and 
efficient implementation of the insolvency law. They are authorised to exercise certain 
powers over distressed businesses and they have a duty to protect the value of those 
businesses. They are also empowered to protect the interests of other stakeholders such 
as the creditors and the employees.143  
In Libya, there are concerns regarding the duration of the procedures and the issue of 
insolvency qualifications. The insolvency law of Libya does not provide a timeline for 
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the procedures as the court has wide discretion to determine the time of the procedures, 
not to mention the cumbersome and time-consuming nature that have tended to 
characterise the court procedures. They are subject to multi appeal processes triggered 
by dissenting parties which results in delays in procedure conclusion.144  
And the insolvency representatives in the country, namely the court appointed judge 
and the trustee/ practitioner, are neither required to obtain insolvency or business-
related qualifications or experience nor do they receive training to deal with insolvency 
cases. Regarding the insolvency trustees/ practitioners, Article 1032 of the CCA 2010, 
entitled ‘Roster of Judicial Administrators’, provides that District Courts shall keep a 
roster of judicial experts among whom the insolvency trustee is selected but no specific 
knowledge is required. The Judicial Expertise Act 2003145 in Article 5(3) and its 
Executive By-law146 in Article 2(z) require for judicial experts to obtain only 
graduation qualifications with practical experience defined by the Expertise 
Committee. However, what constitutes a practical experience does not necessarily 
relate to insolvency or business matters. In fact, insolvency and liquidation matters 
have been dealt with either by lawyers or accountants who have no specific knowledge 
about the insolvency and rescue cases.147 
It is vitally important for the insolvency and rescue procedures to proceed in a timely 
manner because this would increase the confidence of the creditors in the procedures 
and would in turn increase credit availability and affordability. Therefore, insolvency 
law and procedures have to include sufficient mechanisms that help the court and the 
practitioners to ensure that procedures are concluded quickly and efficiently. In 
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addition, the matter of the insolvency representative is very essential in achieving 
decent outcomes from the procedures and, therefore, the introduction of training and 
certification at the same time as the legal framework would clearly be useful in the 
country. This is very crucial for an effective insolvency law that is anchored on 
principles such as the maximisation of the insolvency estate value, saving viable 
businesses from liquidation and applying a timely resolution of insolvency. Such 
principles cannot be achieved without professional and competent practitioners that 
capable of realising such principles.148 
Evidence from international practice has shown that countries that pay particular 
attention to the minimum qualifications and insolvency-specific training and 
knowledge for insolvency practitioners succeeded in increasing the recovery rates in 
the insolvency proceedings.149 For example, the UK IA 1986, influenced by the Cork 
report, adopted the compulsory professional licensing “for most insolvency 
procedures” as a response to a number of high-profile scandals caused by misconduct 
of unqualified liquidators. The insolvency practitioners these days in the UK are 
professionally qualified and members of recognised professional bodies. The 
introduction of this system in the UK has been praised for its benefit to the insolvency 
profession as it has led to improved standards of supervision and management of 
insolvent companies.150 
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3.4.6. Obj.6. Preservation of the Insolvency Estate to Allow Equitable Distribution 
to Creditors 
Preservation of the value of the insolvency estate is a fundamental objective to 
collective insolvency procedures as it may ensure that the insolvency estate has 
sufficient value for distribution among creditors by keeping the assets in the estate 
together.151 It also increases the likelihood of a successful rescue or the sale of the 
business as a going concern in liquidations by maintaining sufficient assets available 
for the process.152 Preservation of the insolvency estate is usually achieved by 
preventing the insolvent debtor from making unfair disposition of its assets at the 
expense of creditors. 
In insolvency, the property of the distressed company is supposed to be available for 
distribution to the creditors. But the insolvency estate could potentially be depleted 
when an insolvent company disposes of its property for less than full value to the extent 
that would affect the distribution for creditors, either in the value of the estate available 
or in the entitlements of creditors. The legal response to this problem is to employ 
provisions enabling the avoidance of such abusive transactions to maintain the scheme 
of distribution.153 These provisions are known as the transaction avoidance laws. 
Provisions governing transaction avoidance are considered key features of any effective 
insolvency law because of their contribution to maintaining and enforcing the schemes 
stated in the insolvency laws for the distribution of the insolvency estate. Without such 
provisions, the insolvency estate can be depleted before or after the opening of the 
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insolvency case which may lead to creditors being left with little, if anything, for 
distribution.154  
To avoid this risk, therefore, the transactions avoidance laws are designed to enable 
the insolvency practitioner to restore the estate to a value equivalent to what would 
have been if the transaction had not taken place.155 This is the rule. The UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide recommends that the insolvency law “… should include provisions 
that apply retroactively and are designed to overturn transactions, involving the debtor 
or assets of the estate, and that have the effect of either reducing the value of the estate 
or upsetting the principle of equitable treatment of creditors”.156 
According to the Legislative Guide, there are three types of avoidable transactions 
that can be found in most legal systems: (a) transactions intended to defeat, hinder or 
delay creditors from collecting their claims, (b) transactions at undervalue, (c) 
transactions that could be regarded as preferential treatment to certain creditors.157 Any 
transactions that are considered by the insolvency practitioner or the court to fall into 
one of these categories should be potentially voidable. To trigger the transaction 
avoidance system, transactions typically have to occur within a certain period of time; 
called the suspect period.158  
The date of a transaction is of a vital aspect in the avoidance provisions. Most 
insolvency laws in the world explicitly specify the time period within which a 
transaction must have occurred if it is to be voidable as well as indicating the date from 
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which the period is calculated retroactively. The suspect period could be several days 
or months prior to a particular event or time. For example, the date of application for 
commencement of procedures or the effective date of commencement of the 
procedures, or it could be the date decided by the court as being the date of cessation of 
payments.159  
Voidable transactions provisions should be properly balanced with the competing 
social benefits. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide proposes that insolvency laws, 
relating to actions to restore assets to the insolvency estate, should take into account 
whether the avoidance of a transaction will be beneficial to the insolvency estate and 
whether the avoidance of a transaction may disturb the rescue plan and the possible 
cost of avoidance proceedings should also be considered. Transaction avoidance should 
be subject to the discretion of the court when exercising its obligation of maximising 
the assets value.160  
In addition, the avoidance provisions are not only shaped by the need to maintain and 
enforce the scheme of asset distribution for the benefit of creditors, but there is also a 
need to achieve a balance between the need to protect the creditors’ interests with the 
need to ensure contractual certainty.161 Therefore, it should be taken into account that in 
some situations parties may have acted in good faith believing that the transaction is 
valid. There is an undesirable consequence then to affect transactions which will 
undermine certainty in contractual dealings. It has been pointed out that, while the 
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former concern leads to the implementation of transaction avoidance, the latter concern 
limits the scope of the transaction avoidance.162 
In Libya, avoidable transactions are regulated in the insolvency law which provides a 
wide range of transactions that are subject to avoidance if they occurred within a 
certain fixed period of time (one year or two years prior to the insolvency declaration) 
and specified that such transactions will be, accordingly, void. The CCA 2010 in 
Article 1069, entitled ‘Transactions Free of Charge’, provides that: “It shall be void, 
any transactions free of charge occurring within two years prior to the insolvency 
declaration…”.163 Article 1070, entitled ‘Repayments’, states that: “It shall be void, the 
repayments of debts that have fallen due in or after the day the insolvency status was 
declared if such transactions occurred within two years prior to the insolvency 
declaration”.164 Article 1072 covers a wide range of transactions stating that: “(1) 
Unless otherwise proven that the beneficiary (the counterparty) acted in a good faith,165 
the following transactions shall not be effective against the creditors: (a) the 
transactions or the obligations occurring within two years prior to the insolvency at an 
unreasonable undervalue, (b) the repayments of monetary debts that have fallen due if 
they are not paid by monetary means as long as they are paid two years prior to the 
insolvency declaration, (c) securing debts that have not fallen due and were not 
previously secured if they occurred within two years prior to the insolvency 
declaration, (2) Provided that the insolvency practitioner/ trustee proves that the 
beneficiary (the counterparty) was acting in bad faith,166 it shall not be effective against 
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the creditors also the fulfilment of debts that have already fallen due, and any 
transactions (even) at reasonable prices and the transactions that immediately grant 
security or preference on a debt if these transactions occurred within one year prior to 
the insolvency declaration”.167  
A critical review of these provisions leads to two main conclusions. On the one hand, 
the Libyan law does not cover all types of avoidable transactions as anticipated in the 
Legislative Guide. The avoidance provisions in Libya do not cover transactions 
intended to defeat, hinder or delay creditors from collecting their claims. On the other 
hand, the duration of the suspect period, which is generally two years or one year when 
it is proved that the counterparty was acting in bad faith, calculated retroactively from 
the date of the insolvency declaration can be criticised on the ground that specifying the 
date of insolvency declaration as the date from which the suspect period is calculated 
can undermine certainty regarding the transaction’s validity. This is because the date of 
the insolvency declaration is not certain as there is a potential for a delay of several 
months after the petition or the commencement of proceedings, then several months of 
that fixed period will be taken up by the period of the delay between the application 
and the insolvency declaration. Such a potential delay can also occur during the 
composition system between the date of the composition application and the insolvency 
declaration. In the meanwhile, debtors may take advantage of the composition to get 
away with transactions during the suspect period, especially when there is no potential 
for the composition, as there is no time limit within which the composition proceedings 
should conclude. Accordingly, some voidable transactions may not be subject to the 
avoidance provisions only because they occurred within a period of more than two 
years, or one year as the case maybe, from the date of the insolvency declaration.  
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Undoubtedly, this will in turn limit the potential effectiveness of the avoidance 
powers and will in turn prejudice the objective of maximisation of the assets value and 
also the equitable distributions to creditors. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
discussed the situation when such a potential delay could happen and recommends that 
the insolvency law should precisely specify the date from which the suspect period is 
calculated. The date may be “… either the date of application for, or commencement 
of, the insolvency proceedings”.168 
3.4.7. Obj.7. Ensuring a Transparent and Predictable Insolvency Law that 
Contains Incentives for Gathering and Dispensing Information 
It is believed that transparency and predictability are very significant in any legal 
system. Transparent and predictable insolvency laws play a fundamental role in dealing 
with distressed companies and in preventing and resolving financial crises.169 
Transparency implies that the insolvency law aims to facilitate accessible corporate 
information. This is important to assess whether a process is reliable and whether the 
procedures are adequate to afford a level of protection to the affected parties. The 
purpose of enhancing transparency in the insolvency procedures is to determine 
whether a decision made by the court or the insolvency practitioner was based on 
sensible justifications. This is essential to ensure that the decision made in the process 
is not benefiting one party over another.170 
Enhanced transparency of insolvency procedures can encourage the creditors to play 
an active role in the decision making. This is because, as the WB acknowledges, 
 
168  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 89. The Legislative Guide in this recommendation allows 
insolvency laws to specify different suspect periods for different types of transactions. For details see: 
Ibid, Part Two, Chap II, para 188 
169 Halliday, ‘Architects of the State’ (n 83) 273 
170 John Wood, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamentals and Existence’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Leeds 2013) 155-56 
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enhancing transparent legal systems through more stringent disclosure requirements is 
an essential requirement to strengthen investors’ protection and increase their 
confidence.171 And transparent insolvency procedures are vital to enable the creditors to 
assess the value of their rights and interests over the assets and liabilities encumbering 
them with a high degree of accuracy.172 Creditors should be provided with relevant and 
accurate information about the financial affairs of the debtor’s business and should be 
provided also with notice of issues that may affect their interests and on which they 
may be required to decide or advice.173  
Predictable insolvency law is beneficial to debtors and creditors as it provides them 
with a high degree of assurance by which they can predict the outcomes of the 
procedures. For example, they can predict what rights and interests they have over 
assets, what liabilities the assets are encumbered with and how their rights and 
liabilities will be enforced in courts.174 Predictability as such is linked closely to legal 
certainty; in essence the law is structurally clear and known in advance as discussed 
above,175 because when the law is associated with legal uncertainty, the outcomes of 
the process would become very unpredictable. Equally important, the insolvency law 
should not only be clear to achieve predictability, but it should also be effectively 
enforceable with less discretion vested in the court or the trustee. It is acknowledged 
that predictable insolvency systems and sound systems for the collective debt resolution 
can have a significant influence on the investment decisions of investors.176 
 
171 World Bank, East Asia: Recovery and Beyond (World Bank 2000) 83 
172 Lawrence Summers, ‘International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures’ (2000) 90 Am 
Econ Rev 1, 11; Carruthers and Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction’ (n 96) 263 
173 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 86 
174 Carruthers and Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction’ (n 96) 263 
175 See above Sec 3.4.1 
176 Frouté (n 68) 204 
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The law in Libya insists on the final reports provided by the insolvency practitioners 
in both rescue and liquidation procedures. Such reports are sources for the court and its 
judge to gather relevant information regarding the situation of a distressed business. For 
example, in the composition procedures, the trustee is committed to do a preliminary 
assessment of the company’s insolvency, the debtor’s composition proposals and the 
guarantees offered to the creditors and submit an assessment report to the court at least 
three days prior to the creditors’ meeting.177 The trustee has to inform the judge 
delegate immediately about any activities that may prove the debtor’s dishonesty or 
unworthiness or any unauthorised activities that may prejudice the creditors’ interests 
during the procedures.178 Such reports are useful to determine the viability of the 
business before the approval of the debtor’s proposals. During the implementation of 
the composition, furthermore, the trustee has to report to the judge about whatever may 
affect the creditors’ interests.179  
In the insolvent liquidation procedures, the trustee has a duty to submit to the judge a 
detailed report within one month of the insolvency declaration articulating all relevant 
information and documents that demonstrate the responsibility of the management, the 
supervisory board, external accounts auditors and shareholders. The trustee is expected 
to provide a monthly statement to the judge articulating his/ her management of the 
insolvent company’s business and assets.180  
Due to the lack of an insolvency profession in Libya, it may be useful to resort to 
related professional bodies to assist the court and its representatives in carrying out the 
rescue and insolvency procedures. In some cases, the law refers to the options where 
 
177 CCA 2010, Art 997(1)(2) 
178 Ibid, Art 998 
179 Ibid, Art 1010 
180 Ibid, Art 1038 
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the judge may appoint an assistant expert to assist the practitioner in carrying out the 
procedures. For instance, in Article 997(2) of the CCA 2010, the judge is authorised to 
appoint an external expert to help in assessing the valuation of the business.181 One of 
the professional bodies that the court may resort to is the Libyan Auditors and 
Accountants Association. The CCA 2010 refers to this body and obliges companies to 
appoint at least one external accounts auditor. The law considers the reports issued by 
the auditor valid and effective unless otherwise proven.182 
Further, the law vests in the external accounts auditor an important duty to examine 
the company’s financial situation and submit a report in this regard to the company’s 
general assembly within a period not exceeding forty five days from the date he or she 
received the company’s financial data. The law requires the company’s management to 
coordinate with the auditor and provide all financial statement and documents.183 A 
copy of each of the auditor’s report, the general assembly minutes, the reports of board 
of directors and the supervisory board must be approved by the general assembly and 
must all be submitted to commercial registry within ten days of the general assembly’s 
approval.184 In the insolvency context, it is important that the insolvency practitioners 
to cooperate with auditors’ reports as they could foster transparency and predictability 
of the procedures and this would advantage not only the interests of the creditors but 
might also ensure local and foreign investors’ confidence as to what to anticipate if 
they need to resort to the procedures. This, therefore, should be the norm and the 
insolvency practitioners in fact should be under a duty, where they lack the necessary 
experience, to seek advice and assistance from such professionals. 
 
181 Ibid, Art 997(2) 
182 Ibid, Art 18 
183 Ibid, Art 209 and 210 
184 Ibid, Art 211 
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When businesses become insolvent, creditors should be allowed by the insolvency 
law to exercise their rights and interests in a predictable manner with the facilitation of 
the possible alternatives, whether liquidation or rescue, that maximise the economic 
values of the insolvency estate.185 In Libya, creditors, mainly banks, are frustrated from 
enforcing their interests in the event of insolvency and the tendency among creditors is 
to overlook loan delinquency and roll over the debts hoping for turnaround. In the 
meanwhile, they tend to declare the non-performing status of loans. Actually, this is 
attributable to inefficiency of courts for debt recovery combined with the inefficiency 
of the current structure of the insolvency law which has been associated with 
unpredictability in terms of enforcement since creditors may wait years before they can 
see any returns, if ever.186 
For example, time limitation on the formulation of insolvent liquidation or the 
composition strategy within which procedures are conducted is lacking while the court 
is vested with great discretion over this matter. Article 988 of the CCA 2010, for 
instance, states that “Should the court deem the proposal to be admissible, it shall 
declare the commencement of the composition procedure by an order that includes the 
following: (1) to delegate a judge to carry out the procedures; (2) to call for the 
creditors to convene within thirty days from the date of the commencement order; (3) 
to appoint the judicial supervisor selected from the judicial supervisors list; (4) to 
specify a time limit not exceeding  eight days within which the party who applied for 
the composition has to pay the expenses necessary to carry out the procedures; …”. As 
it appears from this Article, there is no clear timeline within which the court has to 
commence or conclude the procedures and as such it may take the court a longer time 
than necessary to deem the admissibility of the proposal. This would undoubtedly raise 
 
185 Carruthers and Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction’ (n 96) 247 
186 Gabgub (n 76) 192-224  
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concerns as to whether the proceedings provide an acceptable level of predictability 
and accountability to all interested parties.  
In the insolvent liquidation, further, the insolvency trustee and the judge are the 
parties who carry out the management of the distressed business.187 The law, however, 
does not define the limitation of the management by the insolvency representatives and 
as such they can exercise a great deal of discretion regarding the administration of the 
business. This opens the door for corruption and gives the insolvency representatives 
incentives to prolong the procedures. As a result, distressed businesses will likely be 
exposed to increased costs of the procedures including fees required by accountants, 
lawyers, auditors as well as costs caused by the delayed procedures.188 The insolvency 
practitioners may get advantaged by the great discretion given to the court regarding 
their remunerations.189 Arguably, such undefined discretion is undesirable as it should 
be limited to ensure transparency and predictability.190 This otherwise would heighten 
the level of unpredictability to the creditors and would minimise returns to the 
creditors. Therefore, a clearly defined time limit that encourages expeditious handling 
for the procedures is necessary.  
Transparency and predictability can be achieved when the creditors are enabled to 
clarify their priorities and when they are enabled to assess rights and risks.191 
Practically, this can be achieved by the establishment of an effective security 
 
187 CCA 2010, Art 1036(1) 
188 Stephen Ferris and Robert Lawless, ‘The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 
11’ (2000) 61 UPittL Rev 629. Also see: James Ang, Jess Chua and John McConnell, ‘The 
Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note’ (1982) 37 J Fin 219 
189  CCA 2010, Art 1044(1) states that “Remunerations of the trustee are determined by an 
unchallengeable order issued by the Court of Instance upon a request of the trustee, in accordance with 
the delegate judge’s report and with the scheme of the experts’ roster”. 
190 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 11 
191 Ibid, Part One, Chap I, para 11 
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registration system.192 This is because registration systems function to inform parties 
about the existence of secured assets and to establish the effectiveness and priority of 
secured creditors against third party claimants. By this, the problem of false wealth can 
be avoided and the certainty regarding continued rights of secured interests can be 
enhanced.193 
The availability of credit assessment information provided by registration systems 
can contribute to enhance the certainty and predictability in the application of rescue 
procedures. First, with an effective registration system, insolvent businesses that are 
hopelessly burdened by debt and therefore nonviable may be identified as unsuitable to 
enter the procedures at an early stage. This would result in better candidates for 
possible rescue and would lead to the maximisation of the business value for the benefit 
of creditors. Second, as registration systems establish the validation and effectiveness 
of security interests, more certainty regarding secured property interests can be 
achieved. In the context of insolvency, this means that secured interests that are 
unperfected will be invalid against the insolvency estate and other secured property and 
they will be dealt with free from claims of such interests.194 In addition, the 
determination of the priority between secured creditors in a certain manner can 
advantage the administration of the rescue procedures because any disputes regarding 
the priority of secured interests over the encumbered assets can be dealt with by the 
 
192 This will be discussed in more detail below in Sec 5.5 
193 Alejandro De la Campa, ‘Increasing Access to Credit through Reforming Secured Transactions in the 
MENA Region’ [2016] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5613, at 35 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794918> accessed 6 Mar 2019 
194 Ronald Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Law and Policy Reform 
at the Asian Development Bank’ (2000) 1 International Insolvency Institute Report No TA 5795-REG, 
at 91 <www.iiiglobal.org/node/1815> accessed 13 Apr 2018  
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insolvency representatives.195 This would result in smooth and streamlined 
processes.196 
3.4.8. Obj.8. Recognition of Existing Creditor Rights and Establishment of Clear 
Rules for Ranking of Priority Claims 
In business failure, the interests of creditors are affected. Therefore, it is important 
that the law protects those interests against the insolvency of the debtor in accordance 
with national priorities. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide sets out clearly that an 
insolvency law should clearly recognise the rights and priorities of creditors in 
insolvency. Creditors are passionate about having their interests protected in such 
situations and the law should provide assurance that the rights and priorities of the 
different creditors are recognised. This is an essential objective of the law because it 
“will create certainty in the market and facilitate the provision of credit”.197 Given the 
importance of this Objective, it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five which 
will analyse secured transactions law of Libya.198 
3.5. Conclusion 
Libyan policymakers are encouraged to use those international benchmarks and key 
objectives to bring its insolvency laws and practices in line with international best 
practices. The rationale for using the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to evaluate the 
Libyan insolvency system is that its principles and recommendations reflect the best 
practices of developed economies where the insolvency field has witnessed a notable 
degree of success in enhancing national economies by increasing flows of capital and 
 
195 Ibid 92 
196 For details about the discussion on the registration system in Libya, see below Sec 5.5 
197 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (Objective Eight), Part One, Chap I, Para 13 
198 See Sec 5.2 
133 
 
attracting investors both locally and internationally.199 Also, the benchmarks of the 
Legislative Guide recognise the divergence between countries by offering a flexible 
approach built on a wide range of alternatives and options to allow national States to 
accommodate what best suits their domestic contexts.200 Besides, the adaptability of 
such international benchmarks is further promoted by offering the opportunity to 
cooperate more closely with their technical assistance resource to help national 
policymakers to introduce adequate implementation of the insolvency reform.201 
Such benchmarks provide decent proposals to Libya’s policy designers to consider 
when reforming the insolvency law. Since the introduction of the economic reform and 
privatisation programme, Libya gave a great interest to the establishment of an 
attractive economic environment for investors, especially foreigners. However, 
insolvency law remained static. As has been discussed in this Chapter, reforming the 
insolvency law in Libya has now become important due to its associated weaknesses. It 
carries outdated features which can be traced back to insolvency systems that were 
widely prevalent in the 19th century. Since 1953 when Libya had adopted its first 
insolvency system, economies around the world have changed significantly in a way 
that leaves no doubt that the current insolvency law has no prospect of making any 
sense to the national economy.  
By measuring against the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide benchmarks, the analysis in 
this Chapter showed that Libyan insolvency law is associated with profound 
shortcomings. The current insolvency procedures in Libya are characterised by high 
cost and time consumption. The delay in resolving an insolvency case has been a major 
challenge for many reasons. Those include the cumbersome procedures and 
 
199 Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building’ (n 21) 33 
200 McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (n 4) 1-2 
201 See above Sec 3.2 
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inefficiency of the court systems which are too formalistic and bureaucratic. The 
recovery rate for the creditors is very low in liquidation cases and the attempts on 
rescue are infrequent.202 As has been mentioned,203 Libya’s insolvency law is ranked by 
the WB Doing Business report at 168th out of 190. Its practical scarcity in court cases 
can also evidence this claim.204  
In addition to the above, the widespread intervention by the government to subsidise 
its insolvent SOEs adds to the situation and threatens an effective application of 
insolvency law. What matters to the government is the political and social values 
associated with the existence of those enterprises; i.e. to maintain social and economic 
stability. This agenda, however, can negatively affect the economic reform process and 
the rule of law in Libya. The assets of nonviable SOEs should be allocated at their best 
use by facilitating liquidation of nonviable businesses. Consideration of political and 
social values is legitimate but this should have limits as this should not be at the 
expense of private competitors in the market. In regard to social and political 
objectives, these can be achieved instead by promoting an effective business rescue 
system, where employees maintain their jobs, and where liquidation is necessary, social 
instability can be mitigated by promoting social safety net systems in the country.205 
Equally important, since the insolvency framework of Libya is heavily led by courts, 
and in order to gain any possible achievements, any reform process cannot overlook 
reconsidering the inefficiency of the judicial system.206 Training and educational 
 
202 Uttamchandani, ‘No Way Out’ (n 75) 30 
203 See above Sec 1.2.3 
204 See above Sec 1.2.1 
205 This will be discussed in Sec 6.6.1 
206 There was an attempt in Libya with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) to reform the judicial system in the period between 2006 and 2009 under the project of the 
Modernisation of the Justice Sector in Libya. Unfortunately, the reform was unsuccessful. See: 
‘Assessment of Development Results: Libya’ [2010] UNDP, at 25 
<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/6011> accessed 5 Apr 2018 
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programmes can be considered in parallel with reforming the contextual legal 
framework. This would contribute to the development of proficiency in this field of law 
as well as to foster more sympathetic approaches to insolvency among judges and 
practitioners as well as the public. As this is the case, Libya is burdened with a 
challenge of how to reform its insolvency system and bring it on track. The challenge 
becomes greater if we consider the fact there has been no real practice in this field of 
law in Libya since the birth of the insolvency law in 1953. This means also that there is 
a lack of an insolvency profession and experts necessary to properly implement the 
reform (this challenge will be discussed further particularly in Chapter Six). Having 
considered most of the Legislative Guide’s benchmarks, attention now turns to two 
matters that require particularly detailed considerations namely business rescue and 
secured transactions and these will be the subject of the next two Chapters. Chapter 
Four will address Objective Three while the latter Chapter will examine Objective 
Eight.
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Chapter 4 The Application of UNCITRAL Principles with Particular 
Reference to Business Rescue in the Libyan Context 
4.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, insolvency law’s primary function used to focus on liquidation,1 as well 
as receivership where secured creditors were able to enforce their security outside of 
the insolvency procedures.2 Such an approach had no regard to the wide impact of 
business failure on various stakeholders including unsecured creditors, employees as 
well as the society. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide signalled a global movement of 
law reform that is based on saving distressed yet viable businesses.3  
It has been widely recognised in many jurisdictions that it is important to provide 
alternatives to liquidation by encouraging business rescue as one of the key objectives 
of the insolvency system.4 This is because rescue on a going concern basis would 
benefit, directly or indirectly, all stakeholders and would protect them from business 
failure and liquidation. For instance, the employees keep their jobs, the community 
benefits from the business operations due to considerable contributions to the economic 
life of the society, the creditors’ wealth can be maximised through maintaining the 
going concern value of the distressed business, the debtor will be offered a second 
 
1 Bo Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: The Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue (Edward Elgar 
2016) 18 
2 Ian Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments–Changes to Administrative Receivership, 
Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements–The Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 
2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 Eur Bus Org Law Rev 119, 122-25 
3 Terence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global 
Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Apr 2006) at 6 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Halliday5.pdf> accessed 02 Aug 2018 
4 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (UTP 2003) 
32 
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chance to survive etc.5 Business rescue as seen by theory is a necessary mechanism to 
provide fair treatment for important stakeholders who deserve protection, which will in 
turn contribute to economic and social stability in the society.6 
The Libyan insolvency law implements one route for rescue through the composition 
system since its first introduction by the Commercial Code 1953. Since then, this 
rescue regime has seen no reform. Not only that, but it remained inactive due to the 
introduction of the socialist regime in the country since early 1970s until the present as 
the country has still been under significant influence of the socialism despite the reform 
process.7 This Chapter will examine the procedures of the composition scheme to 
identify whether it has features capable of delivering efficient rescue outcomes. It will 
also explore whether the composition system can provide sufficient incentives for the 
interested stakeholders to involve in this kind of procedure. As this Chapter focuses on 
examining business rescue in Libya, the Chapter will be dealing with Objective Three 
of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (Striking a Balance between Liquidation and 
Reorganisation) in more detail separately from the other Objectives which were 
previously examined in Chapter Three. This Chapter will draw upon the insolvency 
benchmarks as set out in the Legislative Guide in general as well as the theoretical 
discussion of Chapter Two. 
 
5 Rebecca Parry and Yingxiang Long, ‘China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Building an Infrastructure 
towards a Market-based Approach’ (2020) 20 J Corp Law Stud 157, 160 
6 On the account of the traditionalist approaches see above Sec 2.2.2 
7 See above Sec 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 
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4.2. Preface to the UNCITRAL View of Business Rescue (Legislative Guide 
Objective Three) 
As has been discussed previously,8 the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide encourages 
rescue as an alternative to liquidation. The choice between rescue and liquidation lies at 
the heart of most disputes relating to the valuation of the business’s assets. Creditors 
may support rescue procedures if they are assured that the going concern value of the 
business exceeds the liquidation value (piece meal value of business’s assets), 
otherwise immediate liquidation may be the best option.9 The thing with business 
failure is how to deal with the associated risk. Insolvency laws in general can reallocate 
the risk of failure and the chances of recovery for the creditors by, for example, the 
priority given to privileged or preferential claimants or by the imposition of the 
moratorium which affects the way in which creditors can recover their debts. But 
business rescue can introduce another layer of reallocation of impact on risk and 
recovery by prolonging the life of insolvent businesses which can lead to diminishing 
the asset value recovered by creditors. The outcomes of business rescue, as such, are 
more difficult to predict than the outcomes in liquidation and business rescue is 
therefore difficult to plan around. This is the scenario each party in insolvency does not 
really expect or desire.  
A rescue system, therefore, should be rational10 by not making the situation more 
uncertain. It should accordingly be implemented in a way that strikes the right balance 
between all competing interests by not reallocating the risk and burden of insolvency to 
 
8 See above Sec 3.4.3 (Key Objective Three of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
9 Chaim Fortgang and Thomas Mayer, ‘Valuation in Bankruptcy’ (1985) 32 UCLA L Rev 1061, 1063 
10 In circumstances where an insolvency law sounds irrational to some stakeholders, they would not lack 
the incentives to play strategically around the process in order to avoid the risk distribution and achieve 
their own certainty rather than to endure the risk they are not responsible for in the first place. Thomas 
Jackson and Robert Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Va L Rev 155, 164 
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be borne by stakeholders whose interests enjoy more protection under a non-insolvency 
system and who are less beneficial to the process; secured creditors.11 This issue has 
been the subject of debate between theorists and lawmakers around the world. What 
proceduralists are concerned about in business rescue is the reallocation of risk 
produced by the procedures.12 On the contrary, traditionalist approaches being more-
friendly to business rescue than the proceduralist accept the reallocations of risk of 
business rescue.13 
Because rescue procedures can add more risk to the process on the economic rights 
and interests of various stakeholders, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide’s principles 
are built on providing mechanisms as to how to make an appropriate balance between 
rescue and liquidation.14 Therefore, the objective of business rescue does not really 
dominate above all other objectives and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide still places 
a great emphasis on protecting the commercial bargaining of secured creditors and 
maintains their non-insolvency entitlements.15 Rescue procedures should be facilitated 
only when distressed businesses are considered viable. This is because rescue is not 
supposed to establish a safe haven for nonviable businesses which should be dealt with 
under the process of liquidation in a quick and efficient manner.16  
The insolvency law of Libya must provide the necessary mechanisms to put those 
principles in practical contexts. In doing so, the balance between liquidation and rescue 
needs to have a mechanism in place which can differentiate between viable businesses 
(that should be allowed to continue and then rescued), and nonviable businesses (that 
 
11 See above Sec 3.4.1 (Objective One of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
12 See above Sec 2.2.1 
13 See above Sec 2.2.2 
14 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 1(C). See also: Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit and the 
Harmonisation of Law: The UNCITRAL Experience (Edward Elgar 2011) 154-55 
15 For more details see above Sec 2.3 
16 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 18 
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should otherwise be liquidated). In the context of business rescue, the valuation of the 
business assets, especially the encumbered assets, is vital for the interested parties to 
calculate the risk. At the valuation stage, creditors would require sufficient information 
to allow them to make informed decisions on continuing to supply goods or extending 
the necessary credit to their debtors. The valuation of the assets, as such, determines 
whether secured interests are protected, sacrificed or risked during the rescue plan.17  
It is essential to the rescue procedures that the confidence of secured creditors is 
enhanced in the procedures through the acknowledgement of the extent of the 
business’s financial difficulty. This is arguably because interested stakeholders, with 
particular reference to secured creditors, have to be persuaded that there is a sensible 
reason to increase their financial risk in the rescue process.18 A rescue system should be 
designed to provide creditors with better returns than they would receive if the business 
was first placed into liquidation. This should be carried out in a way that reassures that 
assets value of the estate are not diminished, the process is not expensive and the 
procedures do not delay the ability of creditors to recover their interests to unreasonable 
extent. 
Encouraging business rescue in the society resonates well with the goals of enhancing 
the domestic economy and maintaining social stability by preserving for the employees 
their jobs and social security advantages and therefore it should be recognised as one of 
the key objectives of the law in a developing country like Libya. The emphasis of a 
theory like the TPT, as a chosen model for reform, that the team members of the 
business has to continue during the insolvency process allows for business rescue to 
take place and it particularly supports the retention of the employees in their jobs when 
 
17 Sarra (n 4) 54; Raymond Nimmer, ‘Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority 
and New Value Contributions’ (1987) 36 Emory LJ 1009, 1043-45 
18 Sarra (n 4) 54 
141 
 
the business is sold to a new owner. Business rescue is also beneficial to the business 
environment because it allows businesses which face financial distress to emerge from 
their distress instead of being liquidated and thus continue to contribute to the 
economic life of the society. This view is desirable in the situation of Libya and should 
be reflected in the reform.  
The perspectives of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in relation to business rescue 
reflect well with the view made by the TPT in this regard by encouraging business 
rescue to benefit wider interests. The idea of this model offers fair treatment to all 
affected stakeholders in that all team members who have firm-specific investment in 
the business should have equal weight of consideration in the insolvency settings by 
providing mechanisms whereby such investment, whether in the form of capital or 
human investment, is protected in the decision making process that may affect the 
future of the business entity they have made the investment in. By this account, the 
TPT provides an elegant approach of addressing the issue of business failure by making 
a right balance between the various interests without resulting in one party being 
privileged over the other. For example, the rescue of the distressed business is 
encouraged only if doing so would lead to save the employees their jobs and would not 
prejudice the interests of creditors too.19 This is similar to the account of the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide by protecting the estate value in the rescue process.20  
Unlike the narrow view of the CBT which focuses on the interests of secured 
creditors, the TPT provides the employees with special treatment which is desirable to 
maintain social stability in the country. An insolvency system influenced by the TPT 
perspectives would favourably take into account not only the traditional entitlements of 
 
19  Samuel Etukakpan, ‘Transfer of Undertakings: The Tension between Business Rescue and 
Employment Protection in Corporate Insolvency’ (PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University 2012) 105 
20 See above Sec 2.3 
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the employees as creditors, but also their, more important, non-contractual interests and 
expectations in the future of their employer by preserving the going concern of the 
business which would lead to preserving some jobs for the employees.21 
4.3. Preventive Composition System and Procedures 
4.3.1. Historical Overview  
Since the features of the current preventive composition of Libya are a legacy of the 
colonial period in the country,22 it may be suitable to have a brief account of the history 
of this system before exploring it in detail. Historically, the preventive composition was 
first introduced in Italy by the enactment of the law no 197 of 24 May 190323 with the 
aim of promoting rescue procedures. Encouraged by recommendations of a royal 
commission in Italy, the Italian policymakers reviewed the insolvency law modelled on 
the English Victorian legislation of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1870 (by means of 
schemes of arrangement) and the Belgian Insolvency Law of 29 June 188724 in order to 
draw lessons regarding the composition procedures (the debtor-creditors arrangement 
procedures).25 This model of the preventive composition, known as the Anglo-Belgian 
model, innovated a shift from the liquidation focused insolvency system towards more 
reorganisational regimes.26  
 
21 Samuel Etukakpan, ‘The Lost Voice in Insolvency: Theories of Insolvency Law and their Implications 
for the Employees’ (2014) 23 Nottingham LJ 34, 60 
22 See above Sec 1.2.1 
23  Stefan Riesenfeld, ‘The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law: A Comparison of the Recent 
Bankruptcy Acts of Italy and the United States’ (1947) 31 Minn L Rev 401, 450-51  
24 Jan Dalhuisen, Compositions in Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Laws of the EEC Countries, 
England and the USA (A W Sitthoff 1968) 50 
25 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Matthew Bender 1986) 1.77-
78. Also see: Riesenfeld (n 23) 450, f.n. 386 
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The Anglo-Belgian 19th century creditors-debtor arrangements introduced one of the 
oldest rescue-oriented procedures in the world.27 This new innovation promoted self-
restructuring mechanisms for distressed companies away from the traditional 
liquidation procedures with an aim of enabling debtor businesses to make a debt-
arrangement with creditors with a chance not to be forced into insolvency.28 By this 
mechanism, troubled companies were enabled to keep some control over their assets 
though under judicial control and oversight. This model of arrangements was subject to 
gaining support of the creditors’ majority of 51% by number representing two thirds of 
the debt value, without which the debtor would be forced into liquidation.29 
The preventive composition was devised as a tool for bona fide debtors who were 
honest but unlucky in order to enable them to initiate rescue procedures and save their 
businesses under court control and supervision.30 Despite the fact that this composition 
was designed to be less socially repressive, some drawbacks were witnessed. First, the 
law required the involvement of the Public Prosecutor in the procedures in order to 
examine whether the insolvency situation carries any criminal characters.31 This is 
because the insolvency system was excessively punitive influenced by the assumption 
that the insolvency occurs due to the inappropriate attitude of the debtor which 
therefore is deserving of punishment.32 Further, the protection of the creditors’ private 
rights and interests was still central to this procedure at the expense of other 
 
27 Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 234 
28 Zhang (n 26) 46-50 
29 Jérôme Sgard, ‘Bankruptcy Law, Creditors’ Rights and Contractual Exchange in Europe, 1808 – 1914’ 
(2006) Oesterreichische National Bank (OeNB) Working Paper No 109, at 11 
<www.oenb.at/dam/jcr:40a4d296-d664-46d6-aefe-2c02f7a007ba/wp109_tcm16-38078.pdf> accessed 
18 Dec 2017 
30 Riesenfeld (n 23) 450, f.n. 387 
31 Dalhuisen, Compositions (n 24) 51, f.n. 129 
32 Roberto Cercone, ‘Italian Crisis Procedures for Enterprises: An Overview’ (Bankruptcy Legislation in 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands conference, Brussels Jul 2000) at 43 
<www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-giuridici/2001-0052/quaderno_52.pdf?language_id=1> 
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stakeholders.33 For instance, secured creditors were not affected by the procedures as it 
affected only unsecured creditors who were not allowed to pursue or initiate any 
execution against the debtor during the composition proceedings.34 Secured creditors 
were not bound by the procedures unless they wished to be so, by surrendering their 
security fully or partially by at least one-third of their total claims.35  
In addition, courts were excessively empowered over the procedures. They had to 
consider various conditions the absence of which would lead to the refusal of the 
proposal. These conditions included the plan feasibility test and the good faith status of 
the debtor.36 In order to protect the creditors’ interests, the court in this system was 
given great ex officio powers to refuse the composition and declare the insolvency 
status of the debtor irrespective of the decision of the creditors on this regard. The 
courts exercised this power when they think that the composition failed the feasibility 
test or when it would prejudice the interests of the creditors.37 The debtor company was 
required to have a worthy offer for the creditors in order to obtain the court’s 
confirmation. They must provide a credible guarantee of at least 40% payment of all 
unsecured claims which must be payable within six months after the composition 
sanction.38 
While the debtor company retains possession of its business during the composition 
procedures, the court would still scrutinise the whole daily business activities of the 
 
33 Wouter Bossu, ‘Introduction to the Belgian Bankruptcy Law Reform’ (Bankruptcy Legislation in 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands conference, Brussels, Jul 2000) at 21-22 
<www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-giuridici/2001-0052/quaderno_52.pdf?language_id=1> 
accessed 4 Jul 2017 
34 Dalhuisen, Compositions (n 24) 77 
35 Sgard (n 29) 11 
36 Riesenfeld (n 23) 451 
37 Dalhuisen, Compositions (n 24) 52-53 
38 Ibid, f.n. 313 
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debtor company.39 During the plan implementation, the debtor would be limited to 
transactions that fall into the normal deeds of administration, whereas transactions 
made beyond this limit would be invalid, unless a prior official permission of the 
delegated judge was granted.40 
Under this procedure, the court and the insolvency trustee were given a heavy role in 
the procedures lowering the influence of the creditors’ role. The court was required to 
take control of the whole procedures and to make all key administration decisions while 
creditors were allowed a very limited role and only in few cases were they entitled an 
advisory function in the process.41 The creditors’ committee enjoyed no directive 
functions in the procedures but rather with consultative functions but neither the court 
nor its insolvency representatives would be bound to follow the decision the creditors 
would take or the advice they would give. An insolvency trustee was appointed along 
with the judge delegate by the court not by the creditors nor could they interfere with 
the court’s decision in this regard.42 
Finally, the composition was much worsened and deteriorated by introducing the 
procedures of ‘assignment for the benefit of creditors’. This is because this assignment 
was designed to serve as liquidation rather than as a rescue, and once the assignment 
was approved, the court was authorised to appoint a liquidator to take over the process 
and to carry out procedures of the asset distribution.43 By virtue of this mechanism, the 
debtor’s proposal had to include all assets for the benefit of creditors, as long as the 
 
39 Riesenfeld (n 23) 404-05 
40 Cercone (n 32) 42 
41 Riesenfeld (n 23) 404, f.n. 16 
42 Paolo Manganelli, ‘The Evolution of the Italian and US Bankruptcy Systems: A Comparative Analysis’ 
(2010) 5 J Bus & Tech L 237, 249 
43 The origins of the assignment of assets generated back since the time of the Roman law by which the 
debtors were able to avoid personal execution and imprisonment for debt. See: Kurt Nadelmann, 
‘Compositions - Reorganizations and Arrangements -In the Conflict of Laws’ (1948) 61 Harv L Rev 
804, 816 
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assets value was equivalent to at least 40% of the total claims of unsecured debts and 
100% of the secured ones, otherwise the proposal would not succeed and the debtor 
would be forced into insolvent liquidation.44 Such a mechanism was devised for 
insolvent debtors to avoid the insolvency stigma, however, as commentators argued, 
this procedure blew away any chance for rescue and in practice the composition system 
lost its original objective of rescue.45 
4.3.2. Access to the Procedures 
The composition procedures are available only when the insolvency situation arises.46 
Insolvency is defined by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as when: “a debtor is 
generally unable to pay its debts as they mature or when its liabilities exceed the value 
of its assets”.47 These are the available tests to examine a company’s inability to pay 
debts. The former concept of “the inability to pay debts as they mature or as they fall 
due” is known as the cash flow test, which is easy to prove and if satisfied, a company 
is deemed insolvent if it failed to pay the due debts even though there is other evidence 
that shows that the company’s assets, if realised, would enable it to fully meet its 
liabilities.48 While the latter test, “the liabilities exceed the value of assets”, is known as 
the balance sheet test by which a company is deemed insolvent when its assets are 
insufficient to discharge its total liabilities.49 
The CCA 2010 determines when a debtor company is qualified to apply for the 
composition by stating that: “Any person liable to be declared insolvent and who finds 
 
44 Monica Marcucci, ‘The Inefficiency of Current Italian Insolvency Legislation and the Prospects of a 
Reform’ (Bankruptcy Legislation in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands conference, Brussels, Jul 2000) 
at 48 <www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-giuridici/2001-
0052/quaderno_52.pdf?language_id=1> accessed 5 Jul 2017  
45 Riesenfeld (n 23) 452-54 
46 For this purpose, insolvency arises when the debts are not paid when they fall due. CCA 2010, Art 984 
47 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Introduction, para 12(s) 
48 See: Cornhill Insurance plc v Improvement Services Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 114 
49 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 111-15 
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himself/ itself unable to pay debts can propose a preventive composition with the 
creditors…”.50 Accordingly, the debtor must be unable to pay its due debts. The 
inability to pay debts as they fall due is considered as the fundamental concept on 
which the insolvency law is grounded51 and which simply indicates the insolvency 
situation of a company.52 Under the Libyan insolvency regime, the definition of the 
“inability to pay the debts”, unlike in some other jurisdictions,53 is absent. For instance, 
the preventive composition is based on the fact that the debtor is “unable to pay debts” 
as they fall due.54 Also, the insolvency declaration is based on the same fact.55 The law 
in these two cases does not provide any clarification of when a company is deemed 
“unable to pay debts” whilst it is important for the determination of the company’s 
insolvency. There is a reference to the predictable failure to pay.56 Here the law 
implicitly refers to the balance sheet test “external factors”, but this is still not enough 
in determining the concept of “inability to pay” in a clear way. 
It has long been acknowledged that the concept of “inability to pay debts” is 
referenced to its explicit meaning “the cessation to pay due debts” regardless of the 
actual solvency of the debtor. That is to say, a company is deemed unable to pay debts 
when it fails to pay its debts as they fall due even though the value of its assets, if 
realised, exceeds the value of its liabilities. Also, it is not required for a company to be 
considered insolvent for it to cease to pay all or a great majority of its due debts, as the 
 
50 CCA 2010, Art 984 
51 Goode (n 49) 110 
52 The phrase “unable to pay its debts” is what some jurisdictions use when referring to the insolvency 
situation of a company. For example, the UK IA 1986 uses the phrase “unable to pay its debts” in 
Section 123 and Sections 222-224 
53 The UK law, for instance, in Sec 123(1) and (2) of the IA 1986 
54 CCA 2010, Art 984 
55 Ibid, Art 1012(1), entitled ‘Insolvency Declaration’, states that: “… the insolvency of a trader, whether 
a natural person or a legal entity, must be declared … if they cease to pay their debts”. 
56 Ibid, Art 1012(2) which states that: “The cessation of debts payment may be demonstrated when the 
debtor becomes unable to fulfil them, or when other external factors demonstrate the debtor’s inability 
to fulfil its obligations on a regular basis”. 
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cessation of paying an individual debt57 is enough to determine its insolvency 
situation.58  
Accordingly, in a legal sense, a company might be in an actual insolvency situation 
but would not be subject to the insolvency procedures simply because it has not ceased 
to pay its due debts (the cash flow test) even though its liabilities exceed the value of its 
assets (the balance sheet test). The balance sheet test, “the company’s liabilities in 
relation to the value of its assets”, is implicitly recognised in the Libyan law within the 
context of company provisions in Article 47(2) of the CCA 2010 which states that: “If 
it has become clear to the liquidator that the company’s assets are insufficient to pay off 
its due debts, he or she must summon the shareholders’ meeting to take the necessary 
decisions in the matter, including, inter alia, the initiation of a preventive composition 
with the creditors or filing for insolvency”. However, debtor companies should be able 
to enter the procedure not necessarily only when they are all insolvent on the ground of 
either the cash flow test or the balance sheet test. Rather, they should be permitted to 
access the composition process even though they are only struggling but not technically 
insolvent because that would be a situation where business rescue can anticipate 
insolvency and restructure the company in such a way that insolvency is avoided. 
Following from the above, the requirement of inability to pay debts prevents 
companies from filing for the composition at an early stage. The Libyan law does not 
define how early a distressed company can file for a composition. It only allows a 
distressed company to file for a composition with creditors not after the insolvency 
 
57 The Libyan law does not set a minimum amount of the debt that a company is deemed insolvent if it 
was unable to pay. Some jurisdictions, such as the UK IA 1986 in the Art 123(1)(a) defines the 
company’s inability to pay debts that is when the company has for three weeks, after a written demand 
from the creditor requiring it to pay the due sum of debt exceeding £750, neglected to pay the sum or to 
secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor. See: Goode (n 49) 128 
58 See: Ali Younis, The Bankruptcy (Arabic Book Library) 41-44  
149 
 
declaration.59 Accordingly, a company may be illegible to file only when it becomes 
unable to pay debts as they fall due and filing before this situation happens is 
impossible in Libya due to the statutory requirements for which the court has the right 
to strike down the application even though the company is in financial difficulty as 
long as it is still able to pay debts. This is detrimental to business rescue which requires 
access to the procedures at a sufficiently early time. This is because encouraging early 
access would help to maximise the value of the insolvency estate which can result in 
positive outcomes in business rescue and contribute to the avoidance of piecemeal 
liquidation.60  
Therefore, businesses should be encouraged to file for the proceedings before they 
become insolvent. This feature can be seen in the US Chapter 11 reorganisation where 
there is no formal requirement for insolvency or inability to pay debts as they fall due 
as long as the debtor acts in good faith.61 Also, the EU Directive on restructuring 
frameworks requires member states to enact legislation that will allow a debtor to 
access the restructuring before it becomes insolvent as this will encourage early access 
to the process which will in turn enable debtors to address their distress at an early 
stage.62 
 
59 CCA 2010, Art 985(1) 
60 Parry (n 27) 13 
61 See: In re Johns-Manville Corp, (1984) 36 BR 727, 732. Also see: Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the 
Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring 
Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus Org Law Rev 615, 617 
62 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Jun 2019 on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the 
efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending 
Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 172/18, Art 24 
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4.3.3. Governance of the Procedures 
The composition scheme is a court-sanctioned arrangement between the company 
and its creditors. The composition is not offered to the secured creditors as their 
securities will not be affected by the composition. Thus, they are not meant to 
participate in the composition unless they relinquish all of their securities or part of 
them up to at least the third of their security.63 To obtain the court sanction, the 
composition proposal must be accepted by the statutory majority of unsecured creditors 
who participate in the voting process. The statutory majority is 51% of the creditors in 
number representing two-thirds of the total claims held by creditors participating in the 
vote.64 It should be noted in this regard that the Libyan insolvency law does not 
categorise creditors into different classes for the purpose of the voting process. As it 
appears from the above, the class of creditors who participate in the process is the 
unsecured creditors while the secured creditors are not required to participate as the 
composition does not affect their claims. And when they wish to participate in the 
process, they will be counted as unsecured creditors and will participate in the process 
with this status. 
The success of the composition proposal will result in minority dissentient creditors 
being bound to the procedures (cram down). The aim of the cram down is to facilitate 
an agreement between the parties if they are unable to reach it between themselves. 
This is because in the absence of such a mechanism, the arrangement with creditors can 
only be concluded through unanimous consent, which may be difficult and costly to 
 
63 CCA 2010, Art 1002(2)(3) 
64 Ibid, Art 1002(1) 
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achieve and it could also be impractical when distressed companies encounter acute 
liquidity disasters.65 
The composition procedures consist of two stages for a composition plan to proceed 
through. In the first stage, termed as the composition initial approval, the petition must 
meet the statutory formalities and conditions. If these formalities are met, the court will 
approve to proceed the composition proposal to be discussed with the creditors. The 
court at this stage has no concern with the merits or fairness of the composition plan as 
it has no discretion to exercise. The court will confirm the composition if it finds that 
all required formalities are complied with. These formalities as stipulated are: 1. the 
petition is submitted before the insolvency declaration, 2. the debtor company has been 
registered in the commercial registry for at least the past two years or has been engaged 
in doing businesses for the same period, 3. the debtor’s accounts and its commercial 
books must be extant for the same period, 4. the debtor company was not previously 
declared insolvent in the five years prior to the composition application nor was 
involved in a preventive composition in the same period, 6. the debtor has offered the 
creditors either one of two options; (a) to provide affirmed guarantees, whether 
personal or in rem, that can cover payment of up to 40% of the total unsecured claims 
payable within six months from the composition approval; (b) to provide an offer worth 
up to 40% of the total unsecured claims.66 
The law emphases that the debtor company must have a worthy offer for the 
creditors providing a sufficient guarantee to pay at least 40% of all unsecured claims 
payable within six months after the composition sanction. The debtor could 
alternatively base its composition proposal on the assets assignment for the benefit of 
 
65 Jennifer Payne, ‘The Role of the Court in Debt Restructuring’ (2018) 77 CLJ 124, 128  
66 CCA 2010, Art 985(1-6) 
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creditors (the assignment of all assets for the benefit of creditors). For the assignment 
proposal to proceed, the valuation of the assets and property must be sufficient to meet 
the creditors’ rights to the minimum percentage of 40% of the total claims of the 
unsecured creditors.67 In this kind of assignment, the court shall appoint a liquidator 
and a committee constitutes three or five of the creditors to assist the liquidator in 
carrying out the final stage of a company’s life; i.e. the liquidation process.68  
After hearing the debtor in the hearing session, the court can refuse the composition 
ex officio if such formalities are not met. In this case, the court has to declare the 
insolvency status of the debtor company and commence the insolvent liquidation 
process.69 If the court granted its initial approval on the composition proposal, it shall 
announce the commencement of preventive composition procedures by an order 
including the following; 1- delegate a judge to carry out the procedure; 2- order a 
meeting of the creditors to be summoned within 30 days from the court’s order; 3- 
appoint the judicial supervisor/ administrator (the insolvency practitioner/ syndic) who 
is selected by the court from its roster of qualified administrators; 4- assign a period not 
exceeding 8 days within which the petitioner has to deposit in the court’s account  a 
sum of money that is necessary to carry out the procedure. In the event that the 
company failed to pay the expenses of the procedures, the court shall ex officio declare 
insolvency status and start the insolvent liquidation.70 Although the court has no 
discretion to exercise in this stage, its role can be valuable in ensuring that the creditors 
have adequate information in the meetings so that abuse can be avoided.71  
 
67 Ibid, Art 985(6)(a)(b) 
68 Ibid, Art 1007 
69 Ibid, Art 987 
70 Ibid, Art 988 
71 Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 65) 134-35 
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After the court’s confirmation of the composition plan, the procedures will extend to 
the second stage, which can be termed as the feasibility test. In this stage, the majority 
creditors’ are required to vote on the proposed plan to proceed. The majority creditors’ 
vote in favour of the composition proposal will not, however, guarantee the court’s 
sanction of the composition as the court still needs to examine the proposal’s feasibility 
in order to maintain the creditors’ interests. In doing so, the court considers the merit 
and worthiness of the debtor company for the composition. In doing so, the court takes 
into account the reasons behind the insolvency and the general activities of the 
insolvent company.72 In this stage, the court is granted broad discretionary powers to 
approve the composition or refuse it regardless of the creditors’ decision. So if the court 
thinks that the proposal has no potential to protect the creditors’ interests,73 it has to act 
on behalf of them and declare the insolvency status ex officio.74 
Although the discretionary power granted to the court in this stage test may seem 
attractive in the first instant because it has a focus on protecting the creditors’ interests, 
some concerns may be raised. The power and discretion vested in the court should be 
limited to reassurance that the statutory provisions and conditions are met by the 
composition proposal (for instance, the attainment of the majority vote or the absence 
of fraud in the approval process) and not beyond that. In examining the feasibility of 
the composition, the court should not be granted such unfettered discretion.75 As long 
as the proposal is fair and equitable to the creditors as a whole and the requisite 
 
72 CCA 2010, Art 1006(1)(d) 
73 The legal test is that if the court thinks that the composition proposal would not achieve the economic 
interests of the creditors (taking into account the existing assets, worthiness of the debtor and its 
activity), it shall declare the status of insolvency. Ibid, Art 1006(1)(a)(b) 
74 Ibid, Art 1006(2) 
75  The court enjoys such unlimited discretion because the court can still have veto against the 
composition even though the majority of creditors have approved it and also because there is no 
structured guidance in the legislation as to how to exercise this discretion to refuse or accept the 
composition. Such kind of discretion would definitely create a degree of uncertainty among creditors 
who were pleased to accept the proposal. 
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majority have voted in favour of the plan, the court should not judge the proposals’ 
commercial merits because courts should arguably be very reluctant to interfere with 
the creditors’ decision of what they believe to be in their best interests.76 Otherwise the 
court will unnecessarily add more time and complexity to the procedures and would 
constrain the discretion of the creditors since their opinion will not matter when they 
favour the rescue proposal.77 
Besides, the implementation of the court’s decision on the feasibility test supposedly 
requires more relevant knowledge and experience among judges because courts need to 
compare the liquidation value and the going concern value of the business’s assets 
before taking any decisions in this regard. Courts will also be required to ensure that 
some insolvency standards and conditions can be achieved. These may include: that 
classes of dissenting creditors will share the economic benefits of the plan and they will 
receive as much of a return under the plan as they would receive in liquidation; that no 
creditor will have returns more than the full value of its claim; and that similarly 
situated creditors are treated equally.78 This is a challenge in Libya since judges and the 
insolvency practitioners lack any relevant knowledge and expertise on business and 
insolvency cases. As such, courts’ decision on the feasibility test could be problematic. 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide states that courts should not be tasked to review the 
economic feasibility of the plan unless the law narrowly defines the circumstances in 
 
76 On the court’s discretion in sanctioning debt restructuring compositions see: Jennifer Payne, Schemes 
of Arrangement: Theory, Structure and Operation (CUP 2014) 77-78. Also see: Re British Aviation 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch); “if the creditors are acting on sufficient information and 
with time to consider what they are about, and have acted honestly, they are, … much better judges of 
what is to their commercial advantage than the Court can be”. Also see: Sarah Paterson, ‘Reflections 
on English Law Schemes of Arrangement in Distress and Proposals for Reform’ (2018) 15 ECFR 472, 
476 
77 However, the dissenting minority (49% of the total participating creditors in number with a third of the 
total claims) may have a good reason to reject the proposal. Therefore, the court may also consider 
their interests especially where there is a possibility of abuse or misuse of the process by the majority 
creditors. See: Charles Qu, ‘Sanctioning Schemes of Arrangement: The Need for Granting the Court a 
Curative Power’ (2016) JBL 13, 15. Also see: Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 65) 132-33  
78 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap IV, para 61 
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which this discretion can be exercised or the courts have sufficient competence and 
experience to exercise such discretion.79 
If the composition plan succeeded to convince the majority of creditors and the 
court’s final approval is granted, the court shall announce the commencement of the 
procedures. By this, the insolvent company will be allowed to continue its daily 
business activities guided by the judge delegate and the supervision of the insolvency 
practitioner. The company’s capability of business participation, however, will be 
limited only to transactions that fall within the ordinary course of business, whereas 
transactions beyond this limit would be void against the creditors, unless a prior official 
permission from the judge delegate is granted.80 Moreover, the presence of the petition 
to the court will have an effect on the creditors’ claims. All creditors will not be able to 
enforce their interests immediately after the submission of the scheme to the court by 
means of the moratorium, but secured creditors are allowed to enforce their claims 
during the composition procedures which start only after the court’s final approval of 
the composition.81  
4.3.4. Debtor in Possession 
The DIP82 regime operates by keeping the existing management of the company in 
control of its business affairs.83 The DIP system is praised for its flexibility with the 
debtor company since it places the rescue plan in the hands of its previous directors 
who have the best knowledge of the business and may be expected to have good 
 
79 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap IV, para 63 
80 CCA 2010, Art 992(1)(2). This will be discussed later in Sec 4.3.4 (Debtor in Possession) 
81 Ibid, Art 993(1). See below Sec 4.3.5 (Moratorium) 
82 As will be seen, this system as so recognised in Libya is not unrestricted DIP because of both the 
involvement of the judge delegate and the insolvency practitioners and the transaction limit.  
83 Vanessa Finch, ‘Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374, 375 
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relationships with the company’s creditors which will be useful in the negotiations.84 
Moreover, the DIP regime is designed to encourage the managers and directors to file 
at an early stage for the insolvency procedures before the financial situation of their 
company is worsened. The managers would be motivated to do so if they realise that 
their position would not be affected by the insolvency application.85 
However, the DIP system is criticised on the ground that it can bring the risk of 
manipulation and would expose the creditors’ interests to the influence and exploitation 
of the shareholders and managers. Contrary to that, practitioner in possession system 
(PIP) is considered advantageous because it brings great resistance to the pressure 
made by shareholders.86 
In Libya, the preventive composition87 enables the company’s management to remain 
in possession after the court’s approval of the proposal.88 When the court approves the 
composition proposal, it has to delegate a judge (judge delegate) and appoint the 
judicial supervisor/ administrator chosen from the judicial administrators list of the 
court to carry out the composition procedure and supervise the debtor management 
during the process.89 The company is not allowed to carry out transactions which fall 
outside the ordinary course of business,90 without the prior officially written consent 
 
84 Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 65) 132 
85 David Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations’ (2004) 4 J Corp 
Law Stud 117, 141 
86 Finch (n 83) 389 
87 In the insolvent liquidation procedures, the management will be displaced by the judge delegate and 
the insolvency practitioner or the syndic. See: CCA 2010, Art 1036(1) and 1047(1) 
88 Ibid, Art 992(1) states that: “During the consummation of the composition procedures, the debtor shall 
still be able to manage its assets and take the helm of its business affairs under both the supervision of 
the judicial supervisor/ practitioner and the guidance of the judge delegate”. 
89 Ibid, Art 988 
90 Ibid, Art 992(2) gives samples of type of transactions that fall outside of the ordinary course of 
business; any settlement with any of the creditors, any payment of any pre-petition claims, granting 
securities, disposing of any of the immovable properties and assets or mortgage them, making a pledge 
on the movable assets, writing off mortgages or accepting conditional wills, etc, and any of transactions 
that the court thinks they fall outside of the ordinary course of business with which the going concern 
value of the business is affected. 
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issued by the judge delegate. If such transactions are made in non-compliance with 
such provisions, they will not be effective against the pre-existing creditors. The court 
is authorised to put an end to the whole process and declare the insolvency status if the 
company was engaged in transactions that fall outside the ordinary course of business 
without obtaining a prior consent of the judge delegate.91 
It should be noted that the successful application of DIP, as acknowledged by the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, depends on variant factors including, inter alia, the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance regime and the insolvency institutions, 
corporate culture, the role of secured creditors, the effectiveness of the court system 
and the level of supervision provided by courts.92 
According to the above statement, one can argue that the application of the DIP 
system in Libya can result in adversity for a couple of reasons. First is attributable to 
the inefficiency of judicial institutions. As the composition procedures in Libya are 
associated with a high level of court involvement, the process can be very expensive 
and potentially time-consuming. Moreover, the bureaucracy associated with the judicial 
system in the country93 can make the process unreasonably delayed. Therefore, such a 
level of judicial involvement would disable the composition process and would make 
the process inadequate leading to minimising the value of the creditors’ interests.  
Second is because of the weaknesses and shortcomings associated with the corporate 
governance system in Libya especially with regard to SOEs as creditors’ interests are 
 
91 Ibid, Art 998(2) 
92 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 4 
93 Faraj Ma’rouf, ‘Specialised Courts as a Mechanism to Improve Justice in Libya’ (The Supreme Courts 
in Arab Countries conference, Doha, Sep 2013) at 08 <https://carjj.org/sites/default/files/wrq_ml_lyby-
_lmhwr_lthlth.docx> accessed 9 Sep 2017 
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not well protected in the law and practice.94 With the current corporate governance 
system in place, creditors’ interests will be prejudiced by fraudulent activities and 
misbehaviour of the management.95 In South Korea after reforms following the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, for example, the DIP proposal received an unwelcome 
response by financial creditors until the corporate governance system improved to 
become more transparent.96 
Although the DIP regime in Libya is a restricted version of the DIP as it operates 
under the supervision of the court, abuse can still happen due to the above reasons. 
Therefore, applying the DIP in such a situation in Libya would bring more harm than it 
would be possible to resolve and therefore inclining towards a system that relies on 
external expertise associated with more creditors’ role in the procedures would be 
desirable to avoid any possible abuse of the process. It should be noted that the DIP 
system is not common worldwide because of its associated risk. An insolvency system 
like in the UK has not favoured the DIP system.97 This is because the attitude towards 
business failure in the UK historically has been based on the assumption that failure is 
caused by the management of the company. Therefore, the law in the UK 
administration procedures favours the replacement of the management with an external 
 
94 Abdu-assalam Hussein, ‘Corporate Governance in Code of Commercial Activity in Libya: A study in 
Line with Principles of Corporate Governance of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’ (2019) 23 UBJLS 219, 247 
95 Chuyi Wei and Yongwei Chen, ‘The Predicament of Bank Creditors in Chinese Bankruptcy and the 
Way Out’ (2018) 27 Int’l Ins Rev 110, 128-29 
96 Soogeun Oh and Terence Halliday, ‘Rehabilitating Korea’s Corporate Insolvency Regime, 1992–2007’ 
in John Gillespie and Randall Peerenboom (eds), Regulation in Asia: Pushing Back on 
Globalization (Routledge 2009) 248-50  
97 It should be noted, however, that the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) procedure in the UK 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch A1, as amended by the Insolvency Act 2000, is DIP with a moratorium. Also, 
the UK Government is proposing, for the first time within the UK, to introduce greater DIP 
possibilities throughout the tenure of the restructuring plan. See: Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Energy, ‘Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response’ (26 Aug 2018) para 
5.131 <www.gov.uk/government/consultations/insolvency-and-corporate-governance> accessed 17 
Mar 2019. See also: Rebecca Parry and Stephen Gwaza, ‘Is the Balance of Power in UK Insolvencies 
Shifting?’ (2019) 7 NIBLeJ 2 <https://www.ntu.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/941417/2.pdf> 
accessed 31 Mar 2020  
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professional to carry out the rescue procedures which has been received as welcome by 
the lending market in the UK.98  
4.3.5. Moratorium 
The moratorium is an important device to help the company maximise its assets value 
for the purpose of rescue by prohibiting individual creditors from dismantling the going 
concern value of the business.99 Allowing the creditors to enforce their claims during 
rescue procedures would, as Professor McCormack points out, frustrate the overall 
necessary purposes of corporate or business rescue.100 This also can discourage 
insolvent companies from filing for rescue at an early stage since companies may rather 
hide the fact of their insolvency situation because of the low prospect for survival 
caused by the creditors’ enforcement.101 The UK Review of the Corporate Insolvency 
Framework 2016 in its proposals for reform recognised that the moratorium is a vital 
tool to encourage a company’s directors to act early before the situation becomes 
irreversible, which is fundamental in establishing the rescue foundation to address the 
company’s distress.102 
The whole purpose of rescue would be frustrated if the moratorium only began as 
soon as the composition came into effect because if the debtor company has to wait 
until the composition proposal is approved, its assets would be dismantled by creditors 
 
98 Hamiisi Nsubuga, Employee Rights in Corporate Insolvency: A UK and US Perspective (Routledge 
2019) 151  
99 Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, ‘Legitimation and Global Lawmaking’ [2006] Fordham Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 952492, 66-67 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952492> accessed 28 Jul 2018 
100 Gerard McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law--an Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar 2008) 
174  
101 Régis Blazy, Bertrand Chopard and Agnès Fimayer, ‘Bankruptcy Law: A Mechanism of Governance 
for Financially Distressed Firms’ (2008) 25 Eur J Law Econ 253, 256 
102 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on Options 
for Reform’ (2016) para 7.6 
<www.advocates.org.uk/media/2191/a_review_of_the_corporate_insolvency_framework.pdf> 
accessed 17 Sep 2017 
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and this would lead to weakening the prospects for rescue. Therefore, the automatic 
moratorium will be significant for rescue procedures because it leads to the effective 
maximisation of the business value by keeping all the assets together.103  
The moratorium in the Libyan insolvency law is effective against all creditors’ 
claims, including the secured, during the period between the composition petition 
submission date and the date of the court’s approval and confirmation of the plan.104 
The moratorium comes into effect upon the filing for the composition and no court 
order is required to trigger it. During this period the creditors are prohibited from 
pursuing any legal actions against their debtor’s business.  
The moratorium in Libya, however, raises some concerns. It is only effective for a 
specific period of time which terminates at the moment when the composition proposal 
comes into force by court’s approval on the feasibility test and the commencement of 
the composition procedures. Two issues may be raised about this structure. First, the 
moratorium can be effective for uncertain period of time as it can take a long time since 
the law does not define a limit within which the court has to approve the proposal’s 
feasibility test. This is a case where an abuse can be caused by prolonging unnecessary 
procedures at the expense of creditors and all other stakeholders. In this regard, the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide emphasises that the moratorium should not diminish the 
certainty of the secured creditor’s ability to recover debt or undermine the value of the 
 
103 Oh and Halliday (n 96) 247 
104 CCA 2010, Art 993 states that: “As of the date of the petition till the court’s sanction on the 
composition comes into effect, the pre-petition creditors shall not institute or continue any debt-
execution actions against the debtor’s assets and properties, otherwise they will be subject to 
invalidity”. 
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security interests because this may undermine the commercial expectations of the 
creditors and would also affect the availability of affordable credit.105 
Second, the moratorium will not cover the period when the composition plan is being 
performed as secured creditors106 will not be bound by the moratorium during the 
implementation of the composition plan. This is because their interests are not affected 
without their willingness.107 Consequently, they will be free to enforce their claims 
unless they choose to participate in the composition and to do so they must relinquish 
their security and then they will be treated as unsecured creditors.108 This approach is 
detrimental because it would lead to the company’s assets being vulnerable to 
individual enforcement of secured creditors which would frustrate the rescue 
endeavours. 
In addition, the moratorium in Libya arises automatically upon the debtor applying 
for composition procedures. Because of this, parties could possibly resort to the 
composition procedures for strategic purposes. Professor Delaney calls this “strategic 
bankruptcy” as a proactive attempt by which the process is used to achieve objectives 
that are not predicted by the doctrinal concept of the law to deal with threats posed by 
an interested stakeholder group. For example, management of the debtor company may 
apply for insolvency procedures to evade employees’ entitlements or to avoid product 
liability claims of victims of defective products.109 The moratorium as such could also 
be operated abusively to the creditors where the directors of the nonviable company 
 
105 “… as the protection provided by security interests declines, the price of credit may need to increase 
to offset the greater risk”. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 37 
106 Unsecured creditors will still be bound by the composition plan according to Articles 1002 and 1009 
of the CCA 2010. 
107 Ibid, Art 1002(2) 
108 Unless they relinquish their security and accept to participate in the composition. In their participation 
in the composition they would be treated as unsecured creditors. Younis (n 58) 440 
109 Kevin Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to Their 
Advantage (UCP 1992) 
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could possibly use the moratorium only to take advantages of its breathing space. This 
will be to the detriment of the creditors as the value of the company’s assets will be 
reduced during the operation of the moratorium.  
As has been mentioned, the moratorium should not be intended to allow nonviable 
businesses to take advantage of the mechanism to prejudice creditors’ interests.110 
Therefore, the moratorium, as the UK Insolvency Service on its consultation reform 
proposals 2016 recommended, should not be intended to allow nonviable businesses to 
take advantage of it by buying time with creditors because they have no practical 
prospect of a successful rescue.111 In order to avoid any possible abuse by the automatic 
imposition of the moratorium under the UK’s proposed framework,112 distressed 
companies must first meet a number of qualifying conditions113 for the moratorium. 
They have to demonstrate to the court their business viability and they have to offer a 
proposal with reasonable prospects for the consideration of the creditors.114  
Accordingly, a careful balance between the need for the business continuation with 
the need to protect the economic value of the creditors’ interests during the rescue 
process should be made. Protecting the economic value of the creditors’ interests is 
considered as an immutable issue that should be prioritised. Although the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide provides for the actions against the debtor’s assets that should be 
stayed, it recognises that the rescue procedures should not be carried out at the undue 
expense of secured creditors who should therefore be well protected. The moratorium 
 
110 For details see above Sec 3.4.2 (Objective Two of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
111 Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework’ (n 102) para 7.16 
112 The Government in the UK has accepted this proposal in Aug 2018. See: Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Energy, ‘Government Response’ (n 97) 
113 In its response to insolvency and corporate governance reform, the UK Government has adopted the 
proposal regarding the qualifying conditions of the moratorium because they are necessary to be met to 
protect the interests of the creditors. For details see: ibid, paras. 5.6- 5.25 
114 For this recommendation see: Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework’ 
(n 102) para 7.23 and for more details on the qualifying conditions see paras. 7.21-24 
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should not affect the right of creditors to take the necessary actions or proceedings to 
preserve their interests.115  Further, the length of such restraint should be determined by 
the court or the practitioner who should examine whether the form of procedures will 
result in liquidation or a possible rescue. If there is a viable opportunity for a successful 
rescue, the restraint on the individual secured claims should be imposed, but for a 
limited and certain period of time.116 In the meanwhile, secured creditors should be 
entitled to apply to the court to have the moratorium lifted on the ground that such a 
moratorium is no longer necessary or may possibly cause irreversible damage to their 
interests. In contrast, if rescue becomes unfeasible and the procedures will likely result 
in liquidation, it is suggested that, there would be no justification to prevent secured 
creditors from enforcing their interests against the debtor’s property.117 This is 
advantageous because it would promote market certainty to the creditors and it would 
support the availability of affordable credit.118  
This approach can be seen in the UK administration regime of the IA 1986 which 
enables a creditor to have the effect of the moratorium lifted by either the consent of 
the administrator or the permission of the court.119 By this, creditors can enforce their 
rights in the secured assets against the insolvency estate. Although the IA 1986 does 
not establish the conditions under which the court may exercise its discretion to lift the 
effect of the moratorium, the case law suggests that a set of conditions has been 
developed to be used as guidelines to make the balance between the need for the 
business continuation with the need to protect the interests of secured creditors during 
 
115 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 47 
116 Ibid, Part Two, Chap II, para 56 and 58 
117 Ronald Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Law and Policy Reform 
at the Asian Development Bank’ (2000) 1 International Insolvency Institute Report No TA 5795-REG, 
at 96-97 <www.iiiglobal.org/node/1815> accessed 13 Apr 2018  
118 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 37 
119 IA 1986, Sch B1, Para 43(2) 
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the administration process. The Court of Appeal in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc120 
established that the moratorium is “intended to assist the company, under the 
management of the administrator, to achieve the purpose for which the administration 
order was made” and therefore the court held that the leave should normally be granted 
where the creditor seeking to exercise his proprietary rights,121 and the creditor’s action 
“is unlikely to impede the achievement of that purpose”.122 
It is argued that, the moratorium should be left to the court’s discretion in order to 
ensure that such a strategic behaviour is avoided. Practically, for the rescue purposes, 
the moratorium can be established automatically subject to challenge by creditors and 
then the court can exercise its discretion in suitable cases upon request. This can ensure 
that the moratorium is stopped being unnecessarily extended if used strategically in the 
first place. In addition, to avoid any unnecessary delay and costs by courts, an 
independent expert can be referred to in order to assess whether the moratorium should 
still continue in effect or should otherwise be lifted if the debtor business has no viable 
potential. And the court will then act accordingly.123 This is because it is not fair to 
impose a moratorium on rights and securities in respect of assets that are not necessary 
for the rescue process or when such rights are in unprotected situations.124  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide insists that secured creditors should be enabled to 
seek protection where the moratorium is not necessary for the procedures and when the 
 
120 Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch 505 
121 In carrying out a balancing exercise between the legitimate interests of the secured creditors and the 
legitimate interests of the other creditors of the company, the court stated that “great importance, or 
weight, is normally to be given to the proprietary interests”. Ibid 542 
122 Ibid 542 
123 Such a response was adopted by the UK Government. See: Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Energy, ‘Government Response’ (n 97) para 5.19 
124 Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 65) 142-43. Jurisdictions like the UK IA 1986 and the US Chapter 
11 entitle the creditors to apply to the court in some circumstances to have the moratorium lifted. For 
more details see: McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 100) 162-67 
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secured interests seem to be not well protected.125 In this regard, the WB in its 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes recommends that 
“The stay (moratorium) should be of limited, specified duration, strike a proper balance 
between creditor protection and insolvency proceeding objectives, and provide for 
relief from the stay by application to the court based on clearly established grounds 
when the insolvency proceeding objectives or the protection of the secured creditor’s 
interests in its collateral are not achieved”.126 
4.4. Post-commencement Funding: Its Importance and Problems 
When a company is insolvent, by definition, it is short of cash.127 For the debtor to 
keep its business going and to preserve the going concern value, obtaining additional 
finance128 (post-commencement finance) to continue its operations and to emerge from 
the financial distress is considered very crucial to the rescue process. Such a fund will 
help debtor companies in their attempts to reorder their affairs until a satisfactory 
composition or arrangement with creditors can be reached.129 Unless such finance is 
obtained, it is likely that any rescue attempt will fail and the probability of liquidation 
will increase.130  
 
125 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 60 
126 World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (World Bank 2016) 
(hereinafter World Bank Principles) Principle C5.3 
127  Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, Global Lawmakers: International Organizations in the 
Crafting of World Markets (CUP 2017) 295 
128 It should be noted that the moratorium in effect is a source of credit to insolvent businesses by 
extending time within which existing creditors must be paid, since their enforcement efforts are 
suspended by the application of the moratorium. Accordingly, insolvent businesses may not need to 
obtain new finance if the extended credit obtained as a result of the moratorium is enough for 
businesses to restructure their affairs for rescue. 
129 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing in Early Transition Countries: Taking a DIP in 
the Distressed Debt Pool’ [2004] LiT, at 07 <www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit042.pdf> 
accessed 01 Dec 2017  
130 Fayez Elayan and Thomas Meyer, ‘The Impact of Receiving Debtor-in-Possession Financing on the 
Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent Under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy’ (2001) 28 Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting 905, 910-11 
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The increased recognition of rescue justifies the encouragement of post-
commencement finance because such finance would help a company to preserve the 
going concern value of its business by avoiding liquidation.131 Given its importance to 
the rescue procedures, the provision of new funding has increasingly been part of the 
global consensus on insolvency law reforms.132 For example, the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide confirms that keeping the debtor’s business in operation after the 
commencement of the procedures is significant to rescue procedures and the company 
must have access to additional funds by means of post-petition new funding to achieve 
this goal. And insolvency laws that promote the continued operation of the debtor’s 
business should facilitate new funding.133 
However, access to finance during business distress can be rather difficult. This is 
because creditors and lenders lack the incentives to extend or provide new funds for the 
troubled companies because of the fear of further risk. Besides, business assets of a 
troubled company may be fully secured which limits the potential for the company to 
provide any further security to the creditors or it will be able only to borrow on a non-
secured basis. This would be counterproductive to creditors because debt repayment 
will depend on the outcomes of rescue and thus may not be repaid in full in a case 
where restructuring fails because of a lack of finance.134 
In response to this issue, some countries have used a super-priority regime to 
encourage existing or potential lenders to make fresh cash available to the debtor. This 
additional fund will be given a priority over the existing creditors. This is known as the 
super-priority system. The advantage of the super-priority system is that it reassures 
 
131 McCormack, Corporate Rescue (n 100) 177 
132 Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing’ (n 129) 9 
133 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 94 
134 Gerard McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ [2007] JBL 701, 702 
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post-commencement lenders that their security would not be wasted but will be 
prioritised over all existing creditors.135 One of the ways in which Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code 1978 provides post-commencement creditors with incentives is 
through a priming lien as a super-priority system under section 364(d) when it seems 
there are no unencumbered assets available.136 
Super-priority, nonetheless, is very controversial. This is because the application of 
such a system would interfere with the interests of pre-existing creditors and it would 
undermine creditors’ predictability and certainty which in turn would cause a serious 
damage to secured transactions systems.137 Unless the super-priority security is 
imposed only on assets newly brought into the pool of assets by transactions such as 
purchase money security,138 it will likely disadvantage existing creditors139 as it is 
spread across all secured creditors because it undermines the available security or it 
will spread the burden to sub-class of creditors such as unsecured creditors who would 
lose far worse because what hope they had of anything will be taken out by super-
priority. As a consequence, super-priority will create a distributional problem in 
insolvency because it will interfere with the rights and interests of pre-existing creditors 
and should the company fail, post-petition funding would operate at the expense of pre-
existing creditors.140  
 
135 George Triantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (1993) 46 Vand L 
Rev 901, 902  
136 Darla Moore, ‘How to Finance a Debtor in Possession’ (1990) 6 Com Lending Rev 3, 4-7 
137 Harmer (n 117) 99 
138 This is one way to reassure that economic interests of the existing creditors are protected against the 
super-priority financing. See: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 104 stating that: 
“As a general rule, the economic value of the rights of pre-existing secured creditors should be 
protected so that they will not be harmed. If necessary, this can be achieved … by making periodic 
payments or providing security rights in additional assets …” 
139 When the assets of the debtor are already encumbered, the US Bankruptcy Code 1978 under section 
364(d) requires the debtor to demonstrate that the interests of existing lien holders (secured creditors) 
are adequately protected before the court approves a priming lien to secure post-commencement 
funding. See: Triantis (n 135) 907-08 
140 McCormack, ‘Super-priority’  (n 134) 706  
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Because of that, many developed rescue systems in the world reject the post-
commencement finance.141 In the UNCITRAL Insolvency Working Group on 
Insolvency Law, delegates from other developed countries, namely France, Germany 
and the UK, were sceptical about the issue on the basis that the incentives for post-
commencement finance might take the law too far against the interests of secured 
creditors and away from the interests of unsecured creditors.142 Lately, in its response 
to insolvency and corporate governance reform, the UK Government has again rejected 
the introduction of the rescue finance proposal on the ground that such finance was not 
necessary since the market already offers sufficient post-commencement finance to 
viable but struggling companies and, further, the introduction of the rescue finance that 
leads to change the order of priority would result in potential serious and negative 
consequences for the general lending market by increasing the cost of borrowing.143 
Where post-commencement finance is to be adopted, lawmakers have to be aware to 
provide the existing secured creditors with reassurance that the economic value of their 
securities will be protected. In this respect, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
emphasises that the provision of the post-commencement finance should not be 
provided unless it is balanced against the pre-existing rights and priorities of 
creditors.144 As Finch and Milman argue that, post-commencement finance should not 
be provided unless it is genuinely value enhancing for all stakeholders.145 Accordingly, 
super-priority funding should be provided only when there is a possibility for rescue. 
 
141 The super-priority granted to post-commencement finance is a unique feature of the US Chapter 11 of 
Bankruptcy Law and not adopted in any country other than the United States and Canada. Terence 
Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb and Bruce Carruthers, ‘Missing Debtors: National Lawmaking and Global 
Norm-Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes’ in Ralph Brubaker, Robert Lawless and Charles  
Tabb (eds), A Debtor World: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Debt (OUP 2012) 266 
142 Block-Lieb and Halliday, Global Lawmakers (n 127) 296 
143 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Energy, ‘Government Response’ (n 97) paras. 5.185-
86  
144 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 104 
145 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, 
CUP 2017) 335  
169 
 
This is because business rescue is not an inevitable solution that must be sought in 
every case because rescue procedures are a multiple-interested party game in which all 
concerned interests should be equally respected. When the company is economically 
onerous, it is not the creditors who should bear the burden of its insolvency whereas the 
liquidation should be the better option to protect their interests.146 
In addition, a system of super-priority might be made less offensive to pre-existing 
secured creditors if such a priority is created by consensual agreement with existing 
creditors or by a court order after taking careful consideration of the existing secured 
interests.147 It is recommended by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide that in case no 
agreement was reached with existing secured creditors whereas the court sees that the 
new funding is value enhancing for the business, the court may be authorised to create 
super-priority on conditions that the existing creditors were given a notice or given the 
opportunity to be heard by the court, the debtor proves that finance is not available in 
any other way and the court sees that the interests of the existing secured creditors will 
be well protected.148 
Obviously, the super-priority is not a straightforward mechanism that can be 
introduced in a country without careful considerations of the impact that it may have on 
the existing creditors. Implementing super-priority supposes that a jurisdiction has 
courts that are competent and staffed with qualified judges and experts in order to be 
able to examine the value enhancing element of the post-commencement financing and 
are able to determine that the economic interests of pre-existing secured creditors are 
well-protected before granting post-commencement creditors any priorities. This is 
 
146 Elayan and Meyer (n 130) 911. Also see: Michelle White, ‘Does Chapter 11 Save Economically 
Inefficient Firms?’ (1994) 72 Wash ULQ 1319, 1319 
147 Harmer (n 117) 99 
148 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 67. This is the approach adopted by the US Bankruptcy Code 
1978 in section 364(d) 
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because super-priority, as previously mentioned, could be counterproductive creating 
much uncertainty and undermining predictability in the market if it is not properly 
installed. As it was acknowledged by Professors Finch and Milman, it would not be 
possible to effectuate super-priority without establishing courts that incorporate 
appropriate training for judges and experts to be competent enough to deal with such 
insolvency cases.149 A jurisdiction like the Libyan system needs, therefore, to enhance 
the judicial institutions to be able to provide confidence for existing creditors that their 
rights will be protected before incorporating incentives for post-commencement finance 
into the insolvency legal system and making the situation much worse.  
Furthermore, adopting a super-priority system supposes that the secured creditors are 
well protected through a predictable and well defined ranking system. In Libya, 
contractual security interests are prejudiced by the priority given to privileged claims 
unless post-commencement finance is provided by the purchase money security 
transaction.150 If this situation continues, super-priority of the post-commencement 
finance will likely be disturbed by the prevalence of the priority statutorily prescribed 
to some privileged claims. As such, creditors with such a structure would be very 
discouraged to provide any additional finance and the interests of the existing creditors 
will be prejudiced if a court decided to approve a post-commencement finance.  
4.5. Role of the Court in the Procedures 
Under the Libyan insolvency system, courts are given a great role to play in the 
procedures. In the composition procedures, the court will be in charge of the whole 
process from the day of the proposal submission. The first meeting of the creditors is 
convened by the court upon the commencement of the procedures and the meeting date 
 
149 Finch and Milman (n 145) 336 
150 This type of transactions is recognised under FLA 2010. See below Sec 5.3.6 and Sec 5.6.2.2 
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is defined by the court’s order.151 In the negotiations of the proposed scheme, the 
creditors will either accept, refuse or suggest modifications to the proposal but they are 
not entitled to initiate a proposal of their own.152 The court is given the power to 
scrutinise and supervise the day to day business of the company.153 The principal 
officer who will supervise the performance of the composition plan is the judge 
delegate whose actions must be conducted in compliance with the way detailed by the 
court.154 For the benefit of the whole creditors, the court is granted wide discretion 
regarding the composition proposal. It can refuse the debtor’s proposal even though the 
creditors have already accepted it.155  
The insolvency practitioner is appointed along with the judge delegate, by the court 
not by the creditors nor can they interfere with the court’s decision.156 The insolvency 
practitioner in Libya is a civil servant and represents the insolvency estate with a duty 
to protect the creditors’ interests.157 The creditors have no right to interfere with the 
role of the practitioner, but if they are not satisfied with his performance they can 
appeal his actions to the judge delegate and the court,158 and request the court to 
dismiss the practitioner and replace him with another.159 Also, the creditors’ meetings 
will be led and instructed by the judge delegate whose decisions really matter.160  
 
151 CCA 2010, Art 988(2) 
152 Ibid, Art 1000 and 1002 
153 Ibid, Art 992 
154 Ibid, Art 1010 
155 Ibid, Art 1006  
156  Ibid, Art 988 in the composition procedures and Art 1021 regarding the insolvent liquidation 
procedures. 
157 See: Ibid, Art 990 
158 Ibid, Art 1041 
159 Ibid, Art 1042 
160 Ibid, Art 999 
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As far as insolvent liquidation is concerned, the whole procedures are resided with 
the court.161 The judge delegate is appointed to manage the entire process and he/ she is 
the person who orders for the creditors’ committee to be convened when he thinks 
appropriate. The judge delegate is empowered to grant permission to the practitioner to 
carry out the debtor’s business activities that fall outside of the ordinary course of 
business, if necessary, without the need to refer to the creditors’ opinion in the 
matter.162 Also, after the insolvency adjudication, the court can order the continuation 
of the ordinary business of the debtor temporarily if it thinks that the sudden cessation 
of the business would result in an irreversible damage to the debtor’s business value. 
That can be done by a court order without the need to consult the creditors’ committee 
unless the list of the creditors with details of their debts is concluded and brought into 
effect by the judge delegate. Only in the latter case does the creditors’ committee have 
the final word regarding the continuation of the business of their debtor.163 Finally, the 
creditors’ committee is formulated by an order issued by the judge delegate consisting 
of three or five members selected among the creditors and the committee will be 
chaired by the judge delegate.164 The creditors’ committee is permitted merely 
consultative functions and only whenever the court or the judge thinks appropriate to 
get the creditors’ consultation taken through a meeting or meetings convened by the 
judge delegate.165 The creditors’ committee is entitled no right to claim for 
remunerations for carrying out its duties, but it has the right to have the expenses 
necessary of its duty reclaimed.166 
 
161 Ibid, Art 1028 states that “The tribunal which has rendered the adjudication shall be in charge of the 
whole insolvency procedures…”. 
162 Ibid, Art 1030(6) 
163 Ibid, Art 1099 entitled ‘The Temporarily Extension of Business Activities’. 
164 Ibid, Art 1045 
165 Ibid, Art 1046(1)(2) 
166 Ibid, Art 1046(4) 
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Having the above in mind, it is plain that the court and its appointed officers are given 
control of the procedures of both the composition and the insolvent liquidation with the 
creditors having only a very limited role in the processes. Such excessive involvement 
of the court in the processes is undesirable. It can add to inefficiency of a rescue system 
due to some reasons. First, the costs of the procedures will increase. These include the 
direct cost, such as fees required by accountants, lawyers, auditors etc. and costs caused 
by the delayed procedures. The troubled companies can also be exposed to indirect 
costs, which include the loss of investment opportunities167 due to the lack of business 
knowledge among the courts and judges in Libya.  
In addition, the excessive court involvement in the composition procedures can limit 
the freedom of the debtor company in managing its business through the DIP system 
which may restrict the company’s business choices and options. It would also add 
potentially significant delay and costs to the restructuring. Also, it is said that the 
court’s ex officio power may encourage courts to go beyond supervising the procedures 
to scrutinise the pre-petition behaviour of the company’s management and attempt to 
prosecute illegal transactions and insolvency-related crimes which, as a consequence, 
deters debtors from filing for insolvency.168 In sum, the excessive involvement of the 
court and its representatives in the overall insolvency procedures limits in turn the right 
of the creditors to effectively participate in the procedures. This will be discussed 
below. 
 
167 Stephen Ferris and Robert Lawless, ‘The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 
11’ (2000) 61 UPittL Rev 629. Also see: James Ang, Jess Chua and John McConnell, ‘The 
Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note’ (1982) 37 J Fin 219 
168 Manganelli (n 42) 259 
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4.6. Role of Creditors in the Procedures 
Creditors’ participation in insolvency procedures is considered important in shaping 
any well-balanced insolvency and rescue regimes.169 The justifications for 
strengthening the creditors’ role in the insolvency procedures and in decision making 
are based on the fact that the insolvency increases the interest of the creditors in the 
business of the debtor and their financial interest will often be greater than that of other 
stakeholders.170 This is because the common pool of assets, to which the creditors will 
have recourse in an insolvency scenario, will be affected and its value may be 
devaluated. For that reason, it is rational that the decision of the creditors in any 
proceedings should be taken into account.171 
Strengthening creditors’ participation is advantageous to the creditor group as a 
whole172 as this would ensure that possible abuse of the insolvency procedures is 
avoided, excessive administrative costs are checked and information regarding the 
procedures is processed which will in turn contribute positively to the value of the 
insolvency estate. Also, they are often in a good position to provide advice and 
assistance regarding the debtor’s business and to monitor the actions taken by the 
insolvency practitioner.173  
The importance of promoting the creditors’ role in the insolvency procedures is 
emphasised in the international benchmarks. For example, the UNCITRAL Legislative 
 
169 Adam Al‐Sarraf, ‘Bankruptcy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Analyzing the New 
Bankruptcy Laws in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain’ [2020] Int’l Ins Rev 1, 9 
170 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para75 
171  Roman Tomasic, ‘Creditor Participation in Insolvency Proceedings - Towards the Adoption of 
International Standards’ (2006) 14 Insolv LJ, at 09 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443762> accessed 26 Sep 2017 
172 As will be discussed later at the end of this section, two issues should be stressed about strengthening 
the role of creditors in insolvency. First, not all creditors will have sufficient incentives to take up an 
active role. Second, participation in real life may be dominated by secured creditors. 
173 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para75 
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Guide insists on increasing the creditors’ participation “… especially as a counter-
balance to the roles assigned to other participants under the law and as an important 
means of safeguarding creditor interests”.174 Also, the WB Principles assure that 
enabling creditors to effectively monitor and participate in insolvency proceedings 
would ensure that their interests are safeguarded which would in turn “ensure fairness 
and integrity …”.175 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide recommends that it is 
desirable that the insolvency law should clearly specify the rights and functions resided 
to the creditors’ committee in the procedures that may include:  
“(a) Providing advice and assistance to the insolvency representative or the debtor-in-
possession; 
(b) Participating in development of the reorganization plan; 
(c) Receiving notice of and being consulted on matters in which their class has an 
interest, including the sale of assets outside the ordinary course of business;176 
(d) The right to hear the insolvency representative at any time;177 and 
(e) The right to be heard in the proceedings”.178 
As has been discussed,179 the Libyan regime of insolvency relies heavily in its 
operation on the court and its representatives (the judge delegate and the syndic) as 
they are the parties in charge of making all key decisions on the procedures. However, 
 
174 Ibid, Part Two, Chap III, para 77 
175 World Bank Principles, Principle C7.1 
176 Receiving notice and being consulted would, in a practical sense, result in a slow and expensive 
process. Therefore, it is more efficient that, as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests, the 
creditors participate through a creditors’ committee so that creditors can meet and be consulted in one 
place to save time and minimise costs. See: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 
110 
177 The phrase ‘the right to hear the insolvency representative’ appears to mean the right to request 
representations on matters relating to the functions of the creditors’ committee (which include 
consulting with the insolvency representative and participating in the development of the  rescue plan) 
and the rights of the committee to access up-to-date information on the financial affairs of the debtor. 
See: Ibid, Part Two, Chap III, paras. 111 and 112 
178 Ibid, Rec 133 
179 See above Sec 4.3.3 
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creditors participate at a very low level and have little influence. The main role that 
creditors can play in the procedures is the requirement of the majority of creditors to 
vote on the composition plan. This situation is undoubtedly unattractive to investors, 
both local and foreign, who prefer to play an active role in the decision making in the 
procedures to ensure that their rights and interests are respected.  
The insolvency regime of Libya regulates the formation of the creditors’ committee 
as a representative of their interests in Articles 1045 and 1046 of the CCA 2010. Article 
1046(3) regulates the role of the creditors’ committee stating that: “the creditors’ 
committee, and every member of the creditors’ committee, shall be entitled to receive 
monetary statements and documents on the conduct of the insolvency estate and shall 
be enabled to request information and clarifications from the syndic and the insolvent 
debtor”. As noted above, this is important in providing the creditors’ committee with 
the mechanism necessary for facilitating transparency and promoting creditors’ 
confidence in the insolvent liquidation procedures.  
However, as previously discussed, the creditors’ committee under the Libyan law has 
only advisory functions and their decisions will not bind the court.180 This is inadequate 
to boost the participation of creditors who should be afforded a more effective and 
adequate role to play in the procedures because they are more vigilant than any other 
party to protect their rights and to monitor the actions taken by the insolvency 
practitioner. Besides, they are often in a much better position to provide advice and 
assistance regarding the debtor’s business. 
Moreover, the possibility of establishing a creditors’ committee in the composition 
procedures is not legislatively clear in Libya. To detail, the creditors’ committee can be 
 
180 See above Sec 4.5 
177 
 
established only after the debt list is given an executive effect which can be made only 
in the insolvent liquidation process. The CCA 2010 states that “The creditors’ 
committee must be established within ten days from the issuance date of the order 
stipulated in Article 1106. Nevertheless, it may be permitted to establish a provisional 
creditors’ committee prior to the mentioned date as the judge thinks fit”.181 Article 
1106 of the CCA 2010 regulates when the debt list is given an executive effect.182  
It could be argued that even though the creditors’ committee may not be allowed to 
be established during the composition procedures, this does not mean that the creditors 
cannot participate in the procedures individually or under any other form of 
participation. Arguably, however, participating through the creditors’ committee is the 
preferred183 form of participation by creditors because it ensures that their voice is 
heard in an efficient manner.184 Where a creditors’ committee is formed, creditors can 
select the most expert creditors to represent them in the procedures. Also, the costs of 
the procedures can be lower than if each creditor participates individually. 
Additionally, participation through a creditors’ committee can help to concentrate the 
information on the debtor’s business in one place so that creditors are able refer to them 
whenever is needed maybe with no costs. This would contribute to maintain and 
maximise the overall value of the debtors’ business. 
Furthermore, the approach adopted by the Libyan law regarding the vote on the 
composition plan raises some concerns. As has been discussed, secured creditors in 
 
181 CCA 2010, Art 1045(1) 
182 Ibid, Art 1106, entitled ‘Executive Effect of the Debt List’, states that “(1) The judge and the clerk 
shall sign the list of debts, and it shall be concluded by an order issued by the judge contending that its 
effectiveness will be from the date of the last creditors’ meeting, or fifteen days after the date of the last 
creditors’ meeting”. 
183  This is preferable especially in cases where multiple creditors are involved. See: World Bank 
Principles, Principle C7.1 
184 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘No Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA 
Region’ (2011) 1 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5609, at 18 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794914> accessed 4 Jan 2019 
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Libya are not required to take a role in the composition procedures and therefore they 
are not bound by the composition plan and procedures because the law reassures them 
the right to protection through court process.185 However, as far as the rescue 
procedures and culture are concerned, such an approach is detrimental to a business 
rescue system and may make rescue impossible to implement especially where the 
encumbered assets are essential to the success of the plan. Particularly where courts, 
judges and practitioners lack capacity and expertise in insolvency laws, it should be 
acknowledged that the need for ensuring the creditor participation is more desirable in 
rescue procedures.186 
In order to increase the success of rescue, secured creditors should participate in the 
procedures. Participation of secured creditors should be separated from that of 
unsecured creditors so that each would vote on the composition plan as divided classes; 
i.e. secured creditors are represented as a class, the general creditors are represented as 
class and the privileged creditors are represented as a class. The composition plan is 
then required to be supported by a majority of creditors of each class while the 
dissenting minority classes will be bound by the plan.187 By doing so, the likelihood of 
successful rescue procedures is increased as secured creditors’ interests are now dealt 
with along with other creditor interests in the composition meeting as they are now 
required to participate. 
 
185 This is because the debtor’s proposal for the composition must have a worthy offer for secured 
creditors. Otherwise, the court will not approve their composition proposal in the first place pursuant to 
Article 985(6)(a) of CCA 2010 
186 However, the creditors’ participation in the liquidation procedures can be informative to the court and 
the practitioner as they can provide a valuable source of advice and information regarding the debtor’s 
business especially where the outcome of liquidation will be a sale of the business on a going concern 
basis. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para84 
187 There are different approaches that can be adopted in this matter. The requisite majority of creditors 
may be based on percentage of the total value of claims or a number of creditors, or may be a 
combination of both. For details see: ibid, Part Two, Chap IV, paras. 50-51 
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Although there are good theoretical reasons for strengthening creditors’ participation 
in insolvency or business rescue procedures, some points must be acknowledged. 
Giving creditors the power to participate in the process may end up with two 
unpredictable possibilities. First, general creditors, especially those who are owed small 
amounts of debts, may not be enthusiastic to take up an active role. In practice, it is 
common that creditors do not participate in the process especially where it seems it is 
not economically rational for them to participate due to both possible further costs 
incurred by their participation and possible insignificant returns.188 
Second, giving creditors control in insolvency or business rescue leads to a collective 
action problem for the dispersed creditor group and therefore it tends to lead to secured 
creditors taking control over the process.189 This is because secured creditors, unlike 
general small creditors, are more economically incentivised and also because they have 
more expertise in dealing with insolvency matters. This is likely lead to secured 
creditors abusing the process to their own advantage especially when they are fully 
secured.190  
The historical development of the UK insolvency law can be given as an example. 
The UK insolvency law pre-2002 reform placed control in insolvency procedures in the 
hands of secured creditors (floating charge holders) through the right to appoint an 
administrative receiver whose duty is to satisfy his appointer only.191 This created 
conflicts of interest between the receiver (representing the secured creditor) and the 
 
188 Tomasic (n 171) 15-16. See also: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 85 
189 Although the dominance of secured creditors in controlling the process may be problematic because 
of the possible conflict with the interests of junior creditors, considering the Libyan situation this 
approach still seems a realistic solution to make a balance with other objectives of business rescue.  
190 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part, Two, Chap III, para 87. Also see: John Armour, Audrey Hsu 
and Adrian Walters, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence 
from the UK’ (2012) 8 RLE 101; Parry and Gwaza (n 97) 
191 This was seen as an incompatible feature with the collective nature of a sound insolvency system. See: 
Kayode Akintola and David Milman, ‘The Rise, Fall and Potential for a Rebirth of Receivership in UK 
Corporate Law’ (2019) 20 J Corp Law Stud 99, 100 
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junior creditors since secured creditors took this procedure to their own advantage.192 In 
response to this problem, the development of insolvency law by the EA 2002 in the UK 
shifted control from secured creditors to unsecured creditors (through the 
administration) to make sure that interests of unsecured creditors are also considered. 
This goal was boosted by the mechanism of voting on the administration proposal and 
the administrator’s accountability to the creditors as a whole.193  
However, the emphasis on secured creditors in the UK is still recognised to a great 
extent. For example, the pre-packs under the administration procedure are in practice 
influenced to a great extent by the floating charge holder.194 Nonetheless, the secured 
creditors’ control195 in the insolvency procedures can yet produce efficient outcomes to 
the benefit of the general body of creditors. This can be manifested by the 
maximisation of returns through the sale of the business as a going concern and the 
reduced costs of pre-packs in comparison with the administration procedures.196 This is 
to suggest that the predominance of the secured creditors in the process may not be 
perceived as a deficient feature of an insolvency law as long as this would lead to better 
 
192 Especially where the assets of the business were worth more than what the secured creditor was owed. 
See: John Armour and Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The 
Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) ESRC Centre for Business Research Working Paper No 288, at 3 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567306> accessed 22 Mar 2020 
193 For details see: Armour, Hsu and Walters (n 190) 102-07; Akintola and Milman (n 191) 110 
194 This is manifested by the ability of the administrator to sell the distressed business outside the 
collective insolvency procedures, the absence of the consent by the general body of creditors to such a 
sale which is rather marshalled by the floating charge holder who is usually the beneficiary of the sale. 
It is suggested therefore that pre-packed administrations achieve objectives similarly to those under the 
administrative receivership. Akintola and Milman, ibid 108 
195 It should be noted that the theory of Creditors’ Bargain is less likely to be concerned with the rescue 
process when secured creditors having an active role in the process because the rights of secured 
creditors will be well-protected.  
196 See generally: Armour, Hsu and Walters (n 190) 
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outcomes for the benefit of the various stakeholders and it may thus be a better 
option197 where there are insufficient institutions. 
4.7. Position of the Employees 
The employees always enjoy special regard by the lawmakers in Libya as an 
application of the theory of ‘social justice’ in the society. An example is that the 
employees enjoy a special hierarchy position in the liquidation. The CC 1953 treats the 
employees’ entitlements (salaries and wages due to employees and public servants for 
the last six months) against their insolvent employer as privileged claims which must 
be paid in full before any secured creditor is paid anything.198 
In business rescue, the sale of the business as a going concern is the strategy that 
should be adopted where this is the better option to maintain the creditors’ interests. 
Under this form of rescue, the business may continue to operate under a new ownership 
as a going concern.199 The Code of Employment Relationships (CERs 2010) safeguards 
employment for the employees when the business is transferred to a new buyer in 
business rescue. Article 49(1) of the CERs 2010 sets a general rule and prohibits the 
employer from terminating the employment contracts when the business is transferred 
to a new buyer for any reason.200 This is a rigid response to the employment issue in 
 
197 Scholars in the UK commenting on the historical development of the UK insolvency regime regarding 
the shift of control of creditors conclude that no one approach of creditor governance is superior over 
the other. Ibid 103; Akintola and Milman (n 191) 119 
198 CC 1953, Art 1145(1)(a) 
199 Sandra Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 247, 
262; Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Administration and Administrative Receivership-An Analysis’ (2004) 57 CLP 1, 
7 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466701> accessed 23 Jul 2019 
200 CERs 2010, Art 49 states that: ‘(1) The fulfilment of obligations provided by means of this law shall 
not be discharged by the … transfer of ownership under any kind of transactions … (2) With regard to 
cases other than liquidation or insolvency or the final closure, employment contracts shall remain 
effective for the term period as set out in the employment contracts and the former employer shall be 
jointly responsible for a period of one year with the successor for fulfilling all pre obligations as set out 
in the employment contracts’. 
182 
 
Libya to prevent the employer and the new owner from making unfair dismissals of the 
employees. 
Although employees may benefit from business rescue, as opposed to corporate 
rescue, because this may secure their jobs by avoiding liquidation, the effectiveness of 
business rescue may require some job reductions. This strategy is necessary to enhance 
the rescue process by providing the new buyers with incentives to buy the business 
with higher going concern value and fewer liabilities owed by the insolvent 
transferor.201 The CERs 2010 provides the employer with an opportunity to make 
business decisions in order to address their business needs as a going concern by which 
the liability for the employment contracts can be discharged provided that the 
dismissals are not connected to the sale or the transfer of business as set out in the 
Article 49(1) of the CERs 2010. 
The law allows the dismissal of the contracts if it was based on restructuring purposes 
or on economic reasons. Article 77(2) of the CERs 2010 states that: “… the employer is 
prohibited from terminating an employment contract unless it is based on the inability 
of the employee to perform its job … or the work necessities (entailing changes in the 
workforce), including the restructuring purposes or for economic reasons …”. This 
Article affords the employers flexibility to make business decisions to address their 
business desires and needs as a going concern which is relevant to business rescue as 
otherwise the rescue process could be restricted. It is argued that the statutory 
provisions that require preserving employment contracts would in some instances 
 
201 This appears to align with the approach offered by the TPT which insists on striking a balance 
between the employees in ensuring their employment and those of the creditors (by ensuring that the 
value of the business is not undermined in the rescue process). See above Sec 4.2 (Objective Three of 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) and 2.2.2.3 
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potentially undermine the rescue procedure.202 To ensure accountability to the 
employees, the law requires the employer to send notice to the Labour Union to which 
the employees belong and to the concerned Job Office (Job Centre)203 explaining the 
reasons for employment dismissals at least one month prior to the dismissal. This is to 
examine the worthiness of reasons for dismissal in order to avoid any possibility of 
unfair dismissals of the employment contracts.204 
However, unfair dismissal could still happen, given the fact that the law provides no 
definition for the terms ‘economic or restructuring’ reasons.205 As such, the balance 
between the interests of the employees and employers would possibly not be achieved 
in practice. Although the dismissal of the employees is prohibited by the law if the 
dismissal was based solely on the transfer or the sale of the business, the employers 
could possibly prejudice the employees’ interests by resorting to Article 77(2) to 
validate dismissals. Therefore, the law should ensure in the insolvency or business 
rescue situation that adequate protection of employees’ rights is granted. 
4.8. Conclusion  
As demonstrated in this Chapter, the current insolvency law is not adequate to 
achieve rescue objectives nor can it contribute to the enhancement of the rescue culture 
in the community. As has been mentioned,206 the current insolvency and rescue 
framework in Libya is traced back to the 19th century Anglo-Belgian insolvency laws. 
 
202 This illustrates the tension between the insolvency law and the employment law as each of these laws 
employs objectives that conflict with each other. The discussion of this point falls beyond the scope of 
the thesis. For details see: Etukakpan, ‘Transfer of Undertakings’ (n 19) 40-41; John McMullen, ‘An 
Analysis of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ (2006) 35 
Industrial Law Journal 113, 133 
203 The Job Office is a government employment agency overseen by the Ministry of Labour. Its purpose 
is to help citizens to find job vacancies. CERs 2010, Art 6 
204 Ibid, Art 77(2) 
205 For similar discussions in the UK law see: Nsubuga (n 98) 102-05 
206 See above Sec 4.3.1 
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During this time, economies have improved and legal systems have accordingly been 
reformed and different mechanisms to deal with the phenomena of business failure 
have been invented. Obviously, Libya has lagged behind. Reports of international 
institutions and the scarcity of insolvency cases in the country prove this claim.207  
Because of the inadequacy of such an insolvency framework to achieve rescue 
objectives, countries which inherited similar legal systems have recently become aware 
of the necessity of reform. For example, Tunisia has abandoned its alike-structured 
insolvency regime and introduced a reform with the aim of promoting more rescue 
objectives. The Tunisian law abolished the provisions of the composition from its 
Commercial Code of 1959208 and substituted it with the law of Rescuing the 
Economically Distressed Enterprises.209 This reform adopted some features of modern 
insolvency laws. For example, it abandoned the punitive nature of the old regime and 
shifted its focus from liquidation for the benefit of creditors towards achieving more 
rescue objectives for the benefit of various stakeholders with the focus on maximising 
the value of the insolvent estate.210 The new law insisted from the very outset that its 
primary aim is to help distressed yet viable businesses to continue their business 
activities, maintaining jobs and to help to fulfil a business’s liabilities.211 Furthermore, 
this reform adopted more streamlined and more expedited procedures with shorter 
timelines which is essential to maximise the insolvent estate value. Also, the 
 
207 See above Sec 1.2.1 and 1.2.3 
208 The Commercial Code of Tunisia no 129 of 1959 (promulgated in the National Gazette in 5 Oct 1959) 
209 Rescuing the Economically Distressed Enterprises Act 1995 
210 Régis Blazy and Aziza Letaief, ‘When Secured and Unsecured Creditors Recover the Same: The 
Emblematic Case of the Tunisian Corporate Bankruptcies’ (2017) 30 Emerg Mark Rev 19, 20. Also see: 
Monsif Al-kasho, The Law of Rescuing Enterprising Experience Economical Distress (Sojeek 2015) 
20-21 
211 Rescuing the Economically Distressed Enterprises Act 1995, Art 1 
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moratorium against the creditors is applied only where the enforcement on the 
business’s assets frustrates the rescue process.212 
This new insolvency approach and practice adopted in Tunisia paved the way towards 
more effective and efficient insolvency practices in the country. According to the WB 
Doing Business 2019 report, the reformed system enabled the country to achieve the 
highest recovery rate in the MENA213 region with just over 51% and lowest costs of 
only 7% of the insolvency estate.214 And courts in Tunisia have perceived this reform 
differently from the old system of composition as a law with collective nature 
characterised with rescue orientations to shift the concerns from the focus on the 
liquidation and creditors’ pay-off together with management restrictions and liability 
towards achieving more rescue objectives.215 
Such an example is potentially inspiring and instructive for Libya. Taking into 
account all of the economic and social circumstances and situations that Libya has been 
through,216 a sound insolvency law that aims to achieve more rescue goals has become 
very significant in the country as it can contribute to promoting the economic growth 
and to mitigating social instability. It is also vital to attract foreign direct investment 
and is a prerequisite for positive investment decisions in a transitional market like 
Libya. An emphasis should also be placed on institutional reform. A substantial 
investment should be made in legal training and education prior to the enactment of the 
reform in order to enhance familiarity of judges and professionals and adaptability of 
the new rules. 
 
212 For details see: Sami bin Farhat, Comments on the Law of Rescuing the Economically Distressed 
Enterprises (El-Magharibia Publishing 2004) 11-17 
213 The term MENA refers to the Middle East and North African States. 
214  World Bank, ‘Doing Business: Resolving Insolvency’ (World Bank Group 2019) 
<www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency> accessed 29 May 2019 
215 Al-kasho (n 209) 34-35 
216 See above Sec 2.5 
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Chapter 5 The Application of UNCITRAL Principles with Reference 
to the Libyan Secured Transactions System 
5.1. Introduction 
The credit sector in Libya was a subject of recommendations for reform provided by 
the World Bank (WB) in its 2006 and 2008 reports. In the 2006 report, the WB insisted 
that in order to successfully proceed with the transition to a market economy, Libya 
needs to reform its existing financial system and the functioning of the credit market.1 
This was followed by a more detailed report conducted by the WB in 2008 which 
recommended that Libya ought to develop its existing legal system of secured 
transactions in line with international practices in secured transactions in order to 
enhance the credit market in the country. The main critical areas that need urgent 
reform, as advised by the World Bank, include the creation of secured transactions, 
publicity of the collateral through a modernised registration system and the 
improvement of the enforcement mechanisms through both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms.2  
As has been mentioned, some legal reforms regarding secured transactions were 
introduced, influenced heavily by the views and recommendations of the above 
mentioned World Bank reports. For example, the Government reformed the secured 
transactions regime embodied in the Commercial Code of 1953 by introducing the 
Code of Commercial Activity 2010 (CCA 2010) and also by the introduction of the 
Financial Lease Act 2010 (FLA 2010). The reform of the secured transactions law was 
 
1 World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 67 
2 World Bank, Modernising the Legal Environment for Business Activities (2008) 48-50. (This document 
is in Arabic - private communication and in file with the author). Hereinafter World Bank, Modernising 
the Legal Environment 2008 
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part of the country’s initiatives to enhance the shift towards the market economy, 
thereby enhancing the role of the private sector and to promote economic growth by 
increasing the availability of credit.3 
The fundamental aim of secured transactions laws is to provide creditors and loan 
providers with the power to enforce their claims against defaulting debtors for the 
unpaid debts.4 As the risk of default is now expected to increase in Libya as a 
consequence of the secured transactions reform, it is important to ensure that the 
legislation provides creditors and lenders with the necessary mechanisms to protect and 
enforce their rights against their debtors when they become insolvent. Indeed, the 
legislature in the 2010 reform allows creditors, for the first time in the country, to 
enforce their security claims under expeditious kinds of court procedures instead of the 
full court procedures in order to streamline enforcement procedures to achieve swift 
and effective outcomes.5 It should be acknowledged, however, that creditors’ debt 
enforcement in the event of insolvency would potentially result in depletion of the 
value of debtor’s assets by the dismemberment of its business if enforcement was 
allowed on an individual basis. The insolvency law therefore intervenes to prevent such 
an inefficient ‘race to collect’ to be replaced by a collective system of enforcement.6 
Obviously, these two aims interact with each other in the event of insolvency and a 
legal system therefore should be designed to regulate such interaction between these 
two statutory systems.  
 
3 For further details see above Sec 1.2.3 
4 John Armour, ‘The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review’ (2001) ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No 197, 1 
<www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp197.pdf> accessed 8 Nov 2019 
5 This will be dealt with later in Sec 5.6.2.1 (regarding the enforcement of the going concern security) 
and Sec 5.6.2.2 (regarding the enforcement of the financial lease) 
6 Armour (n 4) 1 
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This Chapter will examine whether or not the secured transactions reform in Libya 
achieves harmonisation between the secured transactions law and the insolvency law. It 
aims to analyse the reform of the secured transactions law of Libya and assess whether 
it has the potential to provide any sound treatment of credit and of the creditors’ 
interests in the context of insolvency. In so doing, the Chapter will examine the impact 
of the ‘social justice’ theory as adopted by the CC 1953 on the rights of creditors in 
insolvency, given its importance in Libya. 
The Chapter will focus on discussing whether the current framework of the secured 
transactions system could implement features of effective secured transactions laws. A 
secured transactions law should include features that aim, for example, to achieve a 
simple creation of interests in movable assets,7 a comprehensive and clear scheme of 
priority of the competing interests in the assets, a provision for publicity of the secured 
interests, and effective enforcement procedures. These features, as insisted by 
International Finance Corporation report on its secured transactions reform initiative 
2010, are important for the development of any secured transactions system.8 Because 
this Chapter will examine the secured transactions system in Libya, it will first give a 
brief account of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide with particular reference to 
Objective Eight (Recognition of the Rights and Priority of the Existing Creditors) in 
more detail separately from the principles of the Legislative Guide that were subject of 
investigation in Chapter Three, since it has implications for the treatment of secured 
credit. The examination in this Chapter will also be carried out in light of the 
theoretical discussion undertaken in Chapter Two. 
 
7 In the Libyan context, however, movable assets are less important than immovable assets. Banks prefer 
to use immovable assets as security because they are fully effective and cheap security devices. See: 
Al-habeeb Ejboudah, ‘The Pledge on Future Assets in the Libyan Law’ (2014) 3 UTJLS 51 
8 World Bank, Secured Transactions Systems and Collateral Registries (IFC 2010) 39-41 
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5.2. Recognition of the Rights and Priority of the Existing Creditors (UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide Objective Eight) 
It is identified that the most important reason behind the taking of security is to 
prioritise the rights of secured creditors over other claimants in order to maximise 
returns to creditors in the event that the debtor faces financial or economic distress and 
cannot meet its obligations in full.9 The position against which the creditors most want 
protection is when their priority and the value of their security rights are reduced due to 
the insolvency of their debtor.10 Creditors typically suppose that the insolvency law 
preserves their legitimate expectations by upholding their pre-insolvency rights and 
priority with the secured interests being respected although through collective 
processes. This is vital to ensure in the insolvency law because subordinating the 
secured creditors’ rights would otherwise introduce a level of uncertainty in daily 
commercial relationships.11 It is important, therefore, that the law ensures certainty for 
creditors by clearly stating whether secured interests will be recognised upon the 
commencement of the insolvency procedures.12 
But, insolvency, by a balance sheet definition, means that a distressed company is 
encumbered with liabilities which exceed the value of its assets which will result in 
some creditors not receiving full satisfaction. Therefore, the burden of distress is to be 
shared among creditors. This issue is regulated by insolvency laws by classifying 
creditors into different classes in an orderly ranking system by which higher priority 
creditors (secured or preferential creditors) must be repaid in full before lower priority 
 
9 Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (CUP 2004) 5-7  
10  EBRD, Core Principles for a Secured Transactions Law (Jul 2010) 
<http://www.ebrd.com/documents/legal-reform/secured-transactions-coreprinciples-english.pdf> 
Principle 5, accessed 2 Mar 2018 
11 See above Sec 2.2.1. Also see: Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP 1986) 
157 
12 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 4; and UNCITRAL, Model Law on Secured Transactions (United 
Nations 2016) Art 94 
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creditors (ordinary unsecured creditors) may receive anything, under a rule of absolute 
priority.13  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide expresses the importance of having the pre-
existing rights of various creditors, especially with respect to the rights of secured 
creditors, recognised and effectively enforced.14 It is important that those existing as 
well as post-commencement interests are set forth in a clear priority ranking as this will 
provide predictability to investors as to how to assess and manage the risk of 
insolvency.15 Recognition of the existing creditor interests and priorities requires the 
law to minimise priorities of social and political considerations and instead limit the 
priority rules to those priorities of commercial bargaining. But if such socially or 
politically-based priorities were to be recognised by the law, it is fundamental to ensure 
that these priorities are clearly set forth and are predictable to the creditors and lenders 
and are also limited to as great an extent as possible.16 Otherwise, the outcomes of the 
procedures may likely be distorted and the rule of absolute priority will be rarely 
applicable leaving secured creditors with little hope of recovering anything.17 
 
13 Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman, ‘Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors’ (1979) 
88 Yale LJ 1143, 1161-62; Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative 
Destruction: Predictable and Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the Wake of the East Asian Financial 
Crisis’ in Meredith Woo (ed), Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia: A Comparative 
Study (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 242 
14 It is clear that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide holds a position that protects the pre-existing rights 
of secured creditors that simulates the CBT’s view about pre-insolvency entitlements of secured 
creditors. See above discussion Sec 2.2.1 and Sec 2.3 
15 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 13 
16 Jenny Clift, ‘Choice of Law and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process’ (2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin 
& Com L 29, 54 
17 McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (n 9) 7; Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘No 
Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA Region’ (2011) 1 World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No 5609, at 7 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794914> accessed 4 Jan 2019 
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5.3. Overview of Secured Transactions System in Libya 
Historically in the Roman law, a security interest in either movable or immovable 
property could be obtained by a contract known as fiducia which was based on the 
essence that the debtor agrees to transfer ownership of his property and assets to the 
possession of the creditor who agrees to transfer the property back to the debtor when 
the debt was satisfied (sale-for-resale-form). By means of this kind of transaction, the 
creditor became the owner of the transferred property.18 This kind of secured 
transaction was gradually replaced by secured transactions that corresponded more 
closely to the modern concept of pledge known as the pignus. Pignus was based on the 
essence that the debtor transfers only the possession of the property to the creditor 
while he remains the owner (possessory pledge) and was entitled to have the collateral 
returned to him.19 During the time, pignus developed to take the form of hypotheca 
which allowed the debtor to grant a security interest in his property without losing its 
possession during the agreement period (non-possessory pledge).20  
This classification survived the civil law systems, through the French Civil Code of 
1804, with a differentiation between immovable property, which was governed by the 
mortgage system21 where the debtor in most cases remains in possession, and the 
movable tangible property that was dealt with by the pledge which requires the debtor 
to transfer the possession of its pledged property to the creditor.22 As a civil law 
 
18 Harry Sachse, ‘Purchase Money Security Interests in Common Law and the French System of Civil 
Law’ (1969) 15 McGill LJ 73, 74. In the common law, this type of security (fiducia) is known as a 
mortgage. See: McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (n 9) 40 
19 In common law systems, this security is known as pledge too. See: McCormack, ibid 41 
20 Sachse (n 18) 74. This device is similar to the common law charges. See: McCormack, ibid 40 
21 The mortgage device functions like the charge in the common law systems where the borrower retains 
ownership but the lender is given a right to seize the property if the debt is not paid. See: McCormack, 
ibid 40 
22 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: in personam Security and in rem 
Security, Vol 10 (2ed edn, Arab Heritage 1967) 262-63. (Hereinafter in personam Security and in rem 
Security) 
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system, the Libyan law recognises this dichotomy between movable and immovable 
property.23 Accordingly, the CC 1953 distinguishes between immovable and movable 
property. Property that is fixed in a place and cannot be removed undamaged shall be 
considered immovable and any property that falls outside this definition shall be 
considered movables.24 However, a movable property that is assigned by the owner to 
exploit the immovable shall be deemed immovable for that purpose (designed 
immovable).25 Moreover, the law extends the term immovable property to every right 
over immovable property including the ownership of property as well as every legal 
action related to rights in rem on immovables. And any rights that fall outside this 
restriction shall be considered movable property.26 Accordingly, the leasing rights on 
immovable property are not considered immovable property because they fall outside 
the definition of the in rem immovable right in the Libyan law. 
Beside this classification of the security devices (known as real security), there are 
other devices that originally are not security devices as such but they have equivalent 
functions (known as quasi-security). This classification includes the conditional sale27 
and the financial lease agreements.28 Furthermore, the law assigns some claims a 
security right by the operation of the privilege system.29 These claims originally are 
unsecured but they are preferential by the law for social and political considerations. 
 
23 CC 1953, Book IV entitled ‘Accessory Rights in Rem’, Title II ‘Authentic Mortgages’, and Title IV 
‘Possessory Pledges’. 
24 Ibid, Art 82(1) 
25 Ibid, Art 82(2) 
26 Ibid, Art 83 
27 CCA 2010, Art 519 and CC 1953, Art 419 
28 Introduced by FLA 2010 
29 CC 1953, Art 1134 
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5.3.1. Mortgage (Charges) 
The mortgage (similar to the charge as known in common law systems)30 is a security 
device over immovable property by which the creditors obtain priority over ordinary 
creditors and secured creditors following in ranking for the payment of their claims 
over the sale price of the immovable.31 The Libyan law distinguishes between 
consensual mortgage, mortgage by law and judicial mortgage. The mortgage by law 
arises by the operation of law to secure claims like those of the building constructor 
over obligations related to the construction of buildings of reconstruction and to secure 
claims of the State over the property of criminally accused people with civil 
responsibility according to the criminal law and criminal procedural law.32 The judicial 
mortgage is granted to any creditor holding an enforceable court judgment against a 
debtor to secure the creditor’s claims.33 The consensual mortgage is created by a 
mutual agreement and can only be created by an authentic document,34 and will not be 
effective against third parties unless the mortgage deed of agreement is registered in the 
land registry.35 The priority of the mortgage is determined by the date of inscription 
(the date and time of registry).36  
It should be noted that all these types of mortgages are non-possessory in type and are 
imposed on immovable property only. However, the most common type in practice is 
the consensual mortgage and the term mortgage applies to the consensual mortgage.37 
This type of mortgage is traditionally preferred by banks in Libya as ideal security for 
 
30  However, the charge in the common law can be over both types of property, movables and 
immovables. 
31 Farhat Ziadeh, Property Law in the Arab World: Real Rights in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Graham & Trotman 1979) 75  
32 CC 1953, Art 1033 
33 Ibid, Art 1089 
34 Ibid, Articles 1034-1088 
35 Ibid, Art 1057 and 1058  
36 Ibid, Art 1061 
37 Ziadeh (n 31) 75 
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lending because it does not usually depreciate in value and it cannot be hidden away 
from the creditor.38 The creditor secured by consensual mortgage enjoys priority over 
the ordinary unsecured creditors and secured creditors following in rank whether they 
are other mortgagees or holders of a judicial mortgage.39 However, security over land 
by mortgage does not always enjoy a priority. Secured creditors over land are ranked 
lower than general privileges (which are not even required for registration to be 
effective) and they could be ranked lower than holders of special privilege over 
immovables if they registered their security in the land registry later than the privileged 
creditors.40 
5.3.2. Pledge  
The pledge in Libya is a possessory security device which can be used for security 
over both movable property (similar to pledge in the common law), especially 
tangibles, and immovable property.41 Both of the pledge of immovable and pledge of 
movable property become valid as against third parties by the physical delivery of the 
property to the creditor pledgee or to a third party selected by them.42 Under the CCA 
2010, the possessory pledge, termed as the commercial pledge,43 can be used to secure 
tangible movables only and its effectiveness against third parties is subject to 
transference of the physical possession of the secured property from the debtor to the 
creditor or to a third party selected by them.44 However, a pledge of immovable 
property has to be registered in the land registry in addition to the physical delivery. 
 
38 Ejboudah (n 7) 64 
39 Ziadeh (n 31) 75 
40 al-Sanhuri, in personam Security and in rem Security (n 22) 264-65. For details see below Sec 5.3.7 
41  CC 1953, Art 1101 
42 Ibid, Art 1103(1) and CCA 2010, Art 665 
43 The commercial pledge is the pledge that is granted to secure a commercial debt and is defined by Art 
664 of CCA 2010 as: “the pledge over movable property granted to secure a debt that is considered 
commercial for the debtor”. 
44 Ibid, Art 665 
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The ranking of the creditors’ priority is determined by the date of registry in the land 
registry regarding the immovable property and by the date of the written contract 
regarding the movable property.45 The possessory pledge is the only security in the 
Libyan law for tangible movables in contrast to the immovable which can be secured 
by the mortgage device in addition to the pledge.46 
Additionally, Article 1101 of the CC 1953, entitled ‘Assets Subject to Possessory 
Pledge’, stipulates that only the movable or immovable property that can be sold 
independently by public auction can be used as the subject of a possessory pledge. 
Accordingly, only tangible property can be used as security whereas intangibles, such 
as intellectual properties, bank accounts, insurance policies etc. are not capable of being 
used as secured assets47 in Libya.48 Further, the creation of a security under the Libyan 
law requires the existence of the secured property as the law requires the security 
agreement to contain a sufficiently detailed description of the pledged properties.49 
Therefore, the creation of security for after acquired assets is not recognised in Libya.50 
Having the above discussion, some points can be raised. First, the requirement of the 
possessory pledge to transfer the physical possession to the creditor can make a pledge 
of tangible movables less effective in practice because it deprives the debtor of taking 
any advantages of their property and in return it would restrict the ability of the 
borrower to raise capital. In contrast, non-possessory security allows debtors to 
continue using their secured property during the period of the loan and it, therefore, 
 
45 Ziadeh (n 31) 79 
46 Except the pledge of a going concern. See below Sec 5.3.4 
47 Except for the pledge of a going concern which can capture intangible property. See below Sec 5.3.4 
48 See: World Bank, Modernising the Legal Environment 2008, 46 
49 CC 1953, Art 1121 on the pledge of movable property. 
50 The pledge of a going concern, however, can include future assets. See below Sec 5.3.4 
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plays a significant role in promoting business lending.51 Given its important role in 
promoting lending in the market, the non-possessory security should be facilitated in 
Libya. Second, the limitation of the pledge on tangible movables is criticised because, 
as it is insisted that, in modern security transactions systems, the scope of the assets that 
can be used as collateral should be broad to include all types of assets, with the 
exception of those specifically excluded.52 In addition, the requirement of sufficiently 
detailed description is also disadvantageous as it results in future and after acquired 
property being excluded from being used as security and this will lead to a “lack of 
flexibility to address important financing transactions involving changing amounts of 
secured obligations and changing pools of encumbered assets, including future assets 
…”.53 A good practice of secured transactions is to allow a general description of the 
assets subject to security that is enough to allow the identification of the collateral. The 
advantage is to permit a wide range of assets to serve as collateral over all types of 
obligations, including present and future as well as products and proceeds.54 
5.3.3. Pledge of Debts (Receivables) 
The CC 1953 provides for the pledge of debts, which is an application of the 
assignments of rights to payment. By this pledge, any right to receive payments may be 
assigned as security in the receivable to the assignee creditor for advances made or 
credit extended to the assignor debtor.55 This is a type of security over intangible 
 
51 Richard Calnan, Taking Security (3rd edn, Jordans Publishing Ltd 2013) 37. See also: Spiros Bazinas, 
‘Key Objectives and Fundamental Principles of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions’ in John de Lacy (ed), The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge Cavendish 2010) 465 
52 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Chap I, para 5 
53 Ibid, Chap II, para 27. 
54 World Bank, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All (World Bank 2017) 53  
55 Ronald Cuming, ‘Secured Transactions Law Reform: Description and Assessment of Current Iraqi 
Secured Transactions Law and Approach to Reform’ [2005] USAID, at 6 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadq152.pdf> accessed 12 Feb 2018 
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movables which is equivalent to the UK fixed charge over book debts.56 The pledge of 
debts involves three parts; the pledger (debtor), the pledgee (creditor) and the 
receivable debtor. The latter is liable to the pledgee creditor for payments made to the 
pledger after the receivable debtor has received sufficient notice of the assignment. If 
the receivable debtor continues to pay the pledger with no objection from the pledgee, 
the receivable debtor will not be bound by the assignment even if he was aware of the 
assignment. Therefore, the pledgee has to notify the receivable debtor in order to 
effectuate the assignment against him and the pledger’s creditors (third parties).57 As a 
possessory pledge,58 this type of transaction will not become enforceable and effective 
against third parties unless the pledgee creditor holds the title document of the debt 
physically. The priority among successive pledgees of the same receivable will be 
accorded to the pledgee who first managed to deliver notice of the pledge to the 
account debtor.59  In such a mechanism, failure to bring the notice to the attention of 
the receivable debtor would result in the creditor losing the security upon the assignor’s 
insolvency.60 In addition, the assignment cannot be used as security collateral in rights 
that are not presently enforceable.61 
It was pointed out that, such a mechanism of the assignment of receivables is in most 
cases impracticable to be taken as security in jurisdictions where it is recognised. This 
is because the stringent requirements and limitations of the notice provided in favour of 
the receivable debtor can prevent the assignment from being a significant feature of a 
modernised secured transactions system. The efficacy of assignment, therefore, should 
not rely on a notice to the receivable debtor. Alternatively, the notice should be 
 
56 Roy Goode, ‘Charges over Book Debts: A Missed Opportunity’ (1994) 110 LQR 592, 594-95 
57 CC 1953, Art 1127(1) and 292 
58 Ibid, Articles 1127-1133 
59 Ibid, Art 1127(2) and 300 
60 Stephan Haimo, ‘Practical Guide to Secured Transactions in France’ (1983) 58 Tul L Rev 1163, 1184  
61 CC 1953, Art 291 
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provided to the receivable debtor only when the assignor fails to meet his obligations to 
the assignee.62  
5.3.4. Pledge on a Going Concern (Floating Charges) 
The going concern is a legal institution that is based on the notion that the collection 
of all property, immovable and movable (tangible and intangible), which is 
encompassed in and used to operate the business may altogether contribute to the value 
of the business which exceeds the value of individual assets themselves if dismantled.63 
The law defines the going concern as “… a set of assets that are used by a trader in 
connection with the operation of his going concern activity and the rights connected 
thereto in order to attract clientele. The going concern may include a set of tangible and 
intangible elements that (non-exclusively)64 may comprise in particular the name, the 
trademark, leasehold rights,65 licenses and patents, industrial drawings, designs, 
furniture and equipment and goods”.66  
The pledge on a going concern67 is a non-possessory pledge type where the company 
has the freedom to deal with the encumbered assets in the ordinary course of business.68 
The Libyan law introduced the going concern security to facilitate a general security 
interest to be taken over the entirety of a business’s property. This type of pledge can 
 
62 Cuming (n 55) 6-7; Haimo (n 60) 1184 
63Abdul-Monaem Al-shafah, The Collateral of the Business Assets in the Libyan Law (University of 
Tripoli 2016) 15-16 
64 The examples given in this Article are not exclusively mentioned. Mohamed Al-badawi, The Law of 
Economic Activity: General Principles (6th edn, 2013) 359 
65 It should be noted that, the leasehold rights in Libya are, like the most civil law systems, viewed as 
movable property not a property ownership. In Title One, Book Two, the Civil Code 1953 deals with 
the ownership contracts but not including the leasehold rights which are dealt with in Title Two in the 
exploiting contracts. In contrast, the leasehold in the UK is an ownership interest in land. See: Jane Ball, 
‘Renting Homes: Status and Security in the UK and France–A Comparison in the Light of the Law 
Commission’s Proposals’ (2003) 67 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 38, 39 
66 CCA 2010, Art 468 
67 EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions recognised this type of security and it is referred to as the 
enterprise charge. EBRD, Model Law on Secured Transactions, Art 5.6 
68 CCA 2010, Art 478. See also: Al-shafah (n 63) 12-13 
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be extended to all assets of the company, including, unless agreed otherwise, the 
tangible and intangible movables, receivables and immovable property and it can also 
secure all debts due by the company including future debts. All property and 
obligations including present, future and after-acquired assets, products and proceeds 
can now be used as security by this device.69 Therefore, it has become possible now for 
creditors in Libya to use a floating security over the business that would not otherwise 
be allowable with other security devices.70 It should be noted that, this security device 
is similar to the French ‘nantissement de fonds de commerce’,71 and to the general 
floating charge that is available in the UK legal system,72 and it is the only floating 
security available under the Libyan law.73 
Regarding the effectiveness of the going concern security, moreover, the agreement is 
required to be ascertained by a notarised document,74 and, unlike the principles of the 
CC 1953, a generic description of the collateral is adequate to legally effectuate the 
agreement.75 The pledge agreement should also be registered in the commercial 
registry.76 
 
69 Al-shafah (n 63) 38-39 
70 Ibid 39-40 
71 Haimo (n 60) 1180 
72 George Gretton, ‘Reception without Integration-Floating Charges and Mixed Systems’ (2003) 78 Tul 
L Rev 307, 313-14; McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (n 9) 46 
73 The pledge on the going business is a common law feature, with reference to the English law, of the 
‘floating charge’ in which the security interest covers almost all the assets of a company. But the 
floating charge introduced by means of the going concern security in civil legal traditions has no 
feature of appointing a security administrator as the situation in the English law. Jan-Hendrik 
Röver, Secured Lending in Eastern Europe: Comparative Law of Secured Transactions and the EBRD 
Model Law (OUP 2007) 72 
74 CCA 2010, Art 476(1)  
75 Ibid, Art 476(2) states that “If the lien agreement does not fully describe the assets subject to the 
security, it shall be assumed that it includes the name and designs, leasehold rights and trademark”. 
76 Ibid, Art 477(1) 
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5.3.5. Conditional Sale 
The law in Libya permits the contractual parties in deferred sale price contracts to add 
a conditional clause of retention of title by which the ownership of the property is 
retained to the seller until the purchase price is paid in full.77 Conditional sale 
transactions, as quasi-security devices, are not generally recognised as security 
agreements in the legal sense simply because the buyer is not yet the owner of the sold 
property. However, they have an economic function equivalent to real security devices 
by using the ownership to secure the buyer’s obligation under the contract.78 
Historically, this type of transactions as a security to the seller’s interests was 
recognised due to the absence of non-possessory security over movable property.79 
There are two assumptions that should be noted. First, the seller who has inserted 
such a retention of title clause has a security only for the price of the sold property. 
Therefore, the retention of title clause will not be extended to proceeds that resulted 
from a mixture of raw material bought under a contract containing a retention of title 
clause with the buyer’s own goods. Accordingly, the buyer should be able to sell 
proceeds to a third party who will receive a good title.80 Second, in the conditional sale 
retention of title in movables, the buyer can sell the property to a good faith third party 
who will receive perfectly good title to the property. According to Article 980(1) of the 
CC 1953, whomsoever possessed a movable, or an in rem right in a movable, based on 
 
77 Ibid, Art 519 and CC 1953, Art 419 
78 Hugh Beale and others, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (OUP 2012) 1.20 
79 Cuming (n 55) 9 
80  Annina Persson, ‘Security Interest and Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis between Swedish, 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Law’ in Karl Gratzer and Dieter Stiefel (eds), History of Insolvency 
and Bankruptcy from an International Perspective (Södertörns Högskola 2008) 313 
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a valid and legitimate cause shall be considered an owner, provided that the possession 
was carried out in good faith.81 This is rational to protect market transactions. 
5.3.6. Financial Lease  
Financial lease agreements, as ownership-based transactions, are not classified in the 
true legal sense as security devices because they are not rights prescribed over the 
assets that are secured by the grantor.82 However, they play an equivalent economic 
function and they are treated by law like a security device in order to incentivise 
creditors to provide funds.83 In an economic sense, financial lease agreements are 
designed as an alternative to normal bank loan advancement financing for equipment 
purchase where the lessee uses the equipment purchased by the lessor during the period 
of the lease term.84 
As the leasing has become so popular among small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the industrialised countries, there is a high demand for leases of equipment 
in emerging countries expecting it will become the financing tool of choice for SMEs 
in such countries, due to some advantages. Instead of paying cash for equipment and 
asset acquisitions, leasing would allow businesses to use the leased equipment and use 
the financial benefits arising from using the equipment, such as increased returns, 
decreased cost or both, as a means to meet the lease payment instalments. In addition, 
 
81 Art 980(3) of the CC 1953 states that the possession itself is a proof of the legitimate cause and good 
faith, unless otherwise proven. 
82 Roy Goode, ‘The Private Initiative and Security for Payment under English Law’ (2002) 54 Rev Intl 
Droit Comp 41, 48. Also see: Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Basic Issues of European Rules on Security in 
Movables’ in John de Lacy (ed), The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge Cavendish 2010) 449 
83 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 22 
84 Olatunji Sule and Sarat Amuni, ‘Equipment Leasing as a Source of Finance for Small and Medium 
Scale Entrepreneurs in Nigeria’ (2014) 2 IJME 247, 249 
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by enabling businesses to conserve cash which can be used for other essentials, leasing 
would enable businesses to have a potential to achieve higher investment returns.85  
The concept of financial lease in Libya was established by the FLA 2010. In order to 
achieve a variety of ways of obtaining finance to businesses, according to the Deputy 
Minister of Industry and Trade of Libya, the financial leasing is aimed at providing 
viable opportunity for businesses, especially SMEs, to access cheap and affordable 
credit in order to support long-term sustainability and to contribute to the socio-
economic development in the country. The financial lease, he added, would have the 
potential to increase access to finance for businesses as an alternative method of 
financing to that traditionally advanced by bankers which has long been expensive and 
hard to obtain due to the inefficiency of the current secured transactions regime.86  
Under the FLA 2010, financial leasing can take two different forms: 1- new assets are 
provided either by the lessor or a third party supplier to the lessee,87 2- assets are 
originally owned by the lessee who sells them and leases them back from the purchaser 
under a “sale and lease-back” arrangement.88 In a financial lease contract, the debtor 
(lessee) receives the property from the creditor (lessor) who reserves ownership of the 
property. The lessee will be granted the right to hire and use the property for a set 
period of time in exchange for, at least in part, instalment fees payable to the lessor.89 
The property that can be subject to lease agreements in the Libyan law is tangible 
movable and immovable property and it does not cover intangible movables.90 While 
 
85 International Finance Corporation, Global Leasing Toolkit: An Introduction (World Bank 2011) 5 
86 ‘Financial Lease Act 2010 will Make a Shift in Small and Medium Sized Businesses’ (Libya2020, 24 
Jan 2011) <https://libya2020.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/> accessed 25 Jan 2018 
87 FLA 2010, Art 2(1)(2) 
88 Ibid, Art 2(3) 
89 Ibid, Art 2 and 8. Also see: Haimo (n 60) 1188 
90 FLA 2010, Art 2 
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using the leased assets, the lessee carries the risk of obsolescence and costs to maintain 
the assets in good condition upon the agreed terms.91  
The leased equipment may be provided by the lessor or a third party supplier but the 
funds used to purchase the assets will always be provided by the lessor of the 
equipment.92 In the sale and lease-back transactions, the borrower transfers ownership 
of the property to the lender who leases the property back to the borrower. These types 
of transactions facilitate the availability of credit to businesses while the assets remain 
in their possession with the right to use them to operate in their businesses in exchange 
for granting the creditor a security over the leased property by transferring the 
ownership.93 The sale and lease-back mechanism is an attempt to improve the 
availability of non-possessory security on tangible movables in Libya. Lawmakers in 
the country were aware that there would be some cases where businesses could not 
legally use non-possessory security over their movable assets if the sale and leaseback 
mechanism was not recognised.94  
In a financial lease, the lessee is granted an option, not an obligation, to acquire 
equipment at the end of the term while the ownership will be transferred to the lessee at 
the end of the lease term if he exercised his option to purchase.95 Under the FLA 2010, 
the lessee is given either the option to purchase the leased goods on the date and at the 
price specified in the agreement or to renew the lease agreement at the end of the lease 
term.96 This type of transaction is known as a hire-purchase transaction. Where the 
 
91 Ibid, Art 10 and 13 
92 Ibid, Art 1 defines the term ‘lessor’, ‘lessee’ and ‘third party supplier’. The latter term is defined as the 
party from which the lessor or the lessee receives the assets subject of the lease agreement. 
93 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, paras. 41-42 
94 Sale and lease-back agreements are primary found in countries where non-possessory security is not 
generally recognised. See: Ibid, Introduction, para 41 
95 Ibid, Introduction, para 26 
96 FLA 2010, Art 8 states that that the lessee can choose to purchase the leased goods … and the paid 
rent instalments shall be counted in determining the sale price. 
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lessee acquires ownership at the end of the lease period, whether automatically or with 
an option to acquire ownership, the transaction is considered to be a hire-purchase 
transaction in substance. This is irrespective of the form that the lease agreement takes 
whether the arrangement involves each of the lessee, the lessor and the supplier or 
when the arrangement is commenced by the lessee who leases the assets directly from 
the lessor.97 
It should be noted that the FLA 2010 recognises only financial leasing as opposed to 
operating leasing. Under the operating lease, the lessee is not granted the option to 
purchase the leased equipment at the end of the lease term while the lessor retains 
ownership of the leased assets at all times.98 However, the operating lease was referred 
to in the Banking Law 2012. Article 100 bis (3) s.4 numerates the activities that can be 
carried out in compliance with Islamic Sharia’99 including the operating lease. As the 
system of Islamic banking has not been completely implemented in Libya,100 the 
operating lease is yet to practically take place in the domestic market. 
5.3.7. Privileges 
Privileges/ privileged rights are statutory (non-consensual) liens101 for claims that 
originally are unsecured. Privileges are defined as a priority to payment of specific 
types of debts that are determined by, and only by, the operation of the law.102 The 
 
97 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Chap IX, para 32 
98 Ibid, Introduction, para 26 
99 The Banking Law 2012 amended the Banking Law 2005 and inserted a chapter on Islamic banking. 
100 Central Bank of Libya, ‘The Evaluation of the Shift towards Islamic Banking in the Banking sector in 
Libya’ (Central Bank of Libya, 20 Oct 2016) <https://cbl.gov.ly/blog> accessed 19 Mar 2018 
101 The privileges are divided into three categories. First category is the general privileges which can be 
over any type of the debtor’s assets. The second category is the privileges over the debtor’s movable 
tangible property. The third is the privileges over immovable property of the debtor. They are also non-
possessory and non-transactional security. The general and specific privileges over debtor’s movable 
property are not required for registry to be effective but the specific privileges over debtor’s immovable 
property are required for registry to be so. 
102 CC 1953, Art 1134 
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priority rank of a privileged right is usually set out by the law creating the privilege. 
Where the law does not determine its rank, the privilege will have a subordinated rank 
to the priority of other privileges stated by the law.103  
Privileges under the CC 1953104 are divided into; general privileges which affect all 
property of the debtor including movable or immovable, and special privileges which 
are limited only to specific property of the debtor (privileges over the debtor’s specific 
movable property and privileges over the debtor’s specific immovable property).105 
This classification of privileges has an effect on the priority of these claims. The 
priority that privileged claims enjoy varies depending on the type of the property 
whether movable or immovable property. Privileged claims over movable property 
always enjoy a priority over claims secured over movable property. Privileged claims 
against immovable property, the priority between secured and privileged creditors is 
determined by the date of the registry (the first in time first in priority).106 The general 
privileges enjoy a priority ranking order over any type of security rights whether over 
movable or immovable property and irrespective of its date of registry. The striking 
feature of the general privileges is that they are not subject to publicity in that they are 
not required to be registered even if they extend to immovable property.107 The 
privileges, however, are not effective against a possessor of movable property acting in 
good faith.108 
The privileges over specific movable property can be divided into two subcategories; 
primary and secondary. Primary privileges on movable property include (a) Judicial 
 
103 Ibid, Art 1135(1) 
104 Art 1058(1) and Art 1120 of CCA 2010 refers to the priority hierarchy as specified in CC 1953 
105 CC 1953, Art 1136 
106 al-Sanhuri, in personam Security and in rem Security (n 22) 264-65 
107 CC 1953, Art 1138(2). Also see: al-Sanhuri, ibid 930 
108 Ibid, Art 1137(1) 
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expenditures spent for maintaining and sale of the debtor’s property for the benefit of 
all creditors,109 including the liquidation expenses,110 (b) Sums due to the public 
treasury for taxes, fees and any other rights,111 (c) Expenditures for maintaining the 
debtor’s movables.112 After these primary privileges comes in priority the general 
privileges which include salaries and wages due to employees and public servants113 for 
the last six months.114 After the general privileges, which would tend to be typical of 
insolvency systems, come the secondary privileges on movable property in lower 
priority.115 These include some more unusual categories: (d) the privilege for 
agricultural businesses (such as sums of money paid for seeds, fertilisers, cultivation 
and harvesting and the price of agricultural machinery etc),116 (e) the privilege of the 
lessor of land on unpaid rent over the debtor’s movable property that exists in the land 
possession (privilege of the lessor of land),117 (f) and the vendor’s privilege for the 
purchase price of sold goods and assets as long as they remain in the possession of the 
vendee (vendor’s privilege).118  
The privileges over the debtor’s specific immovable property include one type which 
is the sums of money due to contractors and architects for the erection, reconstruction, 
repair and maintenance of buildings or other constructions.119 Because this privilege is 
over the debtor’s immovable property, it must be inscribed and registered and its rank 
 
109 Ibid, Art 1142 
110 Ibid, Art 884(2)  
111 Ibid, Art 1143 
112 Ibid, Art 1144  
113 It should be mentioned that the privileges of judicial expenditures, the privileges of public treasury 
such as taxes and the privileges of the unpaid wages for the employees are standard in many insolvency 
systems because they are based to maintain some social or public interests (privileges of employees and 
tax authorities). However, the privileges over the judicial expenses spent for the benefit of all creditors 
should be limited to the expenses only spent for the benefit of secured creditors. See discussion above 
at Sec 3.4.4 (Objective Four of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
114 CC 1953, Art 1145(1)(a) 
115 al-Sanhuri, in personam Security and in rem Security (n 22) 925-28 
116 CC 1953, Art 1146 
117 Ibid, Art 1147 
118 Ibid, Art 1149 
119 Ibid, Art 1151(1) 
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will be fixed by the date of registry.120 This privilege is treated the same way as the 
security over immovables (mortgage) and the priority between them are defined by the 
registry date (first in time first in priority).121  
According to the above, the ranking order of privileges and security interests are as 
follows: 
1- Primary specific privileges over movable property which include: a). Judicial 
expenditures spent for maintenance and sale of the debtor’s property for the benefit of 
all creditors; b). Sums due to the public treasury for tax and other debts; c). 
Expenditures for maintaining the debtor’s movables). These claims have a priority 
hierarchy among themselves in the order specified above;122 
2- General privileged claims (unpaid wages for employees and public servants for the last 
six months); 
3- Secondary specific privileges over movable property which include: a). Privilege for 
agricultural businesses; b). The lessor of land for unpaid rent; c). The vendor’s 
privilege for the purchase price of sold goods. The priority between these claims is in 
the order specified above following in ranking after the general privileges;123 
4- Privileges over specific immovable property (privilege to contractors and architects) 
and secured claims over immovable property (mortgagee creditor) (first registered, first 
in priority); 
5- Secured claims over movable property (pledgee creditors); 
6- Ordinary unsecured claims; 
7- Deferred claims. 
 
120 Ibid, Art 1151(2) 
121 al-Sanhuri, in personam Security and in rem Security (n 22) 930 
122 CC 1953, Art 1142(2), Art 1143(2), Art 1144(2) 
123 Ibid, Art 1146(2), Art 1147(4), Art 1149(2) 
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The wide-ranging privilege system as such is very detrimental to secured creditors 
whose rights should be assigned priority over other claimants in the insolvency setting. 
As acknowledged by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, recognition of priorities and 
rights of secured creditors in insolvency should be one of the key objectives for an 
efficient and effective application of the insolvency law.124 This is justified by the 
desirability to recognise and respect the contractual bargains and preserve commercial 
expectations because this would foster predictability in commercial debtor-creditor 
relationships.125 Such treatment of the privileged rights in Libya is a clear application 
of the theory of ‘social justice’ upon which the CC 1953 has been based. Under such a 
theory, property in Libya is designed to play more social function, a result of which is 
the inadequate protection to the private rights of secured creditors due to the supremacy 
of privileged creditors as illustrated above. The effect of social justice theory will be 
discussed in the following section. 
5.4. Theory of Social Justice under the CC 1953 and Its Effect on the Creditor-
debtor Relationships 
The Libyan legal system has been based on principles that promote social objectives 
in the community rather than individualistic and economic ones. Another aspect, which 
is the protection of individual interests, is not neglected but not as much emphasised. 
The CC 1953 abandons the individualistic and capital approach replacing it with an 
altruistic approach to property and contract laws. 126  This sociological philosophy 
adopted by the Libyan system was based on the notion of ‘supporting the weak’ or 
‘holding the hand of the weak’ in order to strengthen the position of the weak in the 
 
124 See above Sec 5.2 (Objective Eight of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
125 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap V, para 52 
126 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: Theory of Obligation in General, 
Vol 1 (2ed edn, Arab Heritage 1967) 98 (hereinafter Theory of Obligation) 
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society by addressing the problem of inequalities of bargaining power. 127  This 
philosophy pushed the law and culture in Libya towards accepting the loss distribution 
among parties in the society.128 
As far as the notion of the ‘weaker party’ is concerned, al-Sanhuri defined the weak 
in socioeconomic and legal terms. The weak in socioeconomic terms is defined as the 
individuals who find themselves in a situation of socioeconomic hardship. Examples 
for this may include an insolvent debtor unable to pay debts or loans, employees or 
customers. Under the legal terms, the weak party can be defined as the party who is in a 
position of contractual inferiority to the other party.129  Under the latter definition, 
secured creditors are excluded from the term ‘weak’ although they may be affected by 
the hardship (because they are not paid by the debtor business) that characterises the 
weak party in socioeconomic terms simply because they enjoy a superiority position 
vis-à-vis debtors in the contractual agreements.130 As Professor al-Sanhuri concluded, 
the central objective of the civil law is to provide particular emphasis on the interests of 
the debtor other than to those of the creditors because the debtor is the weak party.131 
The Supreme Court in Libya in a case related to enforcement of contractual security 
interests justified the statutory prohibition on enforcement of security interests privately 
out of court by the desire to protect the debtor being in an inferior position and 
exploited by the creditor.132  
 
127 Guy Bechor, ‘To Hold the Hand of the Weak: The Emergence of Contractual Justice in the Egyptian 
Civil Law’ (2001) 8 Islamic Law and Society 179, 197 
128 al-Sanhuri, Theory of Obligation (n 126) 650 
129 Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code and the Emergence of Modern Arab Civil Law (1932 to 1949) (Brill 
2007) 151; Bechor, ‘To Hold the Hand of the Weak’ (n 127) 190 
130 al-Sanhuri, Theory of Obligation (n 126) 98 
131 ibid 98 
132 Supreme Court of Libya, Civil Cassation No 75/19J. Decision issued on 21 Apr 1974, [1974] 10 (4) 
Journal of Supreme Court, 55 
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The supremacy of the social consideration features in the Libyan legal system can be 
realised in the statutorily enacted priority of various privileged rights explored 
above.133 This simulates the country’s normative choice of social justice under which 
the institution of property no longer functions solely to serve individual property 
holders but has now a more ‘social function’ character under the property law, which is 
designed primary to achieve more social objectives in the community. Property rights 
under this approach, as influenced by Professor al-Sanhuri, are seen as to have limited 
and relative, no longer absolute and limitless, function. The owner or the holder of a 
property right, according to this approach, must consider the collective interests of the 
society.134 This explains the impaired function of the property law in the country to 
provide adequate protections to the property rights of secured creditors which are 
subordinated to the dominance of the privileged creditors even when the law decides to 
prioritise the secured interests like in the insolvency law.135 The theory of social justice 
in property law negates the objective emphasised by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
to protect the rights and priorities of the existing creditors as one of the objectives of 
the insolvency law.136 
In the context of contract law, the Libyan legal system implements a philosophy that 
is founded on the view that an unchecked principle of freedom of contract in 
contractual relationships is not appropriate for the society because it leads to social 
instability and societal calamities caused by potential social injustice.137 
 
133 See Sec 5.3.7 
134 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: Property Right, Vol 8 (2ed edn, Arab 
Heritage 1967) 553-57 
135 Obviously, the Libyan system in this field suffers from an issue of conflicting ideologies between 
different areas of law. This will be discussed later in Sec 6.2 
136 See above Sec 5.2 (Objective Eight of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
137 al-Sanhuri, Theory of Obligation (n 126) 98 
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The Civil Code 1953 of Libya was designed to achieve social justice by the 
application of the principles of equity and justice, including to address the problem of 
inequalities of bargaining power when the balance of contractual relationships is 
disrupted. By this, the law places the interests of the society at the centre and superior 
to any private and individual interests. To achieve that, the law gives the court the 
power to intervene in the freedom of the contractual parties and the content of contracts 
and, sometimes, does not allow parties to agree otherwise.138 Courts in Libya are given 
discretion to adjust the contractual obligations to redress any economic imbalance to 
resolve the problem of inequalities of bargaining power139 between the contractual 
parties by the operation of the unforeseen circumstances (Article 147(2) of the CC 
1953). The theory of unforeseen circumstances or events is applied when the economic 
relationships between the contractual parties is imbalanced during the execution of the 
contract.140 
The CC 1953 gives the court extensive discretionary powers to intervene in contracts 
when there is an economic imbalance between the contractual parties caused by general 
exceptional events (unforeseen circumstances) after the contract was entered into, 
stating in Article 147(2)141 that: “… if, as the result of exceptional events of a general 
nature142 that could not have been anticipated, the implementation of the contractual 
 
138 Bechor, ‘To Hold the Hand of the Weak’ (n 127) 197-99  
139 It may be useful here to refer to Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 by Lord Denning MR. In 
this case, Denning adopted a doctrine of equitable intervention where one party enters into a contract 
upon terms which are very unfair due to the inequality of bargaining power between the parties. About 
the criticism of this judgement see: Paul Richards, Law of Contract (9th edn, Pearson Education 2009) 
306 
140 The theory of unforeseen circumstances is based on the notion that the contract is based on an implicit 
condition that the economic circumstances during which the contract was entered into are the same or 
are not changed significantly during the execution of the contract. See: al-Sanhuri, Theory of 
Obligation (n 126) 633 
141 Section 1 of the Article states that “The contract makes the law of the parties and it is to be nullified 
or amended only by mutual consent of the parties …”. 
142 The term “general” is a condition of the application of this provision requiring that the exceptional 
events must have an impact on a wide range of people not only on a particular debtor. For example, a 
big and unexpected flood or spread of a pandemic.  al-Sanhuri, Theory of Obligation (n 126) 643 
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obligation, even if it is still possible to perform, becomes excessively onerous143 for the 
debtor, threatening him with severe losses, the judge may, in the circumstances of the 
matter and having weighed the interests of the parties, reduce the burdensome 
obligation to reasonable limits. Any agreement negating such a possibility is void”.144 
An application of unforeseen circumstances was stated obviously in Article 333 of 
the CC 1953 which vests to the court, in exceptional cases, the power to intervene to 
allow for a reasonable payment delay for a distressed debtor to pay the due debts as 
long as this payment delay will cause no grave prejudice against creditors.145 This 
Article does not define what constitutes an ‘exceptional case’ and ‘a reasonable’ delay 
and what ‘severe prejudice’ exactly means and therefore the court will have to exercise 
its discretion. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the court may drive a case to 
protect the debtor rather than the creditor as long as no severe damage is caused to the 
latter. As the law in Libya accepts loss distribution between parties and this Article 
(333 of the CC 1953) is an obvious application of the social justice theory,146 the 
interests of creditors will likely be prejudiced obviously because the creditor is not a 
 
143 The term “excessively onerous” is a condition for the application of this provision. This condition 
gives to courts the power to intervene in the contract even if the implementation of the contract is still 
possible but onerous for the debtor. This is unlike the situation of the force majeure (Art 360 of the CC 
1953) where the court interferes only when the implementation of the contract becomes impossible to 
perform. Also, in the application of the unforeseen circumstances/events, the court is not authorised to 
terminate the contract like in the event of force majeure but it only addresses the contractual imbalance 
by reducing the contractual obligations of the debtor to the reasonable limit so that the risk of loss is 
shared between the debtor and the creditor. al-Sanhuri, ibid 644-45 
144 See: Bechor, The Sanhuri Code (n 129) 178. It should be noted here that the doctrine of Art 147(2) of 
CC 1953 is equivalent to what is known in the UK as the law of frustration. What is noted is that the 
UK law of frustration applies a narrow doctrine in comparison to the CC 1953. Whereas Art 147(2) 
applies if the performance of the contract would be “excessively onerous” owing to the occurrence of 
unforeseen events even if it is still possible to do, in the UK, the law of frustration operates only when 
the performance of the contract becomes impossible. See: Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (12th edn, 
Palgrave 2017) 276-77. It should be noted that the UK law of frustration of contracts was elaborated in 
a famous case that had its facts in WWII, Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour 
Ltd [1943] AC 32, and it led to statutory intervention of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 
1943. Richards (n 139) 378-79 
145 CC 1953, Art 333(2) 
146 al-Sanhuri, Theory of Obligation (n 126) 650 
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weak party as defined previously. In the context of insolvency, this will be detrimental 
to the creditors whose rights should be protected in the law not prejudiced. 
To conclude, the legal approach of social justice adopted by the Libyan system was 
designed towards achieving and maintaining more moral-sociological considerations in 
the community. This, however, is at the expense of individual rights and 
considerations. 147  The theory of social justice of the CC 1953 implements an 
excessively social based approach that dramatically deviates from the discussed 
theories and the international benchmarks of the insolvency law. It fails to protect the 
important rights and priorities of creditors which are identified as one of the overriding 
objectives of the insolvency law. The objective of social justice of the CC 1953 needs 
to be reconsidered to reach a reasonable approach that can cater for all affected 
stakeholders.148 
5.5. Publicity of Security Interests 
The registration system is considered a key component in improving secured 
transactions laws as it promotes greater transparency and predictability of secured 
interests with respect to the debtor’s assets and it provides for certainty of recognition 
and continued rights in relation to secured interests.149 Security registration systems are 
designed to fulfil two essential functions: to inform parties about the existence of 
interests on secured assets and also to establish the effectiveness and priority of secured 
creditors against third party claimants.150 This means that in the context of insolvency, 
 
147 Bechor, ‘To Hold the Hand of the Weak’ (n 127) 197-99 
148 This will be subject of discussion in Sec 6.2 
149 Persson (n 80) 318 
150 Alejandro De la Campa, ‘Increasing Access to Credit through Reforming Secured Transactions in the 
MENA Region’ [2016] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5613, at 35 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794918> 6 Mar 2019  
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unregistered security interests will be invalid against third parties and the insolvency 
trustee.151  
In Libya, registration defines priority among security interests and non-registered 
security has no effect against a third party.152 To detail, the priority of an interest over 
land and immovable property by means of the mortgage is defined by the time of 
registration,153 and will not be enforceable against a third party unless it is registered.154 
The effectiveness of the financial lease against third parties is defined by the time of the 
registration.155 Regarding the security on the going concern, the priority among secured 
creditors and the effectiveness of the security on the going concern is determined by the 
time of the registration.156 
It should be noted that, the current registration method in Libya is carried out through 
transaction filing, as opposed to notice filing;157 that is the secured creditor consigns a 
copy of the security transaction agreement to the registry. The secured creditors submit 
to the commercial registry all the particulars of registration in the documented format 
 
151 Ronald Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Law and Policy Reform 
at the Asian Development Bank’ (2000) 1 International Insolvency Institute Report No TA 5795-REG, 
at 91 <www.iiiglobal.org/node/1815> accessed 13 Apr 2018  
152 The possessory pledge on movables is not required for registry as its effectiveness is valid by the 
physical delivery to the creditor pledgee or to a third party. See above Sec 5.3.2 
153 CC 1953, Art 1061 and Art 1099 extends the same provision on the judicial mortgage. Also, Art 50 of 
the Real Estate Registry and State Owned Property Act 2010 (no 17 of 2010, promulgated in the 
National Gazette in 6 Jun 2010. Hereinafter Real Estate Registry Act 2010) states that any unregistered 
security interests on immovable property will not be enforceable against a third party. 
154 CC 1953, Art 1057 
155 FLA 2010, Art 26 
156 Al-shafah (n 63) 68-71 
157 For an explanation of the difference between the registration filing and the notice filing methods see: 
the Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Registration of Rights in Securities by Companies 
(Discussion Paper No 121, Oct 2002) at 8 
<https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/6112/7892/7069/dp121_registration.pdf> accessed 15 Apr 2018. 
Also see: Gerard McCormack, ‘American Private Law Writ Large? The UNCITRAL Secured 
Transactions Guide’ (2011) 60 Int’l & Comp LQ 597 
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combined with the security instrument.158 The law allows any interested party to 
request the information they need for the search of the security.159  
In 2010, the law established the commercial registry160 which is supervised by the 
Ministry of Economy.161 The commercial registry is divided into four divisions for: 
individual traders, commercial companies, non-commercial companies and investment 
funds and any other legal entities that the law requires its registration.162 Establishing 
the commercial registry aims at recording and gathering all the particulars and 
information regarding those who are required for registry as well as enabling any 
interested party to request such information. Besides, the registry aims at confirming 
the legal effect arising from the registration.163 And to make the information that is 
registered in the commercial registry unified, the law requires each local commercial 
registry to submit a copy of the particulars and information registered to the general 
commercial registry office on a weekly basis.164 Further, to achieve coherence between 
the existing registries in the country, the law states that the registry in any other 
registries does not exempt from the requirement of registration in the general 
commercial registry.165 In the case of a pledge of a going concern (the floating 
charge),166 for example, the registration of encumbered land in the land registry does 
not exempt the pledge from the requirement of registration in the general commercial 
registry. 
 
158 CCA 2010, Art 486(1) and Art 11 of the Executive By-law (no 187 of 2012) of the Commercial 
Registry, promulgated in the National Gazette in 22 Apr 2012 (hereinafter the Executive By-law of the 
Commercial Registry 2012). For details see: Al-shafah (n 63) 67 
159 CCA 2010, Art 485(5) 
160 Which is regulated by the CCA 2010 and its Executive By-law of the Commercial Registry 2012 
161 Executive By-law of the Commercial Registry 2012, Art 3 
162 Ibid, Art 5 
163 Ibid 
164 CCA 2010, Art 485(3) 
165 Ibid, Art 485(4) 
166 Art 477 of CCA 2010 requires the going concern security to be recorded in the general commercial 
registry. 
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Beside the commercial registry, there is also a different registry institution established 
by the law regarding the land and immovable property security. This institution is now 
regulated by a different piece of legislation (the Real Estate Registry Act 2010). Three 
issues will arise. First, as the law in Libya is still largely dominated by the possessory 
pledge over movable tangibles, intangibles are therefore not recognised to be used as 
security, unless they are included in the going concern. Because of that, the law does 
not regulate the registry of the intangibles.167 And the only instance where intangible 
movables are recognised to be used as an individual security is the pledge of debt 
receivables, however, this type of security is possessory in nature therefore there is no 
requirement for registry.168  
Second, despite the statutory requirement of Article 485(3)(4) of the CCA 2010 for 
each local registry to submit a copy of the information registered regarding any 
securities to the general commercial registry office and the necessity for registration in 
the commercial registry as an attempt to unify the registration system in the country, 
the treatment regarding the different registry systems is yet incoherent as to how these 
different registries would interact with each other. For example, in the security on the 
going concern, as it involves different types of property ranging from movables 
tangible and intangible and immovable property, the law does not clearly define 
whether the registration of such security in the commercial registry will be legally 
effective in that no additional requirement to register each individual asset in the 
concerned registry is needed or there is a requirement for additional registry (the 
 
167 See above Sec 5.3.2 
168 See above Sec 5.3.3 
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registry of land and immovable property).169 This will raise the issue of priority among 
creditors when encumbrances are found in different registries. 
Furthermore, the available registries are still functionally disconnected from each 
other. Consequently, the data regarding security interests will be registered in different 
institutions with different locations depending on the type of assets on which a security 
is granted whether on a going concern or on land. This will make obtaining the 
information about the security interests costly and hardly accessible because 
prospective lenders and creditors will have to conduct several searches in different 
registries, which is undesirable to the creditors.170  
It is argued therefore that the object of the reform should be to bring in all types of 
security interests under the umbrella of a single unified registry with the possibility to 
make all information about security interests accessible to the general public in real 
time and for a reasonable fee. This would ensure that the priority among secured claims 
is clearly determined.171 International benchmarks, such as the UNCITRAL ST Guide 
and International Finance Corporation, insist that the efficiency of a security 
transactions system will be enhanced if all types of secured interests are brought in 
under one centralised general registry that has the function of recording information 
about the existence of security interests.172 
 
169 Al-shafah (n 63) 68-70 
170 Inessa Love, María Pería and Sandeep Singh, ‘Collateral Registries for Movable Assets: Does their 
Introduction Spur Firms’ Access to Bank Financing?’ (2016) 49 JFSR 1, 4 
171 Heywood Fleisig, Mehnaz Safavian and Nuria De la Peña, Reforming Collateral Laws to Expand 
Access to Finance (World Bank 2006) 37. Also see: De la Campa (n 150) 9  
172 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 66. Also see: World Bank, Secured Transactions Systems 
(n 8) 65-66 
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The third issue is regarding the land registry system.173 Although land registry has 
been in practice for a long time, it has proved to be inefficient as it is associated with 
uncertainty and complexity that may affect proper implementation in case of 
insolvency and default.174 For instance, commercial banks who wish to provide loans 
on immovable property always encounter the problem of information insufficiency 
about the collateral provided by customers. The latter tend to get advantages of the 
situation by providing the same encumbered property as collateral in multiple 
transactions with several banks.175 
5.6. Enforcement of Security Interests 
A sound legal system for enforcement where private transactions can safely be carried 
out has become more desirable for developing countries to attract investment and to 
promote the development of the private sector. The disadvantage of a lack of an 
effective and low-cost enforcement system is summarised by Douglass North as “…the 
most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World”.176 Enforcement of security interests is an area 
that is of vital importance to an effective secured transactions law. A law that provides 
a lender with certainty regarding the priority of their security interests and with 
enforcement mechanisms that are effectively functional in the event of insolvency or 
 
173 Registration of immovable property is now regulated by the Real Estate Registry Act 2010. Art 50 
states that all securities over immovable properties must be registered or, otherwise, they shall be 
unenforceable. 
174 World Bank, Modernising the Legal Environment 2008, 43 
175 Aburawi Gabgub, ‘Analysis of Non-performing Loans in the Libyan State-Owned Commercial Banks: 
Perception Analysis of the Reasons and Potential Methods for Treatment’ (PhD thesis, Durham 
University 2009) 192 
176 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990) 54 
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default will provide lower risk to the creditors. This provides incentives to creditors to 
provide finance.177  
Implementing effective enforcement is essential not only for an effective secured 
transactions system, but it also has paramount importance to the insolvency and rescue 
regime. If creditors are constrained from exercising their powers of enforcement 
regarding the secured property due to inefficiency of the legal process, a number of 
undesirable consequences may arise. For example, debtors with an ineffective 
enforcement system will have no impetus to participate in rescue procedures at an early 
stage but rather it may encourage them to frustrate any enforcement procedures on its 
property as much as possible. This will leave creditors with no choice but to employ 
harsh remedies, such as filing for insolvency or liquidation procedures in order to 
enforce their securities.178 In Libya, the traditional enforcement process is conducted 
under the full court procedures as regulated by the Code of Civil Procedures 1954 
(CCPs 1954).179 However, the legislature in the 2010 reform allows creditors in the 
going concern security and the financial lease to enforce their security under different 
procedures known as the ‘Orders upon Petition’. These will be dealt with below.  
5.6.1. Security Enforcement under Full Procedures of the CCPs 1954 
The enforcement of secured transactions prior to the introduction of the 2010 reform 
was carried out under the regular court procedures of the CCPs 1954. These procedures 
were inadequate to realise any effective enforcement due to the high court involvement 
and time-consumption with the opportunity for the debtor to challenge not only court 
 
177  Sahar Nasr, ‘Access to Finance and Economic Growth in Egypt’ [2008] World Bank Research 
Working Paper No 31405, at 82 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEGYPT/Resources/Access_to_Finance.pdf> accessed 12 Feb 
2018  
178 Harmer (n 151) 92-93 
179 Code of Civil Procedures 1954 (promulgated in the National Gazette in 1954) 
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decisions, such as those pertaining to sale procedures and distributions of sale 
proceedings, but also the creditors’ claims themselves while the court must consider all 
those challenges.180 There were several attempts in Libya to reform the judicial system 
with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (under a 
project known as Modernisation of the Justice Sector in Libya). The project aimed at 
improving procedures within the court system as well as establishing fair and efficient 
administration of justice. Unfortunately, the project faltered and procedures remained 
as inefficient and ineffective as ever.181 According to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), 
banks operating in the country have long been affected by inefficiency of enforcement 
procedures and, as a result, the tendency among banks changed to invest in business 
fields other than providing credit.182 Banks have always attributed the endemic issue of 
the credit write-off of non-performing loans to the inadequacy of the enforcement 
procedures.183 This fact led the legislature to shift the security enforcement to be 
conducted under Orders upon Petition procedures to accelerate the enforcement process 
for some security devices (the going concern security and the financial lease). 
5.6.2. Security Enforcement under Orders upon Petition 
The unsatisfactory outcomes of the full court enforcement procedures forced the 
lawmakers in Libya to improve the procedures for enforcement of the going concern 
security and the financial lease.  Such enforcement is now done under expeditious 
procedures of ‘Orders upon Petition’. Theoretically, Orders upon Petition are 
expeditious and flexible procedures enabling speedy enforcement. Unlike the full court 
 
180 On enforcement procedures under civil law systems see: Fleisig, Safavian and De la Peña (n 171) 42-
44 
181 ‘Assessment of Development Results: Libya’ [2010] UNDP, at 25 
<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/6011> accessed 5 Apr 2018 
182  Central Bank of Libya, Evolution of Financial Data Indexes of the Libyan Commercial Banks 
between 2008 and 2016 (Central bank of Libya) 12-20 <https://cbl.gov.ly/ تاساردو-ثوحب> accessed 09 
Feb 2018  
183 Gabgub (n 175) 205 
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procedures, Orders upon Petition procedures are non-adversarial in nature; i.e. they are 
heard and seen by the court without the presence of the debtor, and the court order 
regarding creditors’ petition must be issued not after the following day the petition was 
presented to the court.184 
5.6.2.1. Enforcement of the Going Concern Security 
The enforcement of going concern security through Orders upon Petition was 
intended to promote the effectiveness of the sale.185 The holder of the going concern 
security has to first deliver an eight days’ enforcement notice to the debtor before the 
sale is effectuated.186 The law enables the holder of the going concern security to 
initiate sale proceedings through Orders upon Petition procedures when the debtor fails 
to fulfil the secured debt requirements by the due date. Sale enforcement under Orders 
upon Petition is an expedited type of court procedure for which creditors have to 
apply.187 The sale order will be issued by the judge who is in charge to define the place 
and date and the way the sale auction is carried out. The judge is also authorised to 
appoint an insolvency practitioner to supervise the sale auction.188 Moreover, Orders 
upon Petition are enforceable under expeditious execution procedures.189 This implies 
that the order upon petition on the sale of the going concern security, once issued, is 
promptly enforceable against the debtor though it may still be challengeable.190 
The going concern security has, in principle, a potential to represent the first 
mechanism under the Libyan legal system that paves the way towards business rescue. 
 
184 CCPs 1954, Art 294 
185 Al-shafah (n 63) 106 
186 CCA 2010, Art 479 
187 CCPs 1954, Art 293 
188 CCA 2010, Art 479, entitled ‘Permission for the Sale of the Going Concern in a Public Auction’. See 
also CCPs 1954, Art 627 
189 CCPs 1954, Art 379 
190 Al-shafah (n 63) 112 
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This is because the floating charge, as acknowledged internationally, is associated with 
a remedy of selling the business as a going concern rather than through a piecemeal 
sale which “may enable an enterprise in financial difficulties to be salvaged while 
increasing the recovery of the secured creditor”.191 This is true particularly where the 
sale on a going concern basis is in the interest of the pledge holder; i.e. where the value 
of the business’ assets is greater than the amount of the debt owed. But where it is 
otherwise, the pledge holder, if granted strong control rights in the process, might 
prefer to liquidate the business as this is the easier and quicker way to get its debt 
recovery than going concern sale.192 
Undoubtedly, the sale of the business as a going concern is justified for a number of 
reasons including maximising returns to creditors, preserving jobs for employees and 
the rescue of viable businesses. In practice, however, the sale as a going concern can 
possibly be associated with a risk of abuse leading to an inefficient sale (undervalued 
sale). Experience from the pre-pack administration as a method of selling the business 
as a going concern in the UK,193 for example, shows that the sale through the pre-pack 
is fraught with a perception that the process, as practiced by the insolvency 
practitioners, does not always result in the best value for the business.194 This is 
believed to be caused by the lack of transparency195 and insufficient marketing which 
led to the lack of trust, most notably among general unsecured creditors.196  
 
191 EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions, Introduction, Principle 8 
192  This was the situation in the per-2002 UK insolvency law reform under the Administrative 
Receivership procedure. See: John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, ‘The Costs and Benefits 
of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK’ (2012) 8 RLE 101, 105  
193  Sandra Frisby, ‘The Second-chance Culture and Beyond: Some Observations on the Pre-pack 
Contribution’ (2009) 3 Law and Financial Markets Review 242 
194  Sandra Frisby, ‘Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professionals: A Preliminary 
Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’ (Aug 2007) at 8-9 
<www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/sandrafrisbyprelim.pdf> accessed 17 Feb 2020   
195 The lack of transparency in the pre-packs attracted criticism by scholars in the UK as it makes the 
process function as administrative receiverships in effect but under another name in cases where the 
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Therefore, a good practice in respect of the sale as a going concern in Libya requires 
actions to be taken to promote institutional support for such sale methods. The focus 
will be placed on the people who are in charge of rescue procedures which are the 
judge and the trustee. Training programmes should be provided to those participants to 
improve the profession in this regard. Also, as previously mentioned, insolvency judges 
and trustees should have personal qualities such as integrity, impartiality and 
independence to ensure that the process is not used abusively.197 
5.6.2.2. Enforcement of the Financial Lease 
The lease agreement is required to be recorded at the respective registry in order to be 
effective and enforceable.198 The enforcement of the lease agreement is accorded 
treatment distinct from the full court procedures. In order to protect the lessor’s 
interests, Article 17 of the FLA 2010, entitled ‘Termination of the Financial Lease 
Agreement’, numerates three cases where the lease agreement will be terminated upon 
default or insolvency of the lessee, as the following: 
“The agreement shall be terminated automatically with no notification requirement in 
the following events:  
1- The lapse of a sixty-day period of time without paying the rent price by the lessee, 
unless otherwise agreed. 
 
interests of secured creditors are recovered. Kayode Akintola and David Milman, ‘The Rise, Fall and 
Potential for a Rebirth of Receivership in UK Corporate Law’ (2019) 20 J Corp Law Stud 99, 109 
196 For details see Teresa Graham CBE, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration Report to the Rt 
Hon Vince Cable MP’ (The Insolvency Service, 16 Jun 2014) paras 3.8-3.11 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration> accessed 26 
Mar 2020. This report was commissioned by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
and was designed to promote transparency and trust in the use of the pre-packs. For that, the report 
made some recommendations, part of which require actions to be taken in relation to the insolvency 
profession. For details see: ibid, paras. 5.21-5.28. See also: Frisby, ‘The Second-chance’ (n 193) 
197 See above Sec 3.4.5 (Objective Five of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
198 According to Art 20 of FLA 2010, the registry for the authorised lessors (financial lessors registration) 
is separate from the registry for recording the financial lease agreements (financial lease agreement 
registration). 
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2- The institution of the liquidation procedures against the lessee, provided that the lessee 
is an artificial entity, whether the liquidation was voluntary or compulsory … 
3- … 
4- … 
5- a) Insolvency declaration of the lessee.199 In this case, the leased assets shall not fall 
within the insolvency estate nor the creditors’ common pool.200 
b) In the event that the insolvency trustee chooses to perform the lease agreement, she/ 
he must notify the lessor about her/ his intention within 30 days from the day of the 
insolvency declaration. In such cases the lease agreement shall stay effective, provided 
that the trustee makes the lease payments as they become due”.  
 
The consequences of terminating the lease agreement are defined in Article 18(2) as 
the following:  
“When the lease agreement is terminated for any reason, the lessee or his successor, 
or the rest of joint partners, or the insolvency trustee, or the liquidator, as the case may 
be, must return the leased assets to the lessor in the condition agreed in the agreement. 
And in case no return has occurred after a repossession notice has been delivered, the 
lessor shall be entitled to file for Orders upon Petition, addressed to the expeditious 
matters judge in the competent court, to issue a repossession order in accordance with 
the procedures available in the Code of Civil Procedures”.  
As we have seen, upon the lessee’s default, insolvency, liquidation and other 
contingencies, the financial lease agreement shall be terminated whereupon the lessor is 
entitled to have the leased property and equipment repossessed and they are not 
 
199 FLA 2010 does not distinguish between personal insolvency and corporate insolvency since the lessee 
can be an individual or a company. For example, Art 17(4) and Art 18(2) of FLA 2010 refer to the case 
where the lessee is a company. 
200 Privileged claims are security over a debtor’s assets, therefore, they are excluded from financial 
leased assets because the assets are not owned by the lessee business. 
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included in the insolvency estate. This also means that the lessor has the right to 
dispose of the property and assets as they please without resorting to the court 
administrated sale. In a case where this obligation is breached, however, the lessor is 
entitled to apply for a court order through the expeditious court procedures of Orders 
upon Petition in order to instruct the police or other enforcement agents to forcibly 
repossess the collateral.  
If properly installed and effectively enforced the way the law has structurally 
designed it, financial leasing can have the potential to play a part in business rescue in 
Libya. As has been mentioned, the FLA 2010 in Article 17(5)(b) enables the insolvency 
trustee to force a continued lease when she/ he thinks that would lead to protect the 
going concern value of the business. Also, in Article 17(2) and (5)(a), the law extracted 
the leased property from insolvency and liquidation procedures while Article 18(2) 
provides instruction for the liquidator or the insolvency trustee, as the case may be, to 
return to the lessor the leased property. This would, therefore, encourage the lessor to 
provide funding to the lessee through the hire-purchase transactions, if a post-
insolvency lease has been agreed, without having to lose priority over the leased 
property. Such a way of treatment can encourage distressed businesses to use this 
instrument as a source of post-commencement funding during the rescue procedures.201 
In exchange, creditors (lessors) will be offered an exceptional superiority which 
functionally amounts to the super-priority system over the leased property and 
equipment ahead of pre-insolvency secured creditors. Not only that, but seemingly the 
 
201 However, the lessee will still need to obtain consent from the judge delegate because this transaction 
falls outside the ordinary course of business according to Art 992(2) of CCA 2010. See above Sec 4.3.4 
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lessor will also enjoy a priority even over the privileged claims such as those of the 
employees.202  
In a case where the lease agreement is used to provide funding during the rescue 
procedures, the priority of the financial lessor will not violate the post-commencement 
financing conditions regarding the protection of pre-insolvency creditors’ interests.203 
This is arguably because the security of the pre-insolvency creditors and the financial 
lessor as a post-commencement creditor do not overlap with one another because the 
lessor will enjoy a priority over new property that is not already encumbered by the 
pre-existing creditors. Of course, the arrangement would be a classic example of 
purchase money security and therefore not detrimental to existing priority rights. 
Further, a post-commencement financial lease agreement may be of benefit to the pre-
existing creditors by increasing returns when the rescue succeeds. However, the 
financial lease agreement should be agreed by existing secured creditors before it is 
used as post-commencement financing.204 This is because if the business was already 
economically distressed, the best solution would then be to liquidate the business 
instead of making the situation much worse for the pre-existing creditors. 
5.6.2.3. Evaluating Enforcement Reliability of Orders upon Petition 
As has been mentioned,205 the enforcement through Orders upon Petition was 
designed to streamline enforcement procedures regarding the going concern security 
and the financial lease distinctively from the general rules of enforcement that are 
available in the CCPs 1954 and the CC 1953. However, the practice regarding Orders 
 
202 FLA 2010, Art 17(5)(a) which excluded the leased assets from the bankruptcy estate and the creditors’ 
common pool. 
203 Bazinas (n 51) 468 
204 See above Sec 4.4 regarding the requirement of a consensual agreement with pre-existing creditors as 
a condition of super-priority financing. 
205 In Sec 5.6.2 above 
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upon Petition illustrates that the effective and swift enforcement may still be frustrated 
for a number of reasons.206 For example, the discretionary power vested in the court 
under the current structure of Orders upon Petition may frustrate effective enforcement 
of the procedures. To detail, according to the general principles of the Orders upon 
Petition, the court is entitled full discretion either to approve or even decline to issue 
the sale order regarding the going concern security. Not only that, but the court, in a 
case where the sale order was already approved, also has the discretion to halt the sale 
enforcement process if it thinks that the sale would probably cause a gross harm to the 
defendant debtor.207 
This would, undoubtedly, have a detrimental effect on the effective security 
enforcement. The practice of this way of enforcing against collateral, for example on a 
going concern basis, in countries with similar systems in the MENA region suggests 
that sale procedures have proved inefficient and have no practical potential.208 For the 
effectiveness of the sale process, it is suggested that, the court must issue the order 
upon receiving enough evidence from the creditor showing that the security is valid and 
that the debt has been in default.209  
Regarding the enforcement on a going concern security, further, secured creditors 
must first deliver an eight days’ enforcement notice to the debtor before the sale is 
effectuated.210 This is another unnecessary barrier put by law to effective enforcement 
because this notice would allow the debtor to hide or even transfer the secured assets 
out of the court’s jurisdiction within the notice period.211 To make it worse, creditors 
 
206 Al-shafah (n 63) 120-25 
207 CCPs 1954, Art 384 
208 See: De la Campa (n 150) 30 
209 Fleisig, Safavian and De la Peña (n 171) 19 
210 CCA 2010, Art 479 
211 Williams Iheme and Sanford Mba, ‘Towards Reforming Nigeria’s Secured Transactions Law: The 
Central Bank of Nigeria’s Attempt through the Back Door’ (2017) 61 J Afr L 131, 149-50 
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would be frustrated from tracking the collateral, especially movables, in the hands of a 
third party purchaser who acted in good faith.212 To tackle such an issue, the EBRD 
Model Law on Secured Transactions provides a mechanism to protect the creditor’s 
security from being prejudiced by the debtor after the delivery of the enforcement 
notice. Article 23 of the Model entitles secured creditors to possess the secured 
business as a protective measure necessary to immobilise the secured business so as to 
prevent the use or transfer of its ownership.213 The Libyan regime should consider 
adopting this treatment to protect creditor’s interests especially when the security 
involves movable property which is advantaged by the good faith principle of the CC 
1953.214 In the context of insolvency and business rescue, the insolvency trustee should 
be enabled to possess the business’s assets soon after the enforcement notice is 
delivered. This would both protect the creditors’ interests and maximise the likelihood 
of business rescue. 
Furthermore, the current structure of the judicial enforcement through Orders upon 
Petition may also be to the detriment of business rescue as the procedures may result in 
a piecemeal sale215 whereas a going concern sale at a better price for the business may 
still be achievable.216 This is because the law does not provide the court with guidance 
on the appropriate sale enforcement, coupled with the lack of a rescue culture among 
judges and practitioners in the country, so the court will exercise its full discretionary 
power. Therefore, both options of the sale are equally possible. This being the case, and 
 
212 CC 1953, Art 980 
213 EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions, Art 22.3, and for more details see Art 23.1-2 and Art 25. 
214 CC 1953, Art 980 
215 Art 479(1) of CCA 2010 explicitly refers to the possibility to sale the going concern security “wholly 
or partially”. 
216 In Tunisia, enforcement of the pledge on the going concern can only be sought for the entirety of the 
business as a going concern while the piecemeal sale for individual components of the business, such 
as the equipment, is largely restricted unless this would generate higher returns to creditors. See: Art 
248 of the Commercial Code of Tunisia (no 129 of 1959) promulgated in 7 Oct 1959. For more details 
see: EBRD, ‘Commercial Laws of Tunisia: An Assessment by the EBRD’ (EBRD, Mar 2013) at 48 
<www.ebrd.com/downloads/sector/legal/tunisia.pdf> accessed 19 Apr 2018 
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with the absence of specialised training programmes for judges, courts may likely opt 
for the enforcement that leads to the dismemberment of the business by a piecemeal 
sale. 
The regulatory structure of the enforcement of the going concern security also 
requires some attention. Lessons from similar jurisdictions illustrate that enforcement 
of the going concern security, as in the way currently structured in Libya, can be 
useless to say the least. In Egypt, as a jurisdiction similar to the Libyan system, the 
enforcement of such a security proved inefficient. This is attributable to the principles 
available in the Egyptian Code of Civil Procedures and the structure used in the law 
regulating the going concern security. In the Sale and Pledge on a Going Concern Act 
1940,217 the sale of the going concern security is carried out through Orders upon 
Petition procedures.218 The principles of the Orders upon Petition entitle the courts 
discretion either to approve or refuse to issue the order.219 This situation forced the law 
designers in Egypt to amend the structure of the enforcement of going concern security. 
Instead of resorting to the court for the sale order, the pledge on a going concern has 
now been dealt with as an executory document (a writ of execution)220 with which the 
creditors are enabled to enforce the sale without recourse even to Orders upon Petition 
 
217 The Sale and Pledge on a Going Concern Act (no 11 of 1940) promulgated in 1940 
218 Ibid, Art 14 
219 The common tendency among courts in Egypt is to refuse the sale of the going concern security under 
the Orders upon Petition system. Al-shafah (n 63) 112 
220 The writ of execution is the final procedure in the judicial process without which debt enforcement 
cannot be carried out. Writs of execution include court decisions and judgments, court orders, official 
resolutions and contracts, bank drafts and any documents that are given executory character by the law. 
The execution officials are the parties with the duty of carrying out the writ of execution and if 
necessary they can seek assistance of the police or other public security agents. See: CCPs 1954, Art 
369(1)(2) and Art 371 
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procedures.221 Although this seems effective to protect the creditors’ interests, it 
prejudices an efficient conduct of business rescue. 
Regarding the enforcement of the financial lease under the FLA 2010 in Libya, the 
enforcement can still be hampered by the same unsupportive institutional environment 
available in the country. Although the FLA 2010 attempted to boost the lessors’ 
position, in the scenario of default or dispute, by ensuring that the leased property is 
repossessed by the lessor,222 the dispute may still arise should the property not be 
returned voluntarily. This situation will have to involve the court in order to issue a 
repossession order under the Orders upon Petition proceedings. As has been discussed 
in this section, the Orders upon Petition mechanism is not the optimal response to the 
issue of security enforcement. Accordingly, repossession may still be the main 
impediment facing the effectiveness of the financial leasing. In a similar situation in 
Egypt under the law of financial lease,223 it has been pointed out that, despite the 
expeditious procedures undertaking under the Orders upon Petition procedures, the 
repossession order is associated with very high costs and a time consuming process.224  
The problem is much deepened in Libya by a statutory approach and a legal culture 
that has long existed in practice which restrains the contractual parties from following 
enforcement remedies other than the formal remedies provided in the CC 1953 and the 
CCPs 1954. Enforcement of security interests through formal judicial intervention is a 
firm principle; in that any agreement entitling the creditor to privately enforce the 
 
221 Art 104 of the Egyptian Law of Central Bank and Banking System 2003 (no 88 of 2003) promulgated 
in the National Gazette in 15 Jun 2003 
222 FLA 2010, Art 18(2). For details see above Sec 5.6.2.2 
223 The Financial Lease Act of Egypt (no 95 of 1995) promulgated in the National Gazette in 01 Jun 1995. 
Articles 19 and 20 of the Egyptian Financial Lease Act 1995 have exactly the same structure of 
Articles 17 and 18 of FLA 2010 
224 Nasr (n 177) 75. Also see Art 20(2)(3) of the Financial Lease Act 1995 of Egypt which entitles the 
lessee the opportunity to appeal the repossession order within three working days of the repossession 
order and grants the court the discretionary power either to approve, amend or even repeal its 
repossession order.  
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collateral or to sell the secured property out of court will be void.225 The Supreme 
Court of Libya has a culture that strongly affirms this attitude on the basis that 
enforcement without a court order will lead to the interests of debtors being in a 
position worse than those of creditors and then will be vulnerable to be prejudiced.226 It 
is pointed out that the enforcement under such unreformed legal systems presents many 
barriers to achieve a speedy seizure and sale of the collateral. As a consequence, the 
collateral will be less attractive and much devalued because of the high enforcement 
cost and delay.227 Thus, the need for an alternative method of enforcement may be 
necessary. 
5.6.3. Self-help Remedies as an Alternative to Court Enforcement 
Self-help enforcement is praised for its capability of providing effective remedies to a 
secured transactions system because it enables a speedy and satisfactory sale of the 
secured interests.228 Because of the effectiveness that self-help enforcement has been 
able to manifest, many jurisdictions have largely recognised the importance of self-help 
as the most efficient remedy for enforcement of secured transactions.229 According to 
the WB Doing Business report, there are more than 130 jurisdictions today that equip 
their security transactions systems with the mechanism of out of court enforcement by 
which secured creditors are allowed, for example, to sell the collateral through public 
auction.230  
 
225 CC 1953, Art 1056 and Art 1112. For more details see: Al-shafah (n 63) 106 
226 Supreme Court of Libya, Civil Cassation No 75/19J. Decision issued on 21 Apr 1974 (1974) 10 (4) 
Journal of Supreme Court, 55 
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228 Cuming (n 55) 20 
229 Yoram Keinan, ‘The Evolution of Secured Transactions’ (2001) 1 World Bank Working Paper No 
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Out-of-court enforcement of security interests is praised by international bodies like 
the UNCITRAL in its ST Guide231 for its capability to realise effective and efficient 
procedures that promote to the maximisation of the value of creditors’ interests.232 
Also, the EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions, in Part 4 Articles 22-32, 
provides considerable flexibility to the secured creditors to enforce their security 
immediately233 after the payment failure of the secured debt without the need to rely on 
the court for enforcement.234 What self-help enforcement is praised for is its capability 
to make the right balance between the protection of the interests of defaulting debtors, 
by ensuring that the seller carries out the sale in a good faith and in an efficient manner, 
and the interests of secured creditors, by promoting the speedy seizure of the 
collateral.235 
However, self-enforcement remedies of the secured transactions regime should be 
carefully considered in the context of insolvency and rescue procedures. As the 
UNCITRAL ST Guide suggests, the secured transactions law should ensure a close 
coordination with the rules of insolvency law.236 Therefore, self-enforcement should be 
relatively limited where rescue procedures are commenced. This is because self-
enforcement mechanisms, although they are advantageous especially to secured 
creditors, can be very detrimental to the rescue procedures as they lead to breaking up 
the business assets leading to the decrease of the business value at the expense of the 
 
231 It should be noted that the UNCITRAL ST Guide employs policies that deviates from the UNITRAL 
Legislative Insolvency Guide. While the latter takes a view which tries to take into account all the 
interests involved in insolvency, which is one of its strengths, (see above Sec 2.3), the former appears 
in this section to be rather focused on the interests of secured creditors only. This is because the 
UNCITRAL ST Guide has been based on the perspectives of secured creditors. See: Gerard 
McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law: The UNCITRAL Experience (Edward 
Elgar 2011) 183 
232 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 56 
233 After enforcement notice is delivered to the security grantor, Art 22.2. of EBRD Model Law on 
Secured Transactions 2004 
234 Röver (n 73) 79 
235 Cuming (n 55) 12 
236 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 56 
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other stakeholders. In the UK pre EA 2002, for example, the administrative 
receivership procedure allowed a receiver to be appointed under the terms of the 
debenture to take control of the business of the distressed company with a basic 
function to realise its assets for the benefit of the holder of a floating charge who made 
the appointment. The EA 2002 virtually abolished administrative receivership in most 
cases and promoted the administration procedure with wider duties to enable the 
administrator to achieve a more going concern based business rescue.237 
Therefore, these mechanisms should be subject to any procedures that promote more 
efficient outcomes in business rescue, such as the moratorium. Then secured creditors 
can enforce their securities through this procedure subject to the court consent. By this, 
a disorderly dismemberment of the assets can be avoided. The involvement of the court 
in the sale enforcement will ensure “appropriate checks to prevent abuse”.238 The 
UNCITRAL ST Guide suggests that effective and efficient enforcement would not be 
achieved without self-help enforcement remedies being subject to court supervision or 
review by other official parties.239  
5.7. Conclusion 
A security transactions system is essential to the insolvency system that seeks to 
promote business rescue. What creditors and lenders are always passionate about is the 
extent to which their interests are adequately protected in and outside the insolvency of 
their debtor.240 And for a successful reform and satisfactory outcomes, it should be 
 
237 McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (n 9) 8 
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ensured that the law of secured transactions is implemented thoroughly and 
concordantly with the existing legal framework and domestic circumstances.241  
The reform of 2010 in Libya regarding the secured transactions law was aimed at 
promoting the social and economic development in the country. However, since the 
enactment of the secured transactions reform in 2010, the credit market has witnessed 
no change in the attitude towards lending practices in the country due to some reasons. 
Empirical studies showed that both the pledge on a going concern and the financial 
leasing devices, which were introduced to expand access to credit in the market, are yet 
to be considered by financial institutions.242 This is perhaps attributable to the 
stakeholders’ distrust of the effectiveness of the security transactions regime and the 
traditional enforcement procedures which are excessively time-consuming and costly. 
Further, the 2010 reform gives no regard to the relationships between the systems of 
secured transactions and insolvency and achieved no harmony with the insolvency law. 
For instance, the outcomes of the current structure of the enforcement proceedings may 
highly likely result in a detrimental effect on business rescue practices. Court 
enforcement of the going concern security under the Orders upon Petition could lead to 
a piecemeal sale as long as secured creditors are satisfied with the sale outcomes 
irrespective of whether a going concern sale may still be possibly achieved. 
According to an empirical study, the inadequacy of the legal and judicial enforcement 
procedures in Libya, moreover, has discouraged banks and other financial institutions 
from initiating insolvency and sale procedures against defaulters.243 The CBL also 
admitted that the commercial banks’ prolonged exposure to the problem of the high 
 
241 Iheme and Mba (n 211) 140 
242 Al-shafah (n 63) 8. Also see: Omar Assadi, ‘The Potential for Financial Leasing among Banks in 
Libyan: A Case Study on the Development Bank’ (2015) 10 Sirit Economic Sciences 48 
243 Gabgub (n 175) 205-24 
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percentage of non-recovered loans is significantly ascribable to the inefficiency of the 
secured transactions law in the country. As a result, commercial banks have been 
inclined to reduce the availability of loans and credit facilities to invest in other 
business fields instead.244  
Because of all the above mentioned factors, the current structure of the security 
transactions system in Libya still requires some attention to improve the outcomes of 
the reform. As illustrated in the Doing Business’ Strength of Legal Rights Index 
indicator245 for Libya in 2017, the current structure of the security transactions system 
in the country is still significantly weak. For example, Libya gained 0 points out of a 
12-point scale on the Legal Rights Index indicator. As a consequence, Libya shared an 
international low rank regarding access to credit and creditor protection. In its Doing 
Business report, the World Bank ranked Libya 185 out of 189 countries on both the 
ease of getting credit and on protection of investors.246 This is attributable, as suggested 
by a World Bank survey conducted in 2015, to the weakness of both laws regarding 
secured transactions and insolvency.247 Besides, as previously noted,248 the political 
situation of Libya since the adoption of the socialist economy in the country added to 
the situation, since businesses were not allowed to fail which means that the insolvency 
law in practical sense was paused resulting in a gap in the institutional level. In 
addition, the current political governance situation in Libyan as seen since 2011 will 
have a negative impact on the function of the institutional structure in the country. 
 
244 Central Bank of Libya (n 182) 12-20 
245 The Legal Rights Index indicator measures the extent to which collateral and insolvency laws protect 
the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus the effectiveness of collateral and insolvency laws in 
facilitating lending. See: World Bank, Doing Business 2017 (n 54) 220 
246 Ibid 220 
247 Pietro Calice and others, ‘Simplified Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping: Libya 2015’ 
(2015) 1 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 99458, at 14 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/910341468191332846/Simplified-enterprise-survey-and-
private-sector-mapping-Libya-2015> accessed 30 Mar 2018 
248 See above Sec 1.2.2 
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It is pointed out that, improving the perception of any newly enacted system among 
credit participants in a country needs to organise well-designed training programmes in 
order to have proper and effective implementation of the desired legal reform.249 
Therefore, the reform should focus on the dissemination of knowledge through a 
communication strategy and building capacity among stakeholders, such as banks and 
other financial institutions as well as enterprises, in order to accelerate their acceptance 
of the new strategy. For the country to derive a proper application of the secured 
transactions reform, the conceptual foundations and objectives of the reform must first 
be sufficiently and properly understood and interpreted by various interested 
participants, such as business people, financial and banking institutions, trade 
financiers, credit bureaus, lawyers, judges etc.250 Comprehensive training programmes 
could include: introduction to the secured transactions system to familiarise creditors 
with the new concepts and principles, the scope of types of all traditional and new 
forms of security, property and obligations and the priorities between conflicting claims 
against the same assets.251 
 
249  Sean Stacy, ‘Follow the Leader: The Utility of UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions for Developing Countries (and Its Call for Harmonization)’ (2014) 49 Tex Int’l LJ 35, 67; 
Mike Gedye, ‘The Development of New Zealand’s Secured Transactions Jurisprudence’ (2011) 34 
UNSW L J 696, 731-32 
250 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 75 
251 World Bank, Secured Transactions Systems (n 8) 91-94. Also see: Iyare Otabor-Olubor, ‘Reforming 
the Law of Secured Transactions: Bridging the Gap between the Company Charge and CBN 
Regulations Security Interests’ (2017) 17 J Corp Law Stud 39, 69  
237 
 
Chapter 6 Synthesis of Insolvency Theory and International 
Benchmarks and their Application to the Libyan Law with Reform 
Proposals  
6.1. Introduction 
It has been more than sixty years now since the introduction of the insolvency law in 
Libya in 1953. However, the law has remained unenforced due to inefficiency, which 
can be attributable mainly to both the lack of judicial practices and the attitude towards 
insolvency under the socialist perceptions. The Libyan community has changed 
dramatically since the introduction of the insolvency system in 1953 through different 
periods of time up to the present. Given the economic reform of the Libyan economy 
towards the market economy, the insolvency law in the country should not remain 
static. Promoting the economic transition, rather, requires reappraisal of the insolvency 
law at regular periods to keep up with the societal needs. Therefore, a reform to 
insolvency law has become imperative.1  
In spite of the introduction of the economic reform in Libya, the culture of the 
socialist economy still influences the current economic practice in the country. The 
legacy of the socialist economy in Libya may be the reason for the lack of incentives 
for the insolvency reform through all past years which consequently caused a lack of 
insolvency practice and expertise. All of this would make the reform for the insolvency 
and rescue system a challenging task. 
In previous chapters, the thesis has analysed the insolvency law of Libya in light of 
the insolvency law theories and international benchmarks and concluded that a reform 
 
1 World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 32 
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has become essential to the achievement of the national economic and social objectives. 
This Chapter will explore the barriers that need to be dealt with to pave the way for an 
adequate application of a reform in light of the various domestic circumstances of the 
country and in light of the insolvency law theories that were discussed in Chapter Two 
and the internationally recognised insolvency and rescue benchmarks that were 
discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five. This Chapter will discuss the alignment of 
the insolvency law of Libya with the insolvency theories and it will suggest reform 
proposals for the development of the composition scheme and the secured transactions 
regime in order to promote an effective application of the rescue regime and culture in 
the country. It is also of vital importance for the same end to investigate the issue of 
institutional reform. 
6.2. Aligning the Libyan Insolvency Law with Theory 
In Libya, there is a lack of theoretical discussion and framework of the corporate or 
business insolvency law. This is because of two main factors. First, it may be because 
the insolvency law had not had a chance to develop in the country. It was first 
transplanted from a foreign country with no consideration of the domestic 
circumstances and desires so it was a completely strange piece of law at the time.2 
Second, the insolvency law was put on hold for almost four decades as the country 
adopted the socialist economy under which insolvency laws and policies were 
redundant.3 
However, it is not hard to illustrate the ethos underpinning business insolvency law in 
Libya. First, the insolvency law in Libya is one of the most liquidation-focused regimes 
in the world and has the focus on prioritising the interests of creditors since it was first 
 
2 See Sec 1.2.1  
3 See Sec 1.2.2 
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introduced in 1953 as borrowed from the Italian bankruptcy system of 1942.4 Even 
under the composition procedures which are available as rescue procedures, the focus is 
always to maximise the creditors’ returns in liquidation. Secured creditors in Libya are 
given strong protections in the insolvency and rescue process. For example, they are 
not bound to vote on the composition plan and they are not bound by the composition 
procedures even after the court approval on the plan is granted. Therefore, they can 
enforce their security during the procedures and the court has no power to force them to 
accept the composition plan.5 It is clear that the Libyan composition process inclines 
towards protecting pre-insolvency rights of secured creditors from the risk of loss that 
may be associated with the rescue procedures under the composition scheme. More 
strikingly, the Libyan system goes even further than a creditor friendly theory like the 
CBT by sacrificing the orderly process to secured creditor interests. Secured creditors 
are given an absolute and strong right of veto that can be used stop the whole process of 
composition. 
The Libyan law gives the secured creditors a right to protection in the process and it 
authorises the court to protect their interests. To do so, the law grants the court wide 
discretion to approve or refuse the composition regardless of the creditors’ decision. In 
exercising its discretion during the feasibility test process of the composition scheme, 
the court has to examine the feasibility of the composition proposal in order to maintain 
the interests of the secured creditors despite the creditors’ acceptance and vote in 
favour of the proposal.6 So, if the court thinks that the proposal has no, or only a feeble, 
 
4 The prime function of the Italian Bankruptcy Law of 1942 (Royal Decree no 267/1942 promulgated in 
16 Mar 1942) was liquidation for the benefit of creditors. See: Mirko Saggiorato, ‘Distress Investing 
under the Italian Bankruptcy Law: A Comprehensive Case’ (PhD thesis, University of Padua 2019) 44 
5 Unless they wish to participate in the composition procedures. For details see above Sec 4.3.5 
6 The discretion of courts in determining business viability should be conducted in a sensible way 
because there are competent stakeholder interests in insolvency that should be balanced fairly so that 
the risk of rescue is not shifted at an expense of some stakeholders such as secured creditors. The 
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potential to protect the creditors’ interests, it has to act on behalf of them and declare 
the insolvency status ex officio.7  
In addition, it is generally recognised that for rescue procedures to lead to any 
positive outcomes, the process should be taken at a sufficiently early time.8 However, 
the insolvency law of Libya does not facilitate early access to the procedures because 
of the statutory requirement that the company must be insolvent and unable to pay its 
due debts.9 The insolvency procedures are therefore only available for businesses who 
already insolvent and unable to pay due debts. This would decrease the likelihood for 
any business struggling to maintain solvency to implement a successful rescue. Rather, 
this would likely increase the probability of liquidation.  
Such a structure of the existing insolvency law of Libya indicates the extent to which 
the law is designed primarily to collect debts by prioritising liquidation only for the 
purpose of enforcing the creditors’ pre-insolvency rights. It is obvious that the Libyan 
system promotes maximisation of realised assets only for the benefit of the creditors. It 
therefore parallels the principles of the CBT’s approach that the insolvency law exists 
only as a debt collection remedy for the creditors’ benefit. Such an approach fails to 
consider the interests of stakeholders other than those of the creditors in the society by 
failing to promote rescue procedures for insolvent businesses. The insolvency law 
should ensure that there is an orderly process under which all affected stakeholders are 
protected including, not only, secured creditors. 
 
capability of courts in Libya of determining business viability will be discussed later. See below Sec 
6.4.4 
7 For details, see above Sec 4.3.3 
8 Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 13 
9 CCA 2010, Art 984 
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Although the insolvency law in Libya is designed to provide strong protections to the 
secured creditors, it actually struggles to deliver this objective for two reasons. First, 
the insolvency procedures are very expensive because of the high level of court 
involvement with lengthy processes which would likely lead to depleting the value of 
the assets required for the creditors. Second, the interests of secured creditors in the 
general legal system in Libya occupy a weak priority position in comparison to that of 
the preferential creditors (privileged creditors) who enjoy priority over secured 
creditors. This is caused by the conflicting ideologies that underpin the different areas 
of law in Libya. As has been mentioned,10 the Libyan legal system is based on the 
notion of social justice and equality under which the redistribution of risk or loss 
among participants is accepted. However, the philosophy of the insolvency law is 
completely different. 
As such, there are inconsistent and conflicting ideologies11 resulting in incoherence 
within the legal system of Libya. These underlying ideologies of the laws have to be 
reconciled because the existence of such a framework would cause confusion and 
create legal uncertainty in court cases as to which interests are to be served by the law. 
As has been discussed, overemphasising the social justice doctrine (or supporting the 
weak party as regulated by the Civil Code 1953) may, on the one hand, result in 
prejudicing the interests of creditors which must not be sacrificed for pure social 
considerations because this would in turn undermine the business environment in the 
country, through creating uncertainty and undermining equitable treatment of all 
participants. On the other hand, the emphasis on protecting the interests of creditors (as 
 
10 See above Sec 2.6 and 5.3.7 
11 This can be explained by the historical transplantation process of the legal Codes in Libya as each of 
the Civil Code and the Commercial Code were imported from different sources. Whereas the CC 1953 
was influenced by the Egyptian Civil Code 1948, which adopted an approach of giving the social 
considerations primacy, the Commercial Code, and the insolvency regime, was influenced by the 
European model of the Italian insolvency law, which implemented a different ideology. 
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regulated by the insolvency law) would lead to unfair outcomes for the wider 
stakeholders in the business. 
In order to resolve such an ideological conflict and achieve coherence within the legal 
system across different areas of the commercial law (insolvency, property and contract 
laws) in Libya, one might argue that the approach of the Team Production Theory 
(TPT) would be appropriate for this end. It is contended that the TPT12 fits the concerns 
and the policy imperatives that are identified in the Libyan context about the impact of 
business failure upon social actors in the society such as the local community 
(represented by local suppliers) and the local workforce who have legitimate concerns 
that should be taken into account in insolvency settings clearly without a doubt. The 
TPT is also realistic regarding the interests of creditors because they also contributed to 
the firm-specific investment by their financial capital inputs in the business.  
The application of the theory of Team Production would help achieve the two 
important goals as identified in Libya which are the protection of the special interests 
of the employees and the encouragement of private sector investment by protecting and 
strengthening the interests of creditors. What distinguishes the approach of the TPT is 
that it takes a further step that responds well to the insolvency situation by making a 
well balanced decision between all interested stakeholders so that no one team member 
is privileged over the other team members without a good reason. This approach can 
rectify the incoherence that is associated with the current Libyan regime under which 
the social justice (which is only geared to protect the weak party) is overemphasised at 
the expense of other important objectives of the insolvency law (the protection of the 
value of the insolvency estate). For example, the TPT encourages the protection of the 
interests of the employees provided that the interests of the creditors in the insolvency 
 
12 See discussion in Sec 2.6 above 
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estate are not prejudiced. But if the decision is dealt with in accordance with the Libyan 
law approach, the interests of the employees will be protected but the interests of the 
creditors will be dismissed which would constitute a striking contradiction to one of the 
objectives that the insolvency law should endorse. By applying the TPT, all the above 
concerns would be avoided. Not only that, but also the concerns of ensuring social 
justice would more likely be reassured given the fact that the TPT’s approach gives 
special treatment to the employees that they lack under the Libyan regime by making 
sure that their future interests in the business will continue, which is likely the 
employees’ most important concern, by encouraging business rescue to effectively take 
place as much as possible. 
As far as social justice is concerned, furthermore, the issue of protecting the 
vulnerable people in the society would be responded to more satisfactorily under the 
TPT’s perspectives. The approach of the TPT responds appropriately to the legitimate 
needs to protect vulnerable and weak parties who contribute to the success of the 
business by ensuring that the treatment of such parties is dealt with through structured 
substantive legal provisions instead of doing that through judicial discretion. This 
would increase the amount of certainty and predictability within the law by shifting the 
power of protection from the hands of judges to be dealt with in a structured response 
and by doing so without jeopardising the vital concerns of social justice. Such a 
response would enable the law to increase trust and confidence of stakeholders in the 
system, thereby motivating the willingness towards investment which in itself is an 
important economic objective of the law.13 
 
13 See discussion on predictability (Objective Seven of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in Sec 3.4.7) 
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6.3. General Evaluations of the Insolvency Law 
Having carried out evaluations by reference to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide’s 
Key Objectives in previous chapters, it appeared that the Libyan insolvency law can be 
associated with some shortcomings that deviate from efficient and effective features of 
insolvency law. To reform the insolvency law of Libya, the legislature must ensure that 
those widely recognised objectives of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide are 
effectively incorporated. First and foremost, the insolvency law in Libya has a criminal 
nature because of the stigma of insolvency as it is perceived as a vehicle for fraud or 
mismanagement.14 This undoubtedly has an effect on the insolvency law framework 
one of which at least is the lack of mechanisms necessary to encourage business rescue 
to take place. This perception has to change because insolvency and failure have been 
recognised as a routine feature of any market economy that can happen not necessarily 
due to deficiency of management or fraud. Rather, it can happen by multiple other 
factors such as global financial crisis, change in the consumer attitudes, the rise of the 
price of raw materials, severe competition atmospheres. Where company failure is 
triggered by such factors, the law should be designed in a way that such undesirable 
failure and its impact are not exaggerated.15 One of the important roles that the law 
should ensure in such events is to facilitate restructuring and preserve the going 
concerns of distressed businesses where appropriate to ease the effect of failure.16 
In addition, the Libyan insolvency framework is liquidation-oriented to a large degree 
and the composition system struggles to deliver positive rescue outcomes. Although 
liquidation can provide more certainty to creditor stakeholders than in rescue processes, 
 
14 See Sec 3.3 
15 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, 
CUP 2017) 131-45 
16 Philippe Frouté, ‘Theoretical Foundation for a Debtor Friendly Bankruptcy Law in Favour of Creditors’ 
(2007) 24 Eur J Law Econ 201, 201-04 
245 
 
a couple of points can be made in this regard. The liquidation procedures in Libya are 
very complex and extremely time-consuming which undermines the certainty of 
investors in the procedures as to when their interests will be enforced.17 The rights of 
creditors in liquidation in Libya are also in an under-protected position due to the 
operation of the system of privileged creditors.18 Besides, the insolvency system should 
not focus only on liquidation but it should also be designed to allow business rescue to 
take place. This is because insolvency laws, as recognised by theory19 and by 
international benchmarks,20 should contribute to the economic development in the 
community by encouraging business rescue by which many other stakeholders such as 
the employees and the suppliers whose interests in the insolvent business will be 
preserved.21 However, the attempt of business rescue can be associated with more 
uncertainty because creditors cannot predict what will happen to the value of their 
rights in the process and there would be a fear that they would be the risk bearers. It is 
acknowledged, therefore, that achieving a balance between all insolvency law 
objectives and maintaining certainty in the rescue process will not be a straightforward 
task without efficient institutions which is a major issue in Libya.22  
One of the issues in the Libyan insolvency law that the objective of maximising the 
value of the assets can be prejudiced by exempting the secured assets from the 
insolvency procedures which can result in a decrease in the going concern value of the 
business necessary to encourage business rescue attempts and going concern sales in 
liquidations by allowing secured creditors to enforce their entitlements, resulting in the 
 
17 See above Sec 3.4.1 (Objective One of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
18 See above Sec 5.3.7 
19 See above Sec 2.5 
20 See above Sec 3.4.1 (Objective One of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
21 Proposals on how to develop the business rescue system in Libya will be detailed in the next section. 
22 This issue will be examined below in Sec 6.6.2 
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dismemberment of the going concern.23 An insolvency law should also be based on 
objectives that ensure equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors (pari passu).24 
By this objective, the insolvency law will ensure equality among unsecured creditors 
and offer predictability to investors as to what to anticipate when the debtor becomes 
insolvent.25 In Libya, the objective of pari passu distribution to similarly situated 
creditors is affected significantly by the dominance of the privileged creditors who are 
assigned priority over not only unsecured creditors but also, oddly enough, on secured 
creditors. The operation of this system can also affect maximisation of the asset value 
for the benefit of secured creditors.26 
Furthermore, an effective and efficient insolvency regime requires taking rapid 
resolutions of insolvency and rescue because unnecessarily time-lengthy procedures 
result in more incurred costs, reducing the asset value for creditors and rescue efforts 
would be unlikely to be successful.27 An insolvency process should result in impartial 
outcomes. This relies closely on qualifications and personal characteristics of the 
people who are in charge of the insolvency process; judges and practitioners.28 
Ensuring timely and impartial resolution of insolvency is an issue of concern in Libya. 
For example, there is a lack of time limitation for most of the insolvency and rescue 
procedures and the court enjoys wide discretion to decide when a procedure is to be 
concluded resulting in inefficient outcomes caused by increased costs of the prolonged 
process. There is also a lack of requirement for judges and practitioners in Libya to 
obtain specific qualifications or training nor they are ensured to have impartiality and 
 
23 Further discussion on this issue will be dealt with below in Sec 6.4.2 
24 See above Sec 3.4.4 (Objective Four of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
25 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 
505 
26 See above Sec 3.4.4 (Objective Four of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
27 Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Strategic Insolvency Migration and Community Law’ in Wolf-Georg Ringe, 
Louise Gullifer and Philippe Théry (eds), Current Issues in European Financial and Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives from France and the UK (Hart Publishing 2009) 91 
28 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 115 
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integrity to be qualified for administering insolvency cases.29 This will lead to bias in 
the insolvency cases.30  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide insists that there should be mechanisms in the 
insolvency law to preserve sufficient assets of the business to allow equitable 
distribution to creditors in rescue or in liquidation.31 This objective is usually achieved 
by transaction avoidance mechanisms. The Libyan insolvency law includes such laws. 
However, a reform is needed in this area to ensure effective preservation of the assets. 
For instance, the law failed to include transactions that are intended to prevent creditors 
from collecting the whole or part of their claims in a timely manner. Besides, the 
Libyan transaction avoidance system allows validity of some abusive transactions by 
the requirement of the suspect period to be calculated from the date of insolvency 
declaration. Setting the date of the insolvency declaration is too late to prevent abusive 
transactions. As such, some transactions will be deemed valid only because they took 
place before that date bearing in mind that the date of the insolvency declaration is not 
certain and can take months after filing up until the court decision to declare 
insolvency. This can be more obvious in the case of the composition where the 
procedures can take a long time before the court decides that the composition proposal 
is nonviable only after which the court can declare insolvency status. But this can take 
an excessive time considering that there is no time limit within which the composition 
is to be concluded. As such, some transactions will be deemed valid only because they 
occurred in a period beyond the time recognised for the suspect period. This needs 
amendment if an effective application of the avoidance powers that seeks to maximise 
and preserve the estate value is to be achieved. For example, the suspect period should 
 
29 The issue of reforming the judiciary will be examined below in Sec 6.6.2 
30 See above Sec 3.4.5 (Objective Five of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
31 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap I, para 10 
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be calculated at an early time such as from the date of the insolvency petition or from 
the date the debtor ceased to pay its due debts.32  
Effective and efficient insolvency laws should ensure transparency and predictability 
among stakeholders. This is important to encourage effective participation by creditors 
and to promote the confidence of investors that the process is not abusive. It is desired 
by investors that the insolvency law provides mechanisms for effective and predictable 
enforcement of their rights to enable them to make the right investment decisions. In 
Libya, investors suffer significantly from inefficient enforcement due to the inefficient 
institutions with unpredictable outcomes and creditors may wait for a long time to 
receive returns, if ever. This is also attributable to the absence of the timeline limit for 
the insolvency procedures either in the liquidation or in the composition which leads to 
excessive delay in the insolvency resolution.33 
One of the important objectives of the insolvency law as identified by the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is the recognition and protection of the existing 
creditors’ rights and priorities in insolvency.34 Creditors have an expectation that the 
insolvency law will protect their rights and priorities they have bargained for through 
the use of non-insolvency law (property law).35 Typically, this objective is achieved by 
classifying creditors into classes where creditors with higher priority ranking are paid 
in full before lower junior creditors are paid anything.36 Effectuating this objective in a 
market-based system requires the law to limit the priority rules to rights gained by 
commercial bargaining rather than political or social considerations. But if the latter 
 
32 For details see Sec 3.4.6 (Objective Six of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
33 See above Sec 3.4.7 (Objective Seven of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
34 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Objective 8. See discussion above at Sec 5.2 
35 Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP 1986) 157 
36 Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman, ‘Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors’ (1979) 
88 Yale LJ 1143, 1161-62 
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considerations are to be recognised by the law, it is important that these considerations 
are limited to as great an extent as possible and are clearly set forth by the law in a 
predictable manner. Otherwise, secured creditors’ rights and priorities will be 
prejudiced which would result in inefficient outcomes.37 Besides, this would reduce 
certainty for creditors and lenders which would lead in turn to reduced availability and 
affordability of credit in the market.38 Unfortunately, property rights of secured 
creditors in Libya are not adequately protected due to the overemphasis on social 
justice of which obvious example is the priority given to the privileged creditors.39  
6.4. Reforming the Composition System 
The composition framework40 in Libya proved inefficient to deliver positive rescue 
outcomes. This is attributable to the deficiency of some mechanisms and approaches 
related mainly to the lack of encouragement for voluntary access to the process by the 
requirement of insolvency status, inadequacy of the moratorium system, the high level 
of court involvement in the composition procedure at the expense of the creditors who 
are given a significantly reduced role to play and the absence of mechanisms for 
effective valuation of business viability. These issues should be attended for the 
composition procedure to improve. 
6.4.1. Encouraging Early Access to the Process 
Rescue procedures in the Libyan composition scheme are available only after the 
debtor becomes insolvent by the inability to pay due debts upon demand.41 As such, 
companies that face some financial difficulties would be frustrated from accessing 
 
37 See above Sec 5.2 (Objective Eight of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
38 See above Sec 3.4.1 (Objective One of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
39 See above Sec 5.3.7 and Sec 5.4 
40 The composition system was subject of discussion in Chapter Four. 
41 CCA 2010, Art 984. Also see above Sec 4.3.2 
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rescue procedures unless they are strictly insolvent. This should be reconsidered if 
rescue is to be promoted. Eencouragement for an early filing is advantageous because it 
leads to maximising the value of the insolvency estate which increases the potential for 
business rescue on a going concern basis and decreases piecemeal liquidations.42 
Following from the above, the requirement of inability to pay debts prevents debtors 
from filing for the composition at a sufficiently early stage. The Libyan law does not 
define how early a distressed company can file for a composition. It allows a distressed 
company to file for a composition with creditors only before the insolvency 
declaration.43 Accordingly, a company may be eligible to file only when it becomes 
unable to pay debts as they fall due and filing before this situation happens is 
impossible in Libya due to the statutory requirements for which the court has the right 
to strike down the application even though the company is in a situation of financial 
difficulty as long as it is still able to pay debts. This is detrimental to business rescue 
which requires access to the procedures at a sufficiently early time. This is because 
encouraging early access would help to maximise the value of the insolvency estate 
which can result in positive outcomes in business rescue and enable the avoidance of 
piecemeal liquidation.44 Therefore, businesses should be encouraged to file for the 
proceedings before they become insolvent to enable them to address their distress at an 
early stage. 
6.4.2. Reconsidering the Moratorium Regime 
The moratorium prevents individual enforcement on the debtor’s assets by creditors 
and avoids a chaotic race to collect their entitlements. Because of this, the moratorium 
 
42 See above Sec 4.3.2 
43 CCA 2010, Art 985(1) 
44 Parry, Corporate Rescue (n 8) 13 
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is recognised as a substantial mechanism to achieve a number of goals; i.e. effectively 
maximising the going concern value of the assets and encouraging distressed 
companies to file for the process at an early stage both of which would increase 
potential rescue outcomes.45 In Libya, the moratorium is set up inappropriately and it 
cannot cater for any rescue purposes. 
First, the automatic imposition of the moratorium can be very abusive because of the 
lack of a mechanism for creditors to apply to the court to release the effect of the 
automatic moratorium. This would lead to the interests of secured creditors being 
prejudiced by prolonging the life of hopeless companies for an uncertain period of time 
leading to undermining creditors’ certainty in the process. This is undesirable for the 
rescue process because creditors will be discouraged to engage in the process from the 
first place and they can act to strike down the proceedings by their power to not 
participate which would allow them to enforce their claims (after the court’s approval 
of the composition plan). 46  The moratorium in such a scenario can lead to both 
undermining the assets value at the expense of secured creditors and decreasing the 
likelihood for a successful rescue. It is emphasised that the moratorium should be 
designed in a way that does not undermine the ability of creditors to recover their debts 
or decrease the value of their rights in the secured assets. This is very important in a 
country where the promotion of credit flows is particularly desired.47 Furthermore, the 
moratorium in Libya can allow for dismantling the business assets by allowing secured 
creditors to enforce their claims after the court approves the composition plan and 
 
45 See above Sec  4.3.5 
46 CCA 2010, Art 993 
47 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 37 
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during the performance of the composition process. As such, rescue can be very hard to 
achieve.48 
Such features of the moratorium in Libya should be reformed in order to promote 
business rescue in the composition regime. Practically, a moratorium can operate 
automatically upon petition to the court in order to prevent dismemberment of the 
business assets. This should be applied also during the implementation process of the 
composition plan because the moratorium is most needed during this period to increase 
rescue outcomes. This is because if creditors are allowed to exercise this over-
protective power, the business’s assets will be broken up between the creditors leaving 
the business with a feeble chance for rescue. In the meanwhile, there should always be 
a focus on protecting the interests of secured creditors. The application of the 
moratorium should be restricted where the interests of creditors may be damaged. 
Therefore, the law should allow courts to release the effect of the moratorium upon 
request of the creditors. This can achieve the appropriate balance between the 
stakeholders in the insolvency (promoting rescue by which multiple stakeholders are 
advantaged and protecting the interests of secured creditors). 
6.4.3. Increasing the Role of Creditors with a Reduced Role of Courts 
In the composition system, only unsecured creditors are allowed to participate in the 
voting process as secured creditors have the power not to participate. However, if 
secured creditors wish to participate, they do so in the position of unsecured creditors.49 
The law excludes secured creditors from participating in the process in exchange for 
providing protection of their interests by empowering the court to take up an active role 
in the procedures. For that, the court is given broad discretionary powers in order to 
 
48 See above Sec  4.3.5 
49 See Sec 4.3.3 
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protect the economic interests of secured creditors. It can, for example, reject the 
composition proposal if the court thinks that the interests of secured creditors will be 
prejudiced even though the plan was approved by the majority of voting creditors.50  
The concern is that such an excessive level of court involvement would lead to more 
costs incurred by the creditors leading to less going concern value. Most importantly, 
the lack of specialised and trained judges and professionals in insolvency will add to 
the costs. This is because it is undesirable to have a rescue system run by courts where 
courts and judges lack the knowledge and experience necessary to deal with insolvency 
and rescue matters. Rescue procedures require a balance between rescue and 
liquidation and between all different stakeholders to be made and this cannot be easily 
achieved without efficient institutions. 
Alternatively, court involvement should be reduced allowing more power to the 
creditors to take an active role in the procedures. Secured creditors particularly should 
be encouraged to lead the process because this is the best response to protect the value 
of their interests.51 This is also beneficial to the business rescue as a system. It has been 
illustrated that where secured creditors take an active role in the procedures, the rescue 
outcomes can benefit different stakeholders. 52  This also can be justified from a 
theoretical point of view in the Creditors’ Bargain Theory (CBT) and the TPT. The 
former theory, obviously, places a pronounced emphasis on protecting the economic 
interests of secured creditors as the only role of the insolvency law. Under the TPT, this 
approach can also be encouraged. As previously discussed, the TPT encourages 
business rescue to take place to benefit a wide range of stakeholders provided that the 
 
50 See Sec 4.3.3 
51 Giving secured creditors an active role in the insolvency process is a primary reason behind taking of 
security. See: Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (CUP 2004) 7 
52 See above Sec 4.6 
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secured creditors are well protected in the process. 53  In Libya where efficient 
institutions are considerably lacking, encouraging secured creditors to lead the 
procedures would be the best appropriate response to protect the secured interests in the 
process.54 
6.4.4. Determining Business Viability in Business Rescue 
The insolvency law in Libya vests in the court discretion to approve the composition 
proposal, considering the feasibility of the proposal to the creditors’ economic interests 
by taking into account the available assets and the debtor’s financial sufficiency.55 If it 
appears to the court that the debtor’s proposal is not viable, it has to declare the 
insolvency status and then start the insolvent liquidation procedures.56 Determination of 
business viability lies at the heart of rescue systems. In this regard, there are various 
approaches. One approach is that valuation is determined through agreement by the 
parties (the debtor or the insolvency representative and the secured creditors). Another 
approach is a court based approach where the court specifies the mode of determining 
the value which can be conducted by appropriate experts or, alternatively, by the 
insolvency practitioner. Another possible approach is through a market valuation of the 
assets through sale.57  
However, the Libyan insolvency law does not specify the mechanism for the 
valuation test. This may open the door for considering the available alternatives. Since 
Libya suffers from the problem of institutional capacity, requiring that the valuation 
 
53 See above discussion in Sec 4.2 and 6.2 
54  It has been previously acknowledged that the approach where secured creditors are dominantly 
allowed to have an active role in the rescue process can result in conflict with the interests of junior 
creditors especially where secured creditors are over secured. However, this approach seems to be the 
most suitable solution to make the necessary balance of the process taking into account the weak 
institutions in the country. See above Sec 4.6 
55 CCA 2010, Art 1006(1)(1) 
56 Ibid, Art 1006(2) 
57 For more details see: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap II, para 67 
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should be carried out by the court or its insolvency practitioners would clearly be 
inappropriate. The suitable two alternatives available are either through agreement by 
the parties or through independent experts while the court may still be enabled to 
exercise its discretion to approve the valuation test. 
This is arguably appropriate for the Libyan system and can be justified for a number 
of reasons. The practice in the country indicates that banks are required by the law58 to 
have recourse to expert offices or professional bodies for valuation of assets provided 
as collateral for loans and other financial facilities. Further, a professional body that the 
law refers to and the court may resort to is the Libyan Auditors and Accountants 
Association. This association is recognised and established by the law which requires 
all practicing accounts auditors to be members of this body in order to be permitted to 
practice.59 The duty of the external accounts auditor is to examine the financial 
statements of the company before they are submitted to the general assembly in its 
annual meeting.60 
An empirical study shows that members of the Auditors and Accountants Association 
in Libya have practical experience in examining companies’ viability and indicating 
financial failure in line with the auditing international guidelines. In doing so, they have 
to raise the red flag before the financial situation worsens in order to alert the company 
to take the necessary steps to avoid any further trouble.61 Arguably, such professional 
 
58 See: Art 82 and 83(3) of the Banking Law 2012 
59 Bob Ritchie and Esamaddin Khorwatt, ‘The Attitude of Libyan Auditors to Inherent Control Risk 
Assessment’ (2007) 39 British Accounting Review 39, 41 
60 CCA 2010, Art 208 
61 For details see: Adel Efkirin and Mosbah al-Khidri, ‘Classifiying the Assessment Indicators of the 
Company’s Viability to Continue from the Auditors’ Perspective in Libya’ (2017) 2 Journal of 
Financial and Economic Research 43, 49-50. According to this study, the account auditors in Libya are 
committed to follow the international benchmarks regarding the company’s valuation assessment. ibid 
71 
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bodies can be involved for the same purpose to help the court and the other concerned 
parties in business valuation. 
Business rescue, however, entails that some interests will be risk bearers if the 
process is unsuccessful.62 These could be secured creditors because business rescue 
requires them to negotiate around the bargain they have made in their contracts.63 But, 
secured creditors usually do not favour this kind of negotiations as they are unwilling to 
take the risk, rather they prefer to have their bargaining enforced. That is legitimate but 
this would also mean that the other stakeholders will be risk bearers which would in 
turn mean that the rescue process will be unlikely to have any potential. This is also a 
potentially unfair resolution because in the society there are stakeholders, other than 
secured creditors, who have investment in the business and their interests as team 
members are therefore legitimate to be considered in insolvency.64 As such, achieving a 
balance between those interests is not an easy task considering the issue of institutional 
weakness in the country.  
To support business rescue culture in the community for such reasons, the State, 
driven by objectives of social stability in the community, may step in to reallocate the 
risk. In a Libyan context, an oil-rich State concerned with social and economic 
stability, whilst seeking enhanced efficiency in the country, has potential choices that 
would offer an appropriate balance between the various interests. Secured creditors 
would have their interests guaranteed and the other stakeholder interests would also be 
maintained. In practical terms, the State guarantees the position of the secured creditors 
 
62  Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday, ‘Institutionalizing Creative Destruction: Predictable and 
Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the Wake of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ in Meredith Woo 
(ed), Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia: A Comparative Study (Palgrave Macmillan 
2007) 245 
63 This is what the CBT is based on (negotiating around the pre-insolvency entitlements). See above Sec 
2.2.1 
64 See above discussion in Sec 2.6 
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during the procedures for a limited period of time, six months for example, and at the 
end of that period the business will be subject to scrutiny in terms of viability of debt 
payment based on an accountancy test to testify and identify viability. Secured interests 
during this period will be held by the operation of the moratorium. If it appears that the 
business is still unable to pay debts as they fall due and its financial situation is not 
improving or is even worsening, the business should be forced into liquidation. The 
court with the assistance of the independent experts identified by the law and practice 
in Libya can implement this task on behalf of the State. By doing so, the need to 
recognise business relationships and the importance of non-creditor stakeholder 
interests like those of the employees, suppliers and the community and the demands of 
social justice in the context of insolvency can all be achieved.65 Besides, the pressure 
that can be caused by institutional weakness in the country that might otherwise prevent 
a fair balance between all various stakeholder interests can also be resolved. 
6.5. Secured Transactions Law: The Weak Position of Secured Creditors and the 
Lack of Harmony with the Insolvency Law 
It is acknowledged that the strength of any secured transactions law is assessed upon 
the debtors’ insolvency when various claims of creditors have to compete against the 
debtors’ estate for debt satisfaction.66 As both systems of insolvency and secured 
transactions may seek to achieve different objectives and different approaches to debt 
in the event of insolvency, there is a potential for considerable tension and conflict 
 
65 See above discussion in Sec 2.5 
66 Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Basic Issues of European Rules on Security in Movables’ in John de Lacy (ed), The 
Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Cavendish 2010) 
449 
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between these two areas of law if each system endeavours to achieve its aims without a 
consideration of the other’s.67 
Secured transactions law in principle is identified as the law of secured creditors 
because it protects their rights and priorities against the insolvency of their debtor in 
order to promote secured credit.68 Secured transactions laws seek to ensure that secured 
creditors are protected in insolvency69 by emphasising effective enforceability of the 
rights of individual creditors in order to enable the realisation of the economic value of 
the encumbered assets for the benefit of secured creditors.70 This is also identified by 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as one of the Key Objectives that the insolvency law 
should cater for.71 However, such an objective may interact with other objectives that 
seek to preserve and maximise the going concern value of the insolvent estate to benefit 
not only secured creditors but also wider stakeholder interests. Accordingly, the 
commencement of the insolvency procedures may affect the interests of the secured 
creditors in ways different from objectives set forth in the secured transactions law.72 
The key issue then is that the law should aim at achieving a degree of harmonisation 
between the secured transactions regime and all existing debtor-creditor related laws, 
particularly the insolvency law. This is because both secured transactions law and 
insolvency law are part of the same legal system concerning debtor-creditor 
 
67 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘The Case for DIP Financing in Early Transition Countries: Taking a DIP in 
the Distressed Debt Pool’ [2004] LiT, at 8 <www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit042.pdf> 
accessed 08 Apr 2018 
68 McCormack (n 51) 
69 As we have seen earlier in this thesis, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory claims that the insolvency law 
should always have the aim of protecting and honouring the interests of the secured creditors because 
this is the bargain they have made ex ante. 
70 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Chap XII, para 2 
71 See above Sec 5.2 (Objective Eight of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
72 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Chap XII, para 3 
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relationships and any weakness in one area poses an unhealthy burden on the other.73 
The UNCITRAL ST Guide insists that without taking consideration of the relationship 
between secured transactions law and other laws in particular law of obligation, 
enforcement procedures law and insolvency law, an effective and efficient secured 
transactions law would be far beyond the possibility of achievement.74 
The issue in Libya that should be reconsidered is that the property law is excessively 
biased towards achieving social justice under which property is designed to have 
‘social function’ which starkly deviates the secured transactions regime from what 
secured creditors expect when taking security (protecting their rights and priorities). 
This can be demonstrated by the statutory dominance of privileged creditors whose 
claims are prioritised over secured creditors leading to inadequate protections.75 
Another issue is that the enforcement procedures of secured interests under the reform 
of 2010 may be carried out without giving regard to the objectives of an insolvency law 
that seeks to maximise the going concern of the insolvent estate. This indicates the lack 
of harmonisation that should be achieved between the law of secured transactions and 
insolvency. It is therefore obvious that the secured transactions law needs to be 
amended so that some degree of effectiveness, in relation to priority of security rights, 
and some degree of compatibility with the insolvency and rescue laws can be 
introduced. These two issues are discussed below. 
 
73 Ronald Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Law and Policy Reform at 
the Asian Development Bank’ (2000) 1 International Insolvency Institute Report No TA 5795-REG, at 
100 <www.iiiglobal.org/node/1815> accessed 13 Apr 2018 
74 UNCITRAL ST Guide, Introduction, para 73 
75 See above Sec 5.3.7 
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6.5.1. Correcting the Position of Secured Creditors  
As reflected the principle of ‘social justice’, property in Libya is designed to have a 
very strong ‘social justice’ role to play in the society resulting in an unfriendly ranking 
system for secured creditors. This is manifested clearly by the powerful treatment given 
to the broadly defined and wide ranging privileged rights that are, ironically, prioritised 
even ahead of the secured creditors. It is argued that, the privilege system as so 
recognised in Libya is dangerous and an elusive enemy of a well-functioning property 
law as well as insolvency and rescue law. As has previously been discussed,76 the 
Libyan privileges system can operate against most of the key objectives of insolvency 
law as recognised by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. They can undermine the pari 
passu distribution to similarly situated creditors, the maximisation of the value of the 
assets, the creditors’ predictability and certainty regarding their priorities in insolvency. 
The privilege system can also disincentivise secured creditors from involvement in any 
rescue attempts which will consequently lead to frustration of rescue procedures which 
will in turn be at the detriment of all stakeholders. 
Therefore, it constitutes a really significant hurdle that is capable of blocking any 
purpose of law development in this field. It may not be far-fetched to conclude that if 
this privilege system, as so structured in Libya, is the only issue within the Libyan legal 
system, it would be a powerful deficiency that is capable by its own to destroy the 
insolvency and rescue system. Thus, without reconsidering this system in the 
legislation, any reform attempts will be useless to say the least. This is because 
property, especially secured property, is, or should be, designed to primarily protect the 
 
76 See above Sec 6.3 
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property holders (secured creditors)77 in the event of debtor insolvency by prioritising 
secured creditors over other creditors.78 Otherwise, the property/ security transactions 
law will be unable to deliver any useful purposes to the very stakeholders the law was 
supposed to protect the most and will be unable therefore to support the goal of 
enhancing private business investments in the country. Recognition of the proprietary 
rights and priorities of the creditors is acknowledged in the insolvency law theory and 
in the international benchmarks as the law should be primarily built on commercial 
bargaining rather than on social or political considerations. The rationale behind this is 
to increase the level of predictability and to encourage businesses and create an 
investment-friendly environment.  
Social considerations and objectives are important as they are given an important 
position against business failure in insolvency laws and theory as well as in the 
international norms. However, the law should provide a fair balance between these 
social objectives and other objectives in the community by protecting the commercial 
bargaining of creditors. This is because overemphasising the social objectives will lead 
to prejudicing many important interests that are also important to maintain as one of the 
fundamental objectives of the law.  
From a theoretical point of view, the CBT defends very strongly that the rights and 
priorities of existing creditors to be protected hence rejecting any special treatment for 
interests other than those of creditors. The problem of the privileged creditors is most 
understood from the CBT’s point of view79 because of their capability of undermining 
 
77 Secured creditors generally are given a non-protective position within the legal system and practice in 
Libya even in issues other than the priority ranking. See above Sec 5.4 
78 McCormack (n 51) 5  
79 Privileged or preferential claims are clearly not grounded in perspectives of the CBT. See: Christopher 
Symes, Statutory Priorities in Corporate Insolvency Law: An Analysis of Preferred Creditor 
Status (Routledge 2016) 61  
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the hypothetical bargain that creditors have made ex ante. The TPT may be a wider 
approach yet it rejects the dominance of one party over the other. Accordingly, it 
rejects the dominance of social objectives prejudicing the commercial bargains of 
creditors. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide also agrees with this approach and insists 
on protecting the rights of the secured creditors whereas social or political objectives 
should be minimised to a great extent as possible. It suffices to say therefore that the 
privileged claims, in the way currently structured in Libya, starkly contradict the 
common norms identified in theory and international benchmarks on insolvency.  
Therefore, this class of creditors must be urgently revisited if Libya is going to reform 
its insolvency system so as to encourage private provision of capital and efficient 
business rescue in insolvency. This can be achieved, for example, by minimizing the 
number of social interests in insolvency. Some privileged claims such as the 
administrative costs of insolvency, those of the employees for unpaid wages and tax 
claims are important to maintain. Such claims are traditionally recognised as important 
in various jurisdictions in the world.80 But recognising claims beyond these claims in 
insolvency will lead to unfair outcomes from which important stakeholder interests, 
like the creditors, will be disadvantaged. Libya can be informed by the 
recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in this regard. It recommends 
that the ranking order should be as in the following; 
(1) Secured Creditors 
(2) Administrative costs and expenses; 
(3) Priority or privileged claims (employee and tax claims); 
(4) Ordinary unsecured claims; 
 
80 Ibid 1 
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(5) Deferred claims or claims subordinated under the law.81 
Accordingly, the priority ranking in Libya should be in the following order; 
(1) secured claims,  
(2) administrative costs and expenses;82 
(3) privileged claims which may include; 
(a) employees’ unpaid wages; 
(b) tax claims due to the public treasury; 
(4) the ordinary unsecured creditors; 
(5) deferred claims or claims subordinated under the law. 
6.5.2. Harmonisation between the Secured Transactions and the Insolvency Laws 
The 2010 reform in Libya regarding the secured transactions system failed to achieve 
harmony with the insolvency and rescue regime leading to some weaknesses. A couple 
of examples can be given to illustrate this claim. First, the FLA 2010 entitles the lessor 
to enforce its rights over the leased assets when the insolvent company ceased to pay 
the rent.83 As has been mentioned, the FLA 2010 excludes the leased assets from the 
insolvency estate and the creditors’ common pool.84 As such, the insolvency 
practitioner is required to return the leased assets to the lessor upon the latter’s request 
irrespective of the moratorium process. This would undermine the rescue process by 
dismantling the assets of the distressed business and reducing the going concern value, 
possibly obliterating the estate. The leased assets should be included in the moratorium 
 
81 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Rec 188 and Rec 189. For more details see: ibid, Part Two, Chap V, B. 
(1)(C) ranking of claims, paras. 62-79  
82 However, judicial expenses and resources expended by the court or the insolvency representative in 
maintaining the value of the encumbered assets (Art 1142 of the CC 1953) may exceptionally be 
prioritised ahead of secured claims. 
83  FLA 2010, Art 17(5)(b) provides a potential solution to this problem by allowing the insolvent 
company (the lessee) or the insolvency trustee to pay the rent. See above Sec 5.6.2.2 
84 Ibid, Art 17(5)(a). See above Sec 5.6.2.2 
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process because this is important to maximise the going concern value and increase the 
chance for rescue. This would not change the position of the secured creditor (the 
lessor) which is protected by excluding the leased assets from the common pool of 
creditors. The lessor instead should be enabled to apply to the court to lift the 
moratorium where the assets are not necessary for the rescue or they are not well 
protected. 
Second, the structure designed for enforcement of going concern security under 
Orders upon Petition procedures is not consistent with the principles of an effective 
insolvency regime. In such a system a sale as a going concern, where a higher price is 
achievable, is preferred to a piecemeal sale. Article 479(1) of the CCA 2010 makes it 
explicitly clear that creditors can apply either for the whole or part sale of the going 
concern security without defining whether the court has the power to decide which 
option can achieve better results. In this way, with the absence of both the legislative 
guidelines and business rescue practice and experience, court practice may sacrifice the 
going concern value of the business in favour of a piecemeal sale even though the sale 
as a going concern may result in better outcomes for all.85  
As has previously been mentioned,86 the sale as a going concern is not easy to 
conduct as the process may lead to an undervalued sale. Therefore, in support for such 
a method, there is a need for institutional support and sufficient marketing. The lack of 
sufficient marketing in Libya might be a barrier for the potential of this kind of sale. In 
supporting the going concern sales of the distressed businesses in the market, the 
Government can step in as a way to support the implementation of an insolvency 
reform, for example, by providing potential buyers with loans for the most or whole of 
 
85 For more details see above Sec 5.6.2.1 
86 See above Sec 5.6.2.1 
265 
 
the purchase price. This intervention by the Government may be justified by the need to 
support business rescue to maintain various associated goals such as social and 
economic stability in the community.87 This is important in Libya where the 
community already faces difficult social issues such as workers resettlement under the 
re-employment scheme set up in the Liquidation of State-owned Companies Fund.88 
6.6. Institutional reform 
Insolvency laws work best through effective institutions to achieve their purposes. 
Insolvency laws that encourage wide spread liquidations of nonviable business in a 
country need to have social safety net systems to absorb any potential unemployment. 
Without this, governments will be under pressure to maintain social stability in the 
society which may lead to the frustration of an effective application of the insolvency 
law by keeping nonviable companies going through governmental subsidies. 89 
Institutional reform requires attention regarding the judiciary system in the country. 
Where the country still suffers from institutional inefficiency and to fill the gap caused 
by this, it suffices to argue that alternatives to the formal insolvency procedures should 
be encouraged. 
 
87  It should be acknowledged, however, that such a governmental intervention must be considered 
carefully. This should be limited to cases where the going concern of the business is economically 
viable and where the business is socially too-important-to-fail because the failure of such businesses 
may present a considerable risk to social stability. Government intervention beyond such cases can be 
problematic as it would create a problem of artificially prolonging the lives of economically inefficient 
companies (zombie companies). See: Rebecca Parry and Yingxiang Long, ‘China’s Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, Building an Infrastructure towards a Market-based Approach’ (2019) 20 J Corp Law 
Stud 157, 175; Kenneth Ayotte and David Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy or Bailouts’ (2010) 35 J Corp L 469, 
470-71  
88 See the resolution (no 104 of 2007) regarding Liquidation of State-owned Companies Fund, Art 3(z). 
Also see above Sec 1.2.3 (Insolvency Law under the Transition Economy) 
89 Which would create the problem of zombie companies. 
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6.6.1. Enhancing the Social Safety Net System 
Enhancing social protections or social safety net systems (SSN) are important 
because they play a vital role in helping individuals to manage the economic shocks 
that may result from the economic transition process. Social protections can include 
supporting effective education, healthcare systems and ensuring social welfare and 
minimum standards of living in general.90 
Enhanced social safety net systems are closely relevant to the application of 
insolvency and rescue laws. To detail, the application of the insolvency law may lead to 
job reductions either through the liquidation or the sale as a going concern. Adequate 
social protections are fundamental in ameliorating social instability that may be caused 
by job reductions. But without such protections, it would be difficult, and maybe 
impossible, for a country to accept such outcomes due to the fear of social and political 
unrest. This as such would prevent the application of an insolvency reform from 
reaching its full effect.91  
This matter should be given great attention in Libya because the Social Security Fund 
that is responsible for providing social protections for individuals in the country 
provides inadequate social protections and wellbeing for individuals.92 Because of the 
lack of an adequate social protection system, Libya is considered one of the countries 
that are vulnerable to economic shocks and other crises due to weak SSN systems.93 
Enhancing social protections has recently become a very sensitive matter more than 
ever in Libya. According to a study, the 2011 revolution in Libya was primarily driven 
 
90 Joana Silva, Victoria Levin and Matteo Morgandi, Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward for 
Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa (World Bank 2013) 35 
91 See for example the delay caused in China by such concerns: Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, 
‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ (2008) 8 J Corp Law Stud 113, 
137 
92 World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 97 
93 Silva, Levin and Morgandi (n 90) 3-4 
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by the population’s sense of a growing inequality, unfair social treatment and 
dissatisfaction with the quality of life provided by the State.94  
6.6.2.  Reforming the Judiciary System 
It is admitted that insolvency law does not exist in an institutional vacuum. Rather, it 
is necessary to build effective institutions with efficient mechanisms alongside the 
legislative reform in order to achieve a meaningful insolvency and rescue regime.95 The 
primary aims of an insolvency system, such as implementing the procedures in a timely 
manner and achieving an appropriate balance between the various stakeholders and 
between rescue and liquidation, rely on a sound judicial system.96  
To enhance institutional capacity in the insolvency field, judges and trustees/ 
practitioners, accountants, asset valuers and other professionals involved in the 
insolvency procedures must be provided with adequate insolvency and credit related 
training and capacity building programmes. This is particularly important because it is 
said that the successful implementation of an insolvency law and the development of a 
sufficient culture of business rescue are dependent on the implementation of a sound 
judicial system with insolvency specialised and trained judges and practitioners.97 
Issues of partiality and personal quality of judges and practitioners are equally 
important for the judiciary to ensure fair procedures. This is very important to gain 
 
94 Elena Lanchovichina, Lili Mottaghi and Shantayanan Devarajan, Inequality, Uprisings, and Conflict in 
the Arab World (World Bank 2015) 29 
95 Jingxia Shi, ‘Twelve Years to Sharpen One Sword: The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and China’s 
Transition to a Market Economy’ (2007) 16 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 5, 23 
96  Sumant Batra and Robert Sanderson, ‘The Import of the Insolvency Professional’ in Survey on 
Insolvency Systems in the Middle East and North Africa, at 9 
<www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/44375185.pdf> accessed 9 Oct 2017 
97 Kenneth Ayotte and Hayong Yun, ‘Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments’ (2007) 25 JL 
Econ & Org 2, 3 
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legitimacy over insolvency cases and support from key stakeholders.98 Further 
programmes may also include programmes to educate the public and other interested 
parties in order to reduce the sense of stigma traditionally associated with business 
failure and to destigmatise rescue laws and encourage the view that they are designed 
to facilitate rescue rather than liquidation.99 The public and interested stakeholders 
would appreciate rescue laws given their potential to have beneficial contributions to 
the welfare of the public by preserving insolvent yet viable businesses which would in 
turn lead to job preservations, maximising the value of the estate for creditors and the 
enhancement of the economic growth and maintenance of public order in the 
community. 
As the entire insolvency procedures in Libya are carried out under extensive court 
involvement, reforming the judicial system is very relevant to the country where the 
attraction of foreign investment has become necessary. As acknowledged, sufficiently 
skilled courts and judges in applying fair treatment in insolvency procedures can ensure 
better enforcement and high recovery rates for creditors. It is widely acknowledged that 
there is a strong relationship between the quality of institutions and efficient legal 
systems and the ability of a country to attract foreign direct investment and investment 
flows; better and efficient institutions and legal systems will attract foreign 
investment.100 
 
98 Terence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global 
Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Apr 2006) at 29 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Halliday5.pdf> accessed 02 Aug 2018 
99 Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: 
The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 1, 76-77 
100 Mustafa El Hamoudi and Nagmi Aimer, ‘The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic 
Growth in Libya’ (2017) 2 IJELS 144, 147. Also see: Giuseppina Talamo, ‘FDI, Mode of Entry and 
Corporate Governance’ in Neri Salvadori, Pasquale Commendatore and Massimo Tamberi 
(eds), Geography, Structural Change and Economic Development: Theory and Empirics (Edward 
Elgar 2014) 30-46 
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Sadly, the judiciary system in Libya is inadequate to deal with business or insolvency 
cases. The judiciary system in the country has been built on general courts in which 
judges have general knowledge in all law branches, lack specialised training and 
experience and they are occasionally rotated between different courts and divisions 
with different subject matter.101 Observers believe that the vast majority of judges in 
Libya lack the essential knowledge and experience in dealing with the level of 
complexity and overlap of up-to-date commercial practices, such as security 
transactions, banking law, intellectual property and insolvency processes.102  
Because of this situation in the country, the vast majority of business disputes in 
general are settled away from the courts due to the courts’ inefficiency and 
weaknesses.103 Despite this abandonment of the formal litigation by businesses, the 
Libyan courts remain subject to excessive delays because of a backlog of cases which 
makes the court unattractive to resort to.104 A possible reform response would be the 
establishment of separate commercial courts or insolvency divisions that would 
excessively deal with insolvency cases. This can be both more responsive to business 
and also would not be subject to the backlog from non-commercial disputes. In 2008, 
Libya was advised by the WB to establish commerce-specialised courts as a way to 
reform its judicial system in order to enhance the capability of judges to deal with 
business disputes to boost the confidence of investors.105  
Nonetheless, as the court and practitioner infrastructure in Libya is not yet 
sufficiently developed, achieving a fair balance between the various stakeholders may 
 
101 Faraj Ma’rouf, ‘Specialised Courts as a Mechanism to Improve Justice in Libya’ (The Supreme 
Courts in Arab Countries conference, Doha, Sep 2013) at 2-3 
<https://carjj.org/sites/default/files/wrq_ml_lyby-_lmhwr_lthlth.docx> accessed 9 Sep 2017  
102 World Bank, Modernising the Legal Environment 2008, 18 
103 World Bank, Libya Economic Report 2006, 67-68 
104 Ma’rouf (n 101) 5 
105 World Bank, Modernising the Legal Environment 2008, 18 
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not be possible which may result in re-allocating the risk of insolvency to the secured 
creditors. This situation would be undesirable because it will likely lead to the public 
and investors losing their confidence in the courts. In such a scenario where courts still 
lack the knowledge or experience necessary to balance the various stakeholder 
interests, it may not be desirable to undertake such a complex task according to the 
court’s wide discretion. Therefore, a system that builds on judicial discretion should 
arguably be avoided.106 This may lead to the argument also that, until the courts are 
developed, a system with increased focus on creditors’ interests may, in practical 
sense,107 be desirable because this is essential to enhance the availability of credit.108 
Giving the secured creditors a strong role to play in the process has been the approach 
that is adopted even in jurisdictions with developed rescue systems and effective and 
well developed institutions like in the UK.109 
6.6.3. Encouraging Informal Workouts 
Given the weakness of institutions as illustrated above and the distrust of the formal 
insolvency system by the business and financial community in Libya, it might be 
important to encourage the development of informal workouts to further encourage 
business rescue to take place in the country. Informal workouts or restructurings are 
recognised to have a particular importance in countries that have inadequate formal 
procedures and institutions because they can provide quick and flexible resolutions for 
 
106 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part One, Chap III, para 6 
107 Obviously, there is a tension created by the need of courts to provide a fair treatment to the interests 
of stakeholders in the community and the insufficiency of courts to achieve that goal. This is to 
acknowledge that weak institutions will add to the pressure of achieving the fair balance between all 
various interests. 
108 Ayotte and Yun (n 97) 25; Ziad Azar, Guidelines for Efficient Bankruptcy and Creditor’s Rights 
Reform (LAP 2013) 33 
109 See above Sec 4.6 
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companies to emerge from their financial difficulties.110 Informal approaches to rescue 
are favoured by both debtors and creditors because they avoid the high costs and 
publicity that are associated with the formal procedures and thus preserve the 
commercial reputation of debtors.111 In the London Approach for example, the entire 
process of a workout is kept secret between the banks and the debtor company without 
other creditors, employees and shareholders being aware that a restructuring workout is 
in process.112 
Informal workouts are praised for their flexibility to encourage voluntary access to 
the restructuring process before the business becomes insolvent. This is useful to 
address the business’s distress at an early time before it is complicated and before the 
position deteriorates past the point of no return. Another attraction to the informal 
restructuring is the encouragement of creditors to participate by ensuring that their new 
funding, where necessary, will have a priority ahead of the existing debts. Informal 
restructurings tend to increase returns to secured creditors because costs of 
renegotiations tend to be reduced. This will incentivise all secured creditors to support 
and participate in the process if they knew that the business will generate higher returns 
to them in informal processes than in liquidation. Furthermore, such approaches are 
attractive to secured creditors because they will spearhead the negotiations in light of 
better information about the financial situation of the business being made available to 
all creditors and this will enable them to sufficiently protect their interests.113 
 
110 Rebecca Parry, ‘Introduction’ in Katarzyna Broc and Rebecca Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An 
Overview of Recent Developments (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2006) 8 
111  Régis Blazy, Jocelyn Martel and Nirjhar Nigam, ‘The Choice Between Informal and Formal 
Restructuring: The Case of French Banks Facing Distressed SMEs’ (2014) 44 JBF 248, 250 
112 John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: The “London approach” to the 
Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 J Corp Law Stud 21, 37 
113 On the advantages of the London Approach see: ibid 34-39 
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It should be acknowledged that informal workouts, such as the London Approach,114 
are considered a matter of culture that is long practiced in a local economy by 
interested parties, such as the bankers and lenders, to suit their flexibility in extending 
support to their debtor companies, and they tend to develop through a series of cases 
and experiences rather than being established in a single case. Therefore, they have no 
formal status, nor do they consist of set of certain rules and conventions.115  
6.7. Conclusion  
This Chapter has built upon the work done in previous chapters and analysed and 
discussed prospects of applying an efficient and effective application of the insolvency 
law theories and benchmarks.  In doing so, it has acknowledged that it is necessary for 
the country to take lessons and experience from other countries that have enacted sound 
insolvency regimes. It was also important for this Chapter to situate the Libyan 
insolvency law within a theoretical foundation. It was concluded that the general legal 
system in Libya suffers from inconsistency between the different branches of laws. It 
was concluded that by using theory, such a situation can be appropriately addressed by 
relying on the view offered by a theory like the TPT. Moreover, a proposal for reform 
has been made to improve a regime of business rescue in the country. Some points 
were made in relation to developing the structure of the composition regime itself 
(encouraging the early access to the process, strengthening the moratorium and the role 
of the secured creditors) and promoting the institutional support in the issue of business 
viability. 
 
114 Historically, the Bank of England played a crucial role in co-ordinating the London Approach and the 
activities of creditors participating in the Approach. However, due to the change in the market, a result 
of which is the increasing diversification of lending, the ability of the Bank to co-ordinate between 
creditors has become more difficult. For details see: Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of 
Debt’ (2008) 8 JBL 756, 770-71 
115 John Flood, ‘The Vultures Fly East: the Creation and Globalisation of the Distressed Debt Market’ in 
David Nelken and Johannes Feets (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 263 
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Furthermore, a sound reform for insolvency and rescue law in general requires the 
legislatures to ensure that harmonisation between the insolvency law and secured 
transactions law is achieved. This is because these debtor-creditor related systems 
should work in harmony and any shortcoming in one system would pose restrictions on 
the application of the other system.116 In Libya, harmonisation between the secured 
transactions law and the insolvency law is lacking. Considerable inconsistency between 
the two systems has been noted especially in terms of security enforcement. Without 
working on the harmonisation between secured transactions laws and insolvency laws 
in particular, the effective application of secured transactions laws would be hard to 
achieve.117 In addition, it was important in this Chapter to highlight the problem caused 
by overprotecting some interests that are based on objectives of social justice 
(privileged claims) prejudicing the commercial-based interests (secured creditors). It 
was argued that such a position will lead to the dysfunction of the legal system in 
general and the insolvency and rescue law in particular. 
This Chapter has also concluded that a meaningful reform does not rely only on 
introducing new legislations, but it also needs to have effective institutions that are in 
charge of implementing the rule of law in the market. An effective application of an 
insolvency law reform depends heavily on reforming the judicial system so as to 
provide adequate training programmes and capacity building for court staff such as 
judges, as well as insolvency practitioners and accountants that deal with insolvency 
cases in order to ensure effective and quick decisions. Effective institutions may also 
entail having a sound social security system in the country to facilitate the application 
of the reform. As we have previously seen, governments will otherwise be reluctant to 
apply insolvency systems that encourage wide spread liquidations of non-viable 
 
116 Harmer (n 73) 100 
117 See above Sec 6.5.2 
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businesses for the fears of social unrest.118 Further, because of the situation of the weak 
institutions in Libya, it was suggested that informal workouts of business rescue should 
be encouraged in order to support the possibilities for business rescue to take place in 
the market.  
 
118 See above Sec 6.6.2 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis has considered, by reference to theoretical perspectives and international 
benchmarks, the need for and the importance of reforming the insolvency law in Libya. 
Since embarking on economic reform in the country, the situation in the country has 
changed requiring reforms to the insolvency law. For a long time, Libya adopted a 
socialist economy in which the insolvency law was not required because businesses 
were not allowed to fail. Notwithstanding, the movement of the country towards the 
market economy in more recent years has resulted in revisiting the socialist influenced 
laws and policies towards adopting a more business-friendly environment in the 
country where a raft of business-related laws was introduced, including the secured 
transactions law and the investment incentives law. However important to accelerate 
the process towards the economic reform, the insolvency law was not considered in the 
reform agenda in Libya. This research thus highlighted the need for and the importance 
of reforming the current, long in force, insolvency law in the country during this period 
of economic transition. This research has examined the current business insolvency 
regime in Libya with the aim of exploring whether the current insolvency regime 
supports the business environment and maintains social justice taking into account all 
domestic situations in Libya. 
This research has particularly highlighted the increasing recognition of implementing 
effective business insolvency laws in general and rescue systems in particular in 
playing an essential role in the development of the economy and business environment 
and influencing investment decisions in a particular country. The research has 
emphasised that an effective application of the insolvency and rescue regimes cannot 
be achieved without examining the efficiency of the secured transactions law. This is 
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because both of these systems regulate the relationships between debtors and creditors 
and inefficiency of one system would have an effect on the efficiency of the other, thus 
the reform has to achieve a degree of harmony between these two systems. 
This research project aimed to discuss how to implement objectives that both promote 
efficient and effective business insolvency and rescue laws and make the right balance 
between all stakeholders’ interests affected by insolvency in Libya, in particular with 
regard to Libya’s status as a developing country. To do so, the study measured the 
principles of the Libyan insolvency law against the insolvency law theory and 
international benchmarks with particular reference to the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide.1 The research, when relevant, referred to the experience and lessons that may be 
considered in some other jurisdictions in implementing their insolvency laws. Using 
theory and global experiences of the international benchmarks was vital to the study to 
evaluate the insolvency framework in Libya and to appreciate how the national 
jurisdiction may be able to develop the existing laws and policies and possibly to make 
helpful suggestions. In doing so, taking into account lessons from the global 
perspectives on how to deliver a meaningful insolvency and rescue law that is suitable 
for a developing country. 
This final Chapter concludes the research. It is divided into three main sections. It 
starts with highlighting the main insights of the study and it considers whether the 
objectives of the thesis were met. It then highlights its originality and contribution to 
knowledge. The limitations of the study and the possible directions for future research 
are mentioned in the last section. 
 
1 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nations 2005) 
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7.1. Main Insights of the Thesis 
The thesis centered on reforming the insolvency and rescue system in Libya. It 
focused on a reform of the insolvency law in general and a reform that particularly 
promotes objectives that are geared towards rescuing financially distressed business 
and the importance of that for developing the business environment in the country. In 
doing so, it takes into account all existing economic and social realities in the country. 
This section will be divided into two subsections. The first part focuses on the purposes 
that the insolvency law in Libya should cater for, while the second part will focus on 
how the insolvency law can achieve those purposes through the reform. By responding 
to these research objectives as set out in Chapter One, the thesis attempted to answer 
the main research question of how can the Libyan insolvency law best be reformed 
considering all circumstances that exist in the country?  
To do this, the thesis set out five sub-questions. Chapter Two discussed the theory of 
insolvency which is very important to the thesis. By analysing the different theories and 
approaches to insolvency, Chapter Two responded to the research sub-question 1, 
which sets out to define the role that should be played by the insolvency system from a 
Libyan perspective. It also responded to sub-question 2, which considers what approach 
that should be subscribed by the insolvency law in defining the boundaries of the 
affected stakeholders to be protected by the insolvency law, taking account of the 
theoretical perspectives and social and economic circumstances of Libya.  
Chapter Three measured the Libyan insolvency system against the international 
benchmarks of insolvency (leaving the subject of business rescue and the rights and 
priorities of creditors for a more detailed consideration in the following two Chapters) 
to examine whether or not the current insolvency law is adequate to achieve the sought-
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after objectives as identified in the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two. This Chapter 
responded to sub-question 3 whether the insolvency and rescue framework in Libya, 
with consideration of the existing institutions, plays the role in promoting the objectives 
as defined by the theories and international benchmarks on insolvency. Since Chapter 
Four examined business rescue in Libya in light of the international benchmarks, it 
stands with Chapter Three as the response to the sub-question 3 above. Chapter Five 
investigated the secured transactions system in the country (using the Objective Eight 
of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the theory of insolvency as a guide for the 
Chapter). This Chapter responded to sub-question 4 in defining whether the secured 
transactions law has any relevance in promoting the interests and objectives that should 
be protected by the insolvency law in Libya. Finally, sub-question 5, considering how 
the insolvency law and institutions in Libya can best achieve the protection of those 
affected interests and the promotion of objectives identified as important to Libya, was 
considered in Chapter Six (which provided insights for a reform as to how to overcome 
the deficiency of the Libyan insolvency law and institutions).  
7.1.1. Purposes and Objectives that the Insolvency Law of Libya Should Serve 
The research by discussing the theories of insolvency in Chapter Two and by 
examining the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide key principles in each of Chapter Three, 
Chapter Four (with reference to Objective Three) and Chapter Five (by considering 
Objective Eight) met the first objective of determining the purposes of the insolvency 
law. In Chapter Two, it explored how insolvency law theories have been used to 
determine what purposes the insolvency law serves, or should serve, in the scenario of 
default. Exploring theories of insolvency law was important to this study because 
theories offer theoretical understanding of how the law should function during times of 
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distress. Inasmuch as the thesis adopted the usage of the international benchmarks as 
guidelines for domestic reforms due to the flexibility they offer,2 it acknowledged that 
applying the principles of such benchmarks into a national reform may lead to skewed 
reform outcomes if insufficient attention is paid to the domestic context.3 It was 
important before exploring the international benchmarks, therefore, to highlight a need 
for determination of what objectives a country should subscribe to. The thesis 
accommodated this by using the insolvency law theories to inform the choices made in 
applying the principles and objectives of the international benchmarks. The 
combination of both the theory and international benchmarks as such was carefully 
pursued throughout the research to that end. 
The investigation of the leading theoretical views was used to refine insolvency law 
theories to suit Libya’s own domestic context in the efforts to ensure both an 
encouraging business environment and maintaining objectives of social justice in the 
country. These are the important objectives that the insolvency law should seek to 
achieve in Libya.4 It was evident in the research that efforts to maintain these two 
objectives simultaneously can be very hard to achieve because they often contradict 
each other. Therefore, there is a need to make an appropriate balance between these 
goals in the reform. To do that, it was necessary to investigate leading theories of 
insolvency law. 
It was established that the theoretical debates on insolvency law have been dominated 
by two main schools of thought characterised in literature as Proceduralists and 
 
2 Gerard McCormack, ‘Criticising the Quest for Global Insolvency Standards’ (2018) 8 KJLL 1, 28; 
Jenny Clift, ‘International Insolvency Law: The UNCITRAL Experience with Harmonization and 
Modernization Techniques’ in Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of Private 
International Law, vol 11 (SELP 2009) 408. See further discussion in Sec 3.2 
3 Terence Halliday, ‘Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global 
Norms and National Circumstances’ (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, Apr 2006) at 33 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/Halliday5.pdf> accessed 02 Aug 2018  
4 See above discussion in Sec 2.5 
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Traditionalists.5 While the former group advocates that insolvency law should focus on 
promoting private rights and protecting non-insolvency entitlements of secured 
creditors, the other camp rejects the narrowness of this approach and holds the view 
that the law should respect the interests of other stakeholders and the wider community 
interests that are affected by insolvency to achieve objectives beyond protecting the 
private rights of creditors. The thesis established that the approaches offered by both 
groups of thought (proceduralists and traditionalists) should be recognised in the 
insolvency law reform in the country. Unlike the traditionalist approach, the 
proceduralist theory has been criticised for being a narrow and incomplete response to 
the problem of distress because it neglects the protection of social objectives in the 
community. The thesis acknowledged, nonetheless, that the model has been fruitful 
because it shows how and why insolvency can lead to suboptimal outcomes when non-
insolvency entitlements of creditors are not well respected. Such an aspect, indeed, is of 
particular and close relevance to Libya. This is because there have been attempts in 
Libya to reform its legal system with the aim to create an attractive environment for 
investment. The thesis established, however, that the reform attempts failed to achieve 
that goal due to a failure to provide adequate protections to secured creditors whose 
position is undermined by the dominance of the social justice theory within the Libyan 
legal system. Investigating such a challenge is best understood, and then resolved, from 
the perspectives of a theory like Creditors’ Bargain Theory. Therefore, the 
consideration of this approach is important to Libya especially from the standpoint of 
promoting credit inflows and enhancing the domestic economy, which were identified 
as important objectives to the country.6 
 
5 Douglas Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale LJ 573, 576 
6 See above Sec 2.5 
281 
 
As the thesis revealed, values in Libya are not confined to the desire to promote the 
economic and business environment, but they also urge consideration of social 
objectives for many social constituencies in the country. But these aims fall beyond the 
scope of the proceduralist approach, hence its incompleteness. The investigation, 
therefore, appreciated the consideration of the approaches of traditionalists. The 
advantage offered by such approaches is the encouragement of business rescue to take 
place in the society which can help in mitigating some domestic challenges such 
unemployment and in enhancing objectives such as of the economic growth and 
stability. A potential problem with these approaches is that they offer undisciplined 
treatment of the situation of business failure and the application of such treatment 
would potentially generate an imbalanced reform by encouraging social objectives but 
at the expense of the economic ones, a resolution which is also undesirable to Libya. 
The thesis in Chapter Two revealed that an approach that is provided by the Team 
Production Theory (TPT) best meets the domestic concerns in Libya because its 
approach for business rescue is well balanced. It offers special and fair treatment for 
important social considerations and it also has features that can encourage private 
business investments and promote economic development and growth.7 
Such a balanced approach is reflected in the international benchmarks. As has been 
seen from a perspective of the Legislative Guide, insolvency law should not be limited 
to serve the interests of creditors only, but it should also be directed to respect wider 
stakeholder interests in the community. This is achieved by encouraging business 
rescue to take place as much as possible as an alternative to liquidation. However, this 
objective is carried out with an emphasis particularly placed on protecting and 
prioritising the private proprietary rights and the commercial bargaining of secured 
 
7 See discussion in Sec 2.6 
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creditors ahead of other stakeholders by subordinating business rescue to the 
maximisation of returns to secured creditors.8 The thesis revealed that such a balanced 
approach to insolvency and business rescue may be appropriate to the reform in Libya 
because it offers treatment under which all interests and objectives can be maintained 
without overemphasising one over the others. This is advantageous to achieve the 
identified objectives in the country (promotion of business environment and economic 
growth by increasing flows of capital and attracting investors both locally and 
internationally9 and maintenance of social justice and stability by considering 
stakeholders such as the employees, the suppliers and customers and the community at 
large). 
Insomuch as the international guidelines as embodied in the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide are considered very informative, the research furthered the investigation on these 
guidelines in Chapter Three, Four and Five. The research examined the Legislative 
Guide’s eight principles and applied them to the Libyan context. The application of the 
principles of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide was important to the research to 
establish whether or not the current insolvency law framework in Libya is suitable to 
achieve its purposes as identified by the theory and international guidelines on 
insolvency.10 The eight key objectives of the Legislative Guide were divided between 
Chapters Three, Four and Five and the investigation of these objectives was carried out 
in light of the theoretical perspectives as outlined in Chapter Two. The thesis discussed 
the objectives that relate to the general matters of insolvency in Chapter Three whereas 
Chapter Four was devoted to analyse business rescue procedures in Libya with 
reference to Objective 3 (striking a balance between rescue and liquidation) and 
 
8 See above Sec 2.3 and Sec 4.2 (Objective Three of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
9 Halliday (n 3) 33 
10 See sub-question 3. 
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Chapter Five examined the Libyan secured transactions law in light of Objective 8 of 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (recognition of the rights and priorities of existing 
creditors).  
The investigation of the principles of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five revealed that the current insolvency law in Libya is inefficient 
and ill-equipped with outdated and inadequate principles to achieve the objectives of 
the country. The examination revealed that such inefficiency is widely attributable to 
the insolvency system and procedures in Libya accommodating features that starkly 
deviate from the key objectives as encouraged by both the theories and Legislative 
Guide of insolvency. The investigation of the Libyan insolvency law as measured 
against the remaining key objectives of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide carried out 
in Chapter Three established that the insolvency law is associated with profound 
shortcomings that deter it from achieving its objectives. Equally, it was revealed that 
the institutions are not sufficiently adequate to apply the insolvency law effectively and 
fairly.11 This resulted in creditors’ recovery from the procedures being very low.12 For 
that, the Libyan insolvency law, according to the WB Doing Business 2018 report, 
shares a very low rank among worldwide insolvency systems at 168th out of 190 for 
resolving insolvency cases.13  
The thesis emphasised particularly Objective Three and Objective Eight, which were 
examined in Chapter Four (which focused on business rescue in Libya) and Five 
(which investigated the rights and priorities of creditors in Libya) respectively. These 
two objectives were very important to the investigation in the thesis for two reasons. 
 
11 These aspects were summarised in detail above in Chapter Six. See Sec 6.3 
12 Mahesh Uttamchandani, ‘No Way Out: The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA 
Region’ (2011) 1 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5609, at 30 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794914> accessed 4 Jan 2019 
13 World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (World Bank 2018) 174 
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First, the objective of business rescue as determined by both the theory and the 
international guidelines is important to protect multiple social interests in the society 
and it is also important to promote economic growth by encouraging distressed 
businesses which are yet viable to remain in business. Second, recognition of the rights 
and priorities of creditors (Objective Eight of the Legislative Guide) is vital to promote 
a healthy business environment by providing lenders and creditors with legal certainty 
as to what will happen in the event of failure. This would incentivise such economic 
players to lend and invest. The achievement of these objectives was subject of detailed 
investigation in Chapters Four, Five and also in Chapter Six as outlined below. 
7.1.2. Achievement of the Identified Purposes through the Reform 
The evaluation of the insolvency law philosophy and the international benchmarks in 
Chapter Two and Three was useful to the study to develop its examinations in the rest 
of the thesis. Chapters Four, Five and Six met the research objective of how to achieve 
the purposes and objectives as identified in theory and international benchmarks 
through the reform. It was established that the Libyan system in the area of insolvency 
and property law is inadequate to maintain the objectives of promoting social justice 
and enhancing the economic growth in the country. It was established that the key 
features relevant for this purpose were the weakness of the insolvency law (part of 
which was carried out in Chapter Three as well) and the inadequacy of the composition 
system as a rescue procedure, the inefficiency of institutions and the inadequacy of the 
secured transactions law by its failure to protect the secured creditors and its failure to 
achieve harmony with business rescue. This is detailed below: 
In Chapter Four, the thesis evaluated the rescue system in Libya in light of both the 
theoretical debate on insolvency law and the approach offered by the Legislative Guide. 
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The examination in Chapter Four established that the rescue system through the 
composition procedure is equipped with outdated and inadequate mechanisms for 
effective business rescue as an alternative to liquidation. For example, issues in relation 
to allowing voluntary filing for the composition procedures at an early stage,14 
problems with the wide discretionary power of the courts in determining the feasibility 
test of the composition proposal,15 the over-protected position afforded to secured 
creditors in the composition system by excluding their interests from the procedures 
(by means of Articles 1002 and 1009 of the CCA 2010),16 and the failure to ensure 
adequate protections for the employees’ interests in the future of their jobs either under 
the composition procedures or under the provisions of Code of Employment 
Relationships 2010 under which unfair dismissal for employees in business rescue can 
possibly happen.17 
It was evident in the study that such features of the composition scheme would 
frustrate an effective application of business rescue leading to more frequent 
liquidations in the country.18 This is one of the major shortcomings that are associated 
with the Libyan insolvency regime which, from the perspectives of insolvency law 
theories and international benchmarks, should promote business rescue, a failure of 
which is a failure to promote economic growth and to maintain social stability as 
objectives to be achieved by the insolvency law.19 This is because liquidation is not 
always favorable because it leaves some stakeholders vulnerable to the situation of 
insolvency caused, for example by, job losses. Also, it can cause distress, poverty and 
long term unemployment for individuals. Besides, it can result in destruction of the 
 
14 See above Sec 4.3.2 
15 See above Sec 4.3.3 
16 See above Sec 4.3.5 
17 See above Sec 4.7 
18 Uttamchandani (n 12) 30  
19 See Sec 4.2 regarding objective no 3 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. 
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economy and de-industrialisation especially for an oil rich State which is liable to the 
‘resource curse’.20 Therefore, it was established that reforming the composition system 
in Libya is vital in order to accomplish the law’s purposes. 
Chapter Five examined the secured transactions law in Libya. Examining the secured 
transactions law is closely relevant to this study to appreciate whether the law takes 
into consideration the relationships with the insolvency law, especially with regard to 
the objectives that should be protected by the insolvency law, and whether the reform 
of this system can promote business rescue in the country. Libya reviewed its secured 
transactions law in light of reports of the World Bank in order to improve the credit 
inflows and create a friendly business environment in the country. For that, several 
statutes were enacted in 2010 including, for example, the CCA 2010, the FLA 2010, 
Promotion of Investment Act 2010. However, the examination established that the 
reform did not have any regard to a big issue that affects this field of law which is the 
rights of lenders and creditors against the insolvency of their borrowers and debtors. 
This is manifested by the wide application of the privileges regime which regards some 
types of unsecured creditors a privilege status to be paid in insolvency ahead of secured 
creditors who are supposed to be the most favoured beneficiaries of property law, thus 
deviating from its main purposes. This significantly limited the function of property 
law to provide adequate protections to secured creditors’ rights and priorities which is 
recognised both in theory21 and international benchmarks22 as one of the key objectives 
that the law should accommodate. As a result of this treatment, the rights of secured 
 
20  This term ‘resource curse’ refers to the negative effects of a country’s natural resources on its 
economic development. It refers to the paradox that countries with an abundance of natural resources 
tend to face more problems of economic development than natural resource-poor countries. See 
generally: Richard Auty and Raymond Mikesell, Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies 
(OUP 1998) 
21 The CBT emphasises that the non-insolvency rights of secured creditors must be protected. See Sec 
2.2.1 
22 See discussion on Objective 8 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide at Sec 5.2 
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creditors are prejudiced which undoubtedly leads to undermining certainty for creditors 
and lenders who are always passionate about getting their interests adequately protected 
in and outside of the insolvency of their debtor.23 Such a legal system, unsurprisingly, 
failed to provide incentives to creditors and lenders and owing to this Libya attained a 
very low rank on the ease of doing business and getting credit and on the protection of 
creditors, being 185th worldwide,24 and, as a consequence, foreign investment inflows 
in the country remain significantly small.25  
A sound reform of the secured transactions regime is also important to enhance the 
adequacy of the insolvency and rescue regimes. This is because protecting the private 
rights and priorities of creditors in insolvency will ensure legal certainty and 
predictability which will increase confidence in the law among investors.26 As Jackson 
asserted in his Creditors’ Bargain Theory, insolvency law functions in the shadow of 
substantive non-insolvency law.27 This being the case, the question arises as to what 
purposes remained for the Libyan insolvency law to serve if the rights of creditors 
under the substantive non-insolvency law are profoundly ill-positioned. Further, the 
thesis established that a sound property law can be very helpful in supporting business 
rescue in the country. The examination in Chapter Five revealed that the secured 
transactions law in Libya failed to function in harmony with the insolvency law. This 
can be seen in the enforcement process of the going concern security and the financial 
lease. The former process can result in a piecemeal sale of the business’s assets even 
 
23 Marek Dubovec and Cyprian Kambili, ‘Using the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as a Tool for a 
Secured Transactions Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Malawi’ (2013) 30 Ariz J Int’l & 
Comp L 163, 183 
24  World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (World Bank 2018) 174; World 
Bank, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All (World Bank 2017) 220 
25 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones (United Nations 2019) 212, 
Annex Table 1 
26 See discussion above in Sec 3.4.1 (Objective One of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide) 
27 Thomas Jackson, ‘A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers’ (2018) 166 UPL Rev 1867, 
1873 
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though a going concern sale may still be achievable,28 while the latter procedure allows 
the lessor (as a creditor) to enforce its rights against the lessee in the event of 
insolvency even though the rescue procedures and a moratorium are taking place.29 
As it appears from the above narrative in the previous few paragraphs, the Libyan 
legal system is associated with a problem of ideological incoherence. This is witnessed 
in features of the insolvency law which places a great emphasis on protecting the 
secured creditors especially in the composition procedures as a primary objective of the 
law, corresponding closely with a theory like the CBT. Such an associated feature is 
undesirable to Libya where the law has to aim to promote wider interests in the country 
beyond those of creditors. Oddly enough, pursuing this objective of the insolvency law 
is even frustrated because it contradicts significantly with the influential application of 
the privileges system as a feature of social justice theory of the CC 1953 under which 
secured creditors’ rights and priorities are jeopardised for the benefit of the socially 
weak parties in the community. The application of a system as such leads to inefficient 
insolvency and rescue laws by subordinating the interests of creditors to primarily 
achieve social and political objectives (by the operation of the privileges and the notion 
of supporting the weak).  
The thesis revealed that these two objectives cannot function simultaneously because 
the application of social justice theory deviates the law dramatically from achieving the 
other objectives that are identified in the thesis as important to the country to promote 
economic growth and to incentivise business and investment environment. It has been 
argued in Chapter Two accordingly that the effect of insolvency and business failure 
should not be considered solely from the perspectives of social justice and protections 
 
28 CCA 2010, Art 479(1). For further details see above Sec 5.6.2.1 
29 FLA 2010, Art 17(5) 
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(by the notion of supporting the weak such as maintaining jobs for employees). 
Looking at the effect of insolvency from an economic perspective, the examination 
concluded that the individual justice for creditors is an important cog in the wheels of 
the insolvency and rescue laws. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the rights of secured 
creditors as encouraged by the insolvency system is unfavourable because of its unfair 
treatment of the vulnerable stakeholders in the insolvent business. 
Relying on the theoretical discussion, the features of such conflicting ideologies 
within the legal system in Libya have to be readdressed if a reform is aimed to achieve 
the identified two objectives of the law. The thesis established that such a problem can 
be rectified by relying on perspectives of a theory like the TPT. It was established in 
Chapter Six (section 6.2. Aligning the Libyan Insolvency Law with Theory) that the 
reliance on the approach of the TPT would help resolve the conflicting ideologies and 
achieve coherence within the legal system across different branches of the commercial 
law in Libya by providing a framework through which social objectives of some weak 
parties in the community and economic interests of creditors can equally be respected; 
without privileging one party in the team over the other without a solid reason. The 
interesting point in this theory is that it gives special treatment to the weak party which 
has been a matter of grave concern to the Libyan community and the legal system in 
general. This can be achieved by ensuring that the interests of those vulnerable people 
in the future of the business in which they have invested will continue and by ensuring 
that their rights are dealt with under substantive legal guidelines rather than under 
judicial discretion. This would provide all stakeholders with the necessary legal 
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certainty and predictability. The thesis established, therefore, that the TPT is the most 
productive approach around which to design a reformed insolvency law for Libya.30 
The thesis revealed that the insolvency and property laws contain weaknesses and do 
not achieve what they are intended to achieve. The thesis in Chapter Six then follows to 
draw the research together by synthesising all the discussion in theory and international 
benchmarks in previous Chapters within the domestic context of Libya. The Chapter 
shed light on what the insolvency law structurally needs to revisit in order to improve 
in compliance with the key objectives as widely recognised by the international 
benchmarks as crucial for an effective and efficient insolvency law. It established that 
the Libyan insolvency and rescue regimes are associated with features that profoundly 
negate an efficient application of the system. Measured against the Key Objectives of 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, the thesis revealed that the underlying cause of 
insolvency is still perceived as connoting fraud or mismanagement, hence the focus on 
liquidation. Other features such as inefficient institutions, the weak protection of going 
concern value by encouraging secured creditors to enforce their claims in the process, 
delay on resolving insolvency cases due to procedural weaknesses and the wide 
discretion of courts in this regard, the insufficient system of transaction avoidance 
necessary for equitable distribution to creditors, unpredictability and non-transparency 
of the insolvency law. Finally and most importantly is the weak position offered to 
secured creditors caused by the influence of social justice theory and its application to 
the privileges system which hinders the effective operation of pari passu distribution to 
similarly situated creditors and the maximisation of the asset value for secured 
creditors, creates legal uncertainty and leads therefore to inefficiency of the insolvency 
 
30 See above Sec 6.2 
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and rescue system in the country.31 Such a feature would continue to result in 
dysfunction of the insolvency and rescue system for a long time to come if not 
reviewed by policymakers in the country. 
The theoretical discussions in Section 6.2 above together with the international 
guidelines as investigated in the previous Chapters were the bridgehead from which the 
rest of Chapter Six sections progressed offering the policymakers commendable 
insights as to how to implement a suitable reform for Libya’s context, both legislatively 
and institutionally. In the following three main Sections (6.4, 6.5 and 6.6), the thesis 
offered solutions to improve business rescue in Libya by reconsidering matters in the 
composition scheme, in the secured transactions law as well as in the level of 
institutions.  
The Chapter recommended that the composition regime and procedures could be 
improved mainly: by encouraging voluntary entry to the procedures at an early stage, 
reconstituting the moratorium regime to be effective against secured creditors, allowing 
and encouraging creditors particularly secured creditors to play an active role in the 
process to avoid the undesirable discretionary power of courts and to ensure that their 
rights are protected,32 and finally enabling effective mechanisms for determining 
business viability.33 Regarding secured transactions law, the examination revealed that 
the secured transactions law needs to ensure that secured creditors are well positioned 
and protected by ensuring that their rights are effectively prioritised in liquidation over 
other stakeholders because this is the historical purpose behind the existence of secured 
transactions systems.34 It was established also that the secured transactions regime in 
 
31 See above Sec 6.3 
32 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part Two, Chap III, para 77 
33 See above Sec 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 
34 Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law (CUP 2004) 5-7 
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Libya needs to achieve harmonisation with the insolvency law to promote more 
business rescue for example by encouraging going concern sales under the going 
concern security and preventing the lessor in the financial lease from repossessing its 
property where the leased property is necessary to the rescue process.35 This Chapter 
recommended also that a reform at the institutional level is important to effectuate the 
reform of the substantive law. This includes reforming the social safety net, ‘SSN’, 
system and the judiciary system. It was evident in the study that the problem of 
institutional inefficiency in Libya can be partially mitigated by encouraging informal 
workouts of business rescue between creditors and debtors.36 
7.2. Contribution to Knowledge by this Thesis 
The thesis has used insolvency law theories and international benchmarks to critique 
existing Libyan insolvency laws and their existing theoretical foundations, as well as to 
suggest a way forward for the reform of these laws, tailored to the specific Libyan 
context. By using this approach, the thesis has made original contributions to human 
knowledge in two respects. The first is the identification of the ideological incoherence 
within the current legal system that regulates creditor-debtor relationships in Libya. 
The thesis established that the Libyan insolvency law draws upon an ideology of ‘social 
justice’ theory to protect the socially weak parties in the society and this is 
implemented either through substantive legal provisions of the secured transactions law 
(the privileges system which affords some types of unsecured claimants a priority 
status in liquidation ahead of the secured creditors) or through the discretion of the 
court under the provisions of the contract law which emphasises protection of the 
socially weak party (in which creditors are not counted thus they are not protected). 
 
35 See above Se  6.5.2 
36 See Sec 6.6.1, 6.6.2 and 6.6.3 
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As demonstrated in the thesis, the recognition of the social justice ideology is 
incompatible not only with the philosophy of the current insolvency law which 
prioritises the economic interests of creditors, but it would also be incompatible with 
the objectives that the insolvency and rescue law should promote in the country, as 
identified using theories and international benchmarks on insolvency. Therefore, the 
thesis concluded that the Libyan legal system is not suitable for use within the Libyan 
society as long as such an ideological inconsistency is not resolved. The challenge 
identified in this thesis in responding to such an intrinsic issue is its acknowledgement 
of the importance to keep the legal commitment to social justice in the society, without 
undermining the necessary commercial certainty and predictability. By doing so, the 
thesis offered an informative solution that can help in rectifying the incoherence of the 
Libyan law, informed by the insolvency theories and international benchmarks which 
provide protections to other important stakeholders who represent economic interests. 
The response of the thesis to the coherence problem in Libya provided policymakers 
with valuable insights about how to achieve a coherent reform within the secured 
transactions law and the insolvency and rescue regimes if the reform is to have any 
hope for successful implementation. 
The second contribution to knowledge by this thesis is its examination of the present 
discretionary aspect of the law which allows courts to achieve the objectives of the law 
at their own discretion and interpretation in applying principles of the social justice 
aspect of the CC 1953. According to the draftsman of the CC 1953 Professor al-
Sanhuri, the judge is given wide discretionary powers to implement the social justice 
objective of the law (by protecting the weak) in accordance with the circumstances and 
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situations existent in the society.37 Who is regarded as weak and how courts should 
provide protection to its interests, remain matters of discretion by the court. The thesis 
acknowledged the importance of providing protection to the vulnerable parties for the 
achievement of social justice and maintenance of social stability. However, it offered a 
response by which protecting the socially weak parties is rather turned into a 
substantive aspect of the law because this is what can promote certainty and 
predictability in the country. The thesis used the Team Production Theory to 
reconceptualise the Libyan insolvency law by defining clearly who the weak or 
vulnerable parties are (being the people who have business-specific investment) and 
how to provide proper protections to their interests (by protecting their future interests 
in the business).38 
By operating at the three levels of evaluation (using insolvency theory together with 
the international benchmarks to evaluate the Libyan insolvency laws in light of the 
domestic context), the thesis has broadened its research scope far beyond its initially 
intended limit as a project evaluating a legal system of a developing country that has 
been influenced by its colonial legal legacy and different circumstances. Using such an 
evaluative method in this context is new to the academic literature in Libya and has not 
been done before, contributing to the lack of scholarship in this field. It enabled the 
research to identify what problems underpin the domestic legal system of Libya, 
thereby offering realistic insights on how to synthesise and reconceptualise different 
approaches of insolvency law with objectives of a domestic country through the use of 
the insolvency theories and the international benchmarks as well as experience of 
selected jurisdictions, where relevant. The thesis claims also that it has added a 
 
37 Abdulrazzaq al-Sanhuri, General Commentary on the Civil Law: Theory of Obligation in General, Vol 
1 (2ed edn, Arab Heritage 1967) 92-93 
38 See discussion in Sec 6.2 
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contribution not only to legal scholarship and decision making in Libya, but it offers 
potential for future research, as it can also be a useful reference for other jurisdictions 
in the MENA region which are part of the same legal family and are influenced by the 
same social justice theory within their Civil Codes as inherited down from the Egyptian 
Civil Code 1948. The thesis attempted to raise awareness among these jurisdictions 
about the detrimental impact on the market-friendly reforms of integrating the 
principles of this theory in an unstructured and potentially arbitrary fashion. This is also 
a contribution to knowledge. 
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis has examined the Libyan formal insolvency and rescue system as enacted 
by the CCA 2010. The study, therefore, focused on the insolvency framework and 
procedures that are available for all businesses as provided by the law and which are 
normally carried out through court control. The study acknowledges, nevertheless, that 
there is another important approach to resolve insolvency issues out of the formal 
collective insolvency procedures. This approach is commonly termed as ‘informal 
workouts’.39 
Much as the study acknowledges that, the lack of market statistics on how informal 
workouts are practised and what forms and modes they take in Libya limits the scope of 
the thesis on the formal procedures. The examination of this balance between formal 
and informal business rescue methods, therefore, requires further study including 
empirical research to explore the market practice and culture in regard to informal 
workouts and how they are relevant to the development of a rescue culture in Libya. 
 
39 Rebecca Parry and Yingxiang Long, ‘China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Building an Infrastructure 
towards a Market-based Approach’ (2020) 20 J Corp Law Stud 157, 161 
296 
 
Further research would be to extend the examination of the impact of Professor 
Sanhuri’s theory of ‘social justice’ on the legal systems of the Arab jurisdictions who 
transplanted the Civil Code of Egypt of 1948. Such an issue has received, up till very 
recently, no particular attention by researchers and policymakers in the region. For 
example, a study published in 202040 to evaluate recently reformed insolvency and 
restructuring systems in some Arab countries has identified that insolvency regimes in 
those countries are still associated with profound weaknesses in delivering adequate 
protections especially to creditors. Yet, the study lacked the examination of whether or 
not the social justice theory of the Civil Codes in those jurisdictions has any impact on 
this matter. Accordingly, a further research will be conducted to examine whether or 
not the application of the theory has a similar effect in the same way it has in Libya and 
also whether the same proposal would be suitable for each of those jurisdictions. 
  
 
40 Adam Al‐Sarraf, ‘Bankruptcy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Analyzing the New 
Bankruptcy Laws in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain’ [2020] Int’l Ins Rev 1, 8 
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